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Preface 
In the late 1940s, many new ideas about the integration of Europe were introduced. 
One of these ideas proved to be particularly successful: it suggested a reorganiza-
tion of the West-European national markets into one larger, liberalized market. 
That idea gradually materialized during political negotiations and was laid down in 
treaties during the 1950s. The result was the European Economic Community 
(EEC), or, the Common Market, which was realized step by step from 1959 on-
wards. This book is about how European large multinationals and internationally 
oriented corporations came to view several major developments in and around 
this trade bloc, from the early 1950s onwards until the late 1970s. The project was 
a spin-off of an investigation on the history of the Solvay company, which resulted 
in the book Solvay: History of a Multinational Family Firm (2013). Leaders of the 
company were co-founders of the European League for Economic Cooperation 
(ELEC) and played prominent roles in other transnational networks. 
 By investigating several important debates in three transnational networks, 
the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission, this dissertation 
reconstructs how the views of European corporations on this Common Market 
developed. In doing so, this investigation moreover provides a basis for a transna-
tional history of European corporations in a context of European integration. Addi-
tionally, the book offers new insights in the workings of the transnational net-
works mentioned and on exchange of ideas on changing circumstances in Europe-
an, Transatlantic and global markets. 
 When I was invited to investigate this wide-ranging topic I awaited my first 
day of research with eager anticipation. The topic was fascinating and the prospect 
of delving into the archives of several obscure-regarded organizations appealed to 
me. I fostered great expectations about what I would encounter. However, as one 
becomes trained in the practice of historical research, one learns that archival 
sources are not as accessible as one hopes and that they are seldom as transparent 
about the subject under investigation as one imagines.  
 Whether I would acquire access to the archives of the Bilderberg meetings and 
the Trilateral Commission was a nearly permanent worry during most of the first 
three years. Only after more than two years into the project the required sources 
on the Bilderberg meetings for the 1960s and 1970s could be located and only 
after more than three years I accidentally learned about the only since mid-2011 
available institutional archive of the Trilateral Commission. Nonetheless, persis-
tence and patience paid off. This is the first time that these sources have been used 
for a better understanding of these organizations, and it has resulted in new in-
sights into their work that are introduced throughout the book. 
16 
Much more daunting than the task of acquiring access to archives however was the 
sheer labour that was involved in singling out the actors and determining their 
backgrounds and positions in the selected debates. Additionally it was necessary to 
create an elaborate database on the networks' main members to understand their 
dominant social make-up. As a result, the practice of investigating this subject 
quickly became a sobering, even humbling experience. Transnational research on 
business debates about European integration poses several challenges due to the 
range of individual, industrial, national, institutional, European and global contexts 
involved. Any naiveté that I fostered about the required effort and knowledge for 
the interpretation of a single European-level debate was soon dispelled. 
 Nonetheless, the investigation of business perspectives on European integra-
tion in an international context has deepened my fascination for the slow germina-
tion of an actual European market, which was only truly realized thirty-five years 
after the decision to establish it. Throughout this process, European corporations 
were very active and well-informed actors in debates regarding the further devel-
opment of the European market. It was particularly interesting to learn how well 
positioned they were to assess the global context of the European market and the 
European Community at large. For this reason I believe that not only this book but 
also the continued investigation of the European business experience will contrib-
ute to new perspectives on the global forces and narratives that have co-shaped 
the present European Union.  
 
Many have been involved in my academic education and more specifically the 
materialization of this dissertation. I feel privileged to be able to express my grati-
tude here to those that aided me and added joy to the experience. 
 Firstly, I wish to thank the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Maastricht 
University for enabling me to write this book. I would like to thank the Maastricht 
University Library team, which kindly helped me out of a fix at numerous occa-
sions. My appreciation is also directed at the members of the N. W. Posthumus 
Institute and the 2010 cohort of PhD candidates. In particular I wish to thank Joep, 
Marten and Simone whose company truly turned the conferences in Brussels, Am-
sterdam, Vienna and Antwerp into great experiences! 
 Often I preferred libraries and archives to my desk. Despite my absence, my 
office fellows Christoph, Natasja and Rik made me feel at home and anchored me in 
the Faculty. The banter, discussions and the white-board that kept track of the 
successful office-door-swings-at-students will always remain a warm memory. 
 My friends in Eindhoven, 's-Hertogenbosch and Utrecht are the most precious 
group of people I know. Their understanding for the reasons of my continuous 
absence has been limitless, for which I am very grateful. As a true master of Excel, 
Marcel deserves credit for helping me in exacting structure and meaning from my 
biographical data.  
17 
During the most crucial phase of writing, my parents in law and Mark and Miriam 
kindly took it on themselves to entertain our young boy at several occasions while 
I was fine-tuning this manuscript. Thanks to them I was able to maintain the nec-
essary flow for tying everything together. They are true lifesavers! 
 I am also thankful for the several engaging conversations with my Basic-
Training-Qualification coach Manuel Stoffers, who helped me to explicate my views 
on academic teaching.  
 At several crucial supervisory meetings my second supervisor Sophie 
Vanhoonacker taught me to take rigorous decisions about the structure and scope 
of the book. These lessons included the crucial subject on whether we were over-
reaching with a fourth empirical chapter or not. I deeply appreciate the role that 
she played in these decisions and the general bird's eye view that she kept on the 
process.  
 During the past eight years, my supervisor Ernst Homburg was repeatedly 
involved in my academic education. In the years preceding this project he intro-
duced me to the ins and outs of archival research. My first experiences with a bio-
graphical database as presented in this book resulted from contributions to his 
collaborative project with Johann Peter Murmann on the social networks of chem-
ists. By suggesting to me to undertake the present investigation Ernst did not just 
offer me a major opportunity but also his engaged and generous supervision. His 
ability to identify my intellectual doubts based on mere drafts never ceased to 
amaze me. More importantly his confidence in the value of my work was crucial for 
maintaining my determination to finish this book. I feel privileged to have been his 
student and he has become more than a mentor to me. 
 My parents have been a permanent source of encouragement in my initial and 
more recent studies. At the occasion of unpleasant setbacks, they have aided me in 
several ways, thereby allowing me to remain focussed on the book. I hope one day 
to do the same for our children, with a similar understanding for their predicament 
as my parents had for mine. 
 Jennie, my gratitude to you is unending and I love you for supporting me so 
wholeheartedly. You forgave me my forgetfulness and absent-mindedness that 
typically emerged around periods of intense writing. For some reason you ignored 
my truly disturbing working habits such as my repeated attempts at finishing a 
section until well into the early hours. I cannot imagine what would have happened 
without your loving care for our young family. Now it is your turn to depend on me. 
And it is time to enjoy life áfter the dissertation, together. Finally, our young boy: 
Son. Your obvious lack of intention to help me write this book was more important 
than any aid I received. Being there for you has been the most rewarding experi-
ence of all. 
 
Ruud Geven, March 5th, 2014. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
This chapter first introduces the reasons for investigating the views of large Euro-
pean businesses and multinationals on the European market. Subsequently the 
methodology of this investigation will be explained. The main part of the chapter 
discusses the historiography on the role of business in three areas of research: 
European integration theory, history of European integration and business history 
in relation to European integration. Additionally the historiography on the three 
investigated networks will be discussed and related to insights on business associ-
ations. The chapter concludes with a recapitulation of the main themes and ques-
tions that will be investigated in this book. 
 
Between WWI and WWII the European market turned from a relatively liberal 
trade area into a patchwork of carefully protected national markets. Nation states 
erected tariff walls and consciously set out to build powerful, national industries. 
Protectionism became the norm.1  
 After WWII, impressed by the economic growth of the world’s largest market, 
the USA, Western European governments gradually accepted the need for liberali-
zation. They engaged in the integration of markets, the creation of trade blocs and 
the founding of supranational institutions to supervise the process of market en-
largement. Multinationals and companies with activities across Europe saw the 
organization of markets change before their eyes. Yet we know little about busi-
nesses' views on the matter. This book is about the developing business-views on 
the changing organization of the European market.2  
 Different countries chose different means and routes for the liberalization of 
markets, which resulted in an uncertain situation in Europe. The governments of 
the Benelux, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy committed them-
selves to economic integration. In 1952 they founded the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), involving the establishment of a customs union for the coal and 
steel industries. Moreover the High Authority was founded, a supranational institu-
tion which was responsible for commercial and industrial policy for all coal and 
steel companies with activities in those six countries. Moreover in 1957 these 
                                                                  
1 Berend, I. T. (2006). An economic history of twentieth-century Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, pp. 61-73. 
2 Ibidem. 
20 
countries also signed the Rome Treaties in which they agreed to gradually imple-
ment a Common Market for industrial goods, the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Import tariffs were diminished step by step and a common external tariff 
wall was established. A trade bloc was the result. Moreover, another supranational 
institution was founded, the European Commission, that would oversee the im-
plementation of a Community competition policy, an agricultural policy, a 
transport policy and several others. The principal aim of these moves was to fuse 
their markets into one.3 
 Other Western European governments rejected such a supranational organi-
zation of markets. The government of the United Kingdom declined invitations to 
join the negotiations on the ECSC and the EEC because British trade was mainly 
geared to the Commonwealth. Moreover the British government was not prepared 
to delegate parts of its sovereignty to supranational institutions. Instead the gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom decided to establish a trade bloc itself based on its 
own preferences. In response to the creation of the EEC, in 1960 the United King-
dom founded the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), together with Austria, Den-
mark, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. This organization of economic integration 
was of a different nature than the Common Market. The free trade area only elimi-
nated internal tariffs between the participating countries. No common external 
tariff was introduced nor was there any supranational institution founded to su-
pervise the developments in the area. Still, Western Europe was now in practice 
divided into two trade blocs. Each bloc liberalized trade within its own area and 
discouraged trade between the blocs, resulting in trade creation and trade diver-
sion effects. Proposals to mitigate these effects by eliminating the tariffs between 
the blocs, ultimately failed after intense discussions.4 
 In the following year the British government reconsidered its position on 
devolving sovereignty to supranational institutions. Moreover, it became aware of 
the declining importance of British trade with the Commonwealth. In 1961 the 
government requested to join the European Economic Community. In 1963 how-
ever the application was denied by the French President de Gaulle. Eventually the 
United Kingdom would join the EEC nonetheless in 1973, together with Ireland 
and Denmark.5 
 Particularly the period from 1950 until 1963 was ridden with uncertainty 
about how the organization of European markets would turn out. According to 
economic integration theory European multinationals and other large corporations 
in the EEC were affected by this uncertainty. Economic theory suggests that corpo-
rations that gain access to larger markets are in a position to realize economies of 
                                                                  
3 Dinan, D. (2004). Europe recast: a history of European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 45-
79. 
4 Dinan, D. (2004). Europe recast, pp. 89-94. Balassa, B. (1969[1962]). The theory of economic integra-
tion. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., p. 25. 
5 Dinan, D. (2004). Europe recast, pp. 89-94. 
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scale. The emerging division of Western Europe in two trade blocs however limited 
the prospect of a truly sizeable market. In addition, conditions, rules and institu-
tional settings changed considerably. Little is known about what European busi-
ness at large thought about these developments.6 
 Some business historians did investigate the EEC context of a small group of 
large multinationals that had realized their industrial networks across European 
national borders before 1950. They were some of the most widely distributed 
companies in the world, such as for example Unilever and Philips. Scholars demon-
strated that the firms saw great opportunities for scale advantages and indeed set 
out to restructure their organizations accordingly. However, because local man-
agement resisted change and governments refused relocation of production the 
adaptation to the large market was difficult and painful. The question therefore 
arises how the established multinational corporations viewed the role of the Euro-
pean Community in these matters? This will be one of our leading questions.7 
 Many other companies, for example the aluminium producer Pechiney, steel 
producer Hoogovens or car-builder Fiat developed into multinationals after the 
1950s, during the period in which the European market was gradually integrated. 
These companies expanded within Europe and beyond and merged with other 
European firms. Which direction for European integration did they prefer, what 
shaped their ideas and to what extent did their ideas change as they were con-
fronted with an enlarging market?8 
 The question on the views of European multinationals and large businesses on 
the European market becomes all the more pressing after considering the few 
available accounts about the views of business on the European market, namely 
those by Sandholtz & Zysman, Maria Green Cowles and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. 
They do not investigate the crucial 1950s or the 1960s but focus on the early 
1980s and the early 1990s. From 1983 onwards the European Round Table of In-
dustry, a group of presidents from European industrial corporations demanded the 
completion of the Common Market as was agreed in the Treaties of Rome. Accord-
ing to them the decisions of 1957 had not been realized. Extensive differences 
between the national markets and national policies had remained and had turned 
into de-facto non-tariff protectionism. Whether or not due to ERTI's lobbying, the 
requests were ultimately met in the Single European Act of 1986. Yet, no account 
exists on how European companies with a multinational outlook came to such a 
view after the broad move towards liberalization during the 1950s (as we will 
show in Chapter 4). One wonders therefore how the views of European multina-
tionals changed with regard to the developments in the organization of the Euro-
                                                                  
6 Balassa (1969[1962]). The theory, pp. 131-137. 
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pean market between 1950-1980? This will be a second leading question of this 
book.9 
 Asking this question however does not necessarily imply that all companies 
held identical views. Business historians and sociologists of business associations 
have demonstrated that often businessmen lack a common perspective. It is un-
likely that businesses were able to find an uncontested consensus on such an en-
compassing and multifaceted theme as the organization of the Western European 
market. We therefore will also investigate which different views were held and 
how such differences can be explained?10 
 Two possible determinants of company preferences may explain such differ-
ences in perception and position. The first is the national origin of a corporation. 
Business historians have identified the significance of national business systems as 
a basis for explaining structures and strategies of firms. The origin of firms from 
different national institutional contexts and markets co-determine the ease with 
which a firm from one country can transfer its activities to other countries. Nation-
al origin thus also matters to our understanding of multinationals. Moreover, since 
the question that is central to this investigation is related to aspects of European 
integration, it is important to acknowledge that the nation state has been inter-
preted as the decisive actor in this process. In his influential European rescue of the 
nation state Alan Milward shows how the national contexts of the economy and 
concerns about the future prosperity of dominant national industries can explain 
governmental positions in the European integration process during the 1950s. The 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic 
Community and their associated policies can be seen as confrontations between 
national contexts, economic path dependencies and preferences. Therefore it is 
interesting to find out to what extent even the views of multinationals were de-
termined by their national origin.11 
 The second plausible determinant of company preferences is the industry in 
which a company operates. According to H.W. de Jong companies shape their fu-
ture by competing with other firms, through cooperation with other firms or by 
controlling other firms within their industries. Industrial contexts of companies 
vary strongly. De Jong has explained how structural differences between industries 
result in different priorities. Consider for example the research and development 
                                                                  
9 See on the ideas of the European Round Table of Industrialists: Sandholtz, W. & Zysman, J. (1989). 
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costs for the pharmaceutical industry for which product innovation stands at the 
core of its ability to compete, versus that of the steel producers whose competi-
tiveness was long determined by process innovations. Different priorities among 
industries may explain differing views on the organization of the European market. 
Such views include stances on European Community policies but also on how the 
Community shaped relations between the European market and external mar-
kets.12 
 This book is thus not merely concerned with the changes in multinationals' 
views on the European market, but also with the question how possible differences 
in views between them can be understood? Can any patterns be identified as a 
result of zooming in on the national origin or industrial characteristics of compa-
nies? Or do other factors possibly explain a divergence in views? 
 Asking these questions enables us to explore a long-term development of 
views of European business about the organization of the European market and to 
be able to describe how and perhaps why these views changed. 
 Before turning to how these questions are investigated it is important to ex-
plain the use of two central terms throughout the book. The first term is multina-
tional. The multinational firm is generally defined as a company that either engag-
es in portfolio investment in a second country, which refers to owning shares in 
foreign companies without management control, or a company that engages in 
foreign direct investments in a second country which does involve management 
control. The companies studied in this book mostly fall into the second category.13 
 Not all companies that receive attention however fall within this definition. In 
practice this book zooms in on three transnational networks in which leaders of a 
variety of firms played important roles: the European League for Economic Cooper-
ation, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. These networks in-
cluded companies that were already widely distributed multinationals before 1950. 
They also included large European companies that were not multinationals during 
the 1950s, which however turned into multinationals during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The ELEC also included some non-multinational export oriented companies. None-
theless, industries with a strong focus on international exports or an involvement 
in international financial developments had a multinational outlook whether or 
not they invested outside their home-market. Employing the organizational defini-
tion of multinationals above too strictly would exclude the views of internationally 
oriented companies that were similarly affected by the changing conditions on the 
European market. Considering this aspect, the term multinationals is generally 
used throughout this book. When necessary however, a concrete distinction will be 
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made between companies that were already widely distributed before WWII and 
companies that were not. 
 The second term that requires explanation is “European market”. When refer-
ence is made to “views on the European market”, this refers mostly to views on the 
organization of the European markets. Because the investigation zooms in on three 
networks that mainly involve companies originating from the EEC, the term gener-
ally refers to the area covered by the Benelux, France, Germany and Italy, also in 
the 1950s.  
Methodology 
As mentioned, the views of European multinationals will be investigated via a 
comparative perspective on three transnational networks. These are the European 
League for Economic Cooperation (since 1947), the Bilderberg meetings (since 
1954) and the Trilateral Commission (since 1973). 
Selection and comparison of networks 
The selection of the above-mentioned networks was motivated by the following 
criteria. Firstly, they all include representatives from European business of which a 
striking share were, or later became multinationals. However, members were not 
exclusively active in business. Economists, politicians, public administrators and 
businessmen interacted in debates about the European, Western and global politi-
cal-economic developments. 
 Secondly the networks are transnational in the sense that its members inter-
acted across national boundaries with international goals in mind. This element of 
selection is crucial because it enables our investigation to go beyond mere national 
viewpoints on the European market and to remain open to transnational view-
points and international conceptions of the European market that multinational 
businesses might have fostered. 
 Thirdly the value of choosing these three networks lies in their varying posi-
tions in relation to the European market in the world economy: the European 
League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) focussed on the place of Western Europe-
an companies in the European market, the Bilderberg Meetings approached the 
European market in the context of Transatlantic relations and the Trilateral Com-
mission discussed the European market within European, American and Japanese 
economic relations. The wide international angle of these networks offers a per-
spective on the interaction between Western Europe and the external economic 
environment where large multinationals also operated. 
 At the same time these differences between the networks may have had con-
sequences for how businessmen formulated their views on the European market. 
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In order to understand how the networks' different aims and membership (Euro-
pean, Transatlantic, Europe-US-Japan) affected the discussions on the European 
market, the network debates are placed in a comparative perspective. Each empir-
ical chapter (4, 5 and 6) will thus juxtapose the views expressed in the networks 
under discussion to find out whether relevant differences existed and to determine 
how these differences can be explained. 
 A comparative approach requires a significant amount of additional context, 
on two levels. At a more general level the interpretation of activities, views and 
perceptions of European business within the three networks firstly requires a 
comparative awareness of their histories, organizational structure, goals and the-
matic preoccupations. Especially an awareness of the differences between the 
networks is of importance. Where possible this book draws on previous research 
about the networks. As will become clear the consultation of new archival sources 
on the networks has also generated new insights on the histories and achieve-
ments of these networks. 
 Moreover, in order to gain an overview of the importance of businessmen in 
the work of the networks, a database mapping the composition of their leadership 
was created. The database includes information on membership and on biograph-
ical details. It identifies the characteristics of actors regarding nationality, profes-
sional affiliation, industrial typology and their position in a selection of societal 
spheres.14 
 The views of European business are investigated through an analysis of the 
debates that were held within the networks' meetings. Information on such meet-
ings is available via minutes, correspondence, publications and policy papers that 
reflect the networks' main activities. An interpretative framework is employed that 
on the one hand considers national and on the other hand sectoral contexts for 
explaining views. In support of this interpretive goal, chapter three will give back-
ground information on companies that played a major role in the three networks.  
Chronological subdivision and thematic choices: cases 
This investigation covers the period going from 1950 until 1980. The beginning of 
this period marks the birth of concrete proposals for the integration of European 
markets, starting with the Schuman Plan. The end of the period is based on the 
foundation of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERTI) in 1983. Investiga-
tions on the ERTI have already resulted in extensive knowledge on the views of 
European business on the European market for the 1980s. According to several 
scholars the ERTI marked a discontinuity of how European multinationals shaped 
their relations with the European Community. Our investigation from 1950 until 
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1980 provides a rich background for discussing whether this indeed was the 
case.15 
 As this book covers a long period and involves a comparative perspective on 
three organizations, some reduction of complexity is required. The mere quantity 
of available material and subjects prevents one from investigating all possible 
angles within the scope of a PhD thesis. It was therefore decided to divide the peri-
od from 1950 to 1980 into three sub-periods of one decade each, and to select one 
major theme per decade that played a role in all networks during the same period. 
These three cases should reflect typical topics that preoccupied business at that 
time, in particular concerning the European market. The cases should therefore 
also be broad enough to affect or encompass most industrial sectors. It has to be 
stressed that the goal of comparing the debates of the networks requires a selec-
tion of cases that were more or less simultaneously under discussion in both or all 
three networks.16 
 The population of cases to choose from was large. From 1950 to 1980, the 
ELEC published approximately 60 reports. The Bilderberg meetings discussed 
about five subjects at each of the 28 meetings between 1954 and 1980. However, 
half of the agenda items on the Bilderberg meetings were considered less relevant 
for our purpose, due to their strong focus on international security. The other, 
relevant share focussed largely on international economic affairs. The Trilateral 
Commission published 19 reports from 1972 until 1980 with a large variety of 
subjects.17 
 Instead of choosing small cases of one publication or agenda item, the choice 
was made to select themes that encompassed several publications and agenda 
items per decade. This way a reasonable representation of the priorities of the 
organizations could be assured. Given the mentioned constraint due to compara-
bility across the networks, what options were available and what factors deter-
mined the final selection? 
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For the period of the 1950s the following options were available. Recurrent themes 
in the Bilderberg meetings were European economic integration, the position of 
developing countries in the international economy and a less recurrent theme of 
energy (nuclear energy, the Middle East). Energy and the relations with developing 
countries were only incidental subjects for the ELEC and were treated as peripher-
al to the subject of the Common Market, whereas European economic integration 
clearly was a dominant theme in most ELEC publications. European market inte-
gration thus became the obvious choice due to its sufficient broadness, and oppor-
tunities for comparison. Moreover a clear relevance for European corporations 
existed, based on the earlier mentioned restructuring plans that multinationals 
developed around proposals for economic integration.18 
 During the 1960s the ELEC focussed on several subjects. In terms of publica-
tions the subject of East-West trade stood out as a major theme. Additionally a 
publication was dedicated to transport policy and two to monetary integration. 
However, a reconnaissance of ELEC's archives made clear that another topic had 
dominated its proceedings without resulting publications: the European response 
to American investments. Moreover, as will be argued in chapter 5, the themes of 
East-West trade and American investments emerged on ELEC's agenda as the re-
sult of an explicit consultation process among business leaders. During the same 
period the Bilderberg meetings combined four different economic subjects: eco-
nomic relations with the Communist countries, trade relations with the developing 
countries, international monetary cooperation, and the tensions that resulted from 
American investments in Europe. East-West trade, monetary integration and 
American investments offered opportunities for comparison. At the same time 
each single subject seemed rather limited as a broader theme. Because the subjects 
on East-West trade and American investments had so clearly emerged from a con-
sultation among European business leaders as urgent issues, both these subjects 
were selected. The subject of monetary integration was thus not selected because 
corporations deemed it less salient to their experiences of the Common Market. As 
will be seen in chapter 5 however, the theme of American investments in Europe 
was tied to French frustrations on the US government's behaviour within the Bret-
ton Woods system. Clearly, themes were connected to each other in a variety of 
ways, but choices had to be made to remain within the scope of a dissertation.19 
 For the 1970s the selected theme required comparison across three networks 
simultaneously. The 1950s and 1960s offered plenty thematic overlap between the 
organizations but this was not the case for the 1970s. Unlike the Bilderberg meet-
ings and the Trilateral Commission, the ELEC did not publish on monetary affairs. 
ELEC's interest in European institutional subjects were ignored by the other or-
ganizations. The Trilateral Commission discussed several major economic subjects 
of global relevance such as tensions in global trade or regulations on oceans that 
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were not discussed in the other networks. Another interesting aspect is that during 
the 1970s according to scholars such as Sandholtz & Zysman the priority for Euro-
pean corporations was Japanese competition in sophisticated technologies. Sur-
prisingly the theme did not come up in the three networks. The only major theme 
that was explicitly and repeatedly discussed in all networks was energy security. 
The topic of energy security was moreover sufficiently representative of major 
developments in the 1970s. Moreover, the subject was likely to have affected a 
range of European multinationals.20 
 Surprisingly, subjects with regard to the European labour market were barely 
discussed in the three networks and never simultaneously. In 1951 the ELEC did 
discuss the mobility of labour in the context of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity. Moreover, in 1957 the subject of social security in relation to the founding 
of the Common Market was discussed. The Bilderberg meetings never paid atten-
tion to these subjects. In 1979, the Trilateral Commission paid attention to the 
subject of collective bargaining and employee participation. But none of these 
examples offered an opportunity for comparison with the other networks.21 
 These considerations result in the following selection: 
 
Table 1.1: Themes investigated within the transnational networks.  
Period Subject Networks
1950-1960 European market integration ELEC & Bilderberg meetings
1960-1970 US investments; East-West trade ELEC & Bilderberg meetings
1970-1980 Energy security ELEC, Bilderberg meetings & Trilateral Commission 
 
1950-1960 European market integration: the theme is ideal for understanding 
business views on the European market. During the 1950s the governments of the 
Benelux, France, Italy and Germany made great strides towards Western European 
economic integration. Several models of approaching economic integration in 
Europe were subject to extensive review. Moreover the question of which role 
supranational institutions should play in the organization of markets was dis-
cussed. In addition the size of the European market was a recurrent issue. Moreo-
ver, these issues were informed by broad debates on liberalization and the ques-
tion on the degree of freedom of entrepreneurship that should be allowed in the 
European market.  
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1960-1970 US investments / East-West Trade: together these subjects represent a 
theme of external competition for the industries already present in the EEC. The 
founding of the European Common market in 1958 had triggered increasing in-
vestments from multinationals from the United States. Due to their size they had a 
competitive edge over the markedly less sizeable multinationals in Europe. Euro-
pean companies feared to become marginalized by American competition in their 
home markets. On the opposite flank of the Common Market the relaxation of eco-
nomic relations with the East-bloc was causing problems. Western European gov-
ernments increasingly extended export loan guarantees to European banks in 
order to finance capital goods exports to Eastern Europe. Companies that exported 
capital goods profited from this state of affairs. Others however were facing fierce 
competition. An external trade policy for the EEC however did not exist. 
 1970-1980 Energy security: the oil crisis of 1973-1974 turned international oil 
trade relations into an important aspect of international politics. Industry in Eu-
rope, Japan and the United States now had to cope with energy shortages and un-
precedented price hikes. The European Community lacked a common energy poli-
cy and had almost no control over the supply of feedstocks. As will become clear, in 
order to improve their positions in the global marketplace Western European 
industries tried to push the topic on the European and international policy agenda. 
 It is important to stress that it is not the goal of this investigation to study 
these themes exhaustively. Instead, the goal is to explore the above-mentioned 
themes to gain a better understanding of views of multinationals on the European 
market.  
Sources22 
This project is partly based on the institutional papers of the ELEC, the Bilderberg 
meetings and the Trilateral Commission. The selected archives typically include 
minutes of meetings, correspondence and publications. 
 The European League for Economic Cooperation: the institutional archive of 
ELEC covers the period from 1946 to 1985 and is located at the University of Lou-
vain-la-Neuve, Belgium. From 1950 onwards it contains a complete collection of 
minutes of ELEC's international governing body, the Central Council. Additionally 
it includes preparatory documents for meetings, minutes of the meetings of ELEC's 
several committees and correspondence of the secretary-general on behalf of 
ELEC's president. All the documents of the archive are accessible. ELEC's publica-
tions can be acquired via several European libraries.  
 The Bilderberg meetings: the institutional archive is located at the National 
Archive in The Hague, The Netherlands. However, only documents older than fifty 
years can be accessed. The archive therefore could only provide the documents for 
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the period from 1952 until 1962. It contains correspondence, Steering Committee 
minutes and incidentally verbatim reports of conferences. Fortunately, the docu-
ments could be supplemented with material from a similarly endowed archive of 
Otto Wolff von Amerongen, a German steel products trader. The archive is located 
at the Rheinisch Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv in Cologne, Germany. The basic 
material for investigation are the Bilderberg conference reports which contain 
elaborate summaries of the debates that were held during the meetings. These 
however do not contain contributions of specific individuals. A substantial share of 
the reports is available through libraries across Europe and the United States.  
 The Trilateral Commission: the institutional archive of the Trilateral Commis-
sion’s North American section is located at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy 
Hollow, New York, the United States. The archive includes minutes of Executive 
Committee meetings, Chairmen meetings, reports of plenary meetings and corre-
spondence on the entire drafting processes of the Trilateral Commission's policy 
studies. Due to “preservation concerns” however, restrictions were imposed on 
documents of some key individuals such as Zbigniew Brzezinsky, Gerard C. Smith 
and early Trilateral Commission correspondence. The Trilateral Commission's 
policy papers, the Triangle papers, and its US-based periodical on Trilateral affairs, 
Trialogue are available through libraries. 
 Additionally, a small amount of interviews was conducted. They were espe-
cially valuable in yielding insights about the involvement of businessmen in the 
selected networks. 
Historiography: a terrain at a crossroads of disciplines 
The views of business with regard to European integration as a research theme is 
related to several sub-disciplines. Roughly three major areas can be identified: 
political science with a focus on European integration, the history of European 
integration, and business history. The following sections review the literature 
about business-views on the European market within and between these sub-
disciplines. The main motives and direction for this dissertation are highlighted in 
the process. Additionally, the historiography of the three transnational networks 
will be discussed. Finally an assessment is made whether these networks can be 
compared to typical business associations and other forms of post-war transna-
tional organization of business.  
Role of business in European integration theory 
Integration theorists have forwarded several interpretations of the role of business 
in European integration. These insights are important as they help in identifying 
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implicit theoretical angles in historical analyses. Moreover, they offer anchors for 
reflection on empirical findings, particularly in our concluding chapter 7. 
 Since the 1950s, theorists of regional integration have tried to explain and 
predict the processes that were unfolding in Europe. Originally the domain of inte-
gration studies was the area of theorists of international relations working from 
the perspective of functionalism. The key representative of these ideas was David 
Mitrany who worked on the question of how lasting international institutions 
should be realized in order to create an enduring peace.23 
 The founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, kick-started 
a specific branch of integration theory in which Europe became the dominant case. 
In 1958 the first comprehensive theory of regional European integration was pre-
sented by Ernst B. Haas. He argued that the creation of a supranational institution 
such as the ECSC's High Authority could start a process in which actors that were 
normally involved in decision-making within the member states would “shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre.” These deci-
sion-makers, or elites as Haas called them, typically included members of public 
administration, politics, organized labour and, central to the concern of this book, 
organized business.24 
 Haas also introduced the concept of spill-over. It refers to a continuous pro-
cess that begins after an institution executes its initial task. According to the con-
cept, this first act inherently results in a situation that requires a solution in the 
form of imposing extra tasks on the institution. The spill-over concept was thought 
of as a continuous force that would create a cascade of shifting loyalties of elites 
and the representation of interests away from the nation state, towards suprana-
tional institutions.25 
 In this way neo-functionalist theory attributed an influential role to societal 
interests in general, including business interests. However, the early integration 
theorists were not interested in the perception, motives and strategies of business 
as such. Their investigations into the role of business in this process mainly fo-
cussed on the institutional orientation of organized business in relation to the 
changes of the European political-economic system. They were looking for evi-
dence whether organized business actually directed their activities, loyalties and 
expectations to supranational institutions. This reduction of organized business to 
its structure, form and function is not uncommon for political scientists that nowa-
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days investigate practices of interest representation in the European Union. An 
interest in the actual business-perspective is largely absent.26 
 An alternative explanation of European integration was offered by Stanley 
Hoffmann in 1964 and more comprehensively in 1966. He conceptualized Europe-
an integration from a realist perspective, which also originated from international 
relations theory. This became known as intergovernmentalist integration theory: 
Hoffmann explained that any progress in European integration was entirely de-
termined by and under control of state actors who firmly guarded the calculated 
interests of the nation state. Business interests or any other non-state interests 
played no direct role in this theory because the state was seen as the mediator of 
all interests. Intergovernmentalist theory gained much recognition, especially due 
to its contribution to explaining the anti-supranationalist motives of the French 
President de Gaulle during the 1960s.27  
 In the face of intergovernmentalist intellectual criticism, neo-functionalist 
theory was not abandoned but adapted and business was given a different role in it. 
In the 1970s, Werner Feld emphasized the function that European multinationals 
could perform in the integration of the largely separate national economies. By 
means of transnational collaboration and international mergers they contributed 
to economic integration of the European market. At the same time he concluded 
that transnational collaboration between European multinationals was being 
blocked by Community Member States in order to protect their national economies. 
According to neo-functionalist theory, transnational behaviour by European firms 
could lead to spill-over pressures which prompted Feld to claim that the member 
states were interfering with tendencies towards European integration. By contrast, 
in 1975 Erwin Häckel concluded that European multinationals had little reason to 
merge with firms from other countries within the European market. According to 
him, the export of goods had become so attractive within Europe that instead of 
forming pan-European collaborations, they opted for expanding their production 
facilities in their home-markets and exporting the surplus that the home-market 
would not absorb. Additionally, they focussed their investments outside the EEC, 
according to Häckel. More important than the outcome of these studies was how 
its respective authors implicitly viewed the function of business in the integration 
process: business was still seen as a potentially integrative force, but now due to 
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its competitive and international behaviour instead of its institutional orienta-
tion.28 
 During the 1970s neo-Marxist integration theorists developed similar ideas 
about the relation between multinationals and European integration. In terms of 
neo-Marxist theory, European integration is an effect of, or a response to the inter-
nationalization of economic activity and an increasing development of production 
forces. In 1978 Axt argued that EEC member states were forcing national capital 
into productive applications within the state. However, to allow integration to take 
place they should let businesses seek added-value for their capital outside the state 
instead. By channelling capital towards national investments, economic relations 
within the EEC remained politicised. So also in neo-Marxist theory business was 
seen as a potential force of economic integration.29 
 Summing up, until the late 1980s integration theorists presented the relation 
between European business and European integration in rather abstract terms. 
Neo-functionalist theorists stressed the functional reorientation of organized busi-
ness towards supranational institutions on the one hand, and the efforts of busi-
ness to realize economic integration by means of collaboration or foreign direct 
investments on the other hand. Ideas about what European integration meant to 
individual firms were limited to theoretic considerations of how the firm in general 
acts in processes of international economic integration. 
 It was not until 1989 that the first more empirically informed investigation of 
business-preferences and political behaviour in European integration surfaced. 
Sandholtz & Zysman rekindled the integration theory debate between neo-
functionalists and intergovernmentalists by investigating the strategic lobby of 
European business leaders in favour of the European Single Act, a treaty between 
Community member states signed in 1986. Sandholtz & Zysman explain how lead-
ers of Europe's largest industrial companies were mobilized by the European 
Commission in order to co-initiate, co-define and forward the goal of a single mar-
ket. As a result the companies became organized as the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERTI) and joined the European Commission in its effort to persuade 
the member states. According to the authors the industrialists had no choice: com-
petition from Japanese firms forced them to realize lower production costs by 
concentrating production. However, the concentration of European industry was 
hindered by intra-Community protectionism. The completion of the single market 
was expected to solve this problem. By acknowledging an important role for the 
ERTI in bringing about the treaty, Sandholtz & Zysman reintroduced the force of 
elites and argued that a new concept of “elite bargains” could significantly improve 
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our understanding of the European integration process. Business-motives now 
entered the debate.30 
 Their renewed focus on the role of elites sparked a fierce academic debate. In 
1991 to intergovernmentalist theorist Andrew Moravcsik argued that the ERTI 
business leaders had entered the process of consensus formation among member 
states too late to affect it. Instead he argued how converging state interests had 
resulted in the treaty. In later years, Moravcsik did incorporate the role of business 
interests in the process of preference formation, but he only acknowledged a con-
tribution of business on the domestic level of states. In doing so Moravcsik de-
signed an initial version of a liberal intergovernmentalist theory. Now business 
was thus also understood as affecting European integration from an intergovern-
mentalist viewpoint, but only through mediation of the member states.31 
 Maria Green Cowles investigated the ERTI more closely and observed that 
industrialists had shaped positions on the national and supranational level simul-
taneously. Green Cowles argued that neither intergovernmentalist nor neo-
functionalist integration theory could properly explain the political role that busi-
ness leaders had performed. As the earliest theorists of neo-functionalism had 
explained, it was anticipated that organized business would shift its lobbies to 
supranational institutions. But according to Green Cowles they had gone beyond 
traditional styles of interest representation. By building consensus between gov-
ernments and supranational institutions, while influencing public opinion through 
the media, they had turned into political actors in their own right.32 
 Sandholtz & Zysman and Green Cowles have expanded the role of business in 
European integration theory: these authors no longer perceived the role of busi-
ness as limited to the form and function of their organization, or to a role assigned 
to them based on pluralist political theory and neo-functionalist integration theory. 
In these more recent accounts, motives and views of business matter. The most 
important innovation that these authors added to the debate was the new percep-
tion of business as political actors in their own right. This enables a different ap-
proach to studying business, also for the period that preceded the founding of the 
European Round Table of Industrialists. As any other societal entity European busi-
ness developed its own ideas about European integration and contributed to the 
development of ideas in the broader political landscape. 
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Role of business in European integration history 
Until recently, historians of European integration paid little attention to business 
ideas on European integration. Until well into the 1990s the dominant historiog-
raphy on European integration was focussed on national diplomatic histories. The 
perspectives of the nation states dominated such approaches. During the 1990s a 
differently informed approach of investigating Europe emerged from an increasing 
interest in cultural history. In 1995 the interdisciplinary sociologist Gerard Delanty 
introduced an awareness of the role of ideas and identity in the historiography of 
Europe with his Inventing Europe. Idea, identity, reality. In 1998 Peter Rietbergen 
presented a cultural history of Europe and in 2002 several scholars in Anthony 
Pagden's edited volume The idea of Europe. From antiquity to the European Union 
investigated changing conceptions of Europe in multiple periods and contexts. 
Instead of tracing the political origins of European integration these authors tried 
to explain how broad cultural notions of Europe had changed in the past.33 
 Only as part of a broader interest in the economic dimension of European 
integration did an interest in the positions of business emerge, albeit gradually. 
Economic history first began to play a serious role in explaining European integra-
tion through the work of Alan S. Milward. In 1984 he presented an economically 
informed account of the immediate post-war years, in which he argued how the 
Schuman Plan had become an economic peace settlement for Western Europe. 
Additionally, in 1992 his influential The European rescue of the nation-state argued 
that European nation states had chosen to integrate their economies during the 
1950s in order to defend their key industrial bases. Milward demonstrates how the 
governments based their decisions on developments in the most important na-
tional industries. But in Milward's accounts only states were presented as media-
tors of such interests. Economic actors such as businessmen merely fulfilled a 
passive role in these state decisions. Milward's presentation thus includes im-
portant characteristics of intergovernmentalist theory.34 
 Also during the 1980s, other historians such as Werner Bührer, Ruggero Rani-
eri and Philippe Mioche started to approach the economic aspects of European 
integration from a perspective of business interests. Investigations were undertak-
en on how the steel industries of especially France and Germany had dealt with the 
coal and steel focussed Schuman Plan. The Schuman Plan and the coal and steel 
sector-based competences of the High Authority resulted in a clear focus on those 
industries. This did not mean that these authors were working from a transnation-
al industrial perspective however. The perspective of the nation state was still dom-
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inant in these accounts. Coal and steel were of such a strategic importance to any 
country that the interests of national industries and the interests of the nation 
state appeared to be similar, hybrid even.35 
 This national perspective in the investigation of business in relation to Euro-
pean integration remained dominant until the late 2000s. It is important to note 
however that a change in scholarly interest occurred. The focus of investigations 
shifted from the Schuman Plan to the Rome Treaties and the subsequent founding 
of the European Economic Community. In an attempt at singling out the business 
interests that were involved in the run-up to the founding of the EEC, historians 
directed their attention to national umbrella business associations. These organi-
zations represented a multitude of industries, each fostering expectations about 
how the future market organization might affect them. Authors such as Werner 
Bührer, Marine Toursel, and Neil Rollings demonstrated the close relations be-
tween national business interests and national governments. By focussing on na-
tional umbrella associations of industry, the analysis of European business inevita-
bly resulted in a focus on national preference formation processes regarding the 
future of national economies. In these preference formation processes the state 
was the key aggregator of interests. The scholars confirmed the perspective of the 
nation state as central actor in European integration by choosing national centres 
of preference formation for an investigation on the role of business in European 
integration.36 
 A first sign of an alternative approach in the investigation of European busi-
ness was introduced in the early 1990s by Eric Bussière and Michel Dumoulin. 
They aimed at identifying European economic elites such as economists or busi-
nessmen, their views, identities and transnational activities regarding European 
                                                                  
35 See for an alternative perspective: Berger, F. (2011). Premières approches historiques sur l'intégra-
tion économique européenne: une réflexion sectorielle. In Badel, L. & Michel, H. (Eds.), Patronats et 
intégration européenne: pour un dialogue disciplinaire raisonée (pp. 17-40). Paris: Harmattan. On the 
coal and steel industries: Bührer, W. (1986). Ruhrstahl und Europa. Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- 
und Stahlindustrie und die Anfänge der europäische Integration (1945-1952). Munich: Oldenburg; 
Mioche, P. (1988). Le patronat de la Sidérurgie francaise et le Plan Schuman en 1950-1952: les appa-
rences d’un combat et la réalité d’une mutation. In K. Schwabe (Ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans. 
1950/51 (pp. 305-318). Baden-Baden: Nomos; Ranieri, R. (1988). The Italian Steel Industry and the 
Schuman Plan negotiations. In K. Schwabe (Ed.) (1988). Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans. 1950/51 (pp. 
345-356). Baden-Baden: Nomos. Gillingham (1991). Coal, steel. 
36 Key examples are: Bührer, W. (1992). Der Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie und die Aussenpo-
litik der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren. In Viertelsjahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 40, 241-261. 
Bührer, W. (1995). German Industry and European Integration in the 1950's. In C. A. Wurm (Ed.), 
Western Europe and Germany: the beginnings of European integration, 1945-1960. Oxford: Berg Publi-
shers. Leitolf, J. (1996). Wirtschaft, Verbände, Integration: britische Industrie und westeuropäische In-
tegration von 1945 bis 1975. Bochum: Brockmeyer. Rhenisch, T. (1999). Europäische Integration und 
Industrielles Interesse. Die Deutsche Industrie und die Gründung der Europäische Wirtschaftsgemein-
schaft. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner; Moguen-Toursel, M. (2002). L'ouverture des frontières européennes dans 
les années 50: fruit d'un concertation avec les industriels? Bruxelles: P.I.E. Lang; Rollings, N. (2007). 
British business in the formative years of European integration, 1945-1973. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
37 
integration. Michel Dumoulin and Anne-Myriam Dutrieue's work on the European 
League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) and the Comité européen pour le progrès 
économique et social (CEPES) which focussed on the ideas of businessmen, econo-
mists and public administrators, was particularly significant for the subject of this 
dissertation. However, as a result of their focus on individuals, both accounts re-
mained detached from business practices and from the experiences and prefer-
ences of corporations and multinationals. Instead, ELEC and CEPES were present-
ed as expressions of a liberal ethos that fostered ideas on rejecting a European 
institutional order with interventionist powers.37 
 The results of Bussière's and Dumoulin's research are difficult to summarize. 
Rasmussen concludes that the project appeared to have no outcome. It resulted in 
a diversity of empiric observations that were difficult to turn into a narrative. Ac-
cording to Rasmussen the lack of an underlying concept or theory about the place 
of individual ideas, identity and ideology in the process of European integration 
made this rather impossible. Nevertheless the project was an interesting attempt 
at going beyond the national and state-central approaches to the history of Euro-
pean integration, particularly with regard to European business.38 
 Since the mid-2000s, a new and broad research agenda has gained shape 
around a conception of European history that moves beyond the nation state that 
has significantly influenced the investigation of European business narratives of 
European integration. This broad agenda was energized by three different, yet 
related approaches. A first step in this direction was formulated in 2006 by two 
historians of technology: Thom Misa and Johan Schot. They proposed to investigate 
the integration of Europe through the lens of technology in order to write a “histo-
ry of the technological shaping of Europe.” They suggested to investigate instances 
of “linking” of technological or infrastructural networks throughout Europe and 
beyond, to follow the “circulation” of people, ideas, objects, companies, and the 
“appropriation” of their meanings in different contexts as they circulate. Such an 
approach could identify the shaping of new identities within and throughout Eu-
rope. Their intention was to start from the question of how technology shaped 
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Europe and write a transnational history in which the nation-state becomes a sub-
ordinate factor. Due to their Europe-wide activities in introducing technologies 
business corporations in particular play an interesting role in these investigations. 
This initiative by Schot and Misa has led to a very productive Europe-wide re-
search collaboration, first under the flag of “Tension of Europe”, later followed by 
the programmes “Inventing Europe” and “Making Europe.” Several book-length 
studies are just being published, or will appear soon.39 
 The second example of a research agenda for a transnational history of Euro-
pean integration stays closer to the political history of the European Union. In 
2009 Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, Michael Gehler and Morten Rasmussen 
introduced the notion of “political networks.” In differentiating that concept from 
network-concepts originating from political science, such as “policy networks,” 
they argue that political networks denote a broader, more general and at the same 
time more informal “set of actors engaged in communication and cooperation 
which is geared towards shaping the political organization of social life.” In choos-
ing this definition they advocate a reliance on contextualized narrative instead of 
depending on narrowly defined ideal types as is often done in network approaches 
in political science. An example of such a transnational political network is the 
post-war transnational party organization of European Christian democrats, inves-
tigated by Kaiser. He argued that between 1947 and 1955, European Christian 
democrats had not only cemented transnational political relations, but were also 
able to mobilize these relations for collective interpretation and the formation of 
preferences regarding European integration. The networks were also used to build 
transnational and strategic alliances with other political forces and public adminis-
trators of the negotiating European governments, thereby influencing the direction 
of European treaties.40 
 Kaiser and his co-authors study political networks as an aspect of the Europe-
an Union or its earlier forms. They see these networks as immersed in an emerging 
“supranational polity” or “a supranational political space.” With those concepts 
they refer to exchanges between networks of a multitude of actors who are in-
volved in “advancing their ideas and material interests, influencing European poli-
cy-making or transferring institutional rules and practices between member-
states.” These exchanges include the activities of the actors from European institu-
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tions and member states. This “space” in which ideas and ideology on the Europe-
an Community were exchanged, tested and negotiated, offers an alternative to the 
established approach of investigating the policies of supposedly coherent states, 
investigations on national preference formation processes and intergovernmental 
negotiations.41 
 Examples of this approach include highly diverse networks. Political party 
networks, but also social networks that were concerned with the formation of the 
EU agricultural policy or monetary policy have been investigated. Additionally, 
results that were already published before the seminal studies by Kaiser and his 
co-authors are now seen as belonging to that approach. Examples include work by 
Valérie Aubourg on the Bilderberg meetings, which also plays a significant role in 
this book, and the work of Maria Green Cowles on the European Round Table of 
Industrialists. Another example is Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez' work on a transna-
tional network of the European automotive industry. During the 1970s that net-
work attempted to persuade the European Community to adopt collective Europe-
an technical safety standards. Whereas this contribution would hitherto have been 
more at home in an edited volume on business history, it now found a place in a 
volume on the transnational history of the European Union.42 
 A third and final research agenda for shaping a transnational history of Eu-
rope was suggested by Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran K. Patel in 2010. They 
redefined the concept of Europeanization, originally coined by social and political 
scientists to indicate transformations in Europe that were the result of the Europe-
an integration process. From the perspective of historical research they propose to 
investigate “to what extent the history of Europe can be conceptualized in terms of 
processes of Europeanization”, or in other words, how Europe was “imagined” in 
cultural expressions, “constructed” through the formation of infrastructure or 
spaces through social practices, or at those instances when practices or events 
unintentionally became European without immediately receiving that label. This 
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approach practically subsumes the aforementioned approaches into one, covering 
“the plurality of forms of Europeanization.”43 
 In these three complementary approaches and conceptualizations of Europe-
an history, transnational actors, ideas and meanings that go beyond the nation 
state or national borders become the central focus of research. In such a percep-
tion of European history, global influences may link up with European or national 
identities and fuse into more hybrid entities. Kiran K. Patel and Johan Schot have 
successfully shown how such transnational ideas and meanings of particularly 
transnational actors played a role in decision-making outcomes regarding the 
agricultural and transport policies of the European Union. Their work indicates 
that the historical investigation of the views of business actors on the European 
market can contribute to a better understanding of how such ideas have played a 
role in decision-making processes on European integration.44 
 Over the years the investigation of business as part of European integration 
history has developed significantly. Since the 1990s business was interpreted as a 
factor in explaining national motives with regard to European integration. Later 
the investigation of European businessmen was undertaken in order to identify 
liberal ideas about the organization of the European Union. The interpretation of 
these ideas however remained detached from the actual experiences of European 
businesses. Since the mid-2000s the research agenda on the history of Europe has 
changed though. The focus on the formation of ideas, meanings and the activities of 
transnational actors give the nation state a secondary role within the field of Euro-
pean integration history. Moreover, these approaches have introduced the concep-
tual flexibility that is necessary for linking European and international influences. 
The investigation of the ideas of businessmen on the emerging European market is 
ideally suited to contribute to the transnational history and to a better insight into 
the Europeanization of Europe. 
Business history and European integration 
A third important discipline for this historiographical overview is that of business 
history. Business historians can contribute significantly to a better understanding 
of the formation of business views on the European market. Until now only a few 
business historians have shown an interest in the relation between European inte-
gration and business though. Moreover, results remained largely isolated from the 
abovementioned debates on the history of European integration. Some investiga-
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tions, however, have yielded original and important insights on strategies of specif-
ic companies in relation to European integration.  
 Since the late 1970s, business historians have mainly focussed on aspects of 
the Chandlerian research agenda. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. practically laid the founda-
tion of modern business history with his book The visible hand. The managerial 
revolution in American business. Chandler argued that American multinational 
business took a lead over European business in the early twentieth century by 
investing in three crucial aspects of the firm: manufacturing, marketing and man-
agement. This enabled them to make use of what Chandler called the economies of 
scale and scope in international markets.45  
 His influential presentation of business dynamics resulted in a historical dis-
cipline with a focus on company practices of internal management in relation to an 
awareness of competitive advantages. Matters of strategy regarding the external 
environment, such as the question on how phenomena of international economic 
integration affected firm-level decision-making or competitive advantage received 
little attention until very recently.46 
 Traditionally, economic historians and business historians have used econom-
ic theories in their investigation of European integration. The “theory of the firm,” 
for instance, was employed to predict the response of business to economic inte-
gration. The outcomes are largely in line with what can be expected to occur ac-
cording to the theory of international economic integration. The fact that a reduc-
tion of import tariffs as occurred in the EEC has caused an immediate increase in 
trade, is a case in point. The changed tariff order also led to a diversion of trade as 
a result of changing cost structures. Moreover, if new regulatory frameworks ac-
company a reduction of tariffs, cost structures are affected again, and the competi-
tive positions of multinationals are affected even more. In other words: a level 
playing field changes the balance of competitive advantage for each firm. The theo-
ry predicts that companies have to attain a new optimal form of organization 
which is aimed at realizing economies of scale. Under such circumstances they are 
likely to invest in relocation and centralization of production.47 
 Recent empiric investigations of interaction between multinationals and in-
ternational economic integration demonstrate though that achieving a new opti-
mal structure and strategy was a difficult challenge. The response to European 
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economic integration included several aspects: path dependencies of company 
structures, national contexts and the mostly unpredictable political developments 
among nation states and the European supranational institutions complicated 
matters severely. The investigation by Geoffrey Jones of British-Dutch detergents 
and foods multinational Unilever illustrates this nicely. During the Interbellum 
Unilever's structure became well adapted to the nationally fragmented and protec-
tionist market structure of Europe. Its many smaller national businesses across 
Europe operated almost completely autonomously in marketing, research and 
development and production. Jones shows that the establishment of the Common 
Market triggered plans with Unilever's management for a centralization of produc-
tion to achieve economies of scale. However, when in the early 1970s Unilever 
began the restructuring of the company the idea met with resistance from local 
management. They were convinced that products could only be marketed on a 
national scale and denounced the plans for marketing on a European scale. Moreo-
ver the relocation and centralization of production became politicized due to the 
inflexibility of European labour markets in crisis-ridden Western Europe. At the 
same time Unilever’s American competitor in detergents, Procter & Gamble could 
make a fresh start in Europe. As a result, Procter & Gamble did much better in reap-
ing the scale-related fruits of the larger market. Ivo Blanken described similar 
restructuring experiences of electronics firm Philips. Moreover, in the case of the 
European experiences of car builder Ford, Steven Tolliday shows how uncertainty 
about European integration formed another problem for the reorganization of 
existing production-structures. From the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957 
onwards, the American multinational had to postpone plans for the integration of 
its several European car production processes until the late 1960s due to uncer-
tainty about EFTA-EEC relations.48 
 Some themes emerge: firstly, early multinationals with a structure distributed 
across several countries potentially had something to gain from the creation of a 
European Common Market. As tariffs were gradually abandoned, the decentralized 
organizations that they built to adapt to nationalist circumstances became increas-
ingly inefficient compared to more centrally organized competitors. In contrast 
with Unilever and Philips however, which were (partly) rooted in the Netherlands 
which small market forced them to expand abroad, other European companies 
with large home markets had been able to expand their operations nationally dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s. After import tariffs were gradually removed during the 
1960s they could likely benefit more from an increased flow of exports.49 
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Secondly, the creation of the EEC destabilized the competitive positions of several 
European multinationals. American companies could introduce more efficient and 
centrally managed foreign subsidiaries. They competed with European companies 
that had company structures that were not well adapted to the emerging scale of 
the European market. 
 Thirdly, the uncertainties that were caused by the existence of two different 
trade blocs within Western Europe were delaying initiatives towards the centrali-
zation of company structures. 
 These insights lead to new questions. As the European market changed, pref-
erences and views of businessmen most likely changed along with it. It is interest-
ing to see whether the dynamic that was introduced by the creation of the Com-
mon Market affected the ideas of European multinationals with regard to invest-
ments from outside the EEC. 
 Business historians have also investigated the theme of business in relation to 
European integration through transnational business networks, while employing a 
focus on business interest associations.50 Neil Rollings' and Matthias Kipping's 
work on the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF) is a key example of 
such a study. CEIF was a federation of national trade-associations of organized 
business, founded in 1949. The authors show how CEIF on the one hand func-
tioned as an instrument to forward the goals of national associations on a Europe-
an level. On the other hand they found that forging transnational contacts was “a 
crucial benefit in the uncertain world of post-war Europe” of the 1950s. According 
to them the continuous political debate about the organization of the European 
market, such as the creation of supranational institutions and a Common Market 
was an important reason for the formation of business networks. According to 
them these were founded with the goal to reduce uncertainty. The work of Ramírez 
Pérez which was mentioned earlier in the section on European integration history 
also falls in this research category.51 
 A final development in the investigation of business in European integration 
merely confirms the earlier identified move from an abstract interpretation of 
business in European integration to a business-centred investigation: the book 
Stratégie d’entreprise et action publique dans l’Europe intégrée, edited by Marine 
Moguen-Toursel, actually moves from the investigation of the formation of ideas 
within business networks to the investigation of causal effects in policy making.52 
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Summing up how the study of integration theory, European integration history, 
and business history have developed in relation to the role played by business 
actors, one can conclude that a major shift in perspective has occurred. Originally, 
in accounts inspired by the dynamic of spill-over or in state-centric accounts about 
European integration, business was merely studied as a function of integration or 
as a function of the state's role in integration. Only more recently Jones, Rollings, 
Kipping and Ramírez Pérez have shown a perspective which started from the pre-
occupations from business itself. They zoomed in on the business experience of the 
changing European markets, the introduction of new institutional layers and the 
adaptation of companies to emerging challenges. 
 This changed perspective leads to new questions. Rollings wonders whether 
European businesses indeed sat idly by when new institutions designed to oversee 
them were created. Did they perhaps interfere with the process of institution for-
mation and did they try to shape the competencies and properties of the High 
Authority and the European Commission? Rollings also suggests to consider the 
effects of a new world of international cooperation that undermined the existing 
mechanisms for organizing international markets by business itself. The prolifera-
tion of new institutions overseeing and governing their activities created a sense of 
uncertainty. Rollings and Moguen-Toursel have suggested to start explaining the 
activities of organized business as expressions of such uncertainty, instead of 
merely sticking to the dominant discourse of policy-making influence. In addition 
the response of European business views to American investments and Japanese 
competition should be considered. Also it is important to pay attention to the ques-
tion of how these problems became Europeanized, using the concept of 
Hirschhausen and Patel. By zooming in on the changing views of European multi-
nationals and businesses on the European market one comes closer to answering 
such questions.53 
Transnational networks: historiography 
The final part of this introductory chapter will give a historiographical overview of 
the three transnational networks through which the views of European business 
will be investigated. The study of the role of businessmen in activities of the Euro-
pean League for Economic Cooperation, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral 
Commission form the empirical basis of this book. Thus far they have been charac-
terized as transnational networks. As was hinted at earlier, this terminology is 
based on the concepts of Wolfram Kaiser and his co-authors, who investigate polit-
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ical networks that are geared to the exchange of ideas, interests or ideology across 
states.54 
 Given the high involvement of businessmen in their ranks, how should we 
characterize these networks in relation to business associations and other types of 
interest groups? To answer these questions, this section firstly presents the main 
historical studies on these networks. Additionally, the networks’ features will be 
discussed in relation to general characteristics of business associations and some 
other transnational business associations that particularly operated in a European 
context.55 
 The oldest transnational network investigated in this study is ELEC. This is a 
European lobbying organization with a clear focus on promoting European eco-
nomic unification. Michel Dumoulin and Anne-Myriam Dutrieue, who investigated 
ELEC's history over the period 1946-1981, concluded that it was a “movement of 
employers” and a “study and action movement in European matters.” The organi-
zation was based on the dominant membership of industry and finance, assisted by 
a smaller group of economists and politicians. However Dumoulin and Dutrieue 
did not investigate the ELEC as an expression of European industry and finance. 
Instead of focussing on the competing interests of these individuals they pointed 
out the liberal characteristics of ELEC's activities.56 
 Dumoulin and Dutrieue's dual characterization of ELEC as a study ánd pres-
sure movement was based on the combination of the several functions it per-
formed for its members. ELEC was in the first place involved in lobbying activities. 
Its national sections conveyed ELEC's preferences to national governments and 
European institutions. In order to fulfil this function effectively, the ELEC also stud-
ied European debates and proposals for integration. A permanent secretariat mon-
itored and informed the members on the stream of plans in the context of Europe-
an economic relations, cooperation and integration. Central Council meetings were 
partly devoted to the gauging of likely outcomes. Moreover, the Central Council 
initialized studies on specific treaties, policies, and institutional developments 
which were published as position papers. They were presented as neutral studies, 
best described as preferences in the disguise of technical narratives.57 
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The Bilderberg group was not directly involved in lobbying. Instead it mainly or-
ganized the exchange of views. Annual Bilderberg meetings were organized since 
1954 and gathered European and American decision-makers and advisors from 
business, public administration, politics and academia around topics of strategic 
importance to the West. The discussions mostly focussed on Transatlantic security 
and Transatlantic economic relations. Bilderberg's most important difference with 
the ELEC was its Transatlantic structure. Valérie Aubourg explains that the original 
purpose of the Bilderberg meetings was to establish a “common understanding” 
between Western Europe and the United States. Its founding members felt that the 
meetings could contribute to repairing the deterioration of Transatlantic relations 
in the early 1950s. Thomas Gijswijt concludes that due to the Bilderberg meetings' 
contribution to a sense of unity, cooperation and unofficial consultation it devel-
oped into an informal supplement to the NATO.58 
 Both Gijswijt and Aubourg saw the Bilderberg meetings as opportunities for 
participants to learn about the differing views on international security and the 
international economy, but also opportunities to influence each other regarding 
current international affairs. Both authors moreover agreed that the meetings 
were not aimed at the formation of a consensus.59 
 The Trilateral Commission is a group of private individuals from the United 
States, Western Europe and Japan. Since it was founded in 1973 its membership 
grew to about 250 representatives, mainly stemming from industrial and financial 
multinationals. The membership also included politicians, public administrators 
and people from academia who were involved in policy making. They discussed 
the tensions between the three main industrialized regions in the world. Themes 
such as the global monetary system, financial relations, energy security, nuclear 
proliferation and north-south relations dominated the Trilateral Commission's 
work in the 1970s. Meetings revolved around discussions on current affairs in 
international economic relations. Moreover, the Trilateral Commission published 
reports that instructed the three regions to cooperate on a range of matters in 
which the differing interests of the United States, Western Europe and Japan were 
causing friction. 
 Scholars have regarded the dominance of multinationals in the Trilateral 
Commission with suspicion. Stephen Gill interpreted the Trilateral Commission 
along the lines of a Marxist class struggle on an international level. According to 
him, the organization served the purpose of shaping the identity of a transnational, 
capitalist ruling class. He sees the Trilateral Commission as a conscious, collective 
and collusive attempt of multinational corporations at reshaping the world in their 
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image, by lobbying in the service of their collective private needs. Other scholars 
have coined the term of an elite planning organization. The also stress the lobby-
character of the Trilateral Commission but also identify the Commission as a 
means to study international developments. Holly Sklar characterizes the Trilat-
eral Commission and its corporate members as “seeking to strengthen and rational-
ize the world economy in their interests.” A similar assessment is made by Johan-
nes Beverungen. According to him the Trilateral Commission's focus on global 
economic and political themes offers the private participants an edge in the field of 
information, enabling them to plan better in a globalized world.60 
 Notwithstanding the obviously different political arena's in which the organi-
zations operated, they also shared several characteristics: an important or even 
dominant role of multinational business, a membership from different spheres of 
society, and a requirement for expertise and up to date information to determine 
their positions. They also shared the characteristic of subtle lobby practices, either 
external, as the ELEC and the Trilateral Commission, or in the case of the Bilder-
berg meetings, internal, by confronting Europeans and Americans with each other, 
or by confronting several spheres of society with the outlook of international busi-
ness. Furthermore, they undertook study and lobby activities in response to a 
changing international system.  
 As business played such a large role in their work, these networks come close 
to the category of business interest associations. But in order to make the compari-
son, it is important to distinguish between two main forms that business associa-
tions take: employers’ associations and trade associations. Through employers’ 
associations business approaches unions and industrial relations issues. Trade 
associations, by contrast, fulfil the role of study groups, interest representation and 
lobbying. As far as the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commis-
sion are similar to business interest associations, they come closer to the category 
of the trade association. Still, the differences cannot be overlooked.61 
 In this perspective, it is useful to be aware of how the organizational structure 
of business associations has developed in the past. Until WWII the highest degree 
of organization of business was that of national organizations. But the post-war 
history has seen the transnationalization of business interest associations. Associa-
tions such as the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF), the Union des 
Industries de la Communauté Européenne (UNICE) and the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERTI) developed and were particularly geared to the emerging Eu-
ropean Union. It is useful to shortly compare these organizations to the ELEC, the 
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Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. The CEIF and UNICE were 
both European federations of national umbrella trade associations of business. 
CEIF included members from Western Europe, UNICE was limited to the member-
countries of the European Community. Until the late 1970s these organizations 
were particularly active in the collection of information. Furthermore they mainly 
pursued the goals of their national counterparts on a European level. Business was 
only indirectly represented: CEIF and UNICE aggregated highly diverse interests 
from a multitude of sectors and several countries. The ERTI was quite different in 
this regard. Its cross-sectoral membership was based on the direct representation 
of leaders of large European industrial companies. As a result the ERTI was a much 
more focussed and decisive organization. It concentrated on a limited number of 
strategic issues such as the future of the European market, whereas UNICE for 
example became an all-round contact on European Community policy debates. The 
ELEC, and the Trilateral Commission with their partly direct representation and 
resolutions on strategic subjects were much more similar to the ERTI than to CEIF 
and UNICE. The Bilderberg meetings however is difficult to place in any of the 
categories.62 
 Lastly, it is useful to briefly consider the underlying logic of business associa-
tions. According to Frans van Waarden, cooperation between different firms is 
based on the desire to achieve a collective good. This good can take several forms: 
a defence against, or lobby in favour of certain policies or regulations in a range of 
areas. Van Waarden stresses that cooperation between firms is hardly evident. He 
notes a “heterogeneity” of interests among firms, that are based on differing activi-
ties, sectoral specificities and several aspects of company organization. At the same 
time, Van Waarden explains that in order to reach their goals, business associa-
tions have to maximize their representativeness to remain viable interlocutors for 
governments, regulatory institutions and other organizations. However, it is im-
portant to realize that business associations are not just engaged in a struggle with 
politicians and public administrators; they indirectly also cater to the needs of 
governments and institutions. Justin Greenwood indicates that due to a lack of 
resources, institutions such as the European Commission require the expertise of 
firms that actually engage with the problem that the Commission wishes to solve 
or the behaviour that it wants to regulate. Expertise, study and lobbying thus can 
be seen as expressions of the same activity.63 
 It is clear from the above that the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Tri-
lateral Commission are not typical business associations. Their membership is not 
sufficiently homogeneous to be categorized as business associations. However, 
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with the exception of the Bilderberg meetings they very much acted along the lines 
of how business associations behave, and were particularly similar to the Europe-
an Round Table of Industrialists. They gathered information about the developing 
international economic system, they built expertise on the topics that affected their 
members, determined the position of members and subsequently deployed the 
results in a lobby, couched in an attitude of expertise. 
Research Questions 
Business, and more specifically multinationals, have been given a limited role in 
European integration theory and history. Theorists of integration expected busi-
ness to shift their lobbying activities from the national sphere to the supranational 
sphere, or to integrate European economic activity. The actual views of multina-
tional business were unimportant in these investigations. At the most they were 
seen as participants in the formation of national preferences. How the European 
multinationals viewed the developments on the European market has received 
little attention, except for the period of the 1980s. This is all the more strange as 
the changes in the organization of the European market were significant during the 
1950s and the 1960s. However, the recent transnational turn in the investigation 
of European history creates opportunities for integrating the history of European 
business with questions about the shaping of European ideas and meanings. More-
over, historians of business have recently arrived at the insight that European 
multinationals were confronted with a particularly complex political and economic 
environment since the 1950s. The proliferation of international institutions and 
trade blocs offered an uncertain basis to work from, while investments from the 
United States and Japan were given free reign, upsetting the competitive balance of 
the European economy. 
 Differences between industries are significant though, and were caused by 
specific sector-based challenges. Therefore, the views with regard to the European 
market may have been very different among different industries. At the same time, 
given the striking circumstances of the 1950s, during which the national economic 
environment of most European multinationals became subject to negotiations over 
the ECSC and the EEC, it is intriguing to see whether multinationals sided with 
their governments and to what extent this possibly continued in later decades. 
From these considerations follow two central question that form the heart of the 
narrative of this book: 
 
How did the views of large European multinational businesses on the European mar-
ket change between 1950-1980? 
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How can we explain differences in views on the European market among multina-
tional businesses? To what extent do national and industrial contexts explain such 
differences? 
 
The first question particularly acknowledges that the changing circumstances that 
European corporations experienced may well have changed their outlook on the 
Common Market. As became clear, these include a changing market organization, 
the introduction of new institutions, the advent of American and Japanese competi-
tion and the uncertainty that the introduction of two trade blocs in Western Eu-
rope may have caused. Moreover, this question is also based on the earlier obser-
vation that during the 1950s some multinationals were in favour of a larger market, 
but in the 1980s appeared unsatisfied with how these plans had turned out. How 
did these views develop in the mean time? 
 The second question fulfils a different role. As suggested earlier, corporations 
possibly fostered different views on the European market. Such a differentiation 
may yield important insights into why these different perceptions gained shape, 
possibly as a result of differing national and industrial contexts. By answering this 
question we gain more insight into the factors that co-determined the debates on 
the organization of the European market. 
 The previous historiographical discussions have indicated that geopolitical 
tensions also played a role in the experience of European multinationals. Moreover, 
the investigated transnational networks were ideal organizations for expressing 
such geo-political perspectives. Questions of a geo-political nature about the possi-
ble conflicts between European, American and Japanese corporations offer an 
interesting perspective on the formation of the European market. However, as this 
dissertation is primarily concerned with the views of European corporations on 
the European market in a context of European integration, these questions will not 
be treated here or in the following chapters. The concluding chapter will return to 
the question on whether this investigation has yielded insights of a geopolitical 
nature. 
 The next chapters attempt to answer these question by investigating three 
transnational networks, the European League for Economic Cooperation, the Bild-
erberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. The networks will be approached 
via three themes in three decades between 1950 and 1980; economic integration 
during the 1950s, East-West trade and American investments in Western Europe 
during the 1960s, and energy security during the 1970s.  
51 
Chapter 2 
 
Transnational networks: 
the participation of businessmen 
Introduction 
The European League for Economic Cooperation, the Bilderberg meetings and the 
Trilateral Commission were very different organizations. For example, the ELEC 
was strictly European in scope, the Bilderberg meetings were Transatlantic and 
the Trilateral Commission combined European, American and Japanese member-
ship. Two of them published policy papers, the third generally did not strive for 
consensus but was designed to facilitate an exchange of views. This chapter ex-
plores these and other differences by separately discussing each group's founding 
history and subsequent development, their organizational structure, the changes 
in themes that they studied, and, last but not least, the role played by businessmen 
in these organizations.  
 That exploration serves several goals. Before starting the analysis of how 
businessmen viewed the developments on the European market an understanding 
of the networks themselves is required. Moreover, by focussing on the different 
characteristics of these networks, a preliminary interpretation can be offered on 
the role that businessmen played in their activities. The main question with regard 
to the comparative perspective is whether businessmen were in a position to pur-
sue different results in different networks? The answer to this question will also 
have consequences for the analyses put forward in the chapters 4 to 6. 
  One element of these networks is of special interest: their different approach-
es with respect to national representation. All three networks were transnational, 
in the sense that their members operated beyond their own national environments, 
with mostly international goals in mind. But national representation was orga-
nized differently in each group, from coherent sections to loose contacts. To what 
extent were national perspectives still relevant in transnational networks like 
these?64  
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These organizations, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission in 
particular, with their confidential meetings between business-leaders and politi-
cians, have attracted quite some attention in the literature. Several authors have 
expressed a concern and even suspicion about undue influence of business on 
politics. Others have argued that such a direct or comprehensive influence is un-
likely. Influences of a more subtle nature may have existed however, for example 
via the establishment of international social relations or as a result of the collective 
reflection on important international themes.65 It is not the primary concern of this 
book to contribute to the historiography of these organizations as such, nor is it 
the goal of this chapter. However, as a result of our focus on the role of business-
men in the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission, new 
sources on these networks were consulted, yielding interesting insights on their 
development. Several of these new insights have found a place in this chapter. 
European League for Economic Cooperation, 1946-1980 
The European League for Economic Cooperation was, and still is, a transnational 
study and lobby network of major European businesses. Considering the lack of 
attention from historians, even in a time when scholarly interest in transnational 
lobbies with regard to European integration is growing, one must conclude that it 
has been largely overlooked. 
 That may partly have been caused by ELEC's initial activities from 1947 until 
approximately 1950. In those years the ELEC clearly was not a straightforward 
business lobby. It was led by personalities from politics and public administration, 
and it was an integral part of the European Movement. In that setting, according to 
Heribert Gisch, the ELEC functioned as an unspectacular and seemingly neutral 
“sub-committee on economic questions”, an “informal adviser”, to the European 
Movement which was led by a “body of experts.”66 
 However, Michel Dumoulin and Anne-Myriam Dutrieue investigated the ELEC 
for the period 1946-1981 and argued that the organization changed considerably 
after 1950. They conclude that it then became a “study and action movement in 
European matters.” According to them the dominant membership from industry 
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and banking, and their ideas, made it a “movement of liberal inspiration” and a 
“movement of employers.”67  
 Despite this awareness of strong business involvement, Dumoulin and 
Dutrieue failed to seriously employ a business perspective and insufficiently 
acknowledged ELEC's overbearing identity as a business association. Dumoulin & 
Dutrieue did not relate ELEC's work to preoccupations of European business. 
Moreover Dumoulin & Dutrieue consciously avoided the dynamic between ELEC's 
different national sections. This book will attempt to fill these gaps in the empiric 
sections. The following offers an overview of ELEC's founding period, its reorgani-
zation into a business association and the role of businessmen in its work.68  
Founding ELEC, 1946-1949 
The ELEC was founded at the initiative of the Polish diplomat Joseph H. Retinger. 
In May 1946 he approached Paul van Zeeland, a former Prime Minister of Belgium, 
with the suggestion to create an international organization to advance the future of 
Europe. Considering Europe's devastated economy after WWII, they concluded 
that their goal should be to “revive the concept of the unity of Europe by applying 
it first to the economic field.”69  
 The cooperation between Retinger and Zeeland rooted in their activities in 
London during World War II. Both were closely involved in their exiled govern-
ments' planning activities on the post-war social order. Retinger was an advisor on 
international affairs to General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish government 
in exile. Zeeland led the Commission pour l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-guerre 
(CEPAG) from 1941 to 1942, the post-war planning organization of the Belgian 
government in exile. Their efforts clearly were of value for their later activities in 
the ELEC. Zeeland's work resulted in a plan for a new international system, involv-
ing the reduction of obstacles to trade and the creation of international institutions 
for overseeing monetary policy and transport. The institutions that Zeeland pro-
posed thus did not yet stress the European dimension.70 
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Joseph Retinger's post-war planning efforts also involved participation by Paul van 
Zeeland. From 1943 onwards, the Polish government in exile organized meetings 
with other exiled governments from the continent. The aim was the creation of a 
post-war bloc of European allies. Paul van Zeeland participated as the Belgian 
liaison to the Polish government and met Joseph Retinger. Other countries in-
volved were the Netherlands, Greece, Norway, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.71 
 Their joint stay in London had provided Retinger and Zeeland with a range of 
international contacts which were later mobilized in ELEC's founding phase. In 
1946 Retinger met with Pieter Kerstens, a former member of the Dutch exiled 
government in London, and Roger Motz, one of the directors of the Belgian Com-
mission pour l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-guerre in London. Kerstens and Motz 
both would lead the Dutch and Belgian sections of the ELEC. The first formal act of 
ELEC's founding phase took place on the 17th of October 1946, when Retinger and 
Van Zeeland created a committee to prepare an association “for the solution of the 
continental problem of Europe.” It was planned to be populated by private citizens 
with considerable national and international standing from France, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Greece and Poland. This association was to be called the 
Independent League for Economic Cooperation (ILEC).72 
 Paul van Zeeland's conceptions of post-war global international relations 
clearly influenced ILEC's initial goals. The association saw Europe as a group of 
economic regions which should be integrated. Moreover, its members felt that 
Europe should be integrated in an even larger order of regions under the umbrella 
of the United Nations Organization, thus achieving a “gradual reconstruction of the 
world.” ILEC was aiming for the reconstruction of the European economy by asking 
European governments to open their markets.73 
                                                                  
71 In his memoirs, Retinger claimed that the meetings were held with the “underlying idea” to “prepare 
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Dutrieue (1993). La Ligue, pp. 23-24. 
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role in Europe's integration in global relations went quite far: ILEC's Central Council was planned to 
include members from France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Italy, Greece, Yugosla-
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LECE, inv. nr. 9, 15-02-1947, Ligue Indépendante de Coopération Européenne, Préambule & Mémoran-
dum Préliminaire; inv. nr. 1, 2 et 3 mars 1947, Ligue Indépendante de Coopération Européenne. Mémo-
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Economic Union, step by step 
However, ILEC was never realized in this form. The United States intervened in the 
rapidly worsening economic situation of Europe and offered financial assistance, 
which became known as the Marshall Plan (5 June 1947). In exchange the Ameri-
can government forced Western European states to jointly plan the allocation of 
the offered aid. ILEC quickly realized that the impetus for its existence had now 
been replaced by official governmental action.74  
  ILEC now adopted a different strategy, consisting of active cooperation with 
several other movements for European unity. As a result, ILEC became one of the 
movements that collectively organized the well-known European Congress in The 
Hague in May 1948 and was one of the founding members of the European Move-
ment with Joseph Retinger as its secretary. Furthermore, ILEC was renamed as 
ELEC.75 
 Altogether, ELEC's involvement with the European Movement was not a suc-
cess. It occupied itself with studying and proposing plans on economic cooperation, 
but in doing so, it had voluntarily curtailed its independence and became associat-
ed with quite diverging ideological conceptions of European cooperation. It devel-
oped into something of an economic subcommittee of the European Movement, a 
role which led to tensions towards the end of 1949.76 
 The official installation of the European Council in September 1949, was seized 
as an opportunity to create some distance between ELEC and the other movements. 
The British representative to ELEC's Central Council, Edward Beddington-Behrens, 
proposed to “organize E.L.E.C. on a wider national and international basis. Now 
that the Assembly is an accomplished fact, it is important to develop an organiza-
tion […] with defined economic objectives, on subjects which are essentially practi-
cal and non-party.” Paul van Zeeland shared the “feeling that E.L.E.C. should in-
crease its activity and independence.”77 
 Another reason for reclaiming independence was the increasing ideological 
competition inside the European Movement on how to proceed with regard to Eu-
rope's future. Other organizations that participated in the European Movement, 
such as the Mouvement pour les États-Unis socialistes d’Europe and the European 
Union of Federalists had become much more active and influential in the course of 
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1948 and had started a federalist campaign in order to convince European gov-
ernments of replacing the nation-based pre-war order with a European society.78 
 This was at odds with ELEC's views on the future of Europe. In March 1947, 
the organization still conceptualized economic cooperation within Europe as 
something that could be achieved by merely reducing obstacles to trade. At that 
time the term “integration” was much less commonly used. However, towards the 
European Congress of May 1948, ELEC’s plans had become much more complex. 
The suggestion of European economic cooperation had given way to a terminology 
of “economic union.” This union would be based on a customs union, with coordi-
nated tariffs and free movement of capital and labour, or, in other words, a Com-
mon Market. Moreover, ELEC’s leaders had come to believe that a manifold of 
common policies were required to improve European productivity. They suggested 
policies on employment, on the coordinated relocation of industry, the stabiliza-
tion of exchange rates, the removal of quotas on trade and transactions, co-
ordination of credit policy, steel and energy and international control of the Ruhr 
industries. Finally, they did not believe in one all-embracing move to such an eco-
nomic union: “The Union cannot be brought about all at once. It will clearly be a 
gradual and organic process, moving by stages towards the freeing of trade in the 
territory in accordance with a co-ordinated plan.” The ELEC preferred gradual, 
functional steps, a conception of process that was at odds with the views of the 
federalists, who wished to make a clean break with the Europe of the past.79 
 Irritation peaked in ELEC during January 1950. The European Movement had 
planned a vote on a resolution that demanded a federal pact among Western Euro-
pean governments which led to rejection by ELEC. The organization decided to 
instruct the four ELEC-delegates in the Bureau and Executive Committee of the 
European Movement to block the vote, joining non-ELEC British representatives in 
the European Movement who had already rejected the proposal. Furthermore it 
was unanimously concluded that a constitutional federation for Europe was “a 
very long term goal.” Since then, while never officially leaving the European Move-
ment, ELEC's Central Council hardly ever discussed the actions of the European 
Movement again.80  
A new organization 
ELEC's reorganization transformed it into an autonomous transnational study and 
pressure organization. Its operations were now centralized. Until late 1949, ELEC 
essentially had been a collection of national organizations within the United King-
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dom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. No central body existed. 
Now a Central Council was founded, which became the main decision-making plat-
form. Its task was to initiate and direct collective studies and to decide on the pub-
lication of studies and resolutions.81 
 Since early 1950, the Central Council met about five times a year. It was com-
posed of the President, the Secretary General, the formal representatives of na-
tional sections, or Vice-Presidents, and a group of deputy members. It started out 
as a group of twenty men, which became larger as a result of new national sections 
that were founded over the next decades. By 1980 it reached the size of 44 mem-
bers.82 
 In addition to the initial five sections, twelve more were founded between 
1950 and 1972 (see table 2.1). Most of them were rather unimportant to ELEC's 
activities  however.  They  were  kept  informed  of  ELEC's work and participated in 
 
Table 2.1: Founding years of ELEC's national sections.83 
National Section Founding Year
France 1946
United Kingdom 1946
Luxembourg 1946
Belgium 1946
Netherlands 1948
Germany 1950
Italy 1950
Austria 1951
Spain 1956
Switzerland 1959
Sweden 1962
Norway 1965
Turkey 1969
Ireland 1971
Monaco 1971
Denmark 1972
Lichtenstein 1972
 
meetings but hardly ever played a role in its strategic decisions. The sections that 
mattered most were those of Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy 
                                                                  
81 The overhaul of ELEC’s organization was decided on the 10th of November 1949 during an Extraordi-
nary General Assembly; CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 3. 10-11-1949, Assemblée Générale Extraordinaire. 
82 See Table A.8, in the Appendix. 
83 ELEC's publications. Each contained information about the composition of ELEC's Central Council and 
the leaders of the national sections. See Sources, following chapter 7, for the complete list of all ELEC 
publications. 
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(though not between 1953 and the late 1960s) and the United Kingdom. Their 
representatives generally determined the content of resolutions and publications 
(see chapters 4 to 6). 
 In March 1950, the ELEC also founded three standing commissions that would 
be devoted to studying current affairs regarding the integration of Europe. The 
first was the “monetary commission.” The second was the “economic commission” 
which would focus on the reduction, and possible abolishment, of customs tariffs in 
Europe and overseas. Thirdly, the “commission of institutions” was created, later 
renamed as the “legal commission.”84  
 The commission's mandates were determined by the Central Council. Pro-
posals for study mostly originated in national sections, after which the Central 
Council took a decision. Often the author of the initial proposal assumed the posi-
tion of rapporteur, who was in charge of processing all the input from the study 
commissions or the Central Council. In other words: the rapporteur repeatedly 
consolidated the process of consensus-building into a new, temporary, consensus. 
Ultimately the Central Council decided on the final text before its publication.85 
 To describe this process of study and negotiation, Dumoulin and Dutrieue use 
the term “transnational laboratory”, referring to a refining process of transforming 
a diversity of national perspectives into feasible proposals with a European scope. 
However, this does not mean that everyone inside ELEC always welcomed the end-
result: unanimity was not a goal in itself. Interestingly, since real interests were at 
stake, negotiations about the wording of final texts were common, especially be-
tween 1950 and 1958. For some, agreeing to statements that deviated too much 
from positions within their national government or parliament was unthinkable 
without carefully weighing the wording, or adding disclaimers.86 
Business takes over ELEC 
Initially Paul van Zeeland and Retinger intended to shape ELEC as an organization 
of nationally and internationally well regarded individuals without official func-
tions. The first President of the Dutch section, Pieter Kerstens, a senator and for-
mer Dutch minister of trade was such a figure, as was the leader of the Belgian 
section, senator Roger Motz, a former Minister of the exiled Belgian government in 
London and President of the Belgian liberal party. The French and British sections 
were led by former public administrators: Daniel Serruys from France, an experi-
enced negotiator of international economic treaties who had recently become a 
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director at Saint Gobain, and Harold Butler, who had worked on foreign trade 
strategies before the war.87 
 Over a very short period, this mix of internationally well regarded statesmen 
and public administrators was almost entirely replaced with leaders from banks, 
large industrial multinationals, major exporters, and financial-industrial holdings. 
A selection of members of the most important Belgian, Dutch, German, French and 
British sections will illustrate this. The database included in the appendix lists all 
the Central Council members of all the sections.88 
 From about 1950, the Belgian section seized a central role in ELEC by occupy-
ing key functions in its organization. Van Zeeland was replaced as President when 
he became Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1949. After a short interlude, 
when the Dutchman Pieter Kerstens held office, the Belgian Baron René Boël took 
over in 1951 and remained at this post for the next thirty years. He was a major 
shareholder and member of the executive board of the multinational chemicals 
producer Solvay & Cie. and co-owner of several steel producing companies. Other 
influential business figures were Louis Camu, the vice-president of Banque de 
Bruxelles who became the Belgian section's representation to the Central Council. 
Another was Lucien-Léandre Sermon, ELEC's new secretary general, economic 
advisor to Brufina. Both Banque de Bruxelles and Brufina were key elements of the 
financial-industrial holding of Baron Paul de Launoit, who partly financed ELEC. A 
further prominent member of the Belgian section was Pierre de Bonvoison of 
Banque de la Société Générale de Belgique. However, while the Belgian section as a 
whole was clearly under control of representatives of basic industries and indus-
trial finance, they did also consult with other groups in society, including senators, 
and the former minister Paul de Groote, leader of the Belgian socialist party and 
member of ELEC's Central Council.89 
 A similar balance between industrial interests and other societal interests 
could be observed in the Dutch section. After Pieter Kerstens stepped down, Dutch 
industry re-established the section in 1950. It was presided over by Pieter Bentz 
van den Berg who was a director of steel producer Koninklijke Hoogovens. The 
section's executive board consisted of Cornelis Klaasse, Board member of the Am-
sterdamse Bank-Incasso Bank, Jo Meynen, executive director of the multinational 
Algemeene Kunstzijde Unie (AKU), a precursor to AKZO, and F. E. Spat, secretary to 
the board of Philips. Representatives of Shell and Unilever were also members. 
Besides members of the ELEC, Shell, Unilever, Philips and AKU were at the same 
time collectively organized in the so-called ABUP, a study group that lobbied on 
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Dutch trade policy. Shell, Unilever, Philips and AKU, and Koninklijke Hoogovens 
shared the total costs of the Dutch ELEC section which amounted to a sum of 
14.000 florins a year.90  
 The supervisory board of the Dutch section also involved two governmental 
agencies, representatives of several unions, and professor of economics Jelle 
Zijlstra, later a Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs. The executive board however 
remained firmly in the hands of industrial multinationals and banks.91  
 The German section was only founded in 1950 and was chaired by Hermann J. 
Abs, a board member of Deutsche Bank since before the war. He was an authorita-
tive advisor to German industry with a range of mandates in advisory councils and 
he was part of a small circle of advisors to Reichskanzler Adenauer and his Minis-
ter of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard. Together with Richard Merton, former 
chairman of Metallgesellschaft and now chairman of the company's advisory coun-
cil, he represented the German section in ELEC's Central Council. During the 1950s 
the German section was almost completely composed of representatives of heavy 
industry and multinationals, such as the steel producing firm August-Thyssen Hütte, 
the Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken (part of Dutch AKU), Farbenfabriken Bayer, the 
Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik, Siemens & Halske, to name a few, and several rep-
resentatives from banking houses and a small group of academics from several 
German research institutes on international trade.92 
 The French section was mostly a collection of industry and banking repre-
sentatives, but differently so than the other sections. The founding of the French 
section in 1946 was a rather unique move: it consisted of incorporating the entire 
Comité d’action économique et douanière which was a committee of private com-
mercial origin working for the elimination of international trade barriers. After its 
founding the French section gradually became more of a mix of liberals, lawyers, 
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intellectuals, industrialists, bankers and union members. During the 1950s howev-
er, the leadership of the section passed firmly into the hands of representatives of 
organized industry and banking, typically fulfilling multiple positions in the na-
tional business association, the Conseil National de Patronat Français. Key figures 
participating in the Central Council were Edmond Giscard D'Estaing, President of 
the French section of the International Chamber of Commerce, a group of French 
exporters and multinationals; Emmanuel Monnick, honorary governor of the 
Banque de France, and Président of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas; and Pierre 
Ricard, Vice-President of the Conseil Central de Patronat Français. Additionally, 
companies frequently represented in the leadership of the French section were 
Saint- Gobain and Péchiney.93 
 The British section was the only section not led by industry. Its president 
Edward Beddington-Behrens, though presiding over several companies, was first 
and foremost an experienced administrator with special experience in internation-
al organizations. He had worked for the League of Nations and was deeply involved 
in all British activities regarding the European Movement. Other leaders were a mix 
from union-representatives, economists, bankers, public administrators and some 
industrialists. The Central Council did not include any British industrialists.94 
 With this turn in leadership, ELEC's metamorphosis was complete. It devel-
oped from an independent body with a globally perceived strategy for European 
reconstruction, into a business-led study and pressure group on economic issues 
with respect to European integration. 
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Table 2.2: Composition of ELEC's Central Council membership in societal spheres, 1950-1980 (abso-
lute figures).95 
Societal spheres 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Business 12 15 17 20 25 32 34 
Politics 5 1 2 1 3 2 4 
Public administration 1 0 3 2 2 0 0 
Semi-Public administration 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Academic 0 2 3 4 3 2 1 
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Labour 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Media 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Total categorized: 20 21 28 29 36 40 42 
Total membership: 20 21 28 30 38 44 44 
 
Figure 2.1: Relative composition of ELEC's Central Council membership in societal spheres, 1950-
1980.96 
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Central Council composition, 1950-1980 
ELEC's development into a business-led group would last. The database that is 
included in the appendix lists the membership of the ELEC's governing body, the 
Central Council from 1950 until 1980, in seven intervals. Based on individual biog-
raphies, each member was categorized as part of a societal sphere, such as busi-
ness, politics, public administration and others. Considering the membership as 
shown in table 2.2 and figure 2.1 it becomes clear that the members of the Central 
Council from the societal sphere of business was consistently above 60% and from 
1960 onwards steadily climbed to approximately 75%. Other societal spheres such 
as politics and labour played a nearly marginal role. The only societal sphere that 
exceeded a share of 10% for more than one interval were the academics, in this 
case mainly economists.97 
 The ELEC composition was thus dominated by representatives from business. 
One aspect of ELEC's membership deserves special consideration however. The 
League allowed non-business members to be part of their national sections and 
even included a member of the Belgian socialist party and a British union leader in 
the Central Council. Several scholars have stressed this aspect and compared this 
trait of ELEC to the different approach of another transnational voice of European 
business, the Comité Européen pour le Progrès Economique et Social (CEPES). This 
was a study and pressure group similar to ELEC, but it only included German, 
French and Italian sections. ELEC and CEPES became embroiled in a conflict, which 
was rooted in the double membership of Italians of both organizations. ELEC pre-
ferred to absorb CEPES to increase ELEC's representativeness and thus the value 
of its policy papers. However, CEPES' President, Vittorio Valleta, also President of 
FIAT, opposed ELEC's practice of including socialist forces into its advisory ranks. 
CEPES only allowed businessmen and economists as members. The failed attempts 
at collaboration led to the de-facto discontinuation of the Italian ELEC section 
between 1953 and the late 1960s.98 
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ELEC itself disagreed internally about the practice of consultation of representa-
tives of labour parties. The French section, as well as ELEC's secretary general 
Lucien-Léandre Sermon, feared that ELEC would lose access to financial support 
from business if it would continue with this practice. The issue was put on edge by 
a request from the British section in 1951 to have the ELEC include more union 
representatives in the Central Council. The request was declined. ELEC's President 
Baron Boël simultaneously had to deal with several national contexts, and did not 
want to run the risk of alienating entire national sections.99 
 It should be remembered that the Western European context of the early 
1950s was characterized by reconstruction policies and an associated productivity 
ideology that was supported by socialists, christian-democrats and liberals alike. 
However in some countries the capitalist-socialist divide was deeper than in others. 
Polarization especially occurred in France where the communist party played an 
influential role, and a similar situation existed in Italy. Against the backdrop of the 
Korean war, starting in 1950, such tensions were fuelled. These aspects at least 
partly explain some of the conflicts within ELEC. However, the very limited partici-
pation of non-liberal economic ideologues in the Central Council, and the sheer 
preponderance of industrial and financial interests suggests that this was a non-
issue for the longer term: indeed after these conflicts the already minimal consul-
tation of socialists was gradually phased out in ELEC's Central Council's work.100 
Themes discussed, 1950-1980 
From 1950 onwards, ELEC worked tirelessly on the theme of a European market 
without internal tariffs. In addition, ELEC also studied monetary questions, agricul-
ture, the organization of transport, and developmental aid for economically weak-
er regions within Europe. After de Gaulle's rejection of British accession the Com-
mon Market in 1963, ELEC felt that new venues of economic integration should be 
explored. In June 1964 it defined new priorities in the direction of industrial poli-
                                                                                                                                                                 
themes. CEPES appears to have been rather ineffective as a transnational study and pressure group in 
the sense of creating coherent statements geared towards a European polity. Regrettably archives have 
been unavailable to date. See for CEPES: Tedeschi, P. (2006). Une nouvelle Europe à construire. La 
section italienne de la LECE, de 1948 à la création du Marché Commun. Journal of European integration 
history, 12, 87-104. Dumoulin & Dutrieue (1993). La Ligue, pp. 60-64, 122-127. Ramírez Pérez, S. M. 
(2010). The European Committee for Economic and Social Progress: Business Networks between 
Atlantic and European Communities. In K. Wolfram, B. Leucht and M. Gehler (Eds.) (2010). Transna-
tional networks in regional integration. Governing Europe 1945-83 (pp. 61-84). London: Palgrave Mac-
millan. CEPES (1961). Möglichkeiten und probleme einer Atlantischen Partnerschaft. Arbeitstagung der 
deutschen CEPES-Gruppe am 16 Februar 1962. Frankfurt a. M.: CEPES, p. 42. 
99 CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 368, 15-03-1951, Beddington-Behrens to Baron Boël, and, no date, Question 
of Representation of Trade Union on the Central Council of E.L.E.C. Dumoulin & Dutrieue (1993). La 
Ligue, pp. 42-43. 
100 See table 2.2 and figure 2.1. Judt, T. (2005). Postwar. A history of Europe since 1945. New York: Pen-
guin, pp. 203-225, 324-330. 
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cies mainly in response to external competition. This will be discussed further in 
chapter 5.101  
 When after de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 British accession to the Common 
Market again became feasible, ELEC shortly refocused on the EEC’s enlargement. 
After 1972, it saw the need to respond to the oil crises from a mainly industrial 
perspective, which also led to a temporary working group on energy policy. Look-
ing at the entire period of 1950 until 1980, the pinnacle of ELEC's activity lies in 
the 1950s. During the 1970s the declining rate of publications and conferences 
shows that the urgency of ELEC's vision for Europe's economic organization lost 
most of its previous drive. But until the end of Baron Boël's presidency of ELEC, in 
1981, the ELEC remained on top of European developments.102 
ELEC and businessmen 
After 1950, the ELEC became an organization of European business that studied 
and lobbied on issues of European integration. For its members the studies on 
developments of the European market provided basic knowledge for anticipating 
important changes in the European market organization. At the same time, ELEC 
was a pressure group that initially approached European governments and later 
also the European Commission. Viscount Etiènne Davignon, former European 
Commissioner on industrial affairs, the internal market and energy (1977-1985) 
characterizes the members of ELEC as “European militants.” They were European 
business leaders who were convinced that “a future within Europe could be better 
than the traditional means of the member-states.” Moreover, according to Davi-
gnon, they were a group of people that “understood why they were for such a pro-
ject”, meaning that they could oversee the consequences of such a choice and were 
also able to convey why they supported certain moves.103 
 ELEC's topics of concern were broader in scope than the liberalization and 
expansion of international trade: as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, ELEC also 
treated questions such as how to deal with competition from outside the EEC. 
However, precisely which message to convey to national governments and later 
the European Commission was hardly self-evident. Negotiations on the content of 
ELEC's position papers or resolutions were an inherent part of its meetings. This 
process of consensus formation required flexibility instead of rigor, as not every-
body's demands could be met. Businessmen were therefore also strategically in-
volved: they aimed at shaping ELEC's consensus in the direction of their prefer-
                                                                  
101 Both subjects will be discussed in chapter 5. ELEC's work on US investments was not turned into a 
publication, but its work on trade relations with Eastern Europe was. For example: ELEC (1969). The 
Inter-European industrial, technical and scientific agreements : concrete measures with a view to develop-
ing them (Vol. 47). Brussels: ELEC. CEHECLlN, ELEC, inv. 748, 19-06-1964, Conclusions de la Table 
Ronde d'Industriels, pp. 1-2.  
102 See Sources for a full list of ELEC publications for the period 1949-1981. 
103 Interview Viscount Etiènne Davignon (Brussels, 8th of September 2010). 
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ences. The specific role played by industrial and national factors in that process 
will be analysed in the next chapter. 
The Bilderberg meetings, 1952-1980104 
The Bilderberg network was an entirely different organization than ELEC. It did 
not focus on lobbying institutions or governments, nor did it strive for consensus 
among its members. Unlike ELEC's focus on Western Europe, the Bilderberg meet-
ings was a Transatlantic organization with North-American and Western European 
membership. Influential politicians, businessmen, public administrators and policy 
researchers discussed matters of transatlantic defence and international economic 
relations. In an abstract and discursive sense, this basic format of the Bilderberg 
meetings was its key message. The well-prepared discussions between reputable 
and influential Americans, Canadians and Western Europeans, were organized 
with the underlying assumption that as long as the Transatlantic dialogue kept 
going, a bond between the industrialized parts of the world would be sustained. In 
other words, the simple fact that the meetings took place, realized Bilderberg's 
intended function. Valérie Aubourg, one of the scholars who investigated the Bild-
erberg meetings, saw this as Bilderberg's key purpose: nurturing an “Atlantic spirit” 
and establishing a “common understanding.”105 
 At the same time, it is clear that those that presided over and took part in 
Bilderberg's activities felt that more was at stake than this primary and at the same 
time rather general purpose. According to Aubourg, Bilderberg members were 
political entrepreneurs, who put forward differing conceptions on for example 
European integration. In doing so, they opened up complex themes for interna-
tional discussion, and enabled members to test their views in a context of interna-
tional politics and economics. Thomas Gijswijt has added to this picture that the 
                                                                  
104 The only extensive and Bilderberg- focussed archive based study on the Bilderberg meetings is 
Gijswijt, T. W. (2007). Uniting the West: the Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European integration, 
1952-1966. Unpublished dissertation, Heidelberg, Heidelberg. Other work that places the Bilderberg 
group in the wider historiography of similar organizations, networks and themes is Aubourg, V. (2003). 
Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952-1963. Intelligence and 
National Security, 18, 92-105; Aubourg, V. (2004). Le groupe de Bilderberg et l'intégration européenne 
jusqu'au milieu des années 1960. Une influence complexe. In M. Dumoulin (Ed.), Réseaux 
écononomiques et construction européenne. Economic Networks and European Integration (pp. 411-430). 
Brussels: PIE Peter Lang; Aubourg V. (2009) Transatlantische Geschäftsbeziehungen. Die Bilderberg-
Gruppe. In M. Gehler, W. Kaiser B. & Leucht (Eds.), Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 
1945 bis zur Gegenwart = Networks in European multi-level governance. From 1945 to the present (pp. 
69-86). Wien: Böhlau. Contributions that engage less with the historiography have been Aalders, G. 
(2007). De Bilderbergconferenties: organisatie en werkwijze van een geheim Trans-Atlantisch netwerk. 
Amsterdam: Van Praag; Thompson, P. (1980). Bilderberg and the West. In H. Sklar (Ed.), Trilateralism: 
the Trilateral Commission and elite planning for world management (pp. 157-189). Montréal: Black Rose 
Books. 
105 Aubourg (2003). Organizing Atlanticism, p. 103. 
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Bilderberg meetings should also be seen as a platform where individuals “influ-
enced each other.”106 
 Indeed, as will become clear in chapters 4 to 6 some members attempted to 
use the Bilderberg discussions to influence the international debate on certain 
themes. Others experimented with their policy views, testing the response of such 
a diverse yet experienced and responsible audience. Some carefully took notice of 
the direction in which the international debate on transatlantic defence and inter-
national economic relations was going.  
Founding the Bilderberg meetings, 1952-1954 
The story of the Bilderberg meetings also starts with Joseph H. Retinger, the same 
man who laid the basis for the European League for Economic Cooperation. He was 
concerned about a growing anti-Americanism in Europe. According to him the 
increasing global policing role of the United States, as a result of Truman’s far-
reaching containment doctrine, in combination with European remilitarization, 
was causing a rift in Transatlantic relations. He feared that ultimately US support 
for European unification would be withdrawn. In his view such a move would put 
the future of European democracy at risk. In 1952 he again turned to relationships 
from his stay in London, starting with Paul van Zeeland who at that point was still 
the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Soon afterwards he contacted Paul Rijkens, 
Chairman of the British-Dutch multinational Unilever, whom he also knew from 
London. Retinger proposed to Rijkens to set up a study on European anti-
Americanism and to present it to the United States' government. According to him 
this could provide a basis for a conference to discuss the existing tensions. Rijkens 
agreed to the suggestion. In May 1952, he subsequently introduced Retinger to 
HRH Prince Bernhard, Prince-consort of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, with 
whom Rijkens had developed close relations since their cooperation in the Dutch 
Study Group for Reconstruction Problems in London during WWII. A last round of 
advice with Paul van Zeeland convinced Prince Bernhard to take part in Retinger's 
initiative.107 
 After Prince Bernhard agreed to Retinger's plan, a group of eminent Europe-
ans was put together from Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, France 
and Greece, including the Prime minister of Italy, Alcide de Gasperi, and the For-
                                                                  
106 Italics are in the original. Aubourg (2004). Le groupe de Bilderberg; Aubourg (2009). Transatlanti-
sche Geschäftsbeziehungen; Gijswijt (2007). Uniting the West, p. 293.  
107 Rijkens, P. (1965). Handel en wandel: nagelaten gedenkschriften, 1888-1965. Rotterdam: Donker, p. 
137. Retinger & Pomian (1972) Joseph Retinger, pp. 250-251; Gijswijt (2007). Uniting the West, pp. 10-
11. For more on the Dutch Study Group for Reconstruction Problems in London during WWII, see: Ween-
ink, W. H. (2005). Johan Willem Beyen, 1879-1976: bankier van de wereld, bouwer van Europa. Amster-
dam: Prometheus, pp. 190, 218, 224-225. Paulussen, & Blanken (2004). Samenwerking tusschen Neder-
landsche industrieën, pp. 30-31. Wubs, B. (2008). International business and war interests: Unilever 
between Reich and empire, 1939-1945. London: Routledge, pp. 137-141. 
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eign Minister of Denmark, Ole Bjørn Kraft. They decided to investigate the occur-
rence of anti-Americanism in their respective countries.108 
 The results were included in a report which Retinger presented to the Ameri-
can government in December 1952. Due to national priorities however, the US 
government was unable to respond in a timely fashion. In September 1953 Charles 
D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President for International Affairs, requested 
John S. Coleman, the chairman of the automotive firm Burroughs Corporation and 
chairman of the business group Committee on a National Trade Policy to form the 
so-called American Committee and to respond to the European report.109 
 After the European group received the American report a conference was 
planned to discuss a synthesis of the main themes of the reports among 50 well-
respected and important participants. It was held from the 29th to the 31st of May 
in Hotel Bilderberg at Oosterbeek, the Netherlands, thereby starting a tradition of 
annual conferences until today. The first was called “the Bilderberg Conference”, 
but at the next sessions the name “Bilderberg Group” was adopted until 1959, 
when it was changed into Bilderberg meetings. The name “Bilderberg Group” had 
suggested to participants that they would be invited back, but in fact no such guar-
antee existed. Moreover, Denis Healey, Labour politician and member of Bilder-
berg's Steering Committee, had signalled that Labour party participants to Bilder-
berg Group conferences had felt uneasy about being in a “group” with capitalists.110 
Organization structure 
The organization of the Bilderberg meetings was in the hands of the Steering 
Committee. It determined the topics for the annual conferences, decided who to 
                                                                  
108 The group consisted of mainly European politicians, public administrators and businessmen: Paul 
van Zeeland (Belgian Foreign Minister, Christian People’s Party), Max Brauer (Mayor of Hamburg), 
Hugh Gaitskell (British Labour Politician), Alcide de Gasperi (Christian Democrat Prime Minister), 
Major General Colin Gubbins (Former British Special Operations Director, WWII), Ole Bjørn Kraft 
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Mueller (German corporate lawyer), Antoine Pinay (French Conservatives, Prime Minister), Panajotis 
Pipinelis, Lord Portal of Hungerford (Director Barclays Bank), Pietro Quaroni (Italian ambassador) and 
Paul Rijkens (Dutch Chairman of the British-Dutch Unilever concern). Gijswijt (2007). Uniting the West, 
pp. 11-12. 
109 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Bilderberg Conferenties, 1952-1999, nummer toegang 2.19.045 inven-
tarisnummer 1 (hereafter, NL-HaNA, Bilderberg Conferenties, 2.19.045, inv. nr.), September 1952, 
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110 Rheinisch-Westfällisches Wirtschaftsarchief Köln, Abt. 72 , Nachlass Otto Wolff von Amerongen 
(hereafter RWWK, NOWA), inv. nr. 72-377-3, 1-01-1960, Meeting of the advisory committee, Soestdijk 
Palace; 02-02-1960, Otto Wolff von Amerongen to Rudolph Mueller. Gijswijt (2007). Uniting the West, 
pp. 32-35. 
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invite and to select authors for introductory papers for the conferences to inform 
discussion on the major topics. The Steering Committee started as a group of four-
teen men in 1954 but grew quickly, reaching the number of thirty members in the 
early 1960s.111 
 In addition to the Steering Committee an Advisory Committee was established 
in 1960 to assist the chairman, the secretaries general for the United States and 
Europe and the treasurer. While originally this had been a task of the Steering 
Committee, its size had made it difficult to convene regularly. The advisory com-
mittee included representatives of the US, France, the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Italy.112  
 The annual meetings were very much like regular conferences: they revolved 
around presented papers and debate. However, the combination of the importance 
of the guests, the important themes such as transatlantic security and global eco-
nomic conflict, and the confidential character, turned them into meetings of con-
sultative relevance for foreign policy debates that were taking place in internation-
al relations. The conference reports read as an overview of what the different 
camps in the West were thinking at the time, including a discussion on how conse-
quences of major differences could be minimized. As will be shown in chapters 4 to 
6, reaching consensus or policy instructions between all participants was mostly 
impossible, positions were simply too divergent.113 
 Finances for the Bilderberg meetings were mostly arranged by privately 
owned business. The Ford Foundation paid large sums at several instances. In 
Europe, contributions were smaller. Wherever a conference took place the national 
business community was often asked to chip in. For example, for the first confer-
ence in Oosterbeek an amount of 27.000 florins was received from ten Dutch com-
panies, among them Philips, AKU and Shell. The conference in Buxton, United King-
dom, relied on thirteen companies, among them British Petroleum, again Shell, 
Imperial Chemical Industries and Unilever, for an amount of approximately 4700 
Pound Sterling. These companies were personally encouraged to contribute by 
Prime Minister Hugh Gaitskell. Baron de Launoit, a prominent Belgian industrialist, 
donated an amount of one million Bfr. in 1956 to cover the Belgian share for the 
following years.114 
                                                                  
111 See table 2.7, figure 2.2 and the Appendix for the evolving composition of the Steering Committee.  
112 The first members of the advisory committee were: Wilfrid Baumgartner, Denis Healey, Rudolph 
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1960, Prince Bernhard to Steering Committee members. 
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Participants and Steering Committee composition, 1954-1980 
Who participated in the Bilderberg meetings? The simple answer is: the Steering 
Committee. This group visited most of the conferences and co-determined the 
main direction of the Bilderberg meetings. However, between 1954 and 1980, 
1035 different visitors took part in the conferences of which only about 70 people 
were Steering Committee members. A look at the structure of the membership and 
their visiting habits reveals interesting results. First of all, table 2.3 shows that 
participants  in  conferences  were a  mix  of  Americans,  Canadians and Europeans 
 
Table 2.3: Start participation of members of Bilderberg meetings, per country, and start Steering 
Committee membership, 1954-1980.115 
Country Start Participation since: Position in the SCM since: 
Belgium 1954 1954
Denmark 1954 1954
United Kingdom 1954 1954
France 1954 1954
Germany 1954 1954
Italy 1954 1954
Netherlands 1954 1954
United States 1954 1954
Norway 1954 1956
Sweden 1954 1956
Turkey 1957 1958
Greece 1954 1959
Switzerland 1954 1960
Canada 1955 1960
Austria 1955 1973
Iceland 1966 1980
Portugal  1956 No SCM
Finland 1962 No SCM
Ireland 1975 No SCM
Luxembourg 1977 No SCM
Spain 1977 No SCM
                                                                                                                                                                 
résument certaines décisions par le Président du Groupe à la suite d'une conversation avec le Prince 
Bernhard des Pays-Bas, le 1er mars 1956. 
115 International Institute of Social History Amsterdam, Archive Max Kohnstamm (hereafter IISGA, 
AMK), inv. nr. 110, Bilderberg Meetings Alphabetical List of Participants 1954-2001; RWWK, NOWA, 
inv. nrs. 72-377-3, 72-378-3, 72-378-4, 72-379-2, 72-374-2, 72-374-3, 72-374-4, 72-372-5, 72-968-3, 
72-969-1, 72-969-2, 72-969-2, 72-969-3, 72-970-1, Advisory and Steering Committee Minutes From 
1959 until 1977 (except for 1966 and 1968 which are not included in the archive); NL-HaNA, Bilder-
berg Conferenties, 2.19.045, inv. nrs. 30-31-35-41-46. Steering Committee Minutes from 1954 until 
1958. Additionally, this data was completed with conference participation lists included in the Bilder-
berg meetings conference reports of the years: 1954-1959, 1962, 1964, 1967 and 1970-1980. See 
Sources, section Publications of networks, section Bilderberg meetings publications.  
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Table 2.4: All individuals with 11 to 28 visits to Bilderberg conferences, 1954-1980.116 
Nationality Last Name, First Name Number of conferences 
Belgium Snoy et d'Oppuers, Jean-Charles 16 
Canada Griffin, Anthony G.S. 16 
Denmark Terkelsen, Terkel M. 19 
England Bennett, Sir Frederic M. 20 
England Healey, Lord (Denis W.) 19 
England Roll of Ipsden, Lord 14 
England Gubbins, Collin 11 
France Baumgartner, Wilfrid S. 15 
Germany Wolff von Amerongen, Otto 26 
Germany Berg, Fritz 13 
Germany Erler, Fritz 12 
Germany Schmid, Carlo 11 
Italy Agnelli, Giovanni 19 
Italy Cittadini Cesi, II Marchese 12 
Netherlands Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands 24 
Netherlands Beugel, Ernst H. van der 21 
Netherlands Luns, Joseph M.A.H. 16 
Netherlands Kohnstamm, Max 15 
Netherlands Lennep, Emile van 12 
Netherlands Rijkens, Paul 12 
Norway Höegh, Leif 21 
Norway Tidemand, Otto Grieg 13 
Sweden Wallenberg, Marcus 21 
Switzerland Umbricht, Victor H. 12 
Turkey Birgi, M. Nuri 21 
U.S.A. Heinz II, Henry J. 26 
U.S.A. Ball, George W. 26 
U.S.A. Johnson, Joseph E. 26 
U.S.A. Rockefeller, David 22 
U.S.A. Hauge, Gabriel 16 
U.S.A. Collado, Emilio 16 
U.S.A. Dean, Arthur H. 13 
U.S.A. Stone, Shephard 12 
 
                                                                  
116 Ibidem. 
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Table 2.5: Number of visitors in relation to the number of conferences visited.117 
Conferences visited Number of visitors
1 711
2 139
3-5 107
6-10 45
11-20 23
21-28 10
 
(including Turkey) from countries not under Soviet communist rule.  
 A small group of individuals can be described as having a tight knit member-
ship. They are listed in table 2.4, which offers an overview of the persons that vis-
ited more than 10 meetings between 1954 and 1980. Table 2.5 clarifies the degree 
of stability of the Bilderberg meetings membership: 711 of the 1035 visitors only 
participated once. Only 190 people participated 3 or more times in the total of 28 
conferences.  
 The selection of participants was in the hands of the Steering Committee 
members who individually arranged invitations per country. For Germany, this 
was Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President of the steel products trading company 
Otto Wolff. His practices show that the selection process was mostly based on qual-
ity and suitability of an individual with regard to topics on the Bilderberg meetings 
agenda. However, the national committees were asked to retain the balance sug-
gested by the Steering Committee: politicians from a mix of parties, foreign policy 
researchers, economists, public administrators and business representatives.118 
 Since 1961 the Steering Committee developed the awareness that the younger 
generations should increasingly be integrated in its proceedings. Initially nothing 
came of this, but in 1968, four months after the student protests in Paris and New 
York, the Secretary for the European members, Ernst van der Beugel, started a 
more forceful campaign. Claiming that the Bilderberg meetings tended “to be a 
rather one sided group” and “establishment”, he asked of all involved to work to-
wards a 25% participation from the age group of 25 to 40 years old, since they 
were “much nearer to the views of the student generation in vital matters of for-
                                                                  
117 Ibidem. 
118 See for example a letter of Otto Wolff von Amerongen to Rudolph Mueller in which he succesfully 
suggested to replace Hans Günther Sohl (leader of Thyssen) for Kurt Birrenbach, also related to Thyssen 
via its Advisory Board, and member of the Auswärtigen Ausschuss of the German Bundestag as a mem-
ber of the CDU. Or the suggestion of Ernst Falkenheim instead of Berthold Beitz (leader of Krupp), who 
combined functions in Deutsche Shell, and the Bund der Deutschen Industrie, making both alternatives 
broader representatives than merely of two large steel producing companies. RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 
72-377-3, 02-02-1960, Otto Wolff von Amerongen to Rudolph Mueller. 
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eign policy and other relevant problems.” Women were only invited from 1972 
onwards.119 
 Table 2.6 and figure 2.2 show how the Steering Committee membership was 
distributed across different societal spheres of business, politics, public admin-
istration and others. Membership from the societal sphere of business was consist-
ently dominant and almost over the entire period from 1955 to1980 well above 
50%. It even reached more than 65% in 1965. It is difficult to ignore the temporary 
importance of the societal spheres of politics and public administration until 1965, 
which was replaced afterwards by representatives from the societal spheres of 
academics, particularly think-tank personnel, and media.120 
 
Table 2.6: Composition of the Bilderberg meetings' Steering Committee membership in societal 
spheres, 1955-1980 (absolute figures).121 
Spheres   1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Business 8 16 19 18 22 26 
Politics 4 4 5 2 2 5 
Public administration 2 4 1 0 0 1 
Semi-Public administration 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Academic 1 1 1 3 3 7 
Military 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Labour 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Media 0 1 1 2 5 5 
Other 2 1 1 1 1 0 
Total categorized:   18 28 28 27 34 46 
Total membership:   18 32 30 28 37 50 
 
 
                                                                  
119 RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-379-2, 17-11-1961, Meeting of the Advisory committee at the “Century 
Club” New York; inv. nr. 72-372-4, 24-09-1968, Ernst van der Beugel to Steering Committee; inv. nr. 72-
968-3, 5-01-1970, Otto Wolff von Amerongen to Helmut Schmidt; inv. nr. 72-969-1, 24-10-1971, 
Minutes of the Meeting held by the Steering Committee at Soestdijk Palace. 
120 Table and chart 2.7 are based on the database discussed in Appendix 1. See Appendix 1 for a full 
consideration of methodology, sources and the database itself. 
121 Source: see the Appendix. For details on the choices in the table, see the Appendix section Tables and 
figures. 
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Figure 2.2: Relative composition of the Bilderberg meetings' Steering Committee membership, divid-
ed according to societal spheres, 1955-1980.122 
 
Themes discussed, 1954-1980 
The first Bilderberg meetings' themes were based on the reports on European-
American relations. Simply put, two main subjects dominated the discussion: 
transatlantic security, and Western economic relations. Transatlantic security was 
tackled from a multitude of angles, such as NATO strategy and relations, suspicion 
of Soviet military behaviour or specific communist strategies, the place of nuclear 
defence in the Transatlantic alliance, etcetera. Western economic relations were 
mainly discussed from the angle of European integration and the place of the de-
veloping countries in Western policy. After de Gaulle blocked British entry into the 
Common Market in 1963, discussion of European integration stopped to dominate 
the economic themes and was replaced by topics such as the GATT negotiations, 
monetary and financial relations and East-West trade.123 
                                                                  
122 Ibidem. 
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Nationaal Archief (1988). Inventaris van het archief van de Bilderberg Conferenties: Secretariaat, 1952-
75 
From 1968 onwards the goal to work towards more understanding between the 
US and Europe appeared to lose its urgency, especially on economic themes. The 
student protests in Paris and New York in May 1968 had illustrated the need for 
directing attention to internal Western developments instead of to international 
relations. The 1969 meeting in Mariënlyst and the 1970 meeting in Bad Ragaz 
addressed the topics “Elements of instability in Western Society” and the “Future 
function of the university in our society”, both addressing internal political and 
cultural movements. In May 1970, Steering Committee member Anthony G. S. Grif-
fin of the Canadian Home Oil Company, felt entirely at ease in suggesting a future 
theme on “urban development”, noting that “Bilderberg has already wandered 
quite far afield from its original subject matter” [...]. He argued that “we are living 
in an entirely different world now and are absolutely right to be dealing with the 
kind of questions which we discussed at Marienlyst and Bad Ragaz.”124 
 Bilderberg's original purpose of improving European-American relations was 
further undermined by a conflict on potential participation of Japanese members 
in Bilderberg meetings. The Executive Committee had been contemplating the idea 
of organizing a conference that would focus on the development of Japan into an 
economic giant. In August 1970, Ernst van der Beugel explained to his colleagues 
that he felt he had no choice but to invite Japanese participants, seemingly as a 
form of decorum in international relations. He was not fond of the idea, because he 
also feared that once the Japanese were invited, the same diplomatic decorum 
would make it problematic to exclude them from later meetings. The issue led to 
disagreements within the Steering Committee that resulted in the start of a discus-
sion on the exclusively Transatlantic organization of the Bilderberg meetings.125 
 Nixon's decision in August 1971 to end the dollar-gold convertibility and the 
subsequent breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system, suddenly forced a 
decision on that subject. The Bilderberg secretaries Joseph E. Johnson for the Unit-
ed States and Canada, and Ernst van der Beugel for Europe, informed the Steering 
Committee that according to them “the events of this summer had brought about a 
fundamental change.” Bringing back into memory the original purpose of the Bild-
erberg meetings, namely “to bring about a greater extent of understanding and 
mutual confidence” they stressed that “since 1945 there hardly has been a situa-
tion so conducive to distrust and misunderstanding as exists today.” Consequen-
tially, Japanese participation was off the table, since it would only “complicate and 
hamper the frankness of our discussion.” Even David Rockefeller, the influential 
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Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank who reintroduced the subject of Japanese 
membership during the conference of April 1972, was unable to change the minds 
of his fellows in the Steering Committee.126  
 After 1971, the topics became directed towards the crisis in European-
American relations. The oil crisis, starting in October 1973, undermined Western 
relations even more, which led to the ominous and only subject of the 1974 confer-
ence, called “Prospects for the Atlantic world.” But also the economic crisis that 
unfolded during the 1970s became a prominently discussed theme. As a conse-
quence, inflation was a recurrent topic, as was the discussion on the role of the 
state in the future Western economic structure. Topics of Western defence were 
part of every conference.127 
Bilderberg meetings and businessmen 
As mentioned, some scholars have developed insight into what Bilderberg mem-
bers gained from these meetings. Some participants used their presence to test 
concepts and strategies in an international environment and others used the op-
portunity to influence participants from other countries. What did businessmen 
gain from participation? 
 One of the most involved people in the Bilderberg meetings was Otto Wolff 
von Amerongen, Chairman of steel products trading company Otto Wolff (1966-
1986), President of the Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag (1969-1988) and mem-
ber of the Bilderberg meetings Steering Committee from 1956 until 1980. He as-
cribed a double advantage to taking part in the meetings. Apart from creating con-
tacts for his trading firm, he gauged the international perception of German trade 
policies. This was important for example for his work for the so-called Ost-
Ausschuss, a private-public body for the promotion of exports to Eastern Europe, 
Russia and Asia.128 
 Another German, Fritz Berg, President of the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie (BDI) (1949-1971), who took part in meetings during the 1950s, had 
used them to explain German positions on the EEC and the Free Trade Zone. His 
participation was thus more aimed at convincing others about German policy-
directions.129 
                                                                  
126 RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-969-1, 28-09-1971, Joseph E. Johnson and Ernst van der Beugel to the 
members of the Steering Committee, pp. 1-2. 
127 See Nationaal Archief (1988). Inventaris. 
128 Translated from German by the author: “In terms of the economic, and associated political economic 
tasks of Mister Wolff, the further importance of his participation in the Bilderberg meetings is to be 
seen in, that in its framework, on an unofficial basis, the reaction on the foreign economic policy of the 
Federal Republic can be determined, not only of the foreign business world, but also of the foreign 
governmental circles.” RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-377-3, 2-04-59, Bilderberg-Konferenz in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen September 1955, p. 2. 
129 RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-377-3, 2-04-59, Bilderberg-Konferenz in Garmisch-Partenkirchen Sep-
tember 1955, p. 2. 
77 
Baron Daniel Janssen, President of the chemicals firm Union Chimique Belge (1975-
1984), CEO (1986-1998) and Chairman of Solvay (1998-2006) and member of the 
Bilderberg meetings Steering Committee (1969-1985) stressed obtaining up to 
date knowledge as a key interest for businessmen. The Bilderberg meeting of 1973 
which discussed possible venues towards a European energy policy was given as 
an example. The meeting took place only half a year before the first oil crisis would 
erupt in October 1973. According to Janssen the representatives of major oil com-
panies that participated in the meeting truly brought home the message of what a 
possible oil shortage would mean. Those present were thus at least enabled to 
prepare for the worst. However, no scenario had considered a four-fold price in-
crease, as Janssen explained. Even up to date information and well-informed opin-
ion has its limits.130 
 Viscount Etiènne Davignon, former European Commissioner on industrial 
affairs, the internal market and energy (1977-1985), among others Chairman of 
the Société de Générale de Belgique (1989-2001) and Chairman of the Bilderberg 
Meetings (1998-2011), confirms the importance for business to gain an edge in 
information. According to him it is crucial for business leaders to know that “when 
there is a crisis, to know how deep it is, what its consequences are in general and 
for them personally. But also to explain the consequences of their actions to politi-
cians.” Thus, the meetings do not merely resolve uncertainty for the participating 
business leaders. They also provide clarity about their position to other decision-
makers.131 
 With regard to the importance of national viewpoints, Baron Daniel Janssen 
explained that while the national context mattered in the selection of participants, 
contributions during the meetings were based on individual experiences. Instead 
of taking a national position he often found himself defending a European view-
point.132 
 Viscount Etiènne Davignon stated that “the Bilderberg is a joint structure.” 
Participants “do not require preparatory meetings to determine their position.” 
However, Ernst van der Beugel, the European secretary of the Bilderberg meetings 
from 1960 until 1980, explained that the nationalist Gaullists could be considered 
as delegates from the French government. He thought that also the Americans 
could be seen as a national section, “who convened every morning.” Van der Beugel 
saw those preparatory meetings as a sign of “an American mission” to consistently 
stress the virtues of European integration, until at least 1968. Thereafter, Henry 
Kissinger, US National Security Advisor from 1969 until 1975 and Secretary of 
State from 1973 until 1977, began to deemphasize that policy. Despite those pre-
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paratory meetings though, the American group still showed internal differences, 
van der Beugel explained.133 
 Compared with the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings emerge as an entirely dif-
ferent organization. It gave priority to the maintenance of Transatlantic relations 
and focussed on the conflicts of interests between Western Europe and the United 
States in the global economy and Transatlantic security. Until 1963 European inte-
gration was often discussed but it hardly was an all-consuming topic as it was in 
the ELEC. Moreover, in the Bilderberg meetings European integration was often 
approached as a strategic goal for the West in a context of Cold War as will be illus-
trated in chapter 4. The ELEC was often preoccupied with specific details whereas 
the Bilderberg meetings focussed on broad ideas. Additionally, in the Bilderberg 
meetings European integration was placed in a context of Western trade. However, 
after 1963 the dimension of European integration moved into the background and 
was replaced by the more general notion of the European market. 
 Because of the expertise of individuals that were taking part in the confer-
ences, businessmen had access to the most recent information on central topics of 
the global economy and international security. At the same time participating 
businessmen themselves fulfilled a similar role of expertise with respect to other 
spheres of the Transatlantic membership, a position that was used by European 
business leaders to sensitize Americans to the priorities in international trade for 
the European market. To European businessmen the Bilderberg meetings can be 
seen as an ideal platform for participating in international debates and as a context 
in which business views are taken seriously.134 
 At the same time, national perspectives were important. Both Otto Wolff von 
Amerongen and Fritz Berg were keen on keeping an eye out for the national inter-
est, at least during the 1950s. Moreover, the motives of French participants under 
de Gaulle (1959-1969) should be interpreted as outright nationalist which at the 
time also meant anti-Transatlantic. While expertise may have been an important 
factor for participation in the meetings, many derived their expertise from intimate 
involvement with the institutions of national governments. This hybridity of iden-
tities creates problems of interpretation which can only be solved by providing 
ample context in each case.135 
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Trilateral Commission, 1972-1980136 
The Trilateral Commission was again different from ELEC and the Bilderberg meet-
ings. The membership of the Japanese turned it into a very different organization. 
That can also be said in relation to ELEC, that lobbied for European economic co-
operation in a context of already existing intentions for integration within Western 
Europe. The Bilderberg meetings on the other hand, tried to improve long-standing 
Transatlantic relations within the context of a military alliance. As will become 
clear, the Trilateral Commission tried to do both: just like ELEC it lobbied for eco-
nomic cooperation, in this case between the United States, Europe and Japan. At 
the same time, the Trilateral Commission tried to improve Trilateral relations, just 
as was done during the Bilderberg meetings. However, lobbying for economic 
cooperation between European countries was different from lobbying for econom-
ic cooperation between Europe, Japan and the United States. Moreover improving 
relations between Japan and the West was more ambitious than improving rela-
tions between Europe and the United States, if only due to a lack of cultural simi-
larity, or the limited relations existing until then.  
 Scholarly analyses of the Trilateral Commission have disregarded that aspect 
of the complexities of Western-Japanese relations. Instead, they focussed on the 
motives of businessmen behind the Trilateral Commission's lobbying activities. 
The best known accounts were characterized by leftist interpretations of the mul-
tinational corporation in global power-relations. For example, Stephen Gill's Amer-
ican hegemony and the Trilateral Commission utilized neo-Gramscian theory on the 
formation of transnational classes to interpret the Trilateral Commission. He de-
picts the organization's membership as a self-conscious and homogenous, capital-
ist class, that mobilized the Commission to intentionally forward, legitimize and 
consolidate their class' hegemony over other classes in the capitalist economic 
system. Others, such as Holly Sklar, have described the Trilateral Commission in 
more neutral terms, calling it an elite planning organization. Both approaches 
stress its elitist character, the supposedly questionable character of its intentions, 
and the Commission’s illegitimate influence over democratic processes.137 
 After an investigation of the Trilateral Commission's archives a less diabolic 
image of multinational enterprises and their lobbies emerges. The idea of a 
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planned, self-conscious vehicle for the furthering of the interests of a self-
conscious class, or elite planning organization is overstated. Instead, the Trilateral 
Commission was a rather unstable organization, it seems. Initially, from 1972 to 
1974, it had trouble finding its footing because of a lack of enthusiasm for the 
Commission's cause among European and Japanese members. Later in the 1970s it 
struggled with upholding the image that its three sections represented a shared 
worldview while in fact it was internally trying to cope with profoundly differing 
interests. Some of these aspects will become clear below, others will be explained 
in more detail in chapter 6.  
Founding the Trilateral Commission, 1972-1973 
The Trilateral Commission was initiated by David Rockefeller who was a member 
of the prominent Rockefeller oil-family, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank 
and member of the Bilderberg Steering Committee. David Rockefeller's reasons for 
founding the Trilateral Commission were primarily aimed at maintaining workable 
relations between the West and Japan. He personally tried to arrange Japanese 
participation in the Bilderberg meetings by introducing the topic at the Bilderberg 
meeting of April 1972. When this failed he decided to create a new organization.138 
 His underlying motives for founding the Trilateral Commission stemmed from 
worries about the increasing competitive attitudes between the major industrial 
powers of the world. The sudden breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary sys-
tem had shaken relations between the United States, Western Europe and Japan. 
Rockefeller was mainly concerned about governments neglecting the long term 
view as they were “compelled instead to concentrate more than ever on issues of 
the moment”, as he explained in July 1972. He added: “Now is a propitious time for 
persons from the private sector to make a valuable contribution to public poli-
cy.”139 
 In concrete terms the Trilateral Commission was established for developing 
“practical action” instead of mere research endeavours, and for fulfilling its main 
purpose of serving “particularly that community of interest which seeks to avoid 
political conflict between Japan, the European Community, and the nations of 
North America.” The specific mention of the European Community instead of Eu-
rope, is noteworthy. It was the result of an intervention by the Dutchman Max 
Kohnstamm, the European chairman of the Trilateral Commission and a close 
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associate to Jean Monnet. He felt that European participation in the Trilateral 
Commission should be limited to people from the European Community. In re-
sponse to David Rockefeller's surprise about such a request, Kohnstamm stressed 
that “[…] Europeans of power and influence will serve only if they do not view the 
Trilateral Commission as a threat to the E.E.C.”140  
 Between the summer of 1972 and October 1973, the planning group built 
support in their respective national circles and recruited key leaders from Japan, 
Western Europe and the US for the formation of a leading body called the Execu-
tive Committee. The Executive Committee's members on their turn secured funds 
and established national sections.141 
 The members of the Executive Committee met for the first time on the 21st of 
October 1973, shortly after the first news of the OPEC oil embargo to the United 
States and the Netherlands. The first plenary meeting took place as late as May 
1975, the first opportunity for the wider membership to actually meet each other. 
In other words, the smaller Executive Committee meetings initially formed the 
core of the Trilateral Commission, and was its only forum until mid-1975.142 
Differing assessments of trilateralism 
The Trilateral Commission had trouble finding its footing during its first years. In 
preparing the first Executive Committee meeting in October 1973, expectations 
had grown within the planning group for a problem-free and ambitious launch. 
Their enthusiasm however appeared to be premature. The Europeans were less 
eager about the Trilateral Commission than the American and Japanese sections. 
They had not even gone through the trouble of a proper preparation. In spite of 
some national meetings and a hastily arranged meeting of the European members, 
they were still unable to speak with one voice, whereas the American and Japanese 
sections were well-prepared.143 
 The planning group's enthusiasm was however seriously curbed after the first 
discussions on the actual mandate of the Trilateral Commission, a key point on the 
first meeting's agenda. According to their draft “statement of purpose”, the time 
had come to institutionalize diplomatic relations between the United States, the 
European Community and Japan. The Trilateral governments were urged to “com-
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mit themselves to prior consultation on all decisions which affect their interde-
pendence and to avoid unilateral actions which affect adversely the interests of any 
of our three areas.” Moreover the document stated that “cooperation should be 
given an organized and continuous framework” and “[c]onsultation should be 
instituted.” The language breathed the atmosphere of essentially problem-free 
relations between the United States, Europe and Japan.144 
 This was however a bridge too far. No single European or Japanese participant 
was prepared to urge their governments to follow such guidelines. The European 
members judged the declaration as too hopeful of trilateralism and deemed the 
language that was used “euphoric.” The Japanese were not convinced either, mak-
ing clear that they felt that the Trilateral Commission should focus on collective 
study and discussion, not on putting pressure on their respective governments 
with respect to a certain political line.145  
 The draft was greatly altered. Any suggestion of the Trilateral Commission's 
role in multilateral decision-making was painstakingly removed. The proposal of 
institutionalizing diplomatic relations was reformulated as follows: forwarding of a 
“sustained process of consultation and mutual education with our countries com-
ing closer together to meet common needs”, in which the Trilateral Commission 
would “promote among Japanese, West European and North Americans the habit 
of working together”, [...] and “generate the will to respond in common.” Especially 
the Americans expressed disappointment about these changes.146 
 The Trilateral Commission clearly meant different things to the different re-
gions. Moreover, the volatile developments in international relations of the last 
three months of 1973 would place the entire endeavour of the Trilateral Commis-
sion in a different perspective. The start of the Yom Kippur war, OPEC's embargo 
and the reduction of oil exports led to diverging appraisals of the situation by 
American, European and Japanese governments. Their different responses to the 
Middle East problems resulted in an atmosphere of reproach.147 
 These developments convinced Max Kohnstamm in early December 1973 of 
an alternative course for the Trilateral Commission. The original goal of the Trilat-
eral Commission, as he explained, was “the maintenance of the system we had 
lived in for 25 years” and implied the continuation of the liberal economic order in 
which American leadership would be replaced with trilateral leadership. However, 
the unexpected “prudence” of the Japanese and the French during the first Execu-
tive Committee meeting and the recent developments in international relations 
had revealed to Kohnstamm that “there is no preordained harmony between all 
the many faceted interests of Japan, the U.S. and Europe.” He expected that the 
                                                                  
144 RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-1025-1, 25-9-1973. Statement of Purposes, pp. 1-3. 
145 RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-1025-1, 5-12-1973, Bericht über die Sitzung des Exekutivausschusses der 
Trilateralen Kommission vom 21. bis zum 23. Oktober in Tokio, pp. 2-3. 
146 Activities of the Trilateral Commission: Statement of Purposes. (1973, November). Trialogue, 2, pp. 1-
2. 
147 See for a broader introduction into the historical context of the early 1970s, Chapter 6. 
83 
Trilateral Commission's focus on action would be void. Instead, Kohnstamm felt 
that it should “stimulate profound thinking, to search for new ways to mutually 
inform and enlighten, to point out policy options” and “to be an instrument of mu-
tual education of our members.” Through Kohnstamm's reflections the European 
members had confirmed their collective hesitation about an outspoken lobby and 
just as the Japanese, they would be satisfied with a focus on study and education. 
However, the American section was not so easily convinced that this was the right 
course and as will become clear in chapter six they would mobilize the Trilateral 
Commission for the purpose of influencing United States policy.148 
 These developments represented more than mere teething troubles and indi-
cate a structural aspect of the Trilateral Commission during the crisis-ridden peri-
od of the 1970s. As Rockefeller predicted in the founding process, economic na-
tionalism would and did become the norm. Tense international relations also de-
termined behaviour among the Trilateral Commission members from the private 
sector. As Baron Daniel Janssen, a member of the Trilateral Commission during the 
1970s explained: no shared outlook existed among its members on how to arrange 
a trilateral order because the different regions were informed by differing priori-
ties.149 
Organization structure 
The Executive Committee determined the themes of studies and the agenda of the 
annual plenary meetings in which the entire membership could participate. These 
were organized from May 1975 onwards. The chairmen of the three regions met 
several times a year to discuss the Commission's long-term development. Unlike 
the chairmen and the Executive Committee, the wider membership of about 300-
350 persons, was not involved in the Commission's current affairs. In cases of 
special relevance they were consulted by the authors of the Commission's policy 
reports, or Triangle Papers. They were also consulted as part of regional and even 
national meetings. Finally, they participated in the annual plenary meetings. The 
program of these meetings consisted of topical speeches of top-level public admin-
istrators and government leaders, informative seminars and planned discussions 
of the commissioned reports.150 
 For each report the Executive Committee selected a team of three specialists, 
often academics, to prepare it, from each region one. Typically the scholars were 
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not members of the Trilateral Commission. The reports took the form of policy 
proposals to the governments of the three regions. They mostly summed up the 
different options with respect to the topic at hand, and it indicated necessary 
measures to be undertaken by each region. These measures were the result of a 
process of consultations among members and experts. Finally, the report was dis-
cussed at the plenary meetings, and if necessary, adapted afterwards to reflect the 
thrust of the discussion.151 
  Other scholars have assumed that the Trilateral Commissions' Triangle Pa-
pers were a key component in its lobbying properties. However, as became clear, 
lobbying mainly stood high on the North-American section's agenda. Moreover, 
when in 1975 the Trilateral Commission discussed cutting its budget, the Europe-
ans were ready to give up the reports. As Max Kohnstamm made clear: “I do not 
think that our research and our Trilateral working parties are the most essential 
elements.” Similarly, Georges Berthoin, Max Kohnstamm's successor as European 
chairman, stated in 1976 to the entire European section, that “[w]e should put less 
emphasis on the academic side of our activities.”152 
 The businessman Baron Daniel Janssen, from 1975 onwards President of 
Union Chimique Belge and Trilateral Commission member since 1973, confirmed 
that the studies were merely a second or even a third priority. According to him, 
their main use was to provide background information during the plenary meeting 
discussions. Instead he stressed the importance of the discussions of the reports 
among participants of different backgrounds. Especially witnessing the process of 
how certain ideas, suggestions and solutions were recognized, and others were 
discarded was important to him. The meetings themselves mattered a lot.153 
 The question arises how the Trilateral Commission was financed. The Execu-
tive Committee's members secured funds through their own members, contacts 
and relations. Main contributors were private foundations and business. For ex-
ample, between June 1973 and June 1976, the Ford Foundation, the Lilly Endow-
ment, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Charles F. Kettering Foundation and the 
Fritz Thyssen Foundation granted the Trilateral Commission a total sum of approx-
imately, 1.1 million US dollars. Over the same period, General Motors, Sears Roe-
buck and Company, Coca Cola Company, Time Incorporated, Caterpillar Tractor 
Company, Wells Fargo Bank, Exxon Corporation, CBS, and Texas Instruments togeth-
er contributed 190.000 US dollars to the North American section.154 
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The costs for European participation were initially covered through abovemen-
tioned grants and were later gradually replaced by European business contribu-
tions. Figures for 1979 show key contributing companies such as the Danish An-
delsbanken, the Dutch Middenstandsbank (a precursor to the ING bank), Shell, 
Montedison, and Fiat. The German case was different however. In addition to the 
key German business associations, paying 40.000 Deutschmark (DM), the German 
Auswärtiges Amt, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also contributed 20.000 DM. De-
tails of the finances of the Japanese section are unknown.155 
Executive Committee composition, 1973-1980 
Table 2.7 and figure 2.3 show an overview of the composition of the Executive 
Committee of the Trilateral Commission in terms of societal spheres. Also in this 
case the dominance of the business sphere is obvious, lying above 50%. The com-
bination of societal spheres of politics, public administration and academics, all 
policy-making oriented, together make up about 30%. 156 
 
Table 2.7: Composition of the Trilateral Commission's Executive Committee membership in societal 
spheres, 1975-1980 (absolute figures).157 
Spheres 1975 1980   
Business 17 20   
Politics 3 5 
Public administration 3 5 
Semi-Public administration 2 1 
Academic 5 7 
Military 0 0 
Labour 2 0 
Media 1 0 
Other 1 1   
Total categorized: 34 39   
Of total members: 34 39   
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Figure 2.3: Relative composition of the Trilateral Commission's Executive Committee membership in
societal spheres, 1975-1980.158 
 
Thematic development, 1973-1980 
The main reason for founding the Trilateral Commission was the rejection of in-
ternational disorder and the uncertainty that it caused. The initial subjects of the 
Triangle Papers confirm this worrisome outlook. They were preoccupied with the 
crisis in the monetary system and with the general lack of political will to solve 
international problems by means of multilateral solutions. The first reports in 
1973 collectively pointed out the need for adapting the conduct of international 
relations to the interdependence that had come about between industrial econo-
mies.159 
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From 1974 until 1980 Trilateral Commission's studies covered a wide range of 
topics, including energy policy, North-South and East-West economic and political 
relations, global tariffs and trade policies, international rules for exploitation of the 
oceans, the functioning of western democracies, reform of international institu-
tions and diplomatic relations, unemployment, industrial relations and industrial 
policy. When interpreted from the context of a time of economic nationalism the 
reports had a rather provocative ring to them. Their consistent global perspective 
and the technical arguments for international cooperation had little in common 
with the rekindled expressions of protectionism and icy international relations 
that left little room for international cooperation.160 
The Trilateral Commission and businessmen 
The position of businessmen in the Trilateral Commission is not very different 
from their experiences in the Bilderberg meetings. Participating in the Trilateral 
Commission on the one hand ensured a source of information on affairs of interna-
tional economic policy based on the three most important economic regions of the 
world. For example the former Steering Committee member Baron Daniel Janssen 
of the Bilderberg meetings explained that when he started to develop activities in 
Asia, he decided to exchange his position in the Bilderberg meetings for a spot in 
the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission for the purpose of learning 
about the Japanese and their priorities. Similarly, as mentioned, witnessing the 
discussions on the Triangle papers was valuable in itself because they provided 
insight into the dynamic of international problem-solving.161  
 Considering the lobbying aspect it became clear that especially the American 
section undertook efforts in this direction and that the initial leaders of the Euro-
pean and Japanese sections considered lobbying a bridge too far. Seeking influence 
was not an important aspect of the Trilateral Commission. 
 Lastly, as pointed out before, participants from the United States, Europe and 
Japan, including businessmen, shared only few priorities for the global economic 
order. This observation severely undermines the idea of a global capitalist class 
that attempted to forward their joint interests and class' hegemony, as suggested 
by Gill. It moreover means that the interpretation of business views in the Trilat-
eral Commission may be much more useful if they are investigated on a section-
level.162 
 The Trilateral Commission again surfaces as a different organization than the 
ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings. As mentioned it combined aspects of both, a 
lobbying role and a role of managing relations, but both took a different form. Lob-
bying, if pursued, took place in a much less receptive set of relations then the 
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ELEC's work in Western Europe. There was no confessed ambition of European, 
United States and Japanese governments to cooperate on economic matters. More-
over, the Trilateral Commission was actually a pioneer in building relations be-
tween the West and Japan: management of relations could only come later. The 
Trilateral Commission was, unlike the Bilderberg meetings, hardly concerned with 
matters of military security.  
 The Trilateral Commission can best be understood by recognizing the alterna-
tive it tried to offer to protectionism and worsening economic relations that were 
part of the context of the 1970s, along with global monetary disorder, two energy 
crises, high inflation, and unreceptive attitudes between the main industrial re-
gions of the world. In addition to the requirement for businessmen to have up to 
date information on international economic developments in such a volatile time, 
the Trilateral Commission at the same time gave them a platform to clarify what 
they needed to be successful. That even in such an organization businessmen from 
different regions had difficulty agreeing on a shared outlook on the world economy 
implies that they are best seen as in competition with each other. 
Joint Membership 
Now that the composition of all three networks' leading bodies has been discussed, 
a question that remains is to what extent their composition overlapped at any 
point? As was shown the ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission 
are related in their origins. The ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings both had the 
same founders, Joseph Retinger and Paul van Zeeland. The Trilateral Commission 
was founded by one of the central members of the Bilderberg meetings, David 
Rockefeller, who drew on the Bilderberg meetings membership for populating the 
ranks of the Trilateral Commission. This suggests a possible overlap in leadership. 
Table 2.8 offers an overview of the double or triple memberships across the ELEC 
Central Council, the Bilderberg meetings' Steering Committee and the Trilateral 
Commission's Executive Committee for seven selected years between 1950 and 
1980. Contrary to popular views that suggest a multitude of ties between these 
organizations and ascribe world government properties to their joint existence, 
only minor overlaps existed. 
 The links between the networks are thus not expressed in their respective 
leadership. Links across the wider membership of the three networks were in all 
likelihood more numerous but as mentioned the regular members were less im-
portant in directing the groups' purposes. At the same time, the result of little over-
lap in leadership makes sense, as many overlaps would undermine the reason for 
the separate existence of the networks.  
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Table 2.8: Overlaps between the ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and Trilateral Commission's leading 
bodies in the years 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980.163 
Person Year Overlapping membership 
Paul van Zeeland 1955 ELEC, Bilderberg
Joseph Retinger 1955 ELEC, Bilderberg
J.-C. Snoy et D'Oppuers 1965, 1975 ELEC, Bilderberg
Giovanni Agnelli 1975, 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
Max Kohnstamm 1975, 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
Otto Grieg Tidemand 1975, 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
David Rockefeller 1975, 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
Leon J. G. Lambert 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
Carlos Ferrer 1980 ELEC, Trilateral
Henry Kissinger 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
Bruce Maclaury 1980 Bilderberg, Trilateral 
Discussion  
Besides an introduction to the three transnational networks that play a central role 
in this book, this chapter offers insights in the most important differences between 
the three organizations. A few aspect should be noted, that are important when 
reading our analysis in the chapters 4 to 6. 
 The different levels on which the networks operated are the most important 
characteristics to take into account. Whereas the ELEC focussed on integration in 
the European market, the European market was less central to the work of the 
Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. In the last two organizations 
the European market was discussed in relation to developments in world trade. In 
chapters 4 to 6, the investigation of ELEC's activities will likely bring to light the 
motives of European businessmen with regard to European integration, while an 
examination of the role of businessmen in the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilat-
eral Commission offers an opportunity to place these seemingly merely Europe-
motivated views in a Transatlantic and respectively global context.  
 It is also important to take note of the different priorities of the networks with 
regard to their national and regional sections. In chapter 4 to 6 especially the in-
terpretation of the debates among businessmen in ELEC requires consideration of 
nationally formed preferences such as national political-economic priorities. In the 
Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission a sensitivity to major differ-
ences between the sections of the United States, Western Europe and Japan is re-
quired.  
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Lastly, the European members of ELEC were much more engaged in a strategic 
process amongst themselves to move consensus in the direction of their priorities. 
The Bilderberg meetings instead stressed themes that were relevant for Transat-
lantic relations, which placed European and American business-contexts in conflict 
with each other. The Trilateral Commission similarly juxtaposed European, Ameri-
can and Japanese business contexts. The investigation of the work of the Bilder-
berg meetings and the Trilateral Commission in chapters 4 to 6 thus also offers the 
opportunity to test what remained of European business priorities that were ex-
pressed in a context of European integration when they were transferred or ele-
vated to the Transatlantic and global levels of the Bilderberg meetings and the 
Trilateral Commission. 
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Chapter 3  
 
European multinationals in national 
and sectoral contexts 
Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the three transnational networks that are central 
to this investigation. This chapter introduces the main multinational corporations 
that were part of the leadership of the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Tri-
lateral Commission between 1950 and 1980. At the same time they are discussed 
within their national contexts of economic and industrial policy. Additionally, the 
second part of this chapter introduces the main dynamics that occurred in the 
dominant industries to which these firms belonged. The introduction of national 
and sectoral contexts offers a framework for interpreting the business views on 
the organization of the European market that are discussed in chapters 4 to 6. The 
distinctive settings in which corporations developed and operated play a role in 
explaining different positions on how European institutions should administer and 
organize markets. 
 As became clear in chapter 1, the context of the national home market has 
clearly mattered to economic historians and historians of European integration for 
explaining the motives of European business in the process of European integra-
tion. Moreover, the sociologist Richard Whitley has explained how the origin of 
firms from different national institutional contexts and markets determine the 
ease with which a firm from one country can transfer its activities to other coun-
tries that have a similar business system. He also suggests that these views may 
have been consistent with preferences of companies with regard to the European 
market organization when it entered a phase of significant reorganization after 
1950. Following this insight this thesis considers the national context as relevant 
for partly explaining views of European multinationals on aspects of European 
market integration.164 
 However, these nationally determined perceptions intersect with the sectoral 
realities that companies are immersed in. Each firm operates as part of one or 
                                                                  
164 Also see chapter 1. Whitley, R. (1992). The comparative study of business systems in Europe: issues 
and choices. In R. Whitley (Ed.), European business systems. Firms and markets in their national contexts 
(pp. 267-284). London: Sage, pp. 267-272, 276-279. 
92 
more industries in which it controls, competes or cooperates with other firms. 
Under the umbrella of his “dynamic market theory” H.W. de Jong introduced the 
insight that each industry has specific characteristics that co-determine the strate-
gies that firms employ. Following de Jong, this thesis proposes that such sectoral 
characteristics also informed preferences of firms with regard to the organization 
of the European market. This chapter intends to offer an introduction into such 
national and sectoral influences.165 
Interpreting multinationals in national contexts 
This section discusses a selection of companies that were part of the leadership of 
the ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. The selection is 
based on the database that was created on all members of the leading bodies of the 
ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. Some qualifications of 
the selection should be made. It principally comprises the industrial firms and 
financial institutions that were based in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. Corporations from other 
countries were not consistently enough involved in the networks to include them 
in this analysis.166  
 As mentioned, the following national contexts play a role in explaining how 
firms viewed certain aspects of European integration. These national settings focus 
on structural aspects of national economies and the positions of companies in their 
home markets. The described contexts however do not offer an overview of broad, 
national or governmental attitudes towards European integration. Such attitudes 
will be offered in chapters 4 to 6 as they apply to the treated theme. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The post-war trade policies of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding interna-
tional trade were strongly determined by one key component: exports. Although 
after WWII almost all countries in Western Europe tried to promote their exports 
in order to finance their reconstruction programmes, Germany followed a more 
systematic strategy to regain the position of major exporter that it had before the 
war. Under pressure of the Allies the government embraced policies that contrib-
uted to the liberalization of international trade and it became a strong proponent 
of organizing conditions for smooth international payments. It subsidized exports 
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and offered incentives through export insurances. Special subsidies for the im-
provement of export conditions were offered to the industries of coal mining, iron, 
steel and chemicals. Additionally, German monetary policy aimed at keeping the 
Deutsch Mark low.167 
 Of special importance was the German post-war focus on gaining back its 
markets in Eastern Europe, Russia, and later China. In order to achieve this, the 
Ost-Ausschuss, or East-Commission, was created. The government cooperated 
closely with export industries such as steel and chemicals in order to create fa-
vourable conditions for Eastern exports. The Germans were committed to expand-
ing their exports.168 
 German corporations that were particularly active in the investigated net-
works during longer periods of time were strongly connected to heavy industry. 
Most important were Metallgesellschaft, Thyssen, Otto Wolff and Deutsche Bank.169 
 Already before the second half of the 19th century, the Metallgesellschaft be-
came a multinational. It developed as a trading company in non-ferrous metals 
such as copper, lead, zinc and aluminium. It also became active in mining and met-
allurgy. The company created a large, international network of sales subsidiaries 
and foreign mining operations that mainly supplied the United States and Europe 
with raw materials. The company also vertically integrated into engineering. Its 
international position in metal trade was seriously affected by the two world wars. 
After World War II the firm started to invest in the production of machinery, as 
well as in research and development. It developed mainly as an exporter of ma-
chinery. In addition, the firm realized modest volumes of metal-trade. During the 
1960s Metallgesellschaft again began to establish foreign subsidiaries in countries 
such as France, Brazil and South Africa.170 
 Thyssen was one of the successors to the large pre-war steel producing firm 
called August Thyssen Hütte. After WWII the Allies blamed Thyssen and other steel 
producers for aiding the German war effort and destroyed major production assets 
of the firm and broke it up into 16 companies. In this move, steel production was 
consciously separated from mining interests. From 1953 onwards the company 
was able to expand again. In the next twenty years it grew within German borders 
through investments in steel producing facilities and it merged with other major 
German steel producing firms. It moreover became active in international sales. 
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Thyssen's production operations remained within German national borders 
though.171 
 Otto Wolff was a company involved in steel production, the trading of steel 
products and investment goods. It was not a vertically integrated firm like for 
example Thyssen, which controlled all dimensions of steel production. Otto Wolff 
was a loosely connected and decentral group with a variety of activities. Until the 
early 1960s the group developed within Germany and exported its goods across 
the globe. But during the 1960s and 1970s the company also founded subsidiaries 
in Brasil, Hong-Kong, Mexico, Venezuela, Australia and sales agencies in Argentina, 
Chile, Columbia, Peru, Kenya and Iran. It also owned an international trade organi-
zation with branches in Europe, Africa, the United States and Asia. Thyssen and 
Otto Wolff developed several joint ventures for the production and sales of capital 
goods, thereby more or less fusing their interests in the export of steel products.172 
 Throughout the post-war era until today, Deutsche Bank has been one of the 
largest financial institutions of Germany. Shortly after WWII the Allies decided that 
the bank had been such an important concentration of financial power for the 
German war effort that it had to be broken up in ten parts. Some reconcentration 
of these parts was allowed in 1952, but only in 1957 Deutsche Bank regained all of 
its former constituents. As before the war, it remained a mixed bank. It offered all 
the services of a deposit bank while owning important shares in German industry. 
Investing in industry was a major activity and advising those firms a central re-
sponsibility: directors of the bank, Hermann Abs in particular, held positions on 
many supervisory boards such as RWE, Metallgesellschaft, Siemens & Halske or 
Deutsche Shell. The bank had retained some portfolio subsidiaries in several South 
American banks from its sizeable international activities before WWII. From the 
late 1960s onwards Deutsche Bank started to establish new foreign subsidiaries 
again.173  
 The German priorities regarding international trade after the war revolved 
around a continued commitment to exports. In the years after WWII the Allies put 
the German economy on the path towards a liberally organized market. Under 
these circumstances, German multinationals were likely to favour similarly liberal 
conditions on an international level: successful exports required a liberal order of 
international trade. It is also important to note that German industry had lost many 
foreign industrial assets, first during WWI and later during WWII. The loss of for-
eign subsidiaries partly explains the strong focus on exports. Only from the 1960s 
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onwards, German foreign investments would pick up again. In other words, the 
export model was in line with the historical experiences of German industry.174 
France 
Before 1950 French international trade was strongly dependent on its colonies, 
which had allowed France to maintain exports during the interbellum, despite 
contracting international trade. In 1952 the colonies represented a share of 42% of 
total French exports. However, this share was halved over the next ten years as a 
result of decolonization. French exports gradually shifted to Western Europe, 
mainly the EEC. In maintaining this trade France depended more on protectionism 
than the rest of Western Europe to safeguard its national industries.175 
 Compared to other Western European countries, the role of the French gov-
ernment in economic planning and industrial policy has been pervasive. After 
WWII, the government started with comprehensive interventions in the economy 
and introduced the praxis of devising national economic plans. The plans advised 
industry on production goals and influenced management decisions in specific 
industrial sectors. During the 1950s an awareness developed that the protectionist 
attitude of the French government had resulted in an inefficient business-structure 
that was unfit for international competition. The government thereupon decided to 
decrease protectionist measures and increase government planning and assistance 
to aid companies in the adaptation process. This paradoxical planned liberalization 
however still included indirect protectionist measures and resulted in deep gov-
ernmental involvement in entire sectors. For example price controls and foreign 
investment controls were introduced in the chemical sector. Moreover the nation-
alized energy sector guaranteed favourable rates for industrial companies. Addi-
tionally, during the 1960s the government forced flagship firms to restructure 
their organizations. In sum French industry originated from a protectionist envi-
ronment and was accustomed to an interventionist government. As a result, 
French corporate management maintained close relationships to the government. 
Topmanagers often were recruited from the civil service and politics.176 
 The list of French multinationals involved in the leadership of the networks 
examined in this research includes well known industrial firms and industrial-
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financial dynasties: Péchiney, Saint Gobain, Rhône Poulenc, IMetal and Marine-
Wendel. They were active in the production of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, glass, 
steel and non-ferrous metals such as aluminium and nickel. Péchiney, was, and still 
is, one of the largest aluminium producers in the world. Its production sites were 
predominantly in France, but the company started to expand abroad since the 
early 1950s, first in the French colonies Cameroon and New Guinea, and later in 
Argentina, Brazil, Greece and the Netherlands. The firm also actively developed a 
position in chemicals and mining products such as special metals and uranium. As 
mentioned, from the 1960s onwards the French government intervened in the 
structure of French firms. It felt that it was essential for French firms to head of 
foreign competitors by creating larger industrial groups. Péchiney responded to 
this policy by absorbing smaller firms in the area of special metals, and undertook 
a large merger with Ugine Kuhlman in 1971, another aluminium and chemicals 
producer. The new Péchiney Ugine Kuhlman, or PUK, formed one of the biggest 
groups of the country.177 
 Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Saint Gobain has been one of 
the key competing glass producers in Europe, owning many production sites 
across the continent. It also held a share in the production of chemicals. In 1969 
the same government-induced drive towards industrial concentration led Saint 
Gobain and Péchiney to combine the dominant parts of their chemical operations in 
a separate group which was bought by Rhône Poulenc. Shortly afterwards, in 1970, 
Saint Gobain merged with glass and chemicals producer Pont-à-Mousson, together 
focusing on glass, forming Saint Gobain-Pont-à-Mousson.178 
 Chemicals producer Rhône Poulenc was one of the most research-intensive 
companies of France, with a strong presence in agricultural chemicals, artificial 
fibres and pharmaceuticals. After its acquisition of the chemicals divisions of Saint 
Gobain and Péchiney, it became the largest company of France in 1969. Until then 
however, Rhône Poulenc had hardly developed its presence and experiences out-
side France, as it had enjoyed its protected position behind tariff walls. When in-
ternational competition increased due to the European Common Market and for-
eign investments, the company started a badly timed phase of international expan-
sion. The 1970s turned out to be a time of general decline of the global chemical 
sector, due to energy crises and the economic crisis.179 
 Other recurrent companies in the study and pressure networks were mainly 
involved in mining and metals production. One of them was the Spain-based min-
ing and mainly non-ferrous metals processing company Peñarroya, a world leader 
in zinc by 1961, but also active in iron and uranium. Another important player was 
Société Le Nickel, a nickel-treating company. Both heavily drew on Rothschild fami-
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ly investments and merged in 1967. After the energy crisis of 1973, the company 
began to increase its foreign investments. It acquired the iron and uranium mining 
company Mokta, together forming the group Imetal. Subsequently the United 
States based Copperweld, the Lead Industries Group based in the United Kingdom, 
and Compagnie Francaise Minerais d'Uranium were added, competing with 
Péchiney as provider of uranium fuel for the French government's ambitious plans 
regarding nuclear energy.180 
 Also leaders of the steel company Sacilor played a role in the study and pres-
sure networks examined in this thesis. It had been created by the De Wendel family 
in 1973, thereby combining most of the Lorraine steelmaking activities. It was 
merged with the Marine-Firminy group, the Creusot steelmaking activities, forming 
the Marine-Wendel group. To restructure the group, the French Government na-
tionalized it in 1975. This is a further illustration of the French interventionist 
approach towards its basic industries.181 
 A firm that arrived on the scene of the study and pressure networks during 
the 1970s was Electricité de France (EdF). This government-owned company was 
the result of the nationalization of the entire French electricity industry in 1946. 
Until the 1960s, EdF had achieved an important share of hydroelectricity in its 
production methods. Higher and more diversely timed demand led EdF to turn to 
oil which became the companies' dominant energy source in 1973. The oil crisis of 
1973 subsequently sparked a combined ambition of the government and EdF to 
replace oil with nuclear power. This was the start of the most comprehensive nu-
clear energy investment plan in Europe. As will be discussed in chapter 6, these 
plans quickly confronted the company with the international sensibilities regard-
ing uranium supply, which in the French market were largely in the hands of 
Péchiney and Imetal.182 
 Finally two French banks should be mentioned, due to their early involvement 
in ELEC: Crédit Lyonnais, an in 1946 nationalized general bank that mainly fi-
nanced French firms, and the privately owned Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas. This 
bank was originally mainly active in the former French colonies.183 
 In sum, the French context was thus shaped by an interventionist government 
and a protected industrial structure, gradually preparing for international compe-
tition. 
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The Netherlands 
The Dutch economy was mainly characterized by a strong degree of trade liberal-
ism and freedom of entrepreneurship in which trade and exports became the 
backbone of economic activity. Before WWII, Dutch governments preferred a lais-
sez faire style of economic policy. After 1945 however, the government started to 
actively intervene in the development of the Dutch economy by creating favoura-
ble conditions for industry and the development of the welfare state. However, 
when in 1949 a comprehensive industrialization strategy was announced, this was 
done without strong intervention in industry. The government limited itself to 
offering incentives for investments and tax reductions for industry. The most im-
portant aspect of post-war governmental involvement was the system of guided 
wages, which was the result of institutionalized consultations between employers, 
unions and the government. The system ensured relatively low wages until well 
into the early 1960s, which was of key importance to the expansion of export-
based companies within Dutch borders.184  
 The longstanding liberal approach to international trade, as well as the small 
domestic market, led to the emergence of several successful multinationals. These 
firms, Royal Dutch/ Shell, Unilever, Philips and AKZO (AKU before 1969), but also 
Koninklijke Hoogovens, had a determining influence on the Dutch economy. The 
basis for most of these firms was created before WWI. Their international expan-
sion took off during the 1920s and 1930s. The protectionist measures that were 
introduced across Europe in that period forced export-focussed firms such as Uni-
lever, Philips and AKU to relocate part of their production to those protected mar-
kets. They were also the firms that were involved in the leadership of the study 
and pressure networks studied in this book.185 
 It is important to stress the degree of international distribution of these firms. 
Unilever already was a very internationalized company before WWII. Not only was 
it an Anglo-Dutch merger, it operated production, research and marketing facilities 
all over Europe, and it sold products and owned productions assets such as planta-
tions all over the world. The product lines were mainly based on margarine and 
soaps, which shared the feedstocks of edible oils and fats. When the innovation of 
synthetic detergents since WWII largely replaced soaps, Unilever shifted to the use 
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of petrochemicals as a feedstock. Later it continued to expand and diversified its 
involvement in foods.186 
 Royal Dutch/Shell similarly was (and is) an Anglo-Dutch merger. Since the 
1920s it was, and still is, one of the major private oil companies of the world, own-
ing large reserves in the Middle East, the Americas, and in other regions. In addi-
tion to oil it developed a strong natural gas branch. Alongside the delivery of oil 
products it also developed a second to none petrochemical industry, spread across 
the world. In the early 1970s circumstances deteriorated. OPEC member states 
seized control of their national oil assets. With it, they gained the price setting 
power that formerly had resided with the oil companies. These events ushered in 
the growth of national oil companies.187 
 AKU, later AKZO, was also active in chemicals, primarily artificial fibres, which 
remained its key product line until the 1970s. AKU also was the result of a success-
ful international merger, though in this case between the Dutch Nederlandsche 
Kunstzijdefabriek and the German Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken. Shortly after 
WWII the company had production sites in the United States, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Spain, Italy and Austria, and established factories in Mexico, Columbia 
and India. In 1969, it merged with the Dutch chemicals, coatings and pharmaceuti-
cals producer Koninklijke Zout Organon, forming the multidivisional company 
AKZO. Its dependence on petrochemicals for the production of artificial fabrics 
subsequently forced it to intensify its diversification into coatings, special chemi-
cals and pharmaceuticals.188 
 Leaders of Koninklijke Hoogovens were continuously members of ELEC from 
1950 until at least 1980. Hoogovens is a steel producer located at the coast of 
Ijmuiden, which began production in 1924. After the war the company received 
governmental support to expand its activities. The company reached an approxi-
mate share of 3,5% of total steel production in 1967 in the European Coal and Steel 
Community. It diversified by acquiring subsidiaries in aluminium, oil, gas and coal 
production. In 1966 the firm merged with Hoesch, which in 1972 formed Estel, 
thereby becoming the fourth steel producer in Europe. However, the steel crisis 
that began in 1975 forced Hoogovens and Hoesch to de-merge by 1981.189 
 A last major Dutch multinational to be mentioned is Philips, a producer of 
lighting products and consumer electronics. Although not in a leading position in 
any of the networks, it is necessary to introduce the firm here due to the important 
influence of Philips-personnel on the ELEC during the 1950s.190 
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Philips' international expansion also took place before WWII. Originally, the com-
pany depended on its exporting capacity. However, as a result of the proliferation 
of import tariffs during the interbellum, Philips established production facilities 
across Europe and the United States. It also expanded to Latin America, South 
Africa and Asia. Philips' post-war development was focussed on its mainly Europe-
an presence. Its established structure of national production facilities, including 
country specific marketing strategies, remained a core aspect of the firm until the 
1980s.191 
 Two banks also require a short introduction: from 1975 onwards Dutch bank-
ers partly replaced industry in the transnational networks investigated in this 
thesis. These were ABN, a bank with a consistent focus on international financial 
services, its chief Dutch competitor Amro, which focussed on investments in busi-
ness in the Netherlands, and Rabobank, which was traditionally focussed on agri-
culture, an important export sector for the Netherlands. The main developments 
that governed the financial sector after WWII will receive further attention in the 
second part of this chapter.192 
 Business historians have identified the international distribution of particu-
larly Philips and Unilever as an important reason for supporting European integra-
tion during the 1950s. The senior management of Philips and Unilever thought to 
be able to take advantage of the resulting large and unified market by reversing the 
decentralization of these firms during the 1920s and 1930s. Centralization of pro-
duction would generate economies of scale. Internal conflict within management 
and unaccommodating unions ultimately prevented a quick implementation of 
these strategies. However, the experiences of the Dutch multinationals yield im-
portant insights: several multinationals based in a small market with liberal tradi-
tions as the Netherlands responded in a very specific way to the economic condi-
tions of the Interbellum. This resulted in a similarly specific support for European 
integration during the 1950s. As such conditions were also prevalent in Belgium 
such explanations might be generalized to some of those firms as well.193 
 In sum, Dutch multinationals emerged from a non-protectionist, small market 
environment with a large degree of freedom of entrepreneurship. Moreover the 
Dutch firms had created many production sites outside the Netherlands, quite 
different from the German firms that until the late 1960s had mainly developed 
their industrial structure within German borders.  
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Belgium 
The Belgian business membership of the transnational networks was formed by a 
recurrent small group of financial holdings of industry that owned and oversaw 
the profitability of most of Belgian national heavy industry. These holdings were 
under control of a few very wealthy families: the Solvay group, the Launoit group, 
the Lambert group and the Société Générale de Belgique. The Belgian financial hold-
ings of industry developed within a very open economy, with low tariffs. Industry 
was accustomed to international competition and little intervention by the Belgian 
government. The proliferation of high tariffs in the 1930s locked Belgian industry 
in on its small home market and forced it to expand on international markets. 
Except for the coal sector, industry was strongly geared to foreign markets, with 
the mentioned holdings controlling or participating in numerous foreign invest-
ments.194 
 The holdings are a Belgian phenomenon that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression. They were the result of a government decision in 1934 to force 
mixed banks to choose between deposit and investment banking. One of the coun-
tries' major mixed banks was Société Générale de Belgique (SGB). Originally it was 
founded in the early 19th century to assist the industrialization. It played an im-
portant role in developing and controlling the countries' infrastructure, public 
transport and utilities but it also invested in coal and steel production, the glass 
industry and the chemical industry. In 1934 these possessions were separated 
from the deposit branch and continued separately as an industrial investment 
bank. Its ownership was shared by the prominent families of Belgium, the Solvay's, 
the Boël's, the Janssen's, the Launoit's, the Empain's and the Lambert's, all having a 
voice in its investment policies.195 
 Belgium's other pre-1934 major mixed bank was Banque de Bruxelles. It was 
owned by the Launoit family and presided by Paul de Launoit. The bank was also 
broken up in a deposit bank, keeping the name Banque de Bruxelles, and a financial 
holding, Brufina. Brufina absorbed the bank's major investments in coal and steel 
production, transportation and electric power generation. Paul de Launoit also 
controlled the important steelworks of Ougrée-Marihaye.196 
 Another group was owned by the Lambert family whose assets were concen-
trated in the Banque Lambert and the financial holding Compagnie Lambert. The 
holding had many participations in Congolese firms. Léon Lambert became the 
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post-war animator of the group who tried to increase its control over Belgian in-
dustry since 1949. Gradually he added industrial participations to his Compagnie. 
In 1972 he merged his holding with the interest controlled by Paul de Launoit, the 
Banque Bruxelles and Brufina.197 
 The Solvay group was no bank but a producer of chemicals, founded in 1863 
as Solvay & Cie. Its success was based on the development of an efficient process 
for the production of soda ash, an important chemical for the production of glass, 
steel, soap, and other industrial products. Based on its superior process the com-
pany expanded in Europe, Russia, Brazil and the United States, becoming one of the 
largest chemicals producers in the world in 1913. After WWI Solvay diversified 
into the production of glass and played a role in the establishment of another 
chemicals production company in 1927, the Union Chimique Belge (UCB), which 
gained control over the Belgian rayon industry. However, its Russian plants were 
earlier already lost during WWI, and after WWII the group's investments in Central 
and Eastern Europe were expropriated, hitting the company hard and in effect 
concentrating its main operations in Western Europe. Until the 1960s the group 
mainly produced bulk chemicals, such as soda ash, caustic soda and chlorine. In 
1949 the firm began producing plastics and during the 1970s the firm expanded 
into pharmaceuticals. After the introduction of the Common Market the important 
advantage of having factories in most Western European countries became a dis-
advantage as competitors began to found central production-sites for the entire 
European market. As a result of the Common Market the company's structure 
became a liability and required a response in terms of cost reduction. The Solvay 
group has been primarily in the hands of the Solvay family, including the closely 
related Janssen’s and Boël’s.198 
 The Belgian holdings share an important feature with Unilever, Philips and 
Akzo. Between WWI and WWII they also invested abroad to cope with the import 
barriers that were erected across Europe, which resulted in widely distributed 
participations in European industry. The Solvay group stands out: already before 
WWI it developed a widespread, multinational industrial structure around its core 
activities.  
Italy 
Italian membership of the transnational networks from business was limited to 
two major industrial groups, Fiat and Montedison. In Italy, industry operated under 
a governmental style that paradoxically combined protectionism with trade liber-
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alization. While lowering tariffs, the government directly supported national in-
dustries. For example during the late 1940s and early 1950s the government cre-
ated favourable circumstances for Fiat by including it in the allocation of Marshall 
Plan funds and by offering the company steel at reduced prices through the na-
tionalized steel industry. At the same time the government pursued European 
trade liberalization to increase exports. During the 1960s and early 1970s, it sub-
sidized investments in heavy industries in southern Italy to remedy its backward 
economic development. Fiat and Montedison soon belonged to the top of investors 
ánd employers of these development projects. Also, during the 1970s, the govern-
ment made a habit of bailing out industries, especially firms with sizeable em-
ployment. Fiat and Montedison fared well under such a governmental safety-net.199 
 Fiat was closely tied to the Agnelli family, which via its financial holding Indus-
trial Fiduciary Institute created a vertically and horizontally integrated industrial 
conglomerate around its car-making activities. Furthermore, Fiat diversified its 
investments in related industries. This process started in the 1920s and Fiat has 
remained the industrial centipede ever since, controlling a plethora of activities in 
addition to car-production. Since the 1950s, Fiat closely guarded its home market, 
which it dominated until the 1960s. However, during the 1960s car-makers from 
the United States began entering the Italian market. The Italian government was 
convinced of its prerogative to protect the position of national industries and aided 
Fiat in its campaign to suppress imports from US cars. However, the difficult cir-
cumstances of 1970s, with its oil crises and economic stagnation eventually hit 
Fiat's sales hard on its crucial home market. At same time Fiat was successful with 
its foreign subsidiaries. The group owned factories in Austria, Germany, France, 
the United States, Argentina, India, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa.200 
 Montedison was the result of a merger between Montecatini and Edison. Mon-
tecatini was the largest chemicals producer of Italy during the 1950s, involved in 
fertilizers, insecticides, pharmaceuticals, artificial fibres and mining. Edison origi-
nally was a major electricity producer that diversified into the petrochemical in-
dustry during the 1950s. Edison's electricity branch was nationalized in 1962. The 
merger of 1966 yielded the conglomerate Montedison, active in chemicals and 
electricity. In 1968, the state took an interest of about 20% in the firm, via the 
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national oil company ENI, another sign of the Italian government's tendency to 
control and safeguard the development of its industry.201  
 Fiat's and Montedison's interests were thus carefully facilitated by the state 
and one was even partly controlled by it. Especially Fiat, but also Montedison, had 
grown accustomed to an interventionist industrial policy from governing institu-
tions.  
The United Kingdom 
Multinationals from the United Kingdom were hardly involved in the leadership of 
the transnational networks, and were equally scarce among regular members. This 
circumstance is probably related to the initial unwillingness of the British govern-
ment to engage with European integration on continental terms. Instead, British 
leading figures in the networks were economists, members of parliament and 
public administrators. Merely one figure from industry, Lincoln Steel participated 
in the ELEC leadership from 1965 onwards. He was chairman of the overseas 
committee of the Federation of British Industry (FBI), which dealt with matters of 
the European market. Before he had been a long-time director of the major chemi-
cals multinational of the country, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), and in that role 
a close colleague of Solvay’s René Boël, the president of ELEC.202 
 Further, three London-based merchant banks were members, who all con-
ducted a full range of financial services to business, S.G. Warburg, Schroders and 
Samuel, Hill & Co. These banks were involved in all aspects of global finance. They 
started to participate in the transnational networks around 1965.203 
 Even though British business played a small role in the investigated networks, 
some introduction to the context of British international trade is useful nonethe-
less. The post-war market of the United Kingdom was strongly protected by import 
quotas and tariffs. Moreover, it had an important base of exports in the Common-
wealth which it shielded from competition through so-called 'preferences'. Even 
after the United Kingdom did away with import quotas during the 1950s and sig-
nificantly reduced tariffs due to its membership of the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) as from the 1960s, compared with the European Community its tariffs 
remained relatively high. Since the United Kingdom had ample access to the mar-
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kets of its former empire it was not keen on getting more access to continental 
markets at the expense of preferential access to the Commonwealth.204  
Interpreting multinationals in sectoral contexts 
To determine which industries were most prominently involved in the ELEC, Bild-
erberg meetings and Trilateral Commission a biographical database was created. It 
includes the members of the three leading bodies of the networks at seven measur-
ing years separated by intervals of five years, for the period 1950-1980. On each 
individual, information was collected regarding nationality, main professional 
activity and main affiliation to a company or institution. Based on this information 
individuals were categorized as part of a societal sphere, such as business, politics, 
public administration and others. The most important reason to do so already 
became clear in chapter 2: to assess the dominant character of the ELEC, the Bild-
erberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission through time. As became clear, the 
role of business was preponderant in all and only increased as time progressed. 
Subsequently companies were categorized in industries to determine to what 
extent the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission were 
geared towards specific industrial sub-interests such as the chemical or automo-
tive industries. Such insights assist in interpreting the views that were discussed in 
the networks and determine dominant directions. The resulting tables and figures 
that are presented below represent the industrial composition of the networks in 
absolute and relative terms.205 
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Table 3.1: Composition of the combined leadership of ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and Trilateral 
Commission in societal spheres, 1950-1980 (absolute figures).206 
Societal spheres 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Business 12 23 33 39 43 71 80 
Politics 5 5 6 6 5 7 14 
Public administration 1 2 7 3 2 3 6 
Semi-Public administration 0 1 1 1 3 5 3 
Academic 0 3 4 5 6 10 15 
Military 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Labour 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 
Media 0 0 1 1 2 6 5 
Other 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 
Total categorized: 20 39 56 57 63 108 127 
Of total members: 20 39 60 60 66 115 133 
 
Figure 3.1: Relative composition of combined leadership ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and Trilateral
Commission in societal spheres, 1950-1980.207 
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Table 3.1 shows the development of the weight of societal spheres for the three 
networks together. Business involvement fluctuates between 60% and 70% from 
1950 to 1980. The other spheres appear as more or less complementary to the 
business sphere, with hardly ever any larger involvement than 10%, except for 
1950 when the political sphere reached an involvement of 25%, in ELEC. The busi-
ness sphere was thus dominant in the population of leading members from the 
three networks. However, the business sphere itself was rather diverse, including 
as much as twenty industries. Table 3.2 and figure 3.2 zoom in on the industrial 
categories of the combined societal business spheres of the networks. 
 
Table 3.2: The representation of different industries in the combined business societal sphere of the 
ELEC, Bilderberg and Trilateral leadership, 1950-1980 (absolute figures).208 
Sectors 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Banking  3 3 9 10 14 28 32 
Multiple 3 6 6 9 5 9 11 
Arms 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Automotive 0 1 0 1 2 2 4 
Chemicals 1 2 1 4 7 3 3 
Electrical engin. 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 
Electronics 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
Foods 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ferrous Metals 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Non-Ferrous Metals 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 
Glass 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Oil 0 0 0 1 1 5 3 
Pharmaceuticals 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
Consultancy 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Law 1 5 5 1 1 4 2 
Transport 0 0 3 2 1 0 1 
Business associations 0 0 1 3 3 3 6 
Private Foundations 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total categorized 12 23 32 38 41 67 77 
Of total business 12 23 33 39 43 71 80 
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Figure 3.2: Relative representation of different industries in the combined business societal sphere of
the ELEC, Bilderberg and Trilateral leadership, 1950-1980.209 
 
Immediately apparent is the large and increasing role of banks in the networks 
from 1950 to 1980. The next category that dominates the chart is that of “multiple” 
which stands for companies with sizeable activities in more than one sector. Ex-
amples include financial holdings of industry that branched into almost all kinds of 
industries, such as Mitsubishi, but also includes Unilever that combined sizeable 
foods and chemicals branches. This category also includes individuals that com-
bine multiple advisory directorships in several sectors at the same time. Addition-
ally the chemical sector and the metal production sectors (ferrous and non-
ferrous) appear to be dominant. At the same time one has to conclude that the 
three networks combined a diverse business membership. 
 The differences in distribution of the industries in the ELEC, Bilderberg meet-
ings and the Trilateral Commission are shown in tables and figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. 
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Table 3.3: The representation of different industries in the business societal sphere of the ELEC 
Central Council, 1950-1980 (absolute figures).210 
Sectors 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Banking  3 3 6 7 8 16 16 
Multiple 3 4 5 5 3 4 6 
Automotive 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Chemicals 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 
Electrical engin. 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Ferrous Metals 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Non-Ferrous Metals 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 
Oil 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Pharmaceuticals 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Consultancy 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Law 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Business associations 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 
Total categorized: 12 15 16 19 23 29 32 
Of total Business 12 15 17 20 25 32 34 
 
Figure 3.3: Relative representation of different industries in the business societal sphere of the ELEC
Central Council, 1950-1980.211 
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As expected, table 3.3 shows that the industry that stands out the most is that of 
banking. In the ELEC the banking sector was present from the beginning, reaching 
a temporary peak in 1960 of about 35% and an absolute peak in 1975, with a 
weight of even 50% of ELEC's business membership. The diversity in industries is 
markedly less than in the total population of business members of table and figure 
3.2, only combining twelve different industries. In addition to the banking industry, 
the “multiple” sector, the chemical industry and metals industries (ferrous and 
non-ferrous) were well represented. It is also worth noting that the category of 
business associations increased in importance in ELEC's leadership. Looking more 
closely at these, it becomes clear that they were representatives from British, Dan-
ish, Norwegian and Swedish national federations of industry, strikingly all coun-
tries that formed part of the original membership of the European Free Trade Area 
in 1960 (see the sector columns for the ELEC entries in tables A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7 and 
A.8).  
 
Table 3.4: The representation of different industries in the business societal sphere of the Bilderberg 
meetings' Steering Committee, 1955-1980 (absolute figures).212 
Sectors 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Banking  0 3 3 6 8 9 
Multiple 2 1 4 2 4 3 
Arms 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Automotive 1 0 1 1 1 2 
Chemicals 0 0 2 4 2 2 
Electrical Engin. 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Electronics 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Foods 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ferrous Metals 0 1 1 1 1 2 
Glass 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Oil 0 0 1 0 2 2 
Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Law 4 4 1 1 1 1 
Transport 0 3 2 1 0 1 
Private Foundations 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total categorized 8 16 19 18 22 26 
Of total business 8 16 19 18 22 26 
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Figure 3.4: Relative representation of different industries in the business societal sphere of the
Bilderberg meetings' Steering Committee, 1955-1980.213 
 
Table and figure 3.4 show a more diverse industry composition of the business 
sphere of the Bilderberg meetings. Banks played a less significant role but still was 
the most represented industry. The “multiple” category, for lack of a better term, 
was also strongly represented, whereas the chemical industry only became a well-
represented sector since the 1960s.  
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Table 3.5: The representation of different industries in the business societal sphere of the Trilateral 
Commission's Executive Committee, 1975-1980 (absolute figures).214 
Sectors 1975 1980   
Banking  4 7   
Multiple 1 2
Automotive 1 1
Electronics 2 1
Ferrous Metals 1 0
Oil 2 1
Pharmaceuticals 0 1
Utilities 2 2
Law 3 1
Business associations 0 3
Total categorized 16 19   
Of total Business 17 20   
 
Figure 3.5: Relative composition in sectors of the combined business components of the Trilateral 
Commission’s Executive Committee, 1975-1980.215 
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The least diverse business sphere was that of the Trilateral Commission, as is 
demonstrated in table and figure 3.5. Again, representatives of banks played a less 
important role than in the ELEC or the Bilderberg meetings, but still were the most 
represented industry. The chemical industry, strongly represented in the ELEC and 
the Bilderberg meetings was not part of the Trilateral Commission leadership.  
 Clearly the composition of the business spheres of the three networks were 
cross-sectoral, with a generally large and increasing role for representatives of the 
banking industry. Besides the banking industry no dominant industry could be 
singled out, except for perhaps the chemical industry and the metal industry, but to 
a much lesser degree. It is important to realize however, that although banks were 
dominant as a single industry, the sum of industrial production companies was in 
general larger than the sum of banks. Only in the ELEC, from 1970 to 1980, banks 
had a larger share in membership than industrial firms. It is particularly striking to 
note which sectors were not included in these networks. Major industries such as 
agriculture, textiles and, surprisingly, the construction sector play no role at all.  
 
As companies compete with other companies within their industry, they have to 
respond to strategies of their competitors, and success is ultimately a result of 
their ability to adapt to new circumstances. Between 1950 and 1980 the pressure 
to adapt grew as European multinationals were increasingly confronted with in-
ternational competition. This was the result of two converging developments. 
There was a gradual process of trade liberalization, firstly within Western Europe 
through the formation of the EEC and EFTA, and secondly on a global level through 
multilateral trade negotiations under the framework of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Next to that, the EEC became a trade bloc: it installed a 
Central External Tariff (CET), which led American multinationals to invest in pro-
duction capacity in the EEC.216 
 Adjustment to competition became a permanent requirement for European 
business. There was a constant need to create competitive advantages, but which 
competitive advantage deserves priority, is a strategic question for each single 
company. The outcomes varied per sector, depending on many factors, including 
product properties, the importance of research and development, capital intensity, 
the availability of resources, investment capacity, cost structures, organization 
structure, management styles, etcetera. These also result in sector-based priorities 
and preferences towards the administrative, legal and political organization of the 
European market. To be able to interpret sector-specific motives on the organiza-
tion of the European market, below key contexts and properties of some of the 
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main sectors in the ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission are 
discussed: the banking sector, chemicals, steel production and car production.217 
Banking industry 
Almost during the entire period from 1950 to 1980 the European banking sector 
was kept on a leash. International competition on the European market was made 
largely impossible. The main dynamic that structured the experiences of banks 
was a slow but gradual expansion of the scope for competition through interna-
tionalization. 
 On a national level the European banking sector had inherited strict regula-
tions from the Great Depression period. Many European governments had sepa-
rated the functions of deposit bank and merchant bank in order to isolate savings 
from risks originating from investments into industry. During the 1960s these 
rules were only gradually softened. Moreover, after WWII European governments 
took a role in the financial sector by nationalizing banks or erecting public savings 
banks and long-term credit institutions for financing investments. In addition Eu-
ropean governments were not willing to transfer national savings to foreign com-
panies and the Rome Treaties did little to change this in the short run. In effect, 
European capital markets and banks were still mainly organized along national 
lines, a situation that persisted until well into the 1970s.218  
 Nevertheless ways were explored to circumvent the national organization of 
European banking. The capital needs during the post-war reconstruction of the 
European economies laid the basis for one of these. Since WWII the role of Europe-
an-based capital was very limited in the reconstruction of the European economies. 
The American capital market provided the required sums instead. However, in the 
course of the 1950s the flow of dollars out of the US reached such levels that in 
1963 the American government introduced a tax on capital exports. The move 
virtually closed the American capital market to Europe. The European national 
capital markets were too small to compensate for this and European banks there-
fore created the Eurodollar. Accumulated dollar reserves deposited outside the 
United States were transferable throughout Europe without national regulations 
impeding exchanges. These deposits were floated as short-term loans and during 
the 1960s they became an alternative capital market that circumvented the limita-
tions of the European national capital markets.219  
 During the 1950s and 1960s some competition among banks developed. 
American banks founded subsidiaries in Europe, and European banks responded 
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by merging with other banks on a national level. Later, European partnerships had 
to fend off American competitive pressures. To reduce risks on the financing of 
large-scale projects, European banks also engaged in European consortia. Competi-
tion further increased by the founding of foreign subsidiaries by European banks. 
A gradual internationalization of the banking sector started to take place. However 
direct investments between European countries remained limited. Moreover, na-
tional governments could obstruct the creation of a foreign subsidiary or restrict 
its freedom of activities. This would only change from 1977 onwards when the 
European Community adopted a directive on a liberalized market, which arranged 
that foreign subsidiaries could no longer be obstructed.220 
Chemical industry 
The chemical industry is a quite innovative and research-based industry. The sec-
tor has been at the forefront of the development of many substances, several of 
which have become commonplace by now. A key aspect of the chemical industry 
has been its capacity to substitute naturally available materials, such as rubber and 
some natural dyestuffs, by synthesized imitations. Another element is the indus-
tries' ability to introduce totally new materials, such as plastics or artificial fibres. 
Additionally the industry produced basic and special chemicals for a multitude of 
production processes in other sectors, or produced materials used in industry, 
such as paints, rubber tires and plastics for the car industry. Moreover, several 
firms in the sector diversified into biotechnology or pharmaceuticals. But perhaps 
even more important was the capacity of the industry to invest in research and 
product development as well as in the development of efficient production pro-
cesses for mass production. Especially the high investments in research required 
large-scale enterprises and the ability to respond to the innovations introduced by 
competitors.221 
 It is important to realize how international the chemical firms already were 
before WWII. Multinational groups and conglomerates such as Solvay & Cie already 
were created during the 19th century. European firms also exported to foreign 
markets and were accustomed to international competition on their home markets. 
This competition only increased after the creation of the EEC and GATT rounds. 
Moreover after WWII European firms started to establish subsidiaries in the Unit-
ed States and vice-versa, causing fierce competition on the European market.222 
 Another aspect of the chemical industry was its dependence on coal before 
WWII, and afterwards on oil: both as a resource for energy and as a feedstock for 
basic chemicals. As coal became relatively more expensive and oil was made more 
widely, and cheaply, available, the chemical industry successfully switched to the 
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new feedstock. When the price of oil quadrupled between 1972 and 1974 the 
chemical industry entered a difficult time, and started a process of re-orientation. 
The sector practically breathed with the international energy developments.223 
Steel industry 
During the period 1950-1980 the European steel sector entered a period with 
recurrent adaptation crises with regard to their competitive position. Partly this 
was caused by steel-producing processes, partly it resulted from the steel-sector's 
dependence on coal. Coalmining, coal-processing and steel production are mutual-
ly dependent industries, though today less so than immediately after WWII. Corpo-
rations often integrated both activities. Coal was used in the generation of heat in 
furnaces. In addition coal is a basic resource for the steelmaking process. Both 
industries were moreover a strategic asset for national governments which result-
ed in far-reaching protectionist measures. This was one of the aspects which the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 intended to remedy: a 
key condition for the creation of a free market in coal and steel was to pool sover-
eignty of national governments over these basic industries.224 
 The development of both industries from the 1950s until the 1980s was 
strongly characterized by international developments. European coalmining was 
hit hard by the burgeoning oil industry and the improvements in transport ser-
vices. During the 1950s oil production increased and falling oil prices reduced the 
use of coal significantly. The chemical industry replaced its coal-feedstock with oil 
which laid the basis for the petrochemical industry. Also electricity producers 
shifted from coal to oil and gas. Moreover due to reduced shipping costs European 
coal-using industries gained access to cheap coal from outside the Community, 
notably the United States. The European coal industry was therefore dealing with 
structural contraction and was constantly confronted with the need for rationaliza-
tion of production methods amidst a demand for protectionism.225 
 These changes in the coal industry also had major consequences for the steel 
sector. Unlike the use of coal, steel consumption increased between 1950 and 1980. 
However, the steel sector experienced intensive competition due to changes in the 
availability of resources and innovations in production techniques. As mentioned, 
dropping shipping rates led to cheaply shipped coal ánd high grade ores against 
acceptable prices. This upset a balance in the sector: it reversed the former ad-
vantage of steelworks close to coalmines into a disadvantage, especially while coal 
was becoming an increasingly protected source of energy, relatively increasing in 
price against oil. Instead coastal steelworks suddenly came into a favourable posi-
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tion. At the same time scale increases in blast furnaces were realized to improve 
coal-efficiency. The oxygen-process, which meant blowing pure oxygen into molten 
pig iron to burn away carbon, was also more efficient in energy use than the for-
merly widespread air process. Finally, also wide-strip mills were introduced to 
increase output efficiency. At the same time a development towards higher scale 
production sites was accompanied by innovations making possible the electricity 
based and continuously casting mini-mills since the mid-1960s. These permanent-
ly changing conditions within the steel industry created strong pressures towards 
mergers and cooperation and yielded entirely different perspectives on interna-
tional competition or protectionism within the sector.226  
Automotive industry 
The European automotive sector shows another side of the European market ex-
perience. Whereas European banks and the chemical sector mainly began to expe-
rience competition from the United States from the 1950s onwards, European car-
builders were familiar with an American presence in Europe: Ford had several 
production facilities, two sizeable ones in Germany and the United Kingdom. Gen-
eral Motors owned Adam Opel. However, Ford and General motors were not a major 
presence. In the EEC their collective market share was approximately 15-16% 
between 1958 and 1968. The European car manufacturers were the most sizeable 
by far. The three largest car producers were Volkswagen, Fiat and Renault, together 
having a 46% market share in 1958, and 56% in 1968.227 
 Up to the late 1950s the European automotive producers did not interfere 
with each others national markets. Each country also carefully protected their car 
industry. Choices in different models were very limited and was incomparable to 
the multitude in styles or colours offered today. National markets were also rela-
tively small. As a consequence, producers tended to avoid competition, each spe-
cializing on a price range of cars. Not having to compete on different models and 
price ranges enabled them to produce their cars in larger numbers.228  
 This more or less tranquil balance was upset with the advent of the Common 
Market introducing a gradual reduction of import tariffs between EEC member 
states during the 1960s. The removal of tariffs coincided with a strong European 
increase in car-demand. Between 1959 and 1969, EEC car production nearly dou-
bled, going from 3.1 million to 7.1 million cars. What occurred was a diversification 
of product lines among the largest producers who engaged in competition between 
price classes. At the same time intra-European trade of cars rose: European manu-
facturers began penetrating each other's markets. However, another development 
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was taking shape in markets outside the EEC and foreshadowed what was to hit 
the European market in the 1970s. Japan had emerged as a car-producer, from 
virtually no production of cars in 1959, to 2.6 million cars in 1969. Approximately 
0,5 million of these were exported to the US and elsewhere, but not to the Europe-
an market. Japanese car-manufacturers were instead building a competitive posi-
tion in markets outside the EEC to where European manufacturers were exporting 
about 2.1 million cars. During the 1970s the Japanese exports to the EEC began to 
increase, forcing European car producers to modernize their plants due to lagging 
productivity. During the 1980s European governments were forced to take re-
course to protectionist measures, brokering deals with the Japanese on maximum 
import levels. Again global factors strongly shaped the automotive industry from 
the late 1960s onwards.229 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that national and sectoral contexts play a part in the ex-
planation of differing views among European multinationals on the organization of 
the European market. At the same time this chapter offers national and sectoral 
contexts that will aid in interpreting the views of European multinationals in next 
chapters.  
 The national contexts for European multinationals differed strongly and de-
pended on longstanding national economic policies, strategies and path dependen-
cies. In France, governmental policy regarding the organization of national indus-
try was interventionist and guided by national economic planning. French multina-
tionals were affected by various forms of state intervention but particularly re-
structuring pressures and nationalization. Ties between the companies and the 
government were strong. Governments of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands 
were much more liberal and largely left businesses to their own devices. The Neth-
erlands and Germany both actively introduced incentives to aid national industri-
alization and to improve national exports. In the German context, the expropria-
tion of foreign assets in the wake of WWI and WWII resulted in export focussed 
domestic corporations. Moreover after WWII the de-concentration policy of the 
Allies forced large German companies to split up in parts, a process which was 
largely reversed during the 1950s. After reversing de-concentration efforts, Ger-
man companies started to invest abroad again only from the late 1950s onwards. 
The Italian government actively aided companies under conditions of steep com-
petition or times of economic decline. Unlike the larger countries, the Netherlands 
and Belgium included very widespread industrial multinationals and multinational 
holdings with participations across Europe already since the interbellum. This 
thesis hypothesises that they were more in favour of unification schemes that 
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harmonized European markets than the firms form larger countries with less for-
eign assets across Europe: the Dutch and Belgian companies were presented with 
an opportunity for centralization. 
 Also sectoral contexts, it is argued, play a part in explaining views of multina-
tional on the European market. A closer look at composition of the transnational 
networks in terms of industries, revealed that they were cross-sectoral. Banks 
were the most represented in all networks. The chemical and metals industries 
were also well represented. Despite the fact that banks were the most represented 
sector, industrial firms as a group were dominant. Interestingly some rather large 
economic sectors were absent from the networks, such as agriculture, the textile 
and construction industries.  
 Zooming in on the contexts of several important industries that were active in 
the transnational networks has made clear that each sector had a different outlook. 
The chemical industry was accustomed to international competition since long 
before WWII. The steel industry was constantly adapting to international devel-
opments since the early 1950s. The car industry was only truly internationalized 
by the advent of the common market and by Japanese competition. Banks were 
much less affected by international competition than the car, steel and chemical 
industries and only saw tangible moves in this direction during the 1970s. What is 
true for all the industries is the increasing internationalization of the competitive 
environment during the entire period covered by this thesis. This development 
was not limited to intra-European changes, but included increasing competition 
from American and Japanese firms.  
 The following chapters investigate the debates among European multination-
als on the organization of the European market. The differing national contexts and 
sectoral contexts that were discussed in this chapter are an important tool to un-
derstand possible differences in views in those debates. Now this thesis turns to 
the first empiric chapter, covering the period 1950-1960, addressing the question 
how European firms viewed the theme of European market integration. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Business leaders and the integration 
of European markets, 1950-1960 
Introduction 
During the 1950s Western Europe took several large strides towards political and 
economic integration. Against the background of an emerging Cold War, European 
governments were dealing with the question to what extent they should integrate 
and with the even more complicated question about which methods of integration 
they should follow. The type of market regulations and institutions that were re-
quired for such moves were nearly permanently under discussion.  
 To Western-European corporations such decisions were of utmost signifi-
cance. Since the end of WWII the United States government was actively pursuing 
the liberalization of international markets and the Western European response 
would inevitably affect all kinds of businesses. As will be seen, business leaders 
seized the moment, organized themselves and expressed their views via the Euro-
pean League for Economic Cooperation and the Bilderberg meetings. 
 This chapter investigates debates among European multinationals with regard 
to European market integration. As will be argued the question of economic inte-
gration meant much more to them than merely the liberalization of trade. Besides 
a focus on the views of multinationals on the liberalization and future composition 
of the European market, this chapter also zooms in on how European corporations 
valued particular methods of, and paths towards, integration. Moreover the chap-
ter highlights views on the institutional dimension of European economic integra-
tion such as the scope and tasks of supranational institutions. 
 As a result, this chapter uncovers broad concepts put forward by European 
business on the organization of markets, on the roles of regulatory institutions in 
markets and on the position of the European market in relation to other markets. 
All these aspects came together in a complex perspective on European market 
integration based on the needs of business for stability, flexibility and other as-
pects of industrial competitiveness in increasingly liberalized, international mar-
kets. 
 At the same time this chapter tries to analyse whether the views of European 
multinationals were in mutual agreement. Considering their origin in differently 
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organized national economies and activities in different sectors, an important 
question is whether European multinationals had a similar outlook in the first 
place, and if they did not, along which lines they disagreed. Were differences relat-
ed to the differing national economies where they had their headquarters or can 
those differences better be ascribed to the differences between the sectors in 
which they operated? Lastly, an important aspect throughout the chapter is a com-
parison between the treatment of the theme of integration by the ELEC and by the 
Bilderberg meetings. 
 The first part of the chapter introduces the fragmented conditions of Europe-
an markets just after WWII and the American pressures to integrate them. Moreo-
ver, it introduces the background to the Schuman Plan and the plans for integra-
tion during the 1950s. The second and third part of the chapter analyse the discus-
sions within the European League for Economic Co-operation and the Bilderberg 
meetings on the major plans for economic integration during the 1950s.  
International context, 1945-1960 
The ideas of multinationals about the European market developed in a context of 
far-reaching transformations of western political and economic relations. The 
emerging Cold War led to new security alliances in the West. Meanwhile the inter-
national economy was under reconstruction mainly according to American plans. 
Simultaneously a continuous diplomatic struggle took place between the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France on a viable form for a lasting Franco-
German reconciliation. The resulting Schuman Plan created a foundation for sub-
sequent initiatives towards European economic and political integration. New 
organizations of the European market were proposed such as a free trade area, a 
customs union or a Common Market. In a free trade area tariffs and quotas are 
removed between member states, but members can still determine their external 
tariffs at will. A customs union differs from a free trade zone because of the exist-
ence of common external tariffs. When within a customs union also the constraints 
on the movement of labour or capital are removed, we speak of a Common Market. 
These three market designs were an integral part of the post-war debates on how 
to liberalize the European market.230 
American plans for European trade structures, 1945-1950 
In Western Europe, the period 1945-1960 saw multiple initiatives towards de-
creasing European protectionism. After WWII high import tariffs and trade quotas 
were the norm in European economic policy. This was the result of a combination 
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of war, depression and autarkic economic policy that had characterized the 1920s 
and 1930s. Before WWI a liberal laisser-faire concept of the role of the state char-
acterised economic practice in Europe. International markets were well integrated. 
Besides the regulation of markets through import tariffs, governments intervened 
little. However laisser-faire policies lost their appeal after the European war econ-
omies had been in operation during WWI: economic planning, the creation of na-
tional industries and the drive for national self-sufficiency in strategic goods had 
demonstrated impressive results. After WWI oversupply and increased competi-
tion made that governments decided to protect their national markets. As a result, 
import tariffs proliferated. From 1929 onwards the Great Depression led to even 
higher tariffs and the introduction of import quotas. National markets increasingly 
became isolated from each other and by 1945 the result was a collection of eco-
nomic islands, each with production structures mainly geared to national needs.231 
 During the 1950s this situation was gradually transformed by means of major 
schemes of European economic integration. The European Coal and Steel Communi-
ty (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) all gradually eliminated tariff walls. Partly, these developments 
must be seen in the light of the leadership of the United States in reforming post-
war international trade in general and the constant pressure it exerted on Western 
European countries to liberalize their economies. On a domestic level from 1937 
onwards the United States government had started a long-term antitrust campaign 
against international cartels that had proliferated between the wars. American 
firms were forced to cancel their non-competition agreements on global markets 
with other firms, particularly in Europe. This cleared the path for American in-
vestments in foreign markets and foreign investments in the United States after 
WWII. In 1944 the United States government took the lead in the introduction of 
an international payments structure that later became known as the Bretton 
Woods system. In addition, in 1946 the American government initiated negotia-
tions on lowering tariffs in international trade which laid the basis for a series of 
conferences under the heading of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Moreover the country became the driving force behind the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), a conference starting in 1947, which aimed for agree-
ments on a liberal international trade order.232 
 The United States government was particularly concerned about the protec-
tionist attitudes in Western Europe and about Europe’s fragmented production 
structure. The Bretton Woods system of multilateral payments that the Americans 
advocated, required balanced exchanges to function properly. It was hoped that 
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Western Europe would become the industrial counterpart of the United States and 
give the system the necessary durability. To achieve this, Europe would at some 
point have to achieve parity with the US in terms of productivity. Since the turn of 
the century however growth figures in Europe had consistently been lagging be-
hind. The American government ascribed this to Europe's fragmented markets. US 
policy-makers were convinced that Western Europe should emulate the large mar-
ket of the United States and actively work towards a matching organization of 
production: large scale industry and mass-production, based on far-reaching 
standardization in a large market. As part of this plan they hoped that Europe 
would establish a customs union.233 
 European economic recovery was a prerequisite for realizing that American 
grand design. When in the spring of 1947 a shortage of dollars obstructed Europe-
an reconstruction efforts, the US-funded Marshall Plan was introduced. It set out to 
facilitate European national reconstruction plans with financial aid. In return the 
European governments were forced to collaborate on the allocation of the funds. 
At the same time American diplomats started to put pressure on Western Europe-
an governments to start with the implementation of a European customs union.234 
 As a result, between 1947 and 1950, the Benelux, France Italy and the United 
Kingdom formed a study group to explore that idea. France used the consultations 
to convince the United States that, despite its rigid attitude regarding Germany, it 
could be a constructive partner. Several French proposals for a customs union 
were introduced, such as a Benelux-France-Italy area (Fritalux), and a French-
Italian arrangement. But the French did so knowing that the Benelux would never 
join any collective market without Germany. Moreover, a French-Italian customs 
union was not seriously pursued by the French government because it would 
mainly benefit Italy. Moreover during these years the British government came to 
the conclusion that joining a customs union such as Fritalux, possibly with Germa-
ny, would be of little practical use to them. British trade was primarily organized 
around the Commonwealth and the imperial trade preferences that were in place. 
This would remain the British position until well into the 1960s. 235 
 The ideas on customs unions and common markets that would take hold in 
Western Europe during the 1950s were thus partly rooted in technical economic-
monetary visions of American post-war planning. These ideas were already under 
consideration by European governments since 1947 and were part of the reper-
toire of ideas circulating within transatlantic and European transnational discus-
sion networks or other forums interested in European integration. However, the 
route to a customs union was blocked by France which was worried about the 
question of how to control Germany in the future. 
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The settlement of WWII, 1945-1950 
It took five years after WWII to lay the basis for a durable peace for Western Eu-
rope. This was achieved through the Schuman Plan, introduced in May 1950. The 
plan was the result of an array of evolving strategic motives among Western Allies 
and the changing Western perception of the threat of the Soviet Union. It is im-
portant to shortly introduce these motives and perceptions because they clarify 
what was at stake with the realization of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Moreover, the motives and strategies for reaching a lasting European peace con-
tinued to shape the international debate about Western European integration 
during most of the 1950s. Lastly, an overview of the dominant motives and strate-
gies provides a contrast to the more practical positions that European multina-
tionals took towards the ECSC and the subsequent proposals for integration that 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 The United States government played a pivotal role in Europe in the first five 
years after WWII, particularly after the introduction of the Marshall Plan in June 
1947. As the Americans had paid a high price for WWI and WWII they had an in-
terest in preventing a European conflict in the future. The key problem for the US 
government was the containment of Germany. After the war the country was struc-
tured in four zones, each separately administered by the United Kingdom, France, 
the United States and Soviet Russia respectively. Initially US policy was in line with 
Soviet Union demands and French desires that wished to prevent a German eco-
nomic revival in order to limit the German capability to wage war. Via the Morgen-
thau plan the US government even aimed at the destruction of industry in the coal-
rich Ruhr area. Additionally, in Spring 1946, together with the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to impose a policy of punitive repara-
tions on Germany. Moreover the US implemented a policy of decartelization of 
large German industrial mergers, for example in steel production, chemicals and 
finance, which they considered important elements of the German war effort.236 
 However, increasing American worries on the policies of the Soviet Union led 
to a change in attitude. Enabling German revival became more important than 
maintaining workable US-Soviet relations. In March 1947 President Truman ended 
the pragmatic approach to the Soviets by announcing his commitment to aid coun-
tries financially in order to contain the further spread of Communism.237 
 At roughly the same time Germany's economic revival became seen as a condi-
tion for the economic recovery of Western Europe as a whole. During the spring of 
1947 European economic reconstruction suddenly stagnated: states had initiated 
such extensive reconstruction plans that their demand for American exports ex-
ceeded their ability to pay in dollars. The resulting balance of payments crisis 
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threatened to stop the flow of import-payments altogether. Three months later, in 
June 1947, the Americans launched the Marshall Plan which was meant to relieve 
the shortage of dollars and thus support the reconstruction efforts. To further aid 
the Western European reconstruction effort, another three months later the United 
States and the United Kingdom allowed West-Germany to raise its production 
levels.238 
 The Marshall plan was not merely an aid package to remove the stifling bot-
tlenecks for European reconstruction. In an attempt to reshape European relations, 
the American government also used it to force the receiving European countries 
into an exercise of cooperation. The Americans asked the United Kingdom to chair 
the negotiation process between the governments on the allocation of aid and on a 
collective plan for European reconstruction. Under the name of the Committee of 
European Economic Co-operation (CEEC) sixteen European governments put them-
selves to that task from July until September 1947. This was continued in the Or-
ganization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) from March 1948 until 
August 1949. However, after two years of negotiations the national plans were still 
too divergent to realize a useful coordination. The United States government 
blamed the government of the United Kingdom, which had obstructed progress 
and had failed to fulfil American hopes that it would take the role of European 
leadership.239 
 The one government most concerned about the outcome of the American 
suggestions for economic integration was that of France. Since 1944 it was deter-
mined to guarantee France's future security by means of neutralizing the German 
industrial assets that had given that country military edge: the coal-rich Ruhr area 
and its steel industry. Moreover, France wanted guaranteed access to the Ruhr's 
resources. To reach this goal the French initially suggested to the United States and 
the United Kingdom to treat the Ruhr as an internationally controlled and separate 
entity. During 1948 the French government tried to acquire direct influence on the 
allocation of Ruhr coal via the proposal for an International Ruhr Authority. To 
secure such influence the French government wanted the Ruhr Authority to be 
able to control management decisions of German corporations. The United States' 
diplomats were however strongly opposed against any intervention in private 
corporate management. This left the plan for a Ruhr Authority with merely indirect 
allocation powers over Ruhr resources. Although in this form the International 
Ruhr Authority did not satisfy French demands, it was still founded in 1949. 
France was forced to accept that its long-term economic and military security 
could no longer rely on controlling the Ruhr, but had to be achieved through politi-
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cal and economic integration within Western Europe, including the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, established in 1949.240 
 The Schuman Plan was the result of the French acceptance of those American 
initiatives. It proposed a less powerful but enlarged Authority that would include 
the entire coal and steel industries of all participating countries. To guarantee 
access to Ruhr coal and steel and the country’s own long-term security, France 
suggested to form a customs union for the French and German coal and steel in-
dustries, under control of a supranational High Authority. Such a market and the 
companies operating on it would be subject to special common policies in order to 
arrive at a negotiated, balanced, and planned restructuring of the industries that 
had caused so much mutual mistrust in former decades. Not only would France 
achieve its main goals, the plan also met the desires of the United States for Euro-
pean economic integration.241 
 The significance of the Schuman Plan was that it worked as a formula for Eu-
ropean reconciliation. However, the idea of transferring commercial and industrial 
powers to the High Authority was unacceptable to the United Kingdom. In June 
1950, it declined to take part in negotiations. The Benelux and Italy joined negotia-
tions though, signing the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Communi-
ty in April 1951.242 
The liberalization of the Western European market, 1950-1960 
The 1950s saw a variety of plans for European integration and the ELEC and the 
Bilderberg meetings dealt with most of them. Those plans that reached a level of 
serious consideration at the level of governments will briefly be discussed here. 
Moreover in order to stress the diversity in plans with which European govern-
ments and the members of the ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings were dealing, the 
following paragraphs also address the different forms of organization of market 
governance that those proposals implied.  
 As explained, the European Coal and Steel Community was the result of chang-
ing American, French and British foreign policies. At the same time its institutional 
organization and actions represented a specific form of economic integration. The 
ECSC only involved the coal and steel industries which was different from the 
American preference for a customs union that would include all sectors of econom-
ic activity. The French government's Schuman Plan introduced a sectoral approach 
to European economic integration. The ECSC's implicit promise was that other 
industries could be integrated through a similar approach. Moreover, the ECSC 
suggested that a larger scale of liberalization of trade could perhaps be achieved by 
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means of partial economic communities, possibly each with its own institutions or 
set of arrangements.243 
 Additionally, through the operations of the High Authority the ECSC intro-
duced a French interventionist approach to economic policy that was at odds with 
basic ideas on freedom of entrepreneurship. The first President of the High Au-
thority was Jean Monnet, an economic planner who since 1946 had been in charge 
of the Plan de Modernisation et d’Équippement. This plan, developed by Monnet 
himself, attempted to restore the industrial competitiveness of France by means of 
state intervention in the economy. Monnet's ideas on the operations of the High 
Authority were similar. The ECSC's High Authority would act as an arbitrator and 
offer general direction. In addition its powers of intervention were comprehensive: 
it regulated prices and investments, enforced decartelization, adjusted related 
common external tariffs and bore a responsibility in the coordination of taxes, 
transport and labour issues. The High Authority was given all the necessary tools 
to create a level playing field and, paradoxically, plan a liberalized market. Future 
plans on European economic integration however were very different in both the 
sectoral approach and the interventionist methods.244 
 The next plan for European economic integration was introduced during the 
negotiations on the European Defence Community between the ECSC countries. The 
outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 suddenly shifted attention from the Schuman 
Plan negotiations to the issue of Western European ánd German rearmament. To 
address the problem in line with their long-term interest of a pacified Germany, 
the French Pleven-plan (1950) proposed a European army under collective Euro-
pean authority. Negotiations on the so-called European Defence Community (EDC) 
began in February 1951 and a treaty was successfully signed in May 1952. The 
negotiations on the EDC were followed by negotiations on the creation of a Euro-
pean Political Community (EPC) which would be designed to subject a European 
army to democratic control.245 
 The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, W. J. Beyen, saw in these negotiations 
an opportunity to realize Dutch goals of economic integration. Claiming that a 
political unity without economic unity could not work he proposed to include a 
declaration of commitment to, and obligation for, the EPC to pursue economic 
integration in the form of a customs union. Moreover in February 1953 he suggest-
ed to include a method in the treaty for achieving this goal: he envisioned a pro-
gressive removal of tariffs and quotas with a fixed end-date. This would force the 
EPC to execute the plan. It failed. In August 1954 the French parliament refused to 
ratify the EDC treaty, rendering void the European Defence Community and its 
associated initiatives. The problem of German rearmament was subsequently 
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solved by including Germany in the alliances of the Western European Union and 
NATO. Nonetheless, via Beyen the idea of a customs union was again on the Euro-
pean agenda.246 
 And it remained on the political agenda. During a meeting of the ECSC foreign 
Ministers in Messina in June 1955 it was decided to install an intergovernmental 
committee, headed by the Belgian foreign minister Paul Henri Spaak to investigate 
the viability of the several proposals for economic integration that had been intro-
duced at the meeting. Based on the resulting Spaak report in May 1956 the ECSC 
foreign ministers decided to establish a Common Market and an atomic energy 
community. The agreement that resulted from the negotiations from June 1956 
until March 1957 also included policies on transport, competition and social and 
economic affairs. Moreover the treaty established an investment bank to aid the 
development of backward regions which was important to Italy. The French more-
over gained an important concession to offset the consequences that it would incur 
from the Common Market: the agricultural policy. The treaty was signed in Rome 
in March 1957. The Commission, the administrating supranational institution of 
the EEC started its work in January 1958. It lacked the interventionist tools of the 
ECSC's High Authority but gave the new body significant powers in implementa-
tion and enforcement of legislation. From January 1959 onwards the gradual abol-
ishment of tariffs and quotas commenced.247 
 The proposal to create a customs union was contested by the government of 
the United Kingdom as soon as the Six in 1955 had decided to study the subject. As 
mentioned above, British trade was much more geared towards the Common-
wealth. A small customs union was therefore deemed unattractive. Despite the 
smaller trade volumes with Western Europe, the British government was con-
cerned about the Common Market's external tariff that could very likely hurt ex-
ports. Therefore in November 1956 the British government introduced an alterna-
tive scheme in the OEEC to replace the plans for a Common Market by a large Eu-
ropean free trade area. It would encompass the entire OEEC and, unlike the Com-
mon Market's plan, the free trade area would leave all external tariffs of the mem-
ber states intact. Additionally agreements for cooperation between member states 
would be achieved on an intergovernmental basis. Pooling sovereignty in a supra-
national institution would thus be unnecessary.248 
 The proposal was well-received inside the OEEC. After negotiations on the 
Common Market were finished, OEEC negotiations on the Free Trade Area (FTA) 
began in March 1957. In effect they were now transformed into negotiations about 
a free trade treaty between the non-Community OEEC countries and the EEC. Ne-
gotiations were slow and the return to power of the French nationalist de Gaulle in 
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June 1958 caused a turn of events. Five months later he decided to pull France 
back from the negotiations on an EEC-FTA association. De Gaulle was not ready to 
put at risk the concessions that France had gained during negotiations on the EEC. 
The United Kingdom, together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden 
and Switzerland subsequently started negotiations on a free trade area in early 
1959 without “the Six” and created the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 
1960. By then the EEC had already begun with lowering internal tariffs due to 
which trade diversion between the two European trade blocs became inevitable.249  
 However, despite the different ideas of the United Kingdom about the organi-
zation of economic integration, the effects of decolonization suddenly caused a 
shift in British policy. During the second half of the 1950s British trade with the 
Commonwealth showed a gradual decline. At the same time trade with the EEC 
steadily grew. This and many other factors, including concerns about British gen-
eral decline as a global power, prompted the UK government in July 1961 to re-
quest negotiations about the terms for accession to the EEC. Although negotiations 
were indeed started they were cancelled in January 1963: de Gaulle vetoed the 
application because he was concerned about the interests of France in the EEC if 
the United Kingdom would become a member.250 
 To summarize, the international debates between 1947 and 1963 about how 
to achieve European market integration show several strategies for liberalizing 
trade relations. A first distinctive aspect were the differences in scale of integra-
tion: the Schuman Plan implemented integration on a sectoral level, whereas the 
EEC integrated all sectors simultaneously, with the exception of agriculture. A 
second difference involved the powers of the governing institutions: the High Au-
thority of the ECSC was given tools to intervene in the operation of markets, gov-
ernment plans and firms, whereas the European Commission in the EEC was not 
able to steer market developments. Instead it monitored the implementation of the 
treaties and enforced its rules. A liberalized market had to develop from the appli-
cation of the rules. A third institutional form was proposed as well: the intergov-
ernmental supervision and decision-making over a free trade area as proposed by 
the British government, which did not involve at all the creation of new institutions.  
 From this introduction into European economic integration plans during the 
1950s, the chapter now turns to how European multinationals perceived these far-
reaching changes, starting with the European League for Economic Co-operation. 
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European League for Economic Cooperation 
The European League for Economic Cooperation, or the ELEC, had only just re-
structured its entire organization when on the 9th of May 1950 the Schuman Plan 
was introduced. ELEC's newly adopted course was to respond to developments on 
European integration in an ad hoc fashion by means of resolutions or booklets on 
European affairs under its own title, published in appropriate media, or sent to 
interested governments or relevant organizations.251/252 
 A lot had changed for the ELEC since the first months of 1950. Sections were 
still in the phase of being founded, or even re-founded, and the planned study 
commissions for the new organization had not convened yet. However, the Central 
Council, ELEC's main decision-making assembly, was in operation and entirely up 
to the task. Strikingly, six out of eighteen members were thoroughly immersed in 
coal and steel interests. They were Pierre Ricard, presiding over several French 
steel firms, the Italian senator Enrico Falck, member of the steelproducing Falck 
family, René Boël from Belgium, owner of Usines Gustave Boël, and the Dutchman 
Pieter Bentz van den Berg, manager at the Koninklijke Hoogovens. Two additional 
Belgians were directly in the sphere of influence of Paul de Launoit, financier of the 
ELEC and owner of important steel production and coal extraction. They were the 
Vice-Chairman of Banque de Bruxelles Louis Camu and Brufina advisor Lucièn Lé-
andre Sermon.253 
The Schuman Plan 
Less than two weeks after the announcement of the Schuman Plan, the ELEC orga-
nized a meeting which resulted in a resolution welcoming the initiative. Particular-
ly the intention to liberalize national markets received ELEC's unequivocal praise. 
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The Central Council expressed “great satisfaction” and judged the plan as an “im-
portant contribution on the road to the creation of a European single market.”254  
 Despite the positive reception, ELEC was concerned about the interventionist 
language of the Schuman Plan though. The Central Council, for example, ques-
tioned whether allowing the High Authority to control coal and steel prices would 
result in a level playing-field. ELEC initially was less opposed to the suggestion of 
coordination of European investments in the coal and steel sectors. The resolution 
merely indicated that coordinated investments should constantly keep the coal and 
steel industries “in the best conditions of efficiency” and improve the productivity 
of the industry. This attitude would quickly change.255 
 The ELEC also stressed a less obvious point: it was concerned about the struc-
ture and functions of the High Authority and its various organs that would be cre-
ated, more particularly “their relations among themselves and with the existing or 
future relations with the European authorities.” Doubts within ELEC about institu-
tional arrangements particularly involved the relation of industry to the High Au-
thority. Moreover, ELEC expressed uneasiness about how the relations between a 
supranational institution and European governments with political responsibilities 
of their own would work and about how these relations would affect the coal and 
steel industries. Clearly, such concerns illustrate that the ELEC was focussed on 
more than mere economic factors.256 
 After the first draft treaty for the ECSC became available in late June 1950, the 
ELEC started an internal review process in order to arrive at a joint policy paper by 
early August. This centred around a meeting in July, combining several coal and 
steel interests, particularly from Germany and Belgium. From Germany, Richard 
Merton of Metallgesellschaft, Hans-Günther Sohl of former Vereinigte Stahlwerke 
and Carl-Alex Volmer of coal miner Rheinischen AG were taking part. From Belgium 
Lucien L. Sermon of Brufina and Pierre van der Rest of the Comité de la Sidérurgie 
belge et du Groupement des Hauts Forneaux et Aciéries belges should be mentioned. 
The Dutch and Italian sections were not taking part in the meeting at all, probably 
because firms from those countries were relatively small stakeholders in both 
sectors.257 
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According to ELEC the proposed High Authority would gain undue powers over the 
industries' adaptation process to a liberalized European market. The High Authori-
ty's key task would be to create a customs union for coal and steel. Existing import 
tariffs would have to be removed. At the same time the institution would have to 
guarantee sufficient production capacity to assist further European recovery 
against acceptable prices and to respond to increasing demand that was caused by 
the American involvement in the Korea war, since late June 1950. Additionally, the 
High Authority had to deal with protectionist policies besides import tariffs. Since 
long, European steel and coal industries were shielded from international competi-
tion in various ways. The Belgian uncompetitive coal-prices, for instance, were 
compensated by the Belgian government. A liberalized market with unsupported 
prices would lead to a quick shakeout in the industry, particularly in Belgium, and 
would cause the overall European production capacity to shrink. In order to avoid 
a shakeout, the draft treaty proposed an adaptation-period, a three year “péréqua-
tion” or equalization phase, that temporarily compensated prices. Less competitive 
companies, the Belgian ones in particular, would receive financial compensation to 
neutralize their high cost prices. This would be paid by more competitive compa-
nies. In practice those would be the Dutch and German producers.258 
 The proposal to found a supranational institution in order to create a liberal-
ized market via price interventions without coordinating these interventions with 
the industries themselves was entirely alien to the ELEC. Moreover, according to 
Sermon it was technically flawed. An international equalization of prices disre-
garded transport cost-constructions over large distances. In his view a regional 
price-equalization would be more sensible. Additionally, an international price 
equalization would also require an international equalization of salaries. Moreover 
the massive apparatus of officials that would be necessary to supervise company-
sales in order to calculate a just division of funds, appeared completely unfeasible 
to him.259  
 Another problem however caused even more frustration. The Schuman Plan 
had opened the door to one of the biggest fears of the Belgian coal industry, which 
was well represented in the ELEC. Just after WWII the Belgian government had set 
out to restructure the Belgian inefficient mine-exploitation and to also lower the 
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price-subsidies that it paid to protect the sector. The attempt was successfully 
resisted by the Belgian private holdings which were unwilling to accept forced 
mergers and intervention in management decisions. Now, in 1950, they suspected 
the Belgian government of using the Schuman Plan and the High Authority to final-
ly realize a government-led restructuring.260 
 Instead of price-intervention, the ELEC proposed that the High Authority 
should embrace cost-price competition. This would force the industries to invest in 
productivity-improvement themselves. Realizing that Belgian inefficient coal 
mines would quickly lose the battle with German coal, ELEC’s solution was that the 
least efficient firms should be closed before the start of the customs union and 
their owners should somehow be compensated by the rest of the entire European 
coal industry. The remaining firms would then compete under unregulated prices. 
In other words, via ELEC the Belgian and German coal and steel interests suggested 
a cartel-agreement to buy out the weakest links in order to keep government in-
tervention at bay.261 
 At the same time, ELEC agreed that the most efficient, or moderately efficient 
producers should be offered a chance to adapt to the new unregulated prices. A 
temporary price “péréquation” could be allowed, but only if this would be orga-
nized without actual involvement of the coal sector itself. ELEC suggested an alter-
native system that would equalize prices by taxing coal-consumers. Whenever a 
coal-consumer from an expensive coal producing country, at that time typically 
Belgium, would buy coal in a country where coal was cheaper, the consumer would 
pay a tax. This would be cashed by the government, not the producers, of the ex-
pensively producing country, which would be used to reduce the country’s coal 
selling-price. In this way private industry would remain in control of restructuring 
its own industries while avoiding action by the High Authority. But more im-
portantly: it left the original prices intact and it prevented German and Dutch coal 
producers from having to subsidize Belgian competitors. Meanwhile, the already 
existing price subsidies to the Belgian competitors would be left untouched. Merely 
their source would be re-routed: from the Belgian public to taxes on energy pro-
ducing corporations and steel makers, the typical coal consumers.262  
 Clearly the industrialists preferred to see as little change as possible in the 
coal and steel industries. Moreover, they wished to reduce the potential powers of 
the High Authority where they could. In this vein the ELEC also suggested to let the 
High Authority play a role of mere coordination over expert committees on coal 
and steel, guarded by a third committee, composed of members from industry, 
labour unions and consumers.263 
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ELEC's proposals on the institutional arrangements of the High Authority were 
informed by entirely different motives. The French government had insisted that 
the High Authority should be a supranational institution and that this was to be 
accepted before negotiations began. As indicated earlier, ELEC wondered whether 
the relation between the Authority and national governments would complicate 
the position of the coal and steel industries. However, ELEC truly began to doubt 
the supranational aspect when in June 1950 the United Kingdom denounced the 
principle of supranationalism and declined the invitation to take part in the Schu-
man Plan negotiations.264 
 ELEC as a whole was highly in favour of British membership of a coal and steel 
customs union, but now that the British government had withdrawn from the plan 
there was little to be achieved. Precisely at that point, the ELEC's British section 
began to express strong objections to technical aspects of transport costs and price 
equalization, even though it was clear that the United Kingdom would not take part 
in the Schuman Plan negotiations. All of a sudden ELEC's Central Council found 
itself in an awkward position. Until then, the British section had been of central 
importance to ELEC's work. If the other sections wanted to retain it as a credible 
partner, they were forced to accommodate to its views. The British section's tech-
nical objections to the Schuman Plan were ignored but instead the ELEC decided to 
propose a lowering of the threshold for the United Kingdom to take part in the 
negotiations: in July 1950, the British section, after negotiations with Edmond 
Giscard d’Estaing of the French section, asked ELEC's Secretary General Louis Ca-
mu to include a preamble that proposed to add a ministerial body to control the 
High Authority. The proposal was the result of a broader preference in the ELEC 
for the organization of a market with the United Kingdom and internal pressure 
from the British section.265 
 The proposal for a ministerial body was a new move for ELEC. Earlier that 
year the Central Council had unanimously expressed a preference for the creation 
of “specialized institutions” to which “states devolve parts of their sovereignty” 
instead of veto-based organizations that involve the direct representation of na-
tional governments.266 Ministerial control over the High Authority however would 
be very much like a veto-based structure. Although earlier drafts of the policy 
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paper included the proposal that the “High Authority would be subject to control 
by the Governments”, they never contained the elaborate proposal for a ministerial 
body supervising it.267 Louis Camu, an enthusiast for an even further-reaching 
Atlantic Union, an idea which required closer ties between the continent and the 
United Kingdom, finally allowed for the preamble to be included. If British mem-
bership hung in the balance ELEC was sensitive to British demands.268 
 ELEC continued to suggest courses of actions that were designed to sensitize 
the negotiating governments to British conceptions of a European market. A later 
instance in December 1950 illustrates this, and reflects ELEC's frustration over the 
prospect of an ECSC without the United Kingdom. At that point the Schuman Plan 
negotiations had progressed to an advanced stage without any changes in attitude 
in the British government. ELEC blamed the negotiating governments. Addressing 
them directly in an ad hoc resolution sent to them by letter, ELEC condemned the 
inability of the negotiating partners to get the United Kingdom to participate, who-
ever “is responsible for her present forbearance.”269 The ELEC thought that with-
out participation of one of the biggest producers of coal and steel in Europe “the 
chances of this undertaking shall appear limited.”270 
 The ELEC even attempted to involve itself with the most fundamental British 
arguments against European economic integration; in 1951 it organized a Europe-
Commonwealth Conference, which gathered delegations from the Commonwealth 
to learn about their relation to the United Kingdom. ELEC members thought that 
the Commonwealth was the main reason why the United Kingdom was not pre-
pared to join.271 
 In the case of the Schuman Plan the views of the ELEC are best explained by 
the clear interests of coal and steel companies to minimize intervention in price-
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setting and market-restructuring. They wanted a liberalized market without tariffs 
and quotas but only if it meant that they, particularly the Belgian and the German 
companies, would be allowed to restructure that market themselves. ELEC's sensi-
bility to institutional arrangements in order to increase the chances for British 
association indicates that the ELEC had a very broad conception of the market that 
they wished to see created in Western Europe. They understood well how certain 
institutional arrangements would affect the management of their companies in the 
long run. ELEC's proposals were not realized however: a temporary “péréquation 
agreement” was included in the ECSC, but not the coal consumers would have to 
pay the tax, the coal producers would. Moreover, the idea to close inefficient 
coalmines in return for compensation was not included in the agreement. Instead 
the rationalization measures for the Belgian coal industry were minimized. ELEC's 
biggest achievement with regard to the Schuman Plan negotiations however was a 
constructive agreement between important Belgian and German industrial inter-
ests within the coal and steel industries. After the ELEC had dealt with the Schu-
man plan, the British section, already lacking direct representatives of multina-
tionals or business, would become one of ELEC's least vocal sections.272 
The many roads to trade liberalization 
As explained in Chapter 2, since its founding in 1947 the European League for Eco-
nomic Cooperation had proposed the elimination of European import tariffs. Within 
ELEC the lobby was most zealously carried by Paul van Zeeland and by the French 
section. Both had raised the issue already since before WWII. In April 1949 the 
ELEC reached a preliminary climax in that endeavour at the Economic Conference 
of the European Movement, in Westminster. As chief organizing party the ELEC 
strongly impressed its views on the preparatory documentation and on the final 
formulation of resolutions. The resolutions mirrored the proposals for a European 
customs union by the United States since the announcement of the Marshall Plan 
and went even further, proposing all characteristics of a Common Market: a cus-
toms union including the freedom of movement of labour and capital. Moreover, 
according to the conference the customs union-element of the Common Market 
was to be arrived at by removing all quantitative restrictions to trade within a 
strict, pre-agreed time-frame.273 
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Throughout the 1950s the idea of a Common Market would remain ELEC's main 
topic. As will be explained below, ELEC appeared to be in agreement about the 
fundamental principles of liberalization of European trade. However, at each point 
when ELEC tried to draft a position paper on the topic it found itself in internal 
conflict with regard to the methods that should be employed. Particularly the eager 
Dutch and Belgian sections with direct representation from Europe's largest mul-
tinationals and financial holdings with interests all over Western Europe, disa-
greed with the French section which was more reluctant with respect to liberaliza-
tion, and more sensitive to general French private interests than merely the inter-
ests of its most internationalized corporations. 
 In 1950 an opportunity presented itself for the ELEC to bring across its views. 
A failed attempt of the Western European governments at gradually removing 
European quotas on all goods, suddenly raised attention regarding the topic of 
trade liberalization. In the years preceding 1950 governments had agreed within 
the OEEC to begin with removing trade quotas in phases. That process was 
planned to start in March 1950. However at the first opportunity national govern-
ments quickly exploited the technical weaknesses of the agreements in order to 
leave the quotas virtually unchanged. The plan failed. The result was that from 
June 1950 onwards the question of how to liberalize European trade was back on 
the agenda.274 
 Within the ELEC the French section seized the moment to provide an alterna-
tive and presented its views to the Central Council. Paul Naudin, the original Presi-
dent of the Comité d’action économique et douanière before it transformed into the 
French ELEC section in 1946, had drafted a proposal for publication by the ELEC. 
At most ELEC meetings the French section was composed of representatives from 
the French national employers association, the Conseil National de Patronat Fran-
çais (CNPF), and in particular by members from its subcommittees on international 
trade. Paul Naudin was one of them, being the President of the French-Latin Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce. His proposal for trade liberalization was written in 
accordance with the general CNPF perspective of French employers.275  
 In principle the French section subscribed to the idea of a Common Market 
and the mentioned Westminster approach. However, Naudin was concerned about 
the cost-price disparities between countries that would remain after the elimina-
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tion of tariffs.276 He proposed to add a temporary levy, called the “droit compensa-
teur.”277 The basis for calculation of this levy would be the difference in national 
cost prices per product group, constituted by several factors of production such as 
wages or structural social costs. He proposed to levy the rate over imports from 
the start of a decisive and rapid lowering of the original tariffs. After the original 
tariffs would be removed, Naudin suggested, the compensating tariffs would be 
gradually decreased. By proposing this levy Naudin addressed a problem of French 
employers who were concerned about competition from countries with lower 
wages. French wages were relatively high, whereas the lowest wages were paid in 
the Netherlands. The French government was also concerned about these differ-
ences. In other words, as part of a plan for tariff reduction Naudin proposed a new 
tariff to protect French high-cost products from competition based on cheap Dutch 
labour.278 
 The other sections gave a mixed response. The members of the diversely 
composed British section were altogether satisfied though they were apprehensive 
about the complicated nature of the proposal. The Dutch section strongly disa-
greed and found the Belgian and German sections on its side.279 
 In contrast to the French section, the Dutch section consisted of representa-
tives of large, industrial multinationals. The Dutch section member A. E. J. Simon 
Thomas of Unilever was convinced that the calculation of such a rate per product 
group was entirely impossible. Instead Simon Thomas proposed an immediate 
freeze of existing tariffs and a quick publication of a liberalization scheme. Accord-
ing to him the plan should include stages at which pre-determined percentages of 
import tariffs would be cut at predetermined dates without any new rates taking 
their place. Moreover he explained that the scheme should be activated automati-
cally on a fixed date, supervised by a new “High Authority”, just like the Westmin-
ster resolutions had suggested. Representatives of the Belgian and German sec-
tions, leaders and advisors of financial holdings of industry such as Sermon, and 
the banker Herman J. Abs, subscribed to these proposals. Those sections were 
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clearly not prepared to accept new protectionist mechanisms as part of a liberali-
zation scheme.280 
 The Central Council ultimately decided to combine the two plans in one reso-
lution and publish a booklet with separate statements from the French and the 
Dutch sections. The disagreement illustrates that all sections principally agreed on 
the need for liberalization but that in the end different economic perspectives 
informed the method and speed of integration. A split between Benelux and Ger-
man sections on the one hand and French and UK sections on the other particularly 
reflects a divide between an accumulation of international trade interests in the 
first group and more general and diversified interests in the second.281 
 Attempts were also made to bridge the divide. The very internationalized and 
highly competitive multinationals from the Netherlands were prepared to deviate 
from the approach that they preferred if the alternative could convince other sec-
tions such as the French to agree to liberalization. In 1951 the plan called “the 
Promotors Inquiry” was introduced by F. E. Spat, secretary to the board of Philips. 
In short the idea was to invite individual firms from several industries to collabo-
rate in convincing their governments to reduce tariffs for their industry. Industry-
based study groups would have to reach agreements within their industry about 
the conditions under which tariff-reduction would be acceptable. Certain indus-
tries whose resistance to liberalization was now blocking progress on large scale 
integration schemes could be catered to separately via this approach. The resulting 
agreements would then be presented to European governments as a basis for ne-
gotiations.282 
 The plan was initiated in December 1951, but not before the ELEC had agreed 
to one request from the president of the French section, Edmond Giscard d’Estaing, 
who was also part of the CNPF as President of the French committee of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce. In principle he supported the plan but he feared that 
the ELEC stood a chance of loosing control of what it had started. The proposal of 
sector-based initiatives reminded him of the, by then much derided, Schuman Plan. 
He wished to impress upon all participants that the ELEC was fighting this “super-
                                                                  
280 LECE (1951). La démobilisation, pp. 17-23. CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 141, 6-11-1950, Commission 
Economique, procès-verbal, pp. 2-4. 
281 Italian members were not taking part in the meeting. CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 45, 2-12-1950, Conseil 
Central; inv. nr. 685, 2-12-1950, Resolution: La démobilisation tarifaire intra-européenne. LECE (1951). 
La démobilisation. 
282 LECE (1952). Enquête des promoteurs (Vol. 11). Bruxelles: LECE. Originally the plan came from the 
Rhodius brothers, Dutch wool importers. To get the necessary attention for their plan, the Rhodius 
brothers approached many companies and officials, among which Philips. Initially, late 1949, the execu-
tive director Van Walsem of Philips had turned down their request to go forward with the idea but 
when the idea started to proliferate in the international business community and in the OEEC, F.E. Spat 
(secretary of the Philips-board) introduced it to the Dutch ELEC section in January 1951. Blanken, I. 
(2002). Een Industriële Wereldfederatie. Zaltbommel: Europese Bibliotheek, p. 249, & Nationaal Archief, 
Den Haag, Europese Beweging in Nederland en Voorgangers, 1945-1987, 2.19.109, inv. nr. 345, 17-01-
1951, Algemene Ledenvergadering.  
141 
dirigisme.” According to him the industry-based study groups “should not make 
new Schuman Plans” and “realise single markets [...] without proposing the unnec-
essary creation of a high authority.” The French section clearly was not prepared to 
achieve any of its preferences for temporary protection-schemes by means of sec-
tor-based institutions.283 
 The response was insufficient for the plan to succeed however. Entrepreneurs 
were not willing to share sensitive information with each other, nor conclude 
agreements that would be seen as illegal cartels elsewhere such as in the United 
States.284 
The Beyen plan 
The European League for Economic Cooperation again found itself in disagreement 
in 1954. This time, liberalization of trade as such was not the issue. It was the ea-
gerness that was displayed by the Dutch and Belgian sections in their attempt to 
push the Beyen plan beyond what was politically prudent for the French section. As 
explained earlier, the plan of the Dutch Minister Johan Beyen was to link political 
integration to economic integration. He followed a strategy of indirectly attaching 
the creation of a customs union to the treaty for a European Political Community 
(EPC), which itself was attached to the founding of a European Defence Community 
(EDC) that had been under discussion since 1951. Beyen, a former Unilever direc-
tor closely adhered to the Westminster method for the formation of a customs 
union and even tried to fix the terms in the draft treaty of the EPC. He succeeded in 
attaching the principle of this idea in the draft treaty that was published on the 10th 
of March 1953. The time scheme was however excluded and merely a gradual 
development of the market was mentioned. Moreover the draft treaty did not just 
suggest the founding of a customs union but a Common Market.285 
 Shortly after the EPC draft treaty was published ELEC tried to use the oppor-
tunity to clarify how a European market should be organized according to its 
members. In a press release they welcomed the prospect of the future founding of 
a “marché commun”, but then quickly followed up to make sure what this should 
mean exactly. For the first time the ELEC did not just make clear how a market 
should be liberalized but also how it should work. ELEC stated that the Common 
                                                                  
283 Translation: “il ne faut pas faire de nouveaux Plans Schuman” and “réaliser des marchés uniques 
mais sans proposer la création inutile d'une haute autorité.” CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 716, 15-12-1951, 
Assemblée Générale, p. 4. 
284 On the Promotors Plan also see Dumoulin & Dutrieue (1993). La Ligue, pp. 74-77. The publication 
was called LECE (1952). Enquête des promoteurs (Vol. 11). Bruxelles: LECE. 
285 Griffiths (1997). The Beyen Plan, pp. 127-128; AEI, Ad hoc assembly instructed to work out a draft 
treaty setting up a European Political Community (1953). Draft treaty embodying the Statute of the 
Europan Community. Information and official documents of the Constitutional Committee, October 1952 - 
April 1953. Paris: Secretariat of the Constitutional Committee, p. 102. Retrieved, August 28, 2013, from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/991/1/poliical_union_draft_treaty_1.pdf. 
CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 45, 27-03-1953, Conseil Central, Annexe, Communiqué de Presse. 
142 
Market should “function under a regime of competition” where “the company de-
velops freely within the framework of the law.” Moreover, ELEC asked to forego 
the “dangerous creation of new specialized authorities of a technocratic character”, 
referring to the ECSC's High Authority. Additionally ELEC stated that the market 
should be as large as possible and that its institutional organization should leave 
room for expansion to other countries by other means than full membership. In 
this regard they stressed that there was a serious danger in integrating the Bene-
lux, France, Germany, and Italy without creating ties with the rest of Western Eu-
rope, members of the OEEC or the European Payments Union.286 
 ELEC's conceptions of the European market thus went beyond mere liberali-
zation schemes. Earlier the group had made clear that the organization of interna-
tional markets through artificially created instruments and intervention in invest-
ment policies was unacceptable. Now their views were translated into a prescrip-
tion for an embryonic competition policy, the only regulatory order for the market 
that was not at odds with the freedom of entrepreneurship that members of ELEC 
valued so highly. More importantly, ELEC's members were in an ideal position to 
appreciate the danger of an integrated European market that would ignore its 
embeddednes in wider European and global trade relations. It was critical to the 
interests of international traders that the designers of the European market were 
aware of this dimension. The treaty text lacked such provisions and ELEC felt it 
had to make clear that a market entailed more than just tariffs. 
 But tariffs had to be lowered first. The multinationals Philips, Unilever, Shell 
and AKU, of the Dutch ELEC section, were aiding Beyen where they could in the 
Dutch political arena. In April 1953 they urged the Dutch employers associations to 
write a general response to back the Beyen plan for a customs union. The employ-
ers associations dutifully fulfilled the request. The ABUP also proved instrumental 
in directing ELEC’s attention to the Beyen plan. They met to discuss the details of 
the plan in June 1953 and decided to introduce them in the ELEC. This prompted 
the Central Council to take up the plan for study that same month. Broadly sup-
ported by all sections, the ELEC even drew up a publication that demanded the 
definitive and scheduled creation of a customs union after the European Political 
Community was realized.287  
 However, the combination of economic integration with political integration 
became a basic controversy within ELEC. The French section thought it was too 
risky. During the Central Council meeting of January 1954, after months of prepar-
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ing for the publication of the study, Edmond Giscard D’Estaing explained that he 
wanted to call it off. The French parliamentary ratification of the European Defence 
Community was delayed and it was far from obvious that a solution would arise. He 
feared that a demand by ELEC for the inclusion of a definitive and scheduled crea-
tion of a Common Market in the EPC-treaty, would slow down the discussion on 
the political community, perhaps block them and as a result slow down or block 
discussions on the EDC.”288 Instead he demanded from the ELEC “to ask the Minis-
ters to sign a strictly political and institutional Treaty.”289  
 The Benelux industrialists responded with agitation. G. A. Kohnstamm of the 
artificial fibres producer AKU, declared that “[t]he Netherlands have no interest in 
ratifying a treaty of which the economic provisions do not ensure the formation of 
common market”, a statement underwritten by the Belgians René Boël of Solvay & 
Cie. and Lucien L. Sermon of Brufina for the Belgian situation. They nonetheless 
had to back down after Edmond Giscard d’Estaing stated that the ELEC, being an 
economic study group, should stay out of matters of a political treaty. The British 
section moreover indicated that it could not accept the reference to the necessity 
of a political authority for the formation of Common Market. The original ingredi-
ents of the Beyen plan and any references to it were subsequently removed from 
the study.290 
 The final content of the brochure on the “[t]he economic scope of a European 
political community”, published in March 1954, was thus a compromise which 
merely tried to remind the negotiating governments that the political community 
at some point would have to start the implementation of a Common Market (“mar-
ché commun”). In addition ELEC also added a sophisticated and complete rework-
ing of its already mentioned ideas on the institutional organization of the market. 
They demanded a regime of competition, freedom of entrepreneurship and an 
open character of the community, including the option for other countries such as 
the United Kingdom to engage in certain forms of association. Moreover they pro-
posed harmonization of national policies on financial, commercial and economic-
social matters. They also offered further reasons for ELEC's denunciation of sector-
based integration under supervision of specialized supranational institutions. They 
feared that the multiplication of separate institutions would only constrict the 
freedom of action of member states. ELEC was convinced that each separate insti-
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tution would develop different political, economic and monetary views and thus 
lay the basis for conflicts among them. To their disappointment however the ratifi-
cation process in the French parliament regarding the European Defence Communi-
ty faltered nonetheless on the 30th of August 1954.291 
 It is unlikely that Giscard d'Estaing really saw an ELEC publication as a large 
risk for the EDC, but within French politics it could likely have backfired on his 
position as one of the nation's semi-public representatives of international enter-
prise. In France the discussion about the economic dimensions of the EPC were 
seen as a nuisance. Moreover, in light of the earlier proposals of the French ELEC 
section for combinations of trade liberalization schemes and semi-protectionist 
considerations, the notion of an automatic implementation of a customs union 
surely was unattractive. Nobody could guarantee that any signatory country would 
be prepared to re-open negotiations on compensating measures when the customs 
union was established. Indeed, already in February 1953 the political division of 
the French Foreign Affairs Ministry was worried about being caught off-guard on 
economic clauses in the EPC treaty. The fact that within the ELEC the Benelux and 
German sections so eagerly tried to exploit the opportunity did not help. ELEC 
affairs in later years however showed that the Benelux sections had learned to be 
flexible, and to sweeten the deal in order to get the consent they wanted.292 
Any market at all... 
By 1954, the ELEC had arrived at a turning point. In April of that year, exactly at 
the point when the brochure on the economic charter of the EPC was published, 
the group sensed that the time had come to recapitulate ELEC's ideas on economic 
and political unification of the six member states of the ECSC. A day before the 
definitive collapse of the European Defence Community ratification process on the 
30th of August, ELEC accepted a draft proposal by its Secretary General, the Bel-
gian Sermon for writing a publication on how a Common Market could best be 
implemented. However, as will be seen, during the next year ELEC's sections would 
all be forced to show their true colours on the subject of a Common Market. Na-
tional governments were suddenly showing a formal interest in the topic. Now that 
a decision about European economic integration seemed to be in the making, 
would the section's views regarding a Common Market remain the same?293 
 The commitment of the Dutch multinationals to the founding of a Common 
Market remained firm. From August 1954 onwards they began to ask for an ELEC 
response to the potentially harmful international developments that were under-
mining the founding of a European Common Market. In August 1954 the secretary 
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to the board of Philips, F. E. Spat, expressed his concerns about recent tariff in-
creases by the United States on Swiss watches. He proposed a resolution which 
was personally underwritten by the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs Jelle 
Zijlstra, a former ELEC member himself. Moreover Spat had the support of several 
of the business leaders within the Dutch section. The Central Council agreed to the 
resolution which condemned “[t]his protectionist measure” through which “Amer-
ica may frustrate Europe’s striving for the creation of a common European market.” 
The rationale of this concern was that American protectionism would curb any 
European willingness to commit to trade liberalization.294 
 Sudden negotiations between the governments of Germany and France trig-
gered a similar response. In October 1954 they concluded agreements on foreign 
trade and mutual investments. In the pessimistic atmosphere on European integra-
tion that had resulted from the EDC debacle, the bilateral agreements triggered the 
fear that the window for founding a multilateral Common Market had closed. The 
possibility that European trade would again be organized by means of bilateral 
agreements suddenly seemed real. As a response in January 1955 the Dutch and 
Belgian sections asked ELEC's Central Council to condemn the negotiations be-
tween Germany and France on the grounds that they might endanger the estab-
lishment of a Common Market. However ELEC's French and German sections 
would not hear of it: they were convinced that such fears were unnecessary.295 
 The fears persisted nevertheless and they strongly affected the drafting of the 
brochure that was intended to recapitulate ELEC's views on the founding of a 
Common Market. During the Central Council meeting in January 1955 ELEC's Pres-
ident René Boël explained that the basis for the document was not any longer a 
customs union but a “free trade area.” When the Belgian Secretary General Lucien 
L. Sermon submitted his draft in ELEC's Economic Committee in March 1955 it 
indeed committed to a “zone de libre échange” causing frustration among the par-
ticipants. The move of ELEC's Belgian section had come shortly after a policy 
change of the Belgian government in January 1955. The Belgian government was 
also displeased with the Franco-German bilateral initiative and now threatened the 
protectionist French government to back a free trade area instead of a Common 
Market. Just as the Dutch ELEC section stood behind the Beyen plan, now the Bel-
gian ELEC section sided with its government.296 
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Especially the French section was surprised by the proposal. By now they were 
thinking about an altogether different proposal as well, one which was also mind-
ful of the views of their new government. The French government was led by Men-
dès-France (June 1954-February 1955), an outspoken critic of European suprana-
tional institutions. As a result the French ELEC section changed its views. Giscard 
D’Estaing indicated that the section favoured the elimination of tariffs by means of 
negotiations among industries themselves. This would involve hammering out all 
sorts of sector-specific deals instead of integrating all sectors at the same time via a 
Common Market. This was similar to what the ELEC had intended with the “Pro-
motors Inquiry.” The French section expected that negotiations on a Common 
Market would result in negotiations between industries of different countries 
anyway. The French section moreover stressed that tax harmonization or the 
equalization of social regimes were not necessary in integration schemes. Accord-
ing to the French, levies could instead be imposed to compensate for the largest 
disparities between countries, just as the French section had proposed in 1951. By 
renouncing tax and social regime harmonization the need for a supranational insti-
tution was further reduced.297 
 ELEC's Economic Committee met again in July 1955, some weeks after the 
Messina conference at which the ECSC member states had decided to study the 
most viable approach to economic integration. Governments were busy devising 
their strategies, but within the ELEC the tone of debate suddenly changed from a 
mutual nation-based strategic attitude into a constructive one. The news of a re-
newed governmental interest in a customs union introduced a careful weighing of 
options instead of negotiating preferences. The sections took a distanced view of 
the matter as if they wanted to provide the intergovernmental committee, starting 
its work in September with as much viable options and techniques that could be 
useful in achieving a positive result.298 
 The French section for example backed down on the proposals for sectoral 
agreements and acknowledged that a simultaneous integration of all sectors would 
be preferable, provided that some sensitivity to specific sector-based problems 
would be built-in. Moreover they indicated that a customs union and a free trade 
zone could exist alongside each other for the time being. Also, the French section 
felt that no preconceived ideas should exist on the size of the market to be created, 
indicating room for the British to join. The Oxford economist Roy Harrod of the 
British section favoured a free trade area. The Belgian section agreed with Harrod, 
as did the German section's secretary Paul Krebs of Deutsche Bank but added that a 
solidarity plan should aid those countries that would have difficulties in adapting 
to the reduction of tariffs. The Dutch Pieter Blaisse, member of the General Assem-
bly of the ECSC and member of the Dutch industrialization committee, explained 
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that the Dutch section had arrived at a point at which it agreed to all the studied 
possibilities: “a customs union and an economic union, an extension of the ECSC, 
support the work in Messina, Professor Harrod’s project” […] to “arrive at a re-
sult.”299 
 In order to guarantee a result, the Dutch section tried to clear away objections 
from governments and economic pressure groups against economic integration. 
Reaching out to French and Italian concerns, they admitted that in view of “signifi-
cant divergences in financial and social policy in different countries or artificial 
differences in the cost structure”, some harmonization was unavoidable.300 To 
increase the acceptability of a Common Market for both countries, Blaisse pro-
posed a development fund to alleviate adaptation costs, especially for underdevel-
oped regions and backward sectors. The proposal had been sent in 1954 by Philips 
lawyer Hein Wertheimer, but the plan was originally rooted in an earlier proposal 
by Pieter Kuin, an economic advisor to Unilever who had already suggested it late 
1953. At the time, Kuin had proposed to the ELEC to investigate in which parts of 
the European economy the resistance against European integration was located 
and to find out what could possibly be done about the cause of this resistance. He 
was explicitly thinking about the limited development of the agriculture sector in 
France, Italy and Germany and several industries in France, Italy and Belgium. In 
other words, in order to make economic integration acceptable to even the most 
backward industries, the Dutch multinationals tried to introduce compensating 
measures. The Dutch section defended the plan valiantly until it was included in 
the final document.301  
 ELEC ultimately presented both major options for economic integration that 
were considered viable within the GATT rules: a Common Market (a customs union 
including the freedom of movement of labour and capital) and a free trade zone. 
However the publication indicated that a Common Market would be the more 
perfect system due to its “common customs tariff and a common commercial policy 
vis-à-vis third countries” which the free-exchange zone would lack. According to 
the ELEC the sheer size of the Common Market would offer advantages for devel-
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opment, rationalization, specialization of production and ultimately an increase of 
the standard of living.302 
 The fixed time frame for customs reduction, strongly preferred by the Dutch 
section, now was described in minute detail, suggesting stages over a period of ten 
years. The ELEC also proposed a method for harmonizing national production 
costs that stemmed from governmental interventions and a mechanism for allevi-
ating adaptation costs for underdeveloped regions and backward sectors. With 
regard to the institutional setup ELEC eschewed “putting into operation powers” 
[…] which “are of a coercive nature” which was in line with its continuing criticism 
on the institutional style of the ECSC’s High Authority. Instead the ELEC preferred a 
market established by treaty with a small international secretariat and a commit-
tee of arbitration, inspired by the Benelux example. This would also make it easier, 
the publication explained, to allow the association of the United Kingdom, Switzer-
land and the Scandinavian countries to the Six. These remarks were an expression 
of ELEC's ultimate goal: a Common Market that would encompass the entire 
OEEC.303 
 The brochure was subsequently produced in haste in order to finish it before 
September 1955 and thus be in time to present it to the experts of the intergov-
ernmental committee that had been appointed by the Messina Conference to inves-
tigate the options for economic integration.304 
Disappointment and recalibration 
Between 1958 and 1963 ELEC gradually began to realize that their approach to 
studying practical proposals for market integration was no longer adequate due to 
changing circumstances. In these years much of ELEC's energy went into a preven-
tion of the impending schism between two major European trade blocs.  
 As mentioned, in response to the plans for founding a Common Market the 
United Kingdom proposed an alternative plan in November 1956. It proposed to 
found a free trade zone for the entire OEEC instead of a Common Market for the Six. 
The ELEC did not respond to the plan until after the Rome Treaties entered into 
force in January 1958. Because the EEC at that time had become an established fact 
the UK proposal now meant to include the EEC in a free trade area of the OEEC. In 
ELEC's perspective it was imperative to prevent trade diversion between a British-
led free trade area and the Common Market. ELEC's response consisted of solu-
tions to the technical problems that were dominating the negotiations between the 
OEEC governments. What was considered especially problematic was the potential 
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diversion of economic traffic as a result from strongly diverging tariffs between the 
EEC and the rest of he OEEC countries. If ignored, the diversion of trade would 
affect a whole range of sectors simultaneously. The ELEC presented a system of 
certification that would treat transferred items based on their origin when they 
passed through customs. But even ELEC itself doubted its own plan due to the 
complexity of the European market. Ultimately the ELEC saw only one fool-proof 
method to prevent trade diversion. It suggested to actually establish a common 
external tariff with the United Kingdom, with similar harmonization schemes as 
the EEC. In order to fend off British concerns about a potential loss of sovereignty, 
it was to be overseen by the OEEC. In fact, ELEC suggested a customs union.305 
 In late 1958 de Gaulle withdrew from the OEEC negotiations and as a result 
the British plan for a free trade zone failed. Subsequently the United Kingdom 
founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) together with Austria, Den-
mark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. This did not change the problem 
of diverging tariffs between the EEC and the EFTA however. The ELEC continued 
its efforts to minimize trade diversion effects. In October 1960 it organized a con-
ference, aptly titled “The Coming Tasks Europe.” A collection of private study 
groups and public bodies, including representatives of the OEEC and the EEC tried 
to tackle the problem. Consensus was even reached over a proposition for a Euro-
pean Trade Association comprising the EEC and the EFTA, thus “associating them 
within a wider system.” Its chief goal would be to work towards removing internal 
tariffs to harmonize external tariffs and the establishment of a common trade poli-
cy.306 
 In June 1961 ELEC learned about the British intention to start negotiations on 
accession to the EEC. The ELEC immediately immersed itself in the problems that 
were sure to come up in subsequent negotiations and drafted two publications 
aimed at facilitating a successful outcome. The first, published in January 1962 
discussed solutions based on what would in all likelihood become the most conten-
tious elements of the negotiations, namely British trade relations with the Com-
monwealth and agriculture. The second publication, published in June 1962, was a 
proposal on how to arrange the tariffs of Commonwealth exports of raw materials 
to the EEC. The strength of the scheme was that it was based on the input from 
chief representatives of major industrial corporations from the UK and the EEC 
which processed the materials themselves. All these efforts would however prove 
to be pointless: seven months later Charles de Gaulle announced his veto against 
the British accession to the EEC.307 
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When the ELEC Central Council met for the first time after the French veto, the 
group was outspoken about its deception. The Belgian Baron Snoy D'Oppuers of 
the Belgian financial-industrial holding Groupe Lambert called it “the most serious 
accident which has occurred in Europe since the rejection of the EDC.” Similar 
deception was expressed by the other sections. The French section clearly was on 
the defensive and attempted to clarify what had gone wrong.308 
 Snoy D'Oppuers was the first to express his doubts about whether the an-
swers that the ELEC had tried to provide during the past fifteen years were still 
adequate under the present circumstances. Two weeks after de Gaulle’s veto, Bar-
on Snoy d'Oppuers stated: “The current situation involves new duties for the ELEC.” 
Indeed, if the French government would not change its mind, little progress to-
wards a more complete economic union was to be expected. During the next two 
years the ELEC would attempt to renew its purpose and adapt its work to new 
circumstances. This will be discussed in the next chapter.309 
 In summarizing the views of multinationals on the European market in the 
ELEC from 1950 until the early 1960s, first the differences deserve attention. 
Whereas most companies fully supported ELEC's founding idea of liberalization of 
the European market, strikingly enough the French businesses, ELEC's section with 
the richest past regarding European tariff reduction, preferred transitional protec-
tionist measures. Representatives of Dutch multinationals were the most out-
spoken in resisting protectionism. Backed by the Belgian and German corporations, 
they were strongly in favour of a complete and automatic liberalization of tariffs 
among the ECSC member states. Moreover, in order to increase the acceptability of 
that plan, Dutch firms devised compensation measures for European industries 
and economic areas that resisted integration. The British section included no busi-
ness representatives.  
 What became clear was that the views of ELEC's national sections at times 
remained very close to the positions of national governments. French corporations 
in 1954 suddenly preferred agreements among sectors as a condition or further 
economic integration just when the Mendès France government was in power. The 
Dutch multinationals strongly supported the Beyen plan and the Belgian multina-
tionals quickly supported their government's sudden shift in 1955 towards prefer-
ring a free trade area when Germany and France had started to develop their bilat-
eral relations.  
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Other views were generally shared among ELEC's multinationals. They resisted the 
introduction of supranational organizations with the task of regulating corporate 
behaviour on a sectoral level. Freedom of entrepreneurship was too important to 
them to allow such external involvement. Instead they preferred competition as an 
organizing principle, though as became clear, French corporations required transi-
tory measures.  
 Moreover, corporations in the ELEC were in agreement on the need for an as 
large, liberalized European market as possible and according to them the institu-
tional structure of the European market should remain as open as possible to allow 
for expansion, particularly to the United Kingdom. This became all the more clear 
when the European market was in danger of being split up in two trade blocs. They 
responded by trying to prevent trade diversion in any way possible.  
The Bilderberg meetings 
The Bilderberg meetings also discussed themes of European trade liberalization 
but these discussions were part of a different dynamic. Unlike the ELEC, the Bild-
erberg meetings did not operate as a lobby group, nor did they try to appeal to 
policymakers on specific decisions. A Bilderberg meeting was an organized con-
frontation of views, where people who were highly informed about international 
economic or security subjects lobbied each other and sounded each other out on 
the room for manoeuvring in Transatlantic and European relations. Whereas the 
ELEC in the 1950s was focussed on European economic unification, the Bilderberg 
meetings focussed on Transatlantic themes in which security and the global eco-
nomic system were dominant. The formation of a European market and its institu-
tional organization played a modest part in the meetings. European integration 
was often discussed as an aspect of transatlantic security or global economic rela-
tions. 
 This had the important consequence that in the Bilderberg meetings the sub-
ject of the European market was never merely a European theme. It was discussed 
as a geopolitical affair which was contextualized by American-led efforts in forging 
a stable, liberal and multilateral trading system. A useful interpretation of the Bild-
erberg meetings' discussions is therefore dependent on a simultaneous treatment 
of tensions among Europeans and tensions between the larger categories of Euro-
peans as a group, ánd Americans. 
 The initial exchanges that preceded the foundation of the Bilderberg meetings 
were particularly characterised by a "Europe versus America" dynamic, which 
placed the discussion of the European market in a context of transatlantic trade. 
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European integration: “...dictated by the circumstances of our times...” 
The founding phase of the Bilderberg meetings which took place in the years 1952-
1953, revolved around a group of European politicians from several parties and a 
few European businessmen who wanted to make the United States government 
aware of an emerging European anti-Americanism. They were especially con-
cerned about the long-term consequences of this development and wanted to illicit 
a response. According to them, European anti-American perceptions involved two 
main aspects. The first was the United States’ attitude to war. Fears had spiralled 
high in Europe after the American confrontation with North Korea in 1950 and the 
subsequent Chinese intervention to stop the American advance. According to the 
European group, Europeans feared becoming involved in a new war as a result of 
American actions. The second source of anti-Americanism in their eyes was the 
United States' irresponsible economic conduct towards Europe. They stated that 
while Europe was already dependent on the United States for dollar aid regarding 
imports from the US, the Americans had only increased European frustration by 
means of adopting the Battle Act (1951). This law made American aid dependent 
on the suspension of parts of European trade with the Soviet Union and China. " 
'Where could the Europeans earn their dollars?' ", they asked: “[I]t is America 
which, while closing to Europe traditional export markets, refuses to open her 
own; it is thus America which is keeping Europe starved of dollars.” According to 
the European group the dollar gap could be remedied by restructuring trade. They 
stated that the “Europeans should be allowed to export to the United States as 
unhindered and unhampered as possible”, and thus enable Europe to earn its dol-
lars to pay for its substantial imports from the US. This way the need for aid would 
be replaced by trade.310  
 The European view was transmitted to the American government in Decem-
ber 1952 but only got a response a year later due to other domestic priorities. 
Eventually the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) requested the Committee 
for a National Trade Policy to write a White House sanctioned response to the Eu-
ropean inquiry.311  
 The Committee for a National Trade Policy was an American lobby group of 
industrial exporters. It was called into action by Eisenhower's White House itself to 
support the President's free-trade agenda. George Ball, corporate lawyer who as 
founding partner of the international law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Ball, served 
a clientele of American multinationals, was the committee's secretary. He helped 
businessmen such as John Coleman of the Burroughs Manufacturing Company, 
Harry Bullis of General Mills, Joseph Spang Jr. of the Gillette Safety Razor Company, 
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John McCloy of Chase National Bank and J.D. Zellerbach of the Crown-Zellerbach 
Corporation, in lobbying for a policy of reciprocal trade with Europe.312 
 Not surprisingly their response to the European report in December 1953 was 
one of emphatic understanding and acceptance: indeed, they agreed that the US 
needed to open its markets and enable Europe to earn the dollars it required for 
imports. But the American group also had a request for the Europeans, which 
made clear that American views had changed little since the introduction of the 
Marshall Plan in June 1947. The Europeans were asked to increase their productiv-
ity by means of founding a single market, thus “restoring Europe’s capacity for self-
help and a balance in its external accounts.” The single market would result in a 
“more rapid advance of productivity than a narrow and protected one defined by 
national boundaries.” Moreover they explained that in the United States little sym-
pathy existed for the slow progress on creating a “single market”, or the ratifica-
tion of the European Defence Community (EDC). They felt that the pooling of re-
sources was merely a technical problem. To them the creation of a single market or 
the EDC seemed “dictated by the circumstances of our times”, and thus inevita-
ble.313  
 It is important to clarify the American use of the term “single market”: in none 
of the Bilderberg meetings between 1954 and 1963 that will be discussed below 
did the American group express a specific preference with regard to the precise 
rules of a European market, such as a customs union, a Common Market or a free 
trade area. Although a preference among American exporters for low European 
external tariffs is understandable, the use of the term “single market” was not 
aimed at conveying this particular preference. 
 This early exchange of views is telling about how the transatlantic context of 
the Bilderberg meetings, and the American attitude in particular, forced Europeans 
to discuss the future of the European market from a geopolitical perspective. In the 
European League for Economic Cooperation, national sections negotiated about the 
methods of integration and studied how national differences could be addressed. 
In a Transatlantic context the European market was however reduced to matters 
of productivity and balances of payments. At such a level of discussion national 
idiosyncrasies become a nuisance. Moreover the tendency to discuss problems in 
geopolitical terms implicitly turned specific national preferences into petty de-
mands whose claimants could be said to have lost sight of the bigger picture. 
 The discussion on the first two reports resulted in the first Bilderberg meeting, 
taking place in the Bilderberg Hotel in Oosterbeek (The Netherlands) at the end of 
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May 1954. In contrast to the urgency that the Americans had attached to the Euro-
pean market in their report on anti-American attitudes, during this meeting they 
explained that they felt that the European market could wait. George Ball explained 
“that progress towards political unification was more important than towards 
economic unification.” He was referring to the European Defence Community and 
the European Political Community that were hanging in the balance at that time.314  
 Moreover, the European and American members alike agreed that the eco-
nomic problems that were identified in the initial reports were no longer as press-
ing. They observed that as a consequence of the Korean conflict, war dollars were 
now pouring into Europe for the sake of rearmament. Moreover, President Eisen-
hower had managed to realize a reduction of American tariffs. As a result of these 
developments the Bilderberg participants concluded that the dollar-gap was, at 
least for now, closed. In addition, during the meeting the efforts by the Committee 
for a National Trade Policy in support of tariff reduction were explicitly acknowl-
edged. According to Pierre de Bonvoisin, a member of the Belgian section of the 
ELEC, and also the President of Société Générale de Banque, admired their “courage 
to go against their own public opinion at home in recommending a lowering of 
tariffs”, adding that it was “evidence of new industrial thinking” in the United 
States. Meanwhile, the American members repeated their hope that Europe would 
find a way to unify in one way or another, possibly by means of a federation. Ac-
cording to them the past 100 years had proven that Europe required a new model 
for its relations. Moreover, in light of the uncertain ratification of the EDC they 
stressed that “European Union is probably Europe's best weapon against Com-
munism.”315  
 The next Bilderberg Conference in March 1955 took place in Barbizon 
(France), and was entirely devoted to Western security in relation to the Soviet 
Union, more specifically the neutrality of several European countries in the Cold 
War and infiltration methods of the Communists in Western countries. Matters of 
European integration were not discussed. However, in September 1955 another 
Bilderberg meeting was organized in Garmisch-Partenkirchen that did discuss the 
European market.316 
A web of high authorities 
Different than in the previous meetings, at Garmisch-Partenkirchen the European 
market was mainly discussed among European members of the group. The agenda 
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featured the topic “European Unity” without further specification, but market inte-
gration was the key problem at hand. The meeting was taking place shortly after 
the start of the European Intergovernmental Committee headed by Paul-Henri 
Spaak, which was studying the options for Western European economic integra-
tion. This added a special relevance to the subject.317 
 Central to the topic was the question of which goal a unified European market 
should serve and which method of integration best fitted this goal. The theme was 
introduced by Guy Mollet, the French leader of the socialist party SFIO. In his view 
the European market should in the first place address the potential scenario of a 
“reawakening of Germany”, which he still felt capable of overpowering France in 
the future. He stressed that Germany was not won for the West yet, despite its 
participation in the European Coal and Steel Community and despite its in May 
1955 realized membership of NATO. Mollet felt that the Federal Republic of Ger-
many might shift its foreign policies closer to those of the Soviet Union if it would 
be offered a deal that would make unification with East-Germany possible. To 
reduce this possibility, Mollet suggested a strategy to lock in Germany, similar to 
what was attempted with the proposal for the Schuman Plan or the Pleven Plan.318 
 His plan involved a proliferation of sectoral supranational institutions or the 
expansion of the High Authority to other sectors. According to Mollet, a Common 
Market could “only be an organized market” in which “necessary powers must be 
put at the disposal of a common Authority.” In his view the High Authority of the 
Coal and Steel Community had proven that such an institution was necessary and 
effective, implying that the institutions that would administrate a Common Market 
would be endowed with similar powers. According to Mollet, an organized Euro-
pean economy was necessary because of France's continuing weakness in dealing 
with international competition. An intervening High Authority would have the 
tools of intervention to mitigate the worst effects. Moreover, Mollet felt that there 
was a limited window for realising a Common Market: he explained that he was 
observing an increasing reluctance of German industry to unite, “flushed by suc-
cess and afraid of being tied to the apron-strings of a European system.” Mollet 
further indicated that the six member states of the ECSC, should be the basis of any 
plan for integration. He felt that they could later strive for the association of other 
countries, such as the United Kingdom. In his view the participation of the United 
Kingdom posed too much risk for everything that had already been achieved. 
Mollet's course was clear: “I am a convinced supporter of the system of “special-
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ized Authorities,” of “integration by sector”, with the underlying goal of binding 
Germany to the same rules and supranational powers of intervention as France.319 
 This design was unacceptable to several European businessmen. They were 
very aware that Mollet’s proposals represented a multiplication of High Authorities, 
that, in line with the associated interventionist economic philosophy, would poten-
tially curtail the freedom of enterprise to achieve its goals. The Dutch Paul Rijkens, 
president of the British-Dutch Unilever, shortly replied being in favour of the 
Common Market approach as opposed to an institutional setup of specialised 
communities “because it offers less difficulties.” Fritz Berg, the President of the 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie first defused Mollet’s fears concerning any 
reluctance in German industry to integrate further, but then quickly continued by 
strongly agreeing with Rijkens. According to Berg an extension of the High Author-
ity, which involved placing more sectors under its control, was not the right course 
of action. In response to Mollet's concerns about France's competitiveness in in-
ternational trade, Berg stated that instead of intervening on a sectoral level he 
preferred to reduce the differences between countries through duties or tax 
agreements.320  
 Louis Camu, a member of the ELEC and President of Banque Bruxelles, be-
lieved that a unified market would psychologically be much more important than 
an extension of the ECSC or the creation of any other institution. He was sure that 
enlarged markets and options for the rationalization of production would be much 
more effective. As an alternative to Mollet’s proposals he gave an exposé of the 
ideas that in fact stemmed from the ELEC brochure on the Common Market. Claim-
ing that they had recently presented their report before the Spaak Committee, 
suggesting “a demobilization of customs through a convention or a treaty between 
states.” Moreover, Camu explicitly denied the requirement for a High Authority. He 
was convinced that the “Marché Commun”, the Common Market, would allow for a 
much easier inclusion of the United Kingdom at a later stage.321  
 The Americans George Ball and Paul Hoffman sided with the European indus-
trialists. Ball, still an internationally operating corporate lawyer, attempted to 
impress upon Mollet that “conditions of competition of the most active kind” would 
be necessary for raising the standard of living, something which a managed market 
might miss. Paul Hoffman, the former ECA administrator and at that point active in 
the automotive industry, advised him to “leave out the ideologies and just stick to 
straight commercial business and try to see you get more and more goods ex-
changed.” According to him the European debate on the planned economy versus a 
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liberal economy would stifle trade instead of forward it. The industrialists and Ball 
and Hoffman were primarily concerned with the biggest possible growth results 
and entirely disregarded the political intentions behind Mollet's method, namely to 
bind Germany to the West.322  
 Within the Bilderberg meetings there was no question about the need for 
liberalizing trade. Even though Mollet indicated that France required a mechanism 
to temporarily reduce the impact of a Common Market, he did not wish to forego 
liberalization. Instead, the method of integration was a main concern. Regarding 
the method, European but also American businessmen knew very well what 
Mollet's plans had in store for them. The High Authority of the ECSC had been too 
unpredictable, and a multitude of High Authorities might turn out to be even worse. 
Remarkably, Mollet's denunciation of the United Kingdom's participation in a 
Common Market appeared to be hardly controversial, not even among business-
men such as Rijkens, president of Unilever, a company whose two seats of man-
agement were placed on both sides of the Channel. Nobody appeared to be worried 
if the United Kingdom would join or not.  
 The Bilderberg conferences in 1956 and early 1957 were not at all concerned 
with the European market or European integration. The Fredensborg conference, 
held from the 11th until the 13th of May in 1956 was entirely devoted to discussions 
on the Western attitude to Asia. The conference of St. Simons Island held from the 
15th until the 17th of February in 1957 focussed on the state of the Western Alliance, 
its security policies towards Europe, and the Middle East. However the Bilderberg 
conference that followed in October 1957, six months after the signing of the Rome 
Treaties, did discuss the European market.323 
 The meeting foreshadowed a more critical atmosphere between the European 
and American groups. As part of a general review of developments in the West, 
members of the American section of the Bilderberg meetings suddenly expressed 
their concerns about the position of the Common Market in international trade. 
They claimed to be satisfied that the EEC now was a fact. But the treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community had left many aspects for later specifica-
tion, among which the level of the common external tariff. This was not at all ap-
preciated by the American group and they made it clear that postponement should 
not lead to the formation of a “self-centred economic bloc.” They warned that the 
US would respond through protectionist measures if Western Europe would use 
the Common Market as an instrument for protectionism.324  
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On behalf of American exporting corporations, present in the form of members of 
the Committee for an Economic Trade Policy, the American group explained that 
they doubted the Common Market’s ability to increase trade between the United 
States and Western Europe. Instead they believed that Europe's industries would 
concentrate, while simultaneously penetrating the US market. They felt that this 
dynamic would decrease opportunities for American firms on both sides of the 
Atlantic. This left them no choice but to buy participations in European businesses 
in order to increase their ability to compete in Europe. The Americans thus de-
manded a liberal common external tariff to maintain their existing export posi-
tion.325  
 The Europeans from the Community member states tried to dispel American 
fears. They assumed that European imports would grow along with intra-
European trade. Moreover the Europeans wishfully stressed that “the Free Trade 
Area would be the next step in the process of European economic integration.”326 
Mending the Schism 
However, during the Bilderberg meeting in 1958 even the European group was not 
certain anymore whether further liberalization of the European market was as-
sured. As has been mentioned before, developments between the Common Market 
member states and the other West-European countries truly brought out the divi-
sive nature of the path to integration that was chosen by the governments of the 
Benelux, France, Germany and Italy. The Six, as they were called, had shown that 
they were willing to form a trade bloc against other West European countries in 
order to secure their own objectives in trade. In the long run these developments 
appeared to be at odds with the interests of European corporations who had a 
European market in mind that went beyond merely the Six.327 
 As an alternative to the Common Market for the Benelux, France, Germany 
and Italy, in June 1956 the United Kingdom introduced a proposal for the creation 
of a free trade area for the entire OEEC. The proposal was only seriously discussed 
after the signing of the Rome Treaties. It suggested a free trade area placed on top 
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of the Common Market structure. Since March 1957 the plan was under serious 
consideration by the European governments represented in the OEEC.328 
 However, during 1958 problems arose because of the complexities that were 
involved in combining the Common Market and its special policies with the free 
trade area. Particularly the governments of France and the United Kingdom were 
at odds with each other. The French were unwilling to give in to concessions that 
they had secured in the Rome Treaties, such as the common agricultural policy, the 
harmonization of social policies, investments in their overseas areas and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community. Moreover the United Kingdom had resisted every 
suggestion of supranationalism in international treaties over the past eight years 
and it was unlikely that it would accept French ideas now. By September 1958, 
when the next Bilderberg meeting took place, the negotiations were stalled.329 
 The Bilderberg meeting paid close attention to the stalled negotiations. An 
unusual number of leaders of European business had joined the meeting, even 
including Swedish, Norwegian and British firms and several members from ELEC. 
The possibility that no agreement would be reached between France and the rest 
of the OEEC, worried all members. The group as a whole was especially concerned 
about the possibility of a schism in trade between the EEC and the rest of Western 
Europe. If negotiations would fail, they all expected the creation of another trade 
bloc by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, dubbed “the Seven”. All agreed that a solution should be found to pre-
vent the undesired long-term effect of trade displacement. 330/331  
 Even Antoine Pinay, a former French Prime Minister, the economist Jacques 
Rueff, advisor to the since that summer Prime Minister of France, General de Gaulle, 
and national banker Wilfrid Baumgartner were in favour of finding a way around 
the emergence of a second European trade bloc. However, they warned that the 
French government would not be prepared to renegotiate the Rome Treaties. Little 
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could be added during the meeting and it would have mattered little: in November 
1958 Charles de Gaulle decided to end the negotiations in the OEEC.332 
 De Gaulle's decision struck a nerve within the Bilderberg group. The Executive 
Committee quickly arranged a Greater Steering Committee meeting on the 18th of 
January 1959 to see if any room for manoeuvring still existed for the creation of a 
free trade area. The meeting took place in an atmosphere of frustration: Ernst van 
der Beugel who in 1958 had resigned as the Dutch Deputy Minister for European 
Affairs and had recently become the President of the Koninklijke Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij (KLM) opened the meeting with an angry statement. He felt that a 
community “cannot stand a continuous major influence of the economic concep-
tion of one of its members”, meaning the French, their protectionist tendencies and 
their unwillingness to compromise. The Dutch clearly preferred the solution of a 
free trade area instead of witnessing the first Common Market's external tariff 
increase vis-à-vis the rest of Europe, only 17 days earlier.333 
 Despite the generally shared frustration among the members, the meeting was 
characterized by a search for pragmatic solutions to the possible diversion of in-
ternal European trade. The group that was gathered would certainly have secured 
a positive outcome if any room for agreement had existed. They included several 
decision-makers or those who were expected to know what their governments 
would agree to. These were the German Alfred Mueller-Armack, the Deputy minis-
ter on European Affairs, Reginald Maudling, president of the British Board of Trade, 
Hubert Ansiaux, the Belgian National Banker, the Italian Ambassador Pietro 
Quaroni and the recently resigned Dutch Deputy Minister on European Affairs, 
Ernst van der Beugel. Apart from France, the member-states of the Common Mar-
ket were well represented. Additionally Raymond Aron, the French liberal philos-
opher was treated as a go-between for the French government.334 
 The meeting mainly discussed a workable proposal from Fritz Berg of the 
Bund der Deutschen Industrie. The proposal suggested a minimum-agreement be-
tween the Six and the Seven on crucial tariffs where “deflections of trade and di-
versions of productive capacity are feared.” He suggested to abolish tariffs for 
products that for 90% or more were produced within the proposed free trade area. 
He explained that the coverage percentage could gradually be lowered as time 
would pass and sentiments changed. Especially the industrialists responded en-
thusiastically: Alberto Pirelli, of Pirelli & Cie, Paul Rijkens of Unilever, Louis Camu of 
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Banque de Bruxelles and the Swiss Walter Boveri of Brown Boveri & Cie. were all 
very much in favour. Reginald Maudling even suggested to collectively agree to it, 
implying that he was witnessing a workable agreement in the making.335 
 However, the Americans H. J. Heinz (H. J. Heinz & Co.) and George Ball criti-
cized the plan from the perspective of GATT rules. Moreover, Raymond Aron, who 
was solitarily fending of an atmosphere of reproach directed towards him, made 
clear that France could only agree to such a proposal if they would have the same 
guarantees as they had in the Common Market. Clearly the Bilderberg meetings 
could not add much to this situation.336 
 That is not to say that the Bilderberg would not try again. This was the sole 
exception to the statement that the Bilderberg meetings were not involved in ex-
erting external influence. At the Bilderberg conference in September 1959 in Ye-
silkoy, the group tried to bring the French and British governments closer together 
by arranging a meeting between the European Secretary of the Bilderberg group, 
Ernst van der Beugel, the economic advisor of President de Gaulle, Jacquess Rueff, 
and Frederic Bennet, a deputy to Maudling, the President of the British Board of 
Trade. The meeting resulted in a disappointment however. Ernst van der Beugel's 
report on the meeting to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the rift 
between France and England is frighteningly deep”, with on the one hand Macmil-
lan who was convinced that France intended to keep the United Kingdom out of 
European affairs, and on the other hand a suspicious French government that was 
certain of British intentions to wreck the Common Market. They concluded that 
only a high level meeting, perhaps initiated by Eisenhower, could restart develop-
ments. Nothing of the sort was undertaken. Only two months after the Bilderberg 
meeting, the United Kingdom, together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden and Switzerland signed the treaty establishing the EFTA trade bloc.337 
 However, in June 1961 the British government announced that it was open to 
negotiations on the terms of EEC membership. The Bilderberg members remained 
worried nevertheless. The Bilderberg meeting of May 1962 tried to gauge the like-
lihood of failure of the UK-EEC negotiations, and more importantly, what failure 
would mean? The large majority of participants felt that a breakdown in negotia-
tions would have “disastrous consequences”: it threatened to damage what had 
already been achieved in terms of European integration. Moreover, several thought 
that the momentum in Western liberalization of trade might be lost. The Kennedy 
administration (January 1961 - November 1963) had only recently started to pur-
sue a proposal for lowering tariffs between the United States and the European 
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Community. As was pointed out at the meeting, approval by the American Con-
gress would at least require a reason to believe that Western Europe would remain 
committed to liberalization.338 
 The fears for failure appeared to be entirely justified. De Gaulle's veto against 
British accession to the EEC in January 1963, caused strong disappointment at the 
Bilderberg meeting in May that year, particularly among the Americans. Congress 
had granted the Kennedy administration its requested mandate to drastically re-
duce American tariffs for the European Community, and even remove tariffs en-
tirely on those products that represented 80% or more of total “free world” ex-
ports, as they were called by the Bilderberg American group. This was called the 
Trade Expansion Act. As several Americans explained, now that the United King-
dom would not become a member of the EEC the mandate was an empty shell with 
only a few products fitting the prescription.339 
 The Americans now even began doubting the Community's continuing will-
ingness for liberalization, as they called attention to the European keenness to 
prevent “competition from powerful, aggressive American firms.” Moreover, they 
complained that the strategy of solidifying the West in economic terms was com-
promised, particularly in light of the Communist challenge. The French partici-
pants to the conference confirmed that the size of American firms, but also Ameri-
can governmental aid to corporations via product-orders were standing in the way 
of far-reaching trade liberalization. Indeed, as was feared the momentum of liber-
alization appeared to slacken. The Bilderberg commitment to the liberalization 
drive of the 1950s was no longer evident. The meeting of 1963 marked a shift in 
themes: a basic consensus about the post-war world order was lost. Subjects with 
regard to Western trade would instead start to focus on what divided the Ameri-
cans and Europeans, such as trade with Eastern Europe or the wave of investments 
by American multinationals. These subjects will be explored in the following chap-
ter.340 
 The Bilderberg meetings' efforts with regard to preventing a European trade 
schism showed the commitment of industrialists on both sides of the Atlantic to 
integrate the Common Market with British trade and the larger OEEC area. They 
particularly wanted to retain the existing trade relations. Moreover, in this case the 
Bilderberg meetings served as a method for bringing together diverging European 
standpoints, albeit an unsuccessful one. 
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A summary of the role of representatives of multinationals and companies with a 
multinational outlook in the Bilderberg meetings results in the following. From the 
early 1950s onwards a general agreement could be noted regarding the liberaliza-
tion of trade between Western Europe and the United States. After the French 
parliament's failure to ratify the European Defence Community in August 1954, a 
first sign of a conviction of the need for a European Common Market emerged. 
Corporations in the Bilderberg meetings at the same time resisted the idea of a 
Common Market that would be organized by several supranational institutions 
with powers of intervention. Initially, doubts whether the United Kingdom would 
or should join the Common Market were not addressed. However, after the signing 
of the Rome Treaties in early 1957, attention shifted to the United Kingdom gov-
ernment's proposal for a European free trade area. Representatives of European 
corporations in the Bilderberg meetings were strongly in favour of the realization 
of a European free trade area and were worried about the potential for trade di-
version between the Common Market and a possible second European trade bloc if 
the OEEC free trade area would fail to come about. The resistance against intra-
European trade diversion and the fear of loosing the momentum of post-war trade 
liberalization further motivated their support for the United Kingdom's accession 
to the Common Market.  
Conclusion 
The main question of this investigation is focussed on learning the views of multi-
nationals on the European market. The main methodological device for answering 
this question is formed by the networks in question. When we compare European 
League for Economic Cooperation and the Bilderberg meetings are compared it 
becomes clear that they approached the idea of a European market in entirely 
different ways which shapes the interpretation of the multinational's views. The 
ELEC started from a shared desire for a European economic union. While that 
union may have meant different things to different members, the motive of closer 
economic integration was shared by all. Other than the Bilderberg meetings ELEC 
worked towards that goal through national groups. The League's organization 
structure in fact mimicked negotiations between governments: each section had 
their set of demands, or specific requirements, on the one hand determined by 
knowledge about what their national government could go along with, and on the 
other hand by their own interests based on their national context. The negotiation 
process was slow but the practice of seemingly preparatory negotiations for real 
negotiations between nation states led to useful results vis-à-vis decision-makers. 
 The Bilderberg meetings had a different aim: transatlantic cooperation. The 
main motive within the Bilderberg meetings was not European integration but the 
transatlantic security agenda. The theme of economic integration as such was 
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submerged in a much larger conception of transatlantic cooperation, anchored in 
shared security goals and a mutually beneficial international system of economic 
exchange that required productive and politically stable units. While indeed Euro-
pean market integration was discussed at several moments it was not a priority for 
discussions between Americans and Europeans. If debated with Americans, the 
theme of the European market was, by Europeans and Americans alike, instantly 
transformed to issues on balances of payments and demands for liberalized trade. 
Therefore, the most interesting examples of debate about the formation of a Euro-
pean market were those held between Europeans, with an incidental American as 
commentator. In fact, the Bilderberg meetings developed as an ad hoc platform for 
Europeans to discuss possible solutions for trade diversion between the Common 
Market and the United Kingdom largely amongst themselves. Besides the ELEC, 
which focussed on the technical aspects of this problem, not many other forums for 
discussions on such themes existed. 
 The main focus of this investigation is about the views of multinationals on the 
European market and how possible differences in views can be explained. The 
debates both in ELEC and the Bilderberg group show that most multinationals 
favoured the liberalization of intra-European trade. However among French corpo-
rations a clear preference for protectionism predominated. Regarding the question 
of the organization of the European market, all corporations resisted the introduc-
tion of interventionist supranational institutions, even the French corporations 
who were originally accustomed to technocratic intervention. A multiplication of 
High Authorities, each intervening in their respective industries was very undesir-
able to them. Most multinationals also opposed a sectoral approach to economic 
integration. Instead there was a general preference for treaty-based integration 
that involved the removal of tariffs and quotas through fixed, predictable steps for 
all sectors simultaneously. The French corporations however again had a specific 
preference in this regard. Despite their apprehension about several sectoral su-
pranational institutions and acceptance of integration for all sectors simultaneous-
ly, French corporations felt that European sectors should negotiate amongst them-
selves in order to arrive at agreements on how the main national disparities could 
be addressed. French business was trapped between the rejection of supranational 
interventionism and the need for protectionism. Instead of organizing the Europe-
an market through interventionist supranational institutions ultimately all sub-
scribed to the mechanism of competition as organizing principle, to clearly retain a 
basic freedom of entrepreneurship vis-à-vis European institutions. Lastly, a gen-
eral point can be made about the preference of European multinationals for the 
most largest market as possible. This was particularly expressed in the efforts to 
creating favourable conditions for the United Kingdom to associate itself with the 
Community or join integration plans. 
 How can these views be explained? The overall accepted view of liberalizing 
trade on the European market can be understood by considering international 
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political and economic circumstances. The aftermath of the Great Depression, the 
run up to WWII and the war itself had resulted in a widespread protectionist or-
ganization of European markets in which international trade was minimized to the 
benefit of an autarkic organization of national markets. After WWII, under leader-
ship of the United States, a debate was sparked among Western European govern-
ments on the liberalization and integration of European markets which character-
ized the entire 1950s. At the same time the organization of international markets 
through business-led cartels was severely undermined by American anti-trust 
campaigns, requiring a new approach to international competition. At the same 
time, companies were presented with the prospect of more opportunities for larg-
er sales. Moreover, as was introduced in chapters 1 and 3, for multinationals with 
multiple subsidiaries across Europe, liberalization offered an opportunity for scale 
advantages. A large market made it possible to rationalize the dispersed produc-
tion structure. This is consistent with the strong preferences for liberalization of 
the Dutch and Belgian multinationals and industrial holdings that were discussed 
in this chapter. 
 As became clear, corporations however held different views, even with regard 
to liberalization which was supported by most. To a very large extent these differ-
ences can be explained by national contexts. The continuous attempts of French 
industry to include forms of protectionism such as delays in liberalization of trade 
for France or tailored private agreements between sectors can be understood as a 
result of the dominant national view of lacking international competitiveness in 
domestic industries, and a relatively more costly national social system than the 
rest of Western Europe. French industry drew the same conclusions as the French 
government: transitional protectionist measures were needed to give firms the 
time to adjust to a more competitive business environment. Within the large 
groups of multinationals that did favour liberalization several options were con-
sidered: a customs union, a Common Market, a free trade area or sectoral integra-
tion by means of High Authority-like institutions. The Dutch multinationals were 
ultimately prepared to accept each of these options as long as this would yield 
results. To make liberalization more acceptable to the French and Italians they 
were moreover prepared to suggest several compensatory mechanisms. As the 
French, the Dutch corporations also remained very close to the interests of their 
governments. The same is true for the Belgian multinationals which just after the 
failure of the EDC shifted from a preference for a customs union to a free trade 
area, just as their government did. German corporations were the least outspoken 
until a stand had to be taken. They opted for a free trade area, a decision that fitted 
the national structure of their international trade very well ánd also remained very 
close to the assessment of their government. Corporations located in the United 
Kingdom were not represented in the ELEC, except via the Dutch section; Unilever, 
which also was well represented in the Bilderberg meetings. Except for Unilever, 
no other firms expressed concrete views, though it became clear in the section on 
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the Bilderberg meetings that they too were worried about a schism in European 
trade. 
 Another key question in this research is whether views of multinationals can 
be explained through sector-based contexts? In contrast to our findings in later 
chapters, these played a minor role in relation to the negotiations on the Schuman 
Plan. The ELEC assembled expertise from representatives of the coal and steel 
sectors. They proposed a sectoral solution for the national problems of the Belgian 
coal industry suggesting the closure of inefficient European coal mines, to be com-
pensated by the sector as a whole. However this proposal did not originate from a 
competitive aspect of the European coal and steel industries vis-á-vis competing 
non-European coal and steel industries. Instead the proposal was an expression of 
the wish to exclude the High Authority from restructuring processes. 
 Turning to the role of business in European integration historiography, it 
becomes clear that the generally followed approach by authors such as Gillingham 
(1991), Milward (1992) or Moguen-Toursel (2002) to interpret the preferences of 
European industry and business during the 1950s through a national perspective 
is the most useful. Multinationals perceived European integration through the 
perspective of their own home markets and the conditions under which they had 
been forced to adapt their organizations and the specific competitive qualities 
which they developed under those circumstances. They wanted the European 
market to be organized accordingly. This was furthermore expressed through their 
support for the positions of their national governments in negotiation processes on 
treaties.341 
 Lastly the question arises whether these activities of European multinationals 
are better understood through conceptualizing them as active lobbies on develop-
ments in European integration or as expressions of uncertainty reduction, as pro-
posed by Rollings and Moguen-Toursel? A mixed conclusion can be drawn. Where-
as the entire organization of the ELEC was structured to generate representative-
ness and influence, it certainly also functioned as a source of information on new 
developments. The Bilderberg meetings however were not aimed at exerting any 
form of external influence on decision-making. It facilitated a way of learning about 
views of others and assessing new developments and how serious they might turn 
out to be. Reduction of uncertainty was likely to be a result of debate among highly 
informed professionals. Formal intentions with regard to Transatlantic mutual 
understanding aside, the Bilderberg meetings primarily functioned as a barometer 
on the state of the Transatlantic consensus. The fact that a group of people met did 
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not mean that they had the same convictions or would be prepared to adopt con-
victions of others.342 
 On a whole, European multinationals in the ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings, 
save the French which required temporary transitional measures, were in favour 
of an as large as possible, liberalized market without interventionist, supranational 
institutions. The Common Market largely was a realization of these views. In the 
next chapter we will see whether the liberalized European market indeed turned 
out to be a favourable development. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Facing challenges from the West and 
the East, 1960-1970 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the actions of Western European companies have been 
discussed in relation to European integration during the 1950s. In the 1960s how-
ever, circumstances changed. The removal of quotas and tariffs that was initialized 
so successfully during the 1950s lost its impetus. Disagreement among Western 
European governments undermined further plans for integration. Expansion of the 
EEC and the introduction of new integration schemes ceased to dominate political 
discourse. Besides the completion of the Common Market's tariff structure and the 
common agricultural policy, little was achieved  
 At the same time, European companies were confronted with collective prob-
lems that required solutions by different means than a reduction of tariffs. During 
the 1960s, large and technologically advanced corporations from the United States 
increasingly directed their investments towards Western Europe. As a result, 
Western European companies were threatened by increased competition. Moreo-
ver, competition on the Western European markets was paralleled by a breakdown 
of Western consensus on the provision of export credits for trade with Eastern 
European states. Through their involvement in the European League for Economic 
Cooperation and the Bilderberg meetings European companies responded to these 
problems and used these networks to address their worries. 
 The present chapter investigates whether these appeals represented a new 
approach towards the organization of the EEC and its place in the wider Western 
European market and international trade relations. It will be argued that the com-
bination of a blocked agenda with regard to liberalization and European integra-
tion, the effects of American investments in Western Europe, and the slipping con-
sensus on credit extensions to the East-bloc, forced European corporations to take 
a stand on how the European governments and the European Commission were 
dealing with issues in the sphere of EEC external trade. As a result, this chapter 
also explores to what extent European companies could actually turn to the Euro-
pean Commission for addressing such EEC-transcending problems that affected all 
of Western Europe. Finally, this chapter analyses to what extent the responses of 
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European companies differed. Special attention is being paid to national contexts, 
and to differences between industrial sectors. 
European and transatlantic tensions  
During the 1960s Western European and transatlantic relations were character-
ised by a weakening consensus on liberalization and integration. The European 
League for Economic Cooperation and the Bilderberg meetings adjusted the scope of 
their activities accordingly. Changes in Western political relations undermined 
ideas that were so successfully pursued during the 1950s. An important reason for 
that change lies in the politics of the French President Charles de Gaulle who in 
1958 unexpectedly re-entered the arena of active politics after his retirement in 
1953. Following the mutiny of the French army against orders to give up the colo-
ny of Algeria, de Gaulle was given a mandate to lead the country and draft a new 
constitution. He became President in late 1958 and stayed on until 1969.343 
 Under the new constitution the position of President granted de Gaulle full 
authority in foreign affairs and defence. He believed in the importance of the na-
tion-state and he rejected France's involvement in supranational institutions with-
in the European Community. Nevertheless he accepted the EEC and Euratom and 
their supranational institutional organization because they represented a means to 
reach important national goals, such as a European policy on agriculture. Still, over 
the next years he antagonized the rest of the EEC member states. De Gaulle blocked 
new and far-reaching initiatives of European economic integration by ending nego-
tiations on the European Free Trade Zone in late 1958 and he refused to allow 
British accession to the Common Market during his Presidency until 1969. Moreo-
ver, in July 1965 de Gaulle de facto immobilized Community decision-making by 
suspending French participation in the Council of Ministers for three months to 
force through a suspension of qualified majority voting on agricultural and trade 
issues. In January 1966 the member states agreed to continue the Council's deci-
sion-making on the basis of unanimity. This became known as the Luxembourg 
Compromise.344 
 Instead of trying to advance European integration via the supranational Euro-
pean Commission, de Gaulle pursued a different route. He introduced the so-called 
Fouchet-plan on Political Union. The Fouchet plan proposed to superimpose a new 
intergovernmental structure for Community decision-making on the existing insti-
tutions of the European Communities. Through increased cooperation in foreign 
affairs, defence and economic policy he intended to re-establish a European inde-
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pendent role in international politics under French leadership and strove for equal 
roles for Western Europe and the United States in NATO. Community negotiations 
on how such a structure would work started in September 1960.345 
 By pursuing the Fouchet plan, de Gaulle consciously opposed the United States. 
His plan was at odds with an American proposal to bring the European Community 
into a Transatlantic partnership. In August 1961 the Kennedy administration pro-
posed to organize equal economic and military relations between an enlarged EEC 
and the United States, though under American political leadership. Furthermore, 
the American government had economic goals in mind. In order to exploit the 
technological lead of American over European companies, Kennedy wanted to 
lower tariffs between the EEC and the US market. In 1962 Kennedy asked Congress 
for the Trade Expansion Act, which gave the President the mandate for cutting 
tariffs substantially and even to completely abolish tariffs on products of which US-
EEC trade represented 80 per cent of the worldwide total. However, only few 
products would fall in this category if the United Kingdom would not become a 
member of the EEC.346 
 De Gaulle's plan for a Political Union was not realized. The Dutch feared the 
prospect of Franco-German dominance and demanded the inclusion of a counter-
weight: the United Kingdom. This was unacceptable to de Gaulle, as the United 
Kingdom would in all likelihood demand close relations with the United States, 
which would be incompatible with his plans for an independent Western Europe. 
At the same time de Gaulle frustrated Kennedy's plans by blocking the accession of 
the United Kingdom to the EEC in January 1963. The move caused deep frustration 
in the United States. The EEC without British membership effectively rendered the 
Trade Expansion Act and the associated Transatlantic partnership futile. De 
Gaulle's move was also taken badly among the member states of the European 
Community. They were particularly baffled by the abruptness and unilateralism of 
his actions.347 
 French resistance against the expanded powers for the institutions of the 
European Community, but also against American dominance and transatlantic 
security structures, had a detrimental effect on Western political relations. Further 
steps of economic integration were blocked for the duration of de Gaulle's term. As 
will become clear, these developments would also affect the agendas of the ELEC 
and the Bilderberg meetings. 
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Emerging challenges for business in European markets 
The dissension in Western relations stood in contrast with the general Western 
economic success. Global, and particularly Western, economic expansion between 
1950 and 1970 reached the highest growth rates in history: global production 
annually increased with a rate of 5,6 per cent. During the 1960s average growth 
rates were the highest. Post-war trade liberalization schemes, for example through 
the GATT conferences, were an important cause of this unprecedented growth. 
Western Europe grew faster, which was partly a result of the mixed economy: 
governments, unions and corporate management jointly determined policies in 
pursuit of maximizing growth. Moreover, in Europe the optimism that followed 
from the founding of the EEC and EFTA led to high investments during the 1960s, 
mainly from the United States. As will be shown however, the persistence of 
growth also resulted in a destabilization of competitive positions for certain Euro-
pean companies. One of these destabilizing factors was the growth of Western 
European trade relations with Eastern Europe.348 
Complexities in East-bloc trade  
Trade between Western Europe and the East-bloc had to be redeveloped during 
the 1950s. As a result of policies of the United States, the existing Western Europe-
an trade relations with the East-bloc had crashed around 1950. As the Cold War 
emerged during the late 1940s, the United States initialized a strategy of economic 
warfare with the Soviet Union and its satellites. In order to prevent unintentional 
facilitation of the East-bloc's capacity to militarize, the Americans limited exports 
to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The US government asked Western Euro-
pean exporters to follow suit, but they initially refused. To Western European 
exporters Eastern Europe represented traditional export areas and they depended 
on the revenues from those markets. The start of the Korea war in June 1950 sud-
denly shifted Western European sentiments. Cooperation with the United States 
quickly took shape within a multilateral agreement to limit the exports of strategic 
materials and sensitive technology. The Co-ordinating Committee agreement (Co-
Com), as it was called, was activated in the summer of 1951.349 
 However, already shortly after the end of the Korea war in 1953 Western 
Europe was given more freedom to restart exports. Negotiations with the United 
States in 1958 generated more options. Many products that were prohibited before, 
such as ships and steel, but also technological know-how, could again be exported. 
From 1959 onwards only the strategically most important goods were withheld 
                                                                  
348 Van der Wee (1987). Prosperity and upheaval. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp. 48-56. 
349 Mastanduno, M. (1992). Economic containment. CoCom and the politics of east-west trade. Ithaca: 
Cornell Press University, pp. 68-92. 
173 
from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, American exporters still were 
not allowed to trade with the eastern bloc.350 
 As a result, Western European trade with the East-bloc boomed: EC exports to 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union increased from $ 626 in 1958 to $992 million 
in 1960. Between 1956-1971, exchanges between developed capitalist countries 
and the Comecon area, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, annually grew with 
more than 11%. Admittedly, East-West trade remained limited to only 2-3 per cent 
of world trade until the early 1970s, and 3-4 per cent of EC trade. It is important to 
note that trade increased despite hostile Cold War confrontations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Octo-
ber 1962).351 
 Not surprisingly, the United States' government continued to express reserva-
tions against Western trade with the East-bloc, and particularly against Western 
exports of sophisticated capital goods. Western Europe had begun exporting entire 
factories and other production equipment to the Communist bloc under generous, 
government-backed export loans. The Communist-bloc was chronically short on 
convertible currencies and was therefore dependent on the ability of Western 
firms to provide export credits. Naturally, the East-bloc countries preferred firms 
that offered the favourable loans. The Americans perceived the increasingly milder 
repayment conditions as a form of aid to the Communist bloc. In 1960, the United 
States asked its Western European allies to limit the duration of export finance 
loans on capital goods. This was arranged via the so-called International Credit 
Insurers Union, or the Berne Union, a public-private association that determined 
financial rules for international credit insurances. Over the next years the member 
countries, almost all of the OECD members, voluntarily adhered to the rule that 
export credits on large capital equipment would have to be repaid within a maxi-
mum of five years.352 
 However, Western European engineering contractors and other capital goods 
exporters challenged the agreement in 1963. They were experiencing competition 
from American engineering contractors on their own home markets. In response, 
aided by government guarantees they began to redevelop their exports to the East-
bloc against more generous repayment terms. Trade relations that thus developed 
would upset a balance in several markets, with different consequences for specific 
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sectors. These imbalances were primarily initiated by the wave of investments by 
American multinationals, which will be discussed now.353  
American investments in Western Europe 
Between 1957 and 1967, foreign direct investments from the United States in 
Western Europe more than quadrupled, going from $ 4.2 billion to $ 18.2 billion 
per year. The growth of the investments in the EEC jumped from $ 1.7 billion to 
$ 8.1 billion per year; and the US investments in the rest of Western Europe, nota-
bly the United Kingdom, grew from $ 2.5 billion to $ 10.1 billion per year. As a 
share of US total foreign direct investments the annually invested capital in West-
ern Europe nearly doubled from approximately 16 to 32 per cent. American corpo-
rations could exploit their generally more advanced production technology and 
management techniques while at the same time profiting from the growing sales of 
durable consumer goods in the EEC. Investments were particularly made in growth 
industries such as the automotive, electronics and petrochemicals industries.354 
 All over Europe these developments resulted in worries and in France they 
even led to a protectionist reflex. The unprecedented size and the corresponding 
large financial capacity of American multinationals were experienced as unfair 
competition. The American subsidiaries in Europe moreover ignored European 
mores in dealing with labour unions and national governments.355 
 American investments were also perceived as a cause for the widening of the 
so-called “technology gap.” Industrial research and development by private com-
panies had surged after WWII. Companies created in-house laboratories to boost 
product innovation. American industrial research dwarfed the Western European 
counterpart: from 1957 until 1967, American spending amounted to slightly over 
$ 155 billion dollar against $ 50 billion in Western Europe. Particularly in France 
the growing investments by large American multinationals was associated with 
this technological gap. De Gaulle claimed that Americans were buying French re-
search-intensive firms, which in his view prevented France from developing and 
exploiting new technologies itself.356  
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Some efforts were undertaken to provide an answer to the American investments. 
During the 1960s the French government developed itself as a very assertive and 
critical defender of the interests of French, and partly as a result, European corpo-
rations. In early 1963 it began delaying the provision of permits on investments 
from US companies. In February 1965 de Gaulle began attacking the reserve cur-
rency role of the dollar in the Bretton Woods monetary system for creating an 
unfair investment advantage to American corporations. In March 1965, in order to 
facilitate European companies to merge into larger units across national borders 
the French government proposed a European company law, claiming that the legal 
disparities between national company laws were discouraging mergers. Addition-
ally, the American investments elicited a further response on a separate track: in 
1969 the European Commission tried to harmonize European taxation rules for 
companies because it considered double taxation to be the main threshold to 
transnational mergers.357 
 In 1970 the European Commission combined all these proposals and other 
related themes in an agenda for a European industrial policy. This was the so-
called Colonna memorandum, named after the European Commissioner for Industri-
al Affairs (1967-1970), Guido Colonna di Paliano. The central idea of the proposal 
was that European industry should be enabled to seize the opportunities of the 
large Common Market. It suggested that in order to realize the concentration and 
transnationalization of European industrial structures, the provision of a legal and 
fiscal system was required, including a European company law. Moreover it pro-
posed to increase access to capital for European industry. Still these aspects of 
industrial policy were not accepted by the Council during the 1970s, except for the 
Commission's proposal on the coordination and funding of Community-wide re-
search which will be discussed in chapter 6.358  
 As will be demonstrated below, European multinationals were consistently 
ahead of the French government and the European Commission in the formulation 
of options to improve their position in relation to American firms. 
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Changing circumstances, new priorities 
Before turning to how these challenges affected the ELEC and the Bilderberg meet-
ings, it is important to explain why these themes entered their agendas. For both 
networks the new themes were a reflection of changing circumstances. With re-
gard to the Bilderberg meetings the effects of changing circumstances were al-
ready illustrated in the previous chapter. De Gaulle's rejection of British accession 
to the EEC in 1963 had produced severe tensions between Americans and Europe-
ans. The Americans expressed serious doubts about whether the European Com-
munity could resist the influence of de Gaulle. They wondered whether the Com-
munity would remain committed to the post-war consensus on liberalisation. 
When formerly transatlantic trade relations were discussed in a congenial atmos-
phere, now contention was creeping in. The discussed themes would develop ac-
cordingly.359 
 For the European League for Economic Cooperation the French rejection of the 
United Kingdom's membership of the EEC also was a turning point. It resulted in a 
consciously initialized re-evaluation of its priorities. There was a distinct feeling 
that de Gaulle would block any initiative on further expansion of the Community 
which led to the question what the League should focus on instead. In December 
1963, Baron René Boël announced a round table meeting with 15 prominent in-
dustrialists based in the EEC and the EFTA to discuss “the most important issues to 
be resolved to advance European integration.”360 
 The industrialists met in June 1964 at the OECD in Paris. Prominent compa-
nies were participating, such as Solvay & Cie. (Baron Boël), Pirelli (Emanuele Dubi-
ni), Unilever (Pieter Kuin), Shell International Petroleum Co. (Pierre Escoffier), 
Bayer (Hanns Gierlichs) and Stockholms Enskilda Bank (Marcus Wallenberg). Inter-
estingly, they were joined by men from key organizations in the international 
business dialogue: one was Lincoln Steel, a former Imperial Chemical Industries 
director who now presided over the International Chamber of Commerce, a global 
agenda setting body on business interests. Also George Villiers took part, the influ-
ential President of the Conseil National du Patronat Français. Moreover, two offi-
cials from the EEC and the EFTA were attending.361 
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The meeting resulted in a suspension of ELEC's original activities on liberalization 
of European markets by means of tariff elimination. De Gaulle's rejection of British 
membership for now had ruled out further political initiatives between the EEC 
and EFTA. ELEC decided that any further action on the matter had to remain lim-
ited to the Kennedy Round, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotia-
tion-round that was planned for the near future. Snoy D'Oppuers summarized: “[I]f 
we are blocked on the customs side, [...] the opening is to start with the other chap-
ters of the economic union.” Instead of continuing to work on the minimization of 
tariffs between the EEC and the EFTA the participants at the meeting of June 1964 
decided to focus on the reduction of differences in policies in the EEC and the EFTA 
such as transport policies, agricultural policies or non-tariff discrimination.362 
 However, the main issue that the industrialists wanted ELEC to respond to 
was competition from outside the Community. The group signalled problems in 
trade with Eastern Europe, which resulted in a new priority for the League: lobby-
ing for a Community trade policy for third countries. Moreover the participants 
expressed concerns about the lack of concentration of European industry in com-
parison to the large US corporations that were currently investing in Europe. Par-
ticularly CNPF President George Villiers expressed doubts about whether the small 
European firms could withstand giant groups such as General Motors and General 
Electric. The industrialists concluded that the European economy had to be pre-
pared to “withstand the shock of competition from large American companies” by 
an induced concentration process. They proposed the investigation of a fiscal and 
legal framework to facilitate transnational mergers among European companies to 
“achieve the optimum dimensions in a very short time.”363 
Eastern European markets and the Bilderberg meetings 
The Bilderberg meetings engaged with the subject of East-West trade only shortly 
after the agreement on export credit facilities for the East-bloc had been struck. As 
explained, two measures limited Western European trade with the East-bloc. In 
1960 the government of the United States pressured European governments and 
exporters to abide by an international agreement on repayment terms of export 
credits for capital goods. At the same time, the CoCom agreement was still in place 
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for certain sensitive goods. As will become clear there was little sympathy for this 
agreement among Western European exporters of capital goods. The Bilderberg 
meetings were the ideal forum for discussing misgivings about such a sensitive 
Transatlantic issue.  
 East-West trade first appeared on the Bilderberg agenda in 1961, a year after 
the five-year credit agreement for capital goods was agreed on. The meeting bore 
the title: “The impact of Communist economic penetration in the Western World.” 
The meeting took place against a disturbing background. It was held from the 21st 
until the 23rd of April, only days after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. This 
was the wrong moment to make an appeal to Americans to end security-based 
trade barriers for the communist East-bloc.364 
 This was nonetheless precisely what two business leaders did. Both were 
important figures in the Western capital goods industry. The first was the Canadi-
an James S. Duncan who was a former CEO at Massey-Ferguson, a producer of agri-
cultural machinery. The second was the German Otto Wolff von Amerongen, presi-
dent of Otto Wolff, a company that produced and traded in steel, semi-finished and 
finished steel capital goods such as container cranes and industrial machinery. Otto 
Wolff was strongly geared towards Eastern Europe. Additionally, Wolff von Amer-
ongen himself was a highly visible proponent and expert on trade with the East-
bloc. As the chairman of the so-called German “Ost-Ausschuss”, the East Committee, 
he embodied the Federal Republic's strategy to gain back control over Germany's 
pre-WWII export markets in Eastern Europe and Russia. In this role Wolff von 
Amerongen operated as a diplomat-businessman, personally closing trade agree-
ments on behalf of the Federal Republic with countries with which regular diplo-
matic relations were too sensitive.365 
 The views of Duncan and Wolff von Amerongen on trade with Eastern Europe 
were remarkably similar in their opposition to official American policy. Duncan 
represented a Canadian viewpoint and tried to convince the Americans that the 
strategy of embargoes of the United States government should be cancelled. Ac-
cording to him the CoCom-agreement was unjustly blocking the trade of certain 
goods. Instead, he felt that trade with the Communist bloc should be expanded in 
order “to increase the dependence of Communist countries on international trade 
and to help them to increase the living standards of their people.” At the same time 
he explained that the Communist-bloc was taking advantage by demanding in-
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creasingly beneficial terms and conditions from Western companies that wanted to 
increase their exports. They were being played out against each other and accord-
ing to Duncan this had to stop. In other words, he wanted “regulatory rather than 
prohibitionary ground rules.” He felt that the embargoes should be replaced with 
an internationally agreed code of conduct for trade with the Communist-bloc to aid 
Western business to resist request for even better terms and conditions.366 
 Otto Wolff von Amerongen was the author of the European paper presented at 
the April meeting. Just as James Duncan he proposed to do away with any security-
based barriers to trade, and stressed that the East-bloc represented traditional 
markets for Western Europe. Now trade with these markets was partially blocked 
via the CoCom-agreement, though. Wolff felt that by removing these artificial barri-
ers “[i]n the field of trade we would do openly what we now do half-heartedly.” 
Moreover he asked to combine the lifting of the embargo with a new export credit 
agreement for the West. According to him, the rule of a maximum of five-year-term 
credits for exports of capital goods to state trading countries that was agreed to in 
1960, was already being transgressed by several private firms.367  
 Duncan's and Wolff von Amerongen's request to lift the trade embargo to the 
Communist-bloc should be seen in the light of competition by American corpora-
tions in Western Europe. Whereas American competitors were free to export to 
Canada or Western Europe, they were prohibited from trading with the Com-
munist bloc. The Canadians and Western Europeans therefore could take ad-
vantage of that situation by exporting to the Communist bloc, if allowed. 
 These two requests for better credit regulations had different reasons. Dun-
can's position was clearly rooted in the idea that companies in the capital goods 
sector were being played out against each other by Eastern European states. Wolff 
von Amerongen's argument for renewed credit regulations was double-layered. On 
the one hand the sectors involved in the production of capital goods such as steel, 
engineering and construction preferred a strengthened negotiation position with 
the East-bloc too, but Wolff von Amerongen's request also carried a specifically 
German dimension. Due to foreign policy decisions the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny had no trade agreements with Eastern European countries until 1963. As a 
result, unlike other Western European countries, the German government was not 
able to guarantee export credits of banks for its capital goods industry. Under close 
supervision by Wolff von Amerongen himself the Federal Republic closed the re-
quired agreements during 1962 and 1963. Wolff von Amerongen's request for a 
new credit agreement therefore had little to do with the capital goods producers as 
                                                                  
366 Haycraft, W. R. (2000). Yellow steel: the story of earthmoving equipment industry. Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, p. 154. RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-378-4. James S. Duncan: The impact of Communist 
economic penetration in the Western World (April 1961), pp. 2-3, 14-15, 18-19. 
367 RWWK, NOWA, inv. nr. 72-378-4. Otto Wolff von Amerongen: Impact of Soviet Economic Penetration 
in the Western World (1961), pp. 10-11. 
180 
a whole but was related to the inability of the German government to support its 
industries.368 
 In the next years however the Western agreement on the repayment terms for 
capital goods exports was severely challenged. As part of an investment wave by 
American corporations in Western Europe since the mid-1950s, U.S. engineering 
contractors had seized the opportunity to exploit their competitive advantage over 
European firms. During WWII they had developed a lead in management tech-
niques and expertise in building installations for petrochemical production pro-
cesses. Particularly these were required in Western Europe as during the 1950s 
the chemical industry began to switch from coal-based processes to oil-based feed-
stocks. As a result Western European engineering contractors soon turned to the 
East-bloc markets, where the Americans were not allowed to exploit their exper-
tise.369 
 The export credit agreement quickly became an empty shell. Entire factories, 
including installations and process technology were exported to the East-bloc. The 
required export loans were financed by Western European banks which on their 
turn were guaranteed by Western European governments. The exporters, banks 
and governments together exceeded the agreed maximum five-year repayment 
term by far. In 1963 a ten-year Belgian credit of $ 7.2 million was granted to Hun-
gary to buy a turnkey chemical plant. The loan was guaranteed by the Belgian 
government. In 1964 the United Kingdom also breached the agreement through 
the provision of two loans, one of twelve years for Czechoslovakia to build fertiliz-
er plants, and one of $ 300 million for a period of fifteen years for the Soviet Union 
to build chemical factories. France soon followed, as did Italy with a deal involving 
FIAT. Abruptly, Western Europe was engaged in a minor bidding war to gain a 
share of the East-bloc market for capital goods. The government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany however was not prepared to follow this practice, which 
reduced the ability of German exporters to compete.370 
 Under these circumstances, the topic of East-West trade quite unexpectedly 
returned to the agenda of the Bilderberg meeting of March 1964. A last minute 
change was made because the United States government suddenly showed an 
interest in allowing the resumption of American trade with the Communist-bloc. It 
had concluded that the CoCom embargo had little effect on the Soviet economy and 
on its capacity to fight a war. Moreover, the export credit agreement was being 
challenged. The result was that the government now wanted American firms to 
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start exporting eastward. George Ball, recently appointed Under-Secretary of State, 
confirmed this but stressed that the export of know-how remained curtailed. 
Moreover, China and, especially, Cuba would be considered off-limits to US export-
ers.371 
 Otto Wolff von Amerongen immediately embraced the new American position 
as an opening to develop a coordinated approach which could level the playing 
field with the rest of Europe for him and his fellow exporters of capital goods from 
the Federal Republic. He explained that he and his colleagues had abided by the 
credit agreement out of necessity, even when others in the EEC had not done so 
and that they were suffering accordingly. Coordination was badly needed and he 
hoped to develop a feasible approach with the Americans. He even proposed to 
include the governments of the United States and Britain in the coordinative talks 
on the East-bloc that had started in the EEC in 1961.372 
 Wolff von Amerongen received support from American businessmen such as 
John McCloy, the chairman of the Ford Foundation and Jack Heinz II of Heinz and 
several US foreign policy specialists. They demanded a clear line of conduct to 
prevent the Communist bloc from pushing through its politically motivated strate-
gies. They proposed fair play rules, arbitration and rules on the exploitation of 
patents by the East bloc. Now that the Americans realized that the previous restric-
tive policies had failed they were ready to take the lead in establishing a level play-
ing field for East-West trade.373 
 However, the Belgian, French, Italian and British participants disagreed on the 
need for a new set of agreements and felt that the existing agreements were suffi-
cient. In their view the playing field did not suddenly require levelling just because 
the United States had decided to let its exporters compete in Eastern markets. The 
Americans were unable to convince European governments to close a new credit 
agreement in the next years. After repeated requests from Wolff von Amerongen's 
East Committee, the German government ultimately began backing export credits 
exceeding the five-year term from March 1965.374 
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In sum, in order to withstand competition with American capital goods exporters 
in their own markets, Western European capital goods exporters tried to remove 
export barriers to the East-bloc. Moreover, they preferred a maximization of the 
repayment-terms of export credits to retain a strong negotiation position vis-à-vis 
the East-bloc. However, when the agreement of export credits ceased to play a role 
after 1963, it became clear that particularly German exporters of capital goods 
required such forms of coordination because the national government was not 
willing to aid national industry in trade with Eastern Europe. Other Western Euro-
pean governments preferred to have a free hand in determining the degree of their 
involvement in the East-bloc and to aid their industries in competing with Ameri-
can capital goods exporters where possible.  
Eastern European markets and the ELEC 
Between 1964 and 1969 the European League for Economic Cooperation responded 
to the same problems. That response was motivated by a different perception of 
trade with the East-bloc though. Not the capital goods sector but mainly the pro-
ducers of industrial goods, such as chemicals and metals, but also banks, were 
influencing ELEC's perceptions and responses. That resulted in an entirely differ-
ent analysis of the issues involved in East-West trade: the ELEC members were 
worried about Western European imports from the East-bloc that resulted from 
the exports of capital goods exports to that region.375 
The Western European chemical industry and Eastern Europe  
A good example of how the export of capital goods to the East-bloc affected West-
ern Europe's goods industries can be drawn from Baron René Boël's experiences in 
the Western European chemical sector. Since January 1964 Boël was Executive 
President of the chemicals producing multinational Solvay & Cie. In that position he 
also chaired an informal association of the European chemical industry, the Club de 
l'Industrie Chimique. The Club was founded in 1959 to discuss the sector's strategic 
interests and exclusively consisted of leaders of major European chemical firms 
such as Solvay, Péchiney, Rhône Poulenc, Montecatini, Hoechst, Bayer and Imperial 
Chemical Industries.376 
                                                                  
375 On ELEC's work on East-West trade also see Dumoulin, M., & Dutrieue, A.-M. (1993). La Ligue Eu-
ropéenne de Coopération Économique (1946-1981): un groupe d'étude et de pression dans la construction 
européenne. Berne: Lang, pp. 158-164. 
376 The Club de l'Industrie Chimique had developed from the Consultative Commission of the Employers of 
the Chemical Industry, founded in 1950. In this body, the European chemical industry coordinated 
strategy towards the International Labour Organization in Genève. When this function was absorbed in 
1959 by the European federation of national employer associations of the chemical industry CEFIC 
(Conseil Européen des Fédérations de l'Industrie Chimique), the industrialists decided to continue the 
183 
From July 1963 to July 1966 the Club de l'Industrie Chimique was paying attention 
to strategic problems in East-West trade. The producers of chemicals had worries 
about the effects of cheaply priced imports from the East-bloc. In 1963 they were 
particularly concerned about the role of their own governments in closing trade 
agreements in which industrial goods from East-bloc countries were accepted 
against dumping prices in exchange for exports of capital goods. The dumped 
goods were driving down the prices on Western European markets. In July 1964 a 
different worry surfaced in the Club. The industrialists concluded that the East-
bloc export market was deteriorating because Western European exporters were 
selling their products below market prices. They particularly blamed governments 
for competing for the exports of capital goods by means of guaranteeing increas-
ingly longer-term export loans. By July 1966 the chemical industrialists noted that 
the government-supported export of capital goods had laid the basis for even 
worse dumping effects then before. Boël warned for a “boomerang effect”: the 
East-bloc factories that were being built by Western European engineering con-
tractors and machinery producers would begin selling their surplus products on 
Western European markets. Moreover, the Club had information about a new de-
velopment in the export of turnkey production plants to the East-bloc. Until then it 
was common to include a non-export clause for Western Europe in the building 
contracts. But in the summer of 1966 the chemicals producers learned that such 
clauses were becoming less and less acceptable to the East-bloc. Western Europe 
was creating its own competition and East-bloc surplus production capacity would 
soon start flooding the West, according to Boël. He concluded that an urgent need 
for effective anti-dumping laws had emerged. In addition he and his colleagues felt 
that indirect governmental support of the capital goods industry should be sus-
pended, or at least limited, by reducing the guarantees on export credits to five-
year-loans.377 
 Clearly the strategies of the Western European capital goods industry con-
flicted with the interests of the Western European chemical sectors. Whereas the 
exporters of capital goods tried to compensate for the loss of market-share to 
American firms, the European chemical industry had to endure the effects of falling 
prices, the disappearance of export markets, and dumping of East-bloc goods. 
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These effects were of course not exclusive to the chemical industry. Car-factories 
or steelworks were also being built in the East-bloc under Western supervision. 
From mid-1964 onwards the ELEC would attempt to normalize relations with 
Eastern European industry under Boël's leadership.378 
Overcoming narrow bilateralism 
When in June 1964 the ELEC directed its attentions to the emerging problems in 
East-West trade relations, Boël steered the debate in the direction of the problems 
that were preoccupying the chemical sector. During informal strategy meetings 
with his fellow chemical industrialists in July 1964, Boël had learned that NATO 
formally adhered to the policy of export loans for capital goods with a maximum 
repayment term of five years. Moreover, the Club de l'Industrie Chimique had de-
cided to address the issue of the competitive behaviour of national governments, 
and started to lobby for a general commitment to the internationally agreed credit 
policy. Boël combined both aspects by arranging a meeting with the Permanent 
Belgian Delegate to NATO, André de Staercke, to whom he proposed collaboration 
on the organization of an ELEC roundtable meeting on East-West commercial rela-
tions.379  
 Since NATO itself was officially prohibited from working on East-West eco-
nomic relations, the Belgian delegation to NATO was very interested in cooperat-
ing with ELEC. They were convinced that improved economic relations between 
East and West would reduce the Cold War hostility. The delegation wondered 
whether the views of industrialists could provide help in overcoming “the narrow 
bilateralism which governs exchanges between East and West.” They hoped it 
would result in collective action and a western front, among others in credit-policy. 
They moreover proposed that Western European industry should approach the 
East-bloc directly and begin negotiations on all sorts of commercial arrangements. 
The League would take up both suggestions in the following years.380  
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In October 1964 Boël was able to persuade the ELEC to organize a round-table 
meeting in May 1965. The goal of the meeting was “to arrive at common concep-
tions, particularly with regard to the credit policies for countries of the Western 
World.” In the past the ELEC had focussed on Western European topics and was 
particularly geared to issues concerning the Common market. However, the Euro-
pean Commission had no means at its disposal to regulate governments or market 
players regarding trade with the East-bloc. The Soviet Union refused to recognize 
the European Community, making collective negotiations with the Comecon im-
possible. The only alternative had been to conclude bilateral agreements, assisted 
by consultations among Community member states. Moreover, an agreement on 
the level of the European Community alone would not be enough as each Western 
country was contributing to the problem. Non-Community members that would 
not adhere to the agreement could simply offer more attractive loans to Eastern 
Europe and profit from the Communities' willingness to prevent internal competi-
tion. Instead, ELEC's goal was similar to that of Wolff von Amerongen in the Bild-
erberg meetings: to bring about a consensus on credit policy for Eastern Europe in 
the entire West, including the United States. This was new territory for ELEC.381  
 The round-table meeting took place in Brussels on the 14th and 15th of May 
1965. ELEC had successfully invited representatives from the European Commis-
sion, the OECD, NATO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The 
European business community was represented by about fifty participants from 
national ELEC sections, some observers from CEPES, UNICE, and members of the 
national federations of industries of the EC member states. Particularly European 
banks were well represented. This is not surprising since the insurance of export 
loans to the East-bloc was a central subject. The selection of visitors shows ELEC's 
ability to assemble the required international institutions and expertise to address 
issues that went beyond the EEC. Still, it is important to understand that ELEC 
organized the round table to address the issue in the business community, and on 
the level of Western supranational and international institutions, to exchange ideas 
on the problems at hand. The resulting resolution however was not a collective 
agreement but merely represented ELEC's views on the subject.382 
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As Boël and the Club de l'Industrie Chimique preferred, the ELEC concluded from 
the round table meeting that Western governments should cease to guarantee 
increasingly longer termed export loans and set up a “coordinated policy” on credit 
terms and a “good conduct code” on commercial practices such as the classification 
of goods, importation safety clauses, and protection of industrial property. Addi-
tionally it became clear during the round-table that the member-states of the Eu-
ropean Community had decided not to develop a joint policy. Individually the 
countries could obviously still contribute to a pan-Western agreement. According 
to the ELEC though, the OECD should shape the coordinative efforts as it was com-
posed of all the major economic interests of the West, including the United 
States.383 
 What does ELEC's work on this matter tell us about views within European 
multinationals on the European market? The ELEC responded to the destabiliza-
tion of markets for Western Europe's basic industries. They were worried about 
the export of factories and industrial machinery to the East-bloc and the resulting 
competition on Western European markets and wished to see it curtailed. The fact 
that ELEC's banks active within ELEC agreed to this approach can be understood 
from the viewpoint of increasing risks that were de facto unnecessary if the West 
could conclude an agreement. The capital goods exporters on the other hand re-
quired the successful exploitation of alternative markets beyond that of Western 
Europe to survive American competition. In contrast to the goods producers and 
banks, they preferred continued support from their governments. These different 
conceptions on the organization of the European market emerged from different 
sectoral priorities. 
 The European Commission proved to be unable to fulfil a role in establishing a 
level playing field. In such global issues the Community represented too few coun-
tries for setting an example for the rest of the world: too many OECD countries 
would benefit from such voluntary restraint. The EEC was part of a larger set of 
competitive forces that paradoxically made a coordinated EEC policy unattractive. 
Instead the ELEC approached NATO and the OECD to address Western trading 
practices. However, as explained earlier, Western governments were unable to 
achieve a new credit term agreement for Eastern Europe. 
Organizing international markets 
After the spring of 1965 the ELEC wanted to continue its work on the normalisa-
tion of trade relations with Eastern Europe. In June 1966 it decided upon a strategy 
that could mitigate the East-bloc exports against dumping prices, which the Club de 
l'Industrie Chimique was so worried about. The ELEC tried to create opportunities 
for direct cooperation between Western and East-bloc companies. The idea was 
proposed to the ELEC by an unexpected party, the European Commission. Louis 
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Kawan, a Commission-expert on East-bloc affairs saw a clear link between the 
problems of the companies active in ELEC and the issues that he as a Commission-
representative tried to achieve. The European Commission wanted to engage East-
ern European governments directly to reach agreements on technical matters of 
economic exchange. However, since the East-bloc did not officially recognize the 
European Community, the European Commission was unable to undertake action. 
Louis Kawan proposed that the ELEC should mobilize its “ideally placed” position 
in economic, scientific and technical matters to open discussions with Eastern 
European governments. At the same time ELEC would operate as an intermediate 
for the European Commission. It was imagined that via one or more round-table 
meetings the ELEC could facilitate cooperation between Western and Eastern in-
dustrial corporations.384 
 These agreements were necessary because the economic systems of Western 
and Eastern Europe were too far apart for engaging in workable East-West joint 
ventures or other forms of cooperation. The concept of the company in East-bloc 
economies was incomparable to that in Western economies. Before 1965 East-bloc 
companies were fully subordinate to the national economic administration and 
sector-based ministries that planned and directed their activities. By 1965 several 
Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia changed the 
position of the industrial firm in their economies. These new policies gave compa-
nies more freedom to co-determine and realize national and sector-based produc-
tion plans. Moreover, selected firms were given more access to international trade. 
However, although East-bloc firms were gradually given the means for collabora-
tion with Western firms, in many respects Eastern European business functioned 
quite differently from the Western market economy. These differences included 
rules on the use of patents, price setting practices, and many other technical-
economic matters and severely complicated East-West collaboration between 
companies. 385 
 As will become clear, the ELEC developed plans to reduce those differences. It 
is important to realize that ELEC's efforts in this regard followed from requests 
from the European Commission. The Commission convinced European business to 
cooperate on proposing new forms of integration with the East-bloc.  
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The first of these proposals, however, initially led to some uneasy feelings among 
the corporate leaders inside ELEC. Some questioned whether it was appropriate 
for “free enterprise country industrialists, to have officials from the East as inter-
locutors.” The majority nonetheless perceived it as an opportunity that could result 
in “beneficial effects on the evolution of minds and on the economic systems of 
state trading countries.”386 
 A round table took place in late February 1967, in Brussels. The meeting in-
volved an initial exchange of ideas between government officials from Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and forty representa-
tives of Western European companies. Of these companies two groups were active-
ly contributing to the East-bloc's industrialization: the commercial banks (10) and 
capital goods producers (18). A third group was formed by producers of industrial 
goods (12) in which the chemical industries were well represented (6). As men-
tioned, these firms were confronted with exports to the EEC against dumping pric-
es. Additionally, in order to observe the progress on potential agreements, repre-
sentatives of the GATT, the European Commission, the EFTA secretariat and the 
United Nations were taking part.387 
 The meeting resulted in a strong awareness that indeed, despite reforms, the 
economic systems of East and West were still far apart. Representatives of Eastern 
European states wanted to be persuaded of the benefits of cooperation. In re-
sponse, a basis for continuing the meetings was found in a format of exchange, in 
which Western companies would offer technology under licence, technical assis-
tance, and commercial access to western markets, while in return Eastern compa-
nies would offer cheap labour and commercial and logistic knowledge of Eastern 
markets. However, the next step required overcoming practical issues that often 
stemmed from basic differences in economic ideology and practice: information on 
price formation processes, industrial ownership, intellectual property rights, arbi-
trage, and several other issues, first had to be exchanged before any progress could 
be made.388 
 Two further meetings were required before the introduction of a draft coop-
eration agreement between Eastern and Western companies was possible. A small-
scale preparatory meeting was organized in Prague from the 2nd to the 4th May 
1968. It coincided with the high time of the Czech liberalization movement, the 
Prague Spring. The meeting resulted in the concrete investigation of cooperation 
agreements. The third and last meeting again took place in Brussels in December 
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1969, with similar participants to the meeting in 1967. Boël explained what was at 
stake: the West wished “to develop their exports”, the socialist countries were, 
besides exports, also interested in the “exchange of technical data and a reduction 
of production cost”, in other words, more efficient production techniques. The 
meeting revolved around an elaborate treatment of technical, legal, commercial 
and financial aspects of cooperation between Western and Eastern firms. Several 
proposals for model-contracts for industrial cooperation were discussed. The ELEC 
had laid the basis for industrial collaboration between Western Europe and East-
ern Europe, which in the following years would actually take shape.389 
 The involvement in this endeavour of both producers of industrial goods and 
the producers of capital goods, despite their conflicting interests, can be under-
stood by revisiting the worries of the Club de l'Industrie Chimique in July 1966. 
Through cooperative agreements with East-bloc corporations the effects of the 
export of East-bloc overproduction could be mitigated: ELEC's efforts made it pos-
sible to replace dumping by productive exchanges. In exchange for knowledge 
about an industrial chemical production process from Solvay & Cie. for example, a 
Hungarian firm could start the production of the resulting product for sales on the 
Hungarian market. By engaging in such joint ventures with Eastern European 
companies, Western European companies could lay a foundation for East-West 
integration. In sum, the strategic behaviour of Western European capital goods 
exporters and of the planners of the East-bloc governments was coordinated in 
several ways, thereby replacing the preceding dumping practices by mutual bene-
ficial agreements. On a more abstract level ELEC's initiatives expressed a demand 
for predictable and controllable markets in which governments were expected to 
defend the interests of European industries instead of fuelling competition. 
 In the discussion on East-West trade one factor remained underexposed: the 
investments by American corporations that had been the initial factor that destabi-
lized the Western European market for capital goods, with all the East-West con-
sequences discussed above. It is indeed the case that the Western European basic 
industries were also directly confronted with competition as a result of very sub-
stantial American investments. The following section will discuss how European 
industry tried to deal with these developments. 
American investments in Europe and the ELEC 
From the second half of the 1950s onwards, American companies bought partici-
pations in existing European firms, or established on a large scale their own sub-
sidiaries. By 1963 the investments started to result in expressions of concern in 
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Western Europe. As discussed above, initially the French government but later also 
voices in other Western European countries began to perceive the size of American 
companies as a threat. The much smaller European companies were thought to be 
unable to withstand such competition. The successful liberalization movement of 
the 1950s, fully in line with the dominant ideas in ELEC and the Bilderberg meet-
ings, had now resulted in a large European market that formed an excellent basis 
for competition from companies from the United States.390 
 In 1967, the French press tycoon Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber published a 
widely read book, titled Le Défi américain that offered an alarming analysis of what 
he called the American takeover of European industry. According to him, Europe's 
approach to organization, management and innovation was hopelessly out-dated 
and was unable to cope with American dynamism. The book was a response to the 
French President's protectionist reflex. Since 1963, de Gaulle had tried to obstruct 
American investments. According to Servan-Schreiber Europe should instead im-
prove its capacity to compete. According to him a clear choice existed between 
protectionism and taking up the challenge posed by the American firms.391  
 ELEC started working on these questions even before Servan-Schreiber con-
veyed his worries. Its work on this subject developed along two parallel tracks 
from 1964 onwards. The first was concerned with the creation of larger European 
firms, or in other words, on how to initialize an industrial concentration process in 
the European market. The second involved the question whether American in-
vestments could be slowed down or at least American use of European capital 
could be reduced.  
European industrial concentration 
The initial request to investigate how to kick-start industrial concentration on the 
European market came from Jean Dupin, leader of the aluminium and chemicals 
producer Péchiney, and president of ELEC's economic commission. In October 
1964 he asked the Central Council to study the introduction of a new European 
company law. The idea of a European company law was not new or innovative and 
originally stemmed from the Dutch professor Pieter Sanders who had first pro-
posed it in 1959. However, at that time it was not associated with the need for 
industrial concentration. The plan involved a new legal structure for European 
companies and was designed to simplify transnational mergers by laying down a 
European Community-wide body of rules. In legal terms it enabled actual transna-
tional mergers instead of the until then customary transnational holding construc-
tions. The framework was meant to exist alongside the differing national laws that 
were already in place. The plan proposed to leave firms the choice to adopt the 
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legal structure that suited their purposes. It was presented as an option instead of 
a requirement.392 
 Already in June 1960 the Central Council of ELEC had asked its national sec-
tions to become involved in exploring the subject during the International Congress 
for the creation of a European commercial company type. The national sections 
however regarded this more as a technical issue of integration than as a require-
ment for their operations. All sections had reservations, but the German and Dutch 
sections were outright opposed. The German section wondered whether it fulfilled 
a need at all, since industry itself was not asking for a new corporate law. Addi-
tionally, on behalf of the Dutch section, Hein Wertheimer, legal advisor to the 
Dutch electronics firm Philips raised issues of legal practice. According to him the 
introduction of a European company law hardly meant that it would be applied 
equally in national courts. More importantly however, he feared that a European 
company law might open the door to elevating to a European level the German 
practice of giving rights of co-determination to employees. Additionally, because 
the Dutch ELEC section also included representatives of Dutch unions who fa-
voured such a development, Wertheimer rejected any association of ELEC with the 
Congress. He feared the emergence of political issues within his section, which he 
wished to avoid at all costs.393 
 Despite the strong opposition, Jean Dupin in October 1964 insisted on repeat-
ing the investigation. This time he felt it should be studied in the light of the new 
circumstances of growing American investments and the required response of 
European industrial concentration. Personally asking the national sections to con-
sider his idea once more, he presented them with a questionnaire that was perme-
ated with Euro-protectionist sentiments: “Would it [the European company type] 
constitute a means of defence against the outside threats of invasion?”394 
 However, with the exception of the French section all important national sec-
tions once again turned down the idea. The UK section simply declined and the 
Dutch and Belgian sections conveyed their unchanged views. Paul van Reepinghen, 
the legal advisor of the Fédération des Industries Belges, had characterized the 
“creation of a new European company type of a supra national character” as a 
project which [...] “marks a utopian cult.” Instead he preferred a different approach, 
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the harmonization of national company laws. On behalf of the German section, Paul 
Krebs of Deutsche Bank expressed fears that if the plan was presented as overtly 
directed against American investments, it might evoke a response in the United 
States that could hurt investments of German multinationals abroad. Moreover, he 
explained that American companies “would not hesitate to make use of this in-
strument, thereby even more being able to strengthen their power of competition 
vis-à-vis companies of genuine European origin.” He did not imply that a European 
company law wás a protectionist instrument, but the fear that it might come across 
as such was larger than the benefits it might pose. Krebs remarks reveal a taboo on 
suggesting even the smallest hint of protectionism vis-à-vis the American govern-
ment.395 
 Instead of pursuing the proposal of a European company law further the Cen-
tral Council launched an investigation on the views of company experts on indus-
trial concentration. From February 1965 onwards, ELEC's Economic Commission 
contacted the management of several companies and organized sessions in which 
recent experiences with mergers and extensive corporate cooperation within the 
EEC were shared. The investigation took more than a year and was concluded in 
March 1966. An interesting outcome was that often psychological problems be-
tween the different nationalities and related misunderstandings about daily prac-
ticalities stood in the way of the well-functioning of industrial cooperation or mer-
gers. The main result was that fiscal differences between countries were seen as 
the biggest stumbling bloc, particularly the issue of double taxation.396 
 Indeed, double taxation could make transnational mergers unattractive. When 
companies merged across borders they were liable to taxes for capital moving 
from one balance sheet to the other. Moreover, subsidiaries were taxed locally on 
generated profits and again on capital transferred from subsidiaries to the parent 
firm. According to the ELEC the removal of fiscal obstacles would be the quintes-
sential problem-solver for the European concentration process.397 
 The consensus within ELEC came about despite the alternative proposed by 
Jean Dupin of Péchiney, which was supported by René Boël, president of the ELEC 
and of Solvay & Cie. When the investigation on concentration started Boël personal-
ly wrote to Max Nokin, Governor of the Société Générale de Belgique, and expressed 
his regret that the ELEC had not agreed on proposing a European company law but 
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instead was exploring different means to stimulate industrial concentration. Even 
after ELEC's consensus on fiscal harmonization emerged, both Boël and Dupin 
remained interested in a European company law.398 
 To explain their views, some insights from the Club de l'Industrie Chimique are 
again helpful. Already during meetings in July 1963 and 1964, the leaders of the 
chemical industry had expressed concerns about the American investments in the 
European chemical sector. In March 1965 the French government requested the 
European Commission to develop a European commercial company law. It was 
meant to provide an alternative to the diverging national company laws which 
according to the French government were inhibiting transnational mergers. The 
resulting concentration of European industry would be required for competing 
with the large American firms. The Club de l'Industrie Chimique responded prompt-
ly and started a study on the ins and outs of the French proposal. A year later, in 
July 1966, Boël made clear why he had been pushing for a European company law 
in the European League for Economic Cooperation since 1960. He “insisted” on its 
importance: “In effect, the [chemical] companies must be of such a size that they 
can finance the heavy spending of research to address the American competitors, 
which would be difficult if there were no European company law.”399 
 The European chemical sector was convinced that only a far-reaching step of 
European integration would enable them to compete with American firms. By 
legally integrating their subsidiaries within the EEC they could limit costs and 
easily merge operations. In other words, now that the European market was more 
and more liberalized, they required the legal flexibility to adapt their organizations 
to the changing circumstances. 
Financial protectionism 
Besides the question of European industrial concentration, the European League 
for Economic Cooperation also paid attention to the financial dimension of the large 
amounts of dollars that were pouring into Europe. In that process however, indus-
try and the financial sector found themselves in opposite camps. A reason for the 
ELEC to investigate the subject emerged with a speech that the French President 
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Charles de Gaulle gave on the 4th of February 1965 about the increasing deficit on 
the US balance of payments. As a result of dollar-gold convertibility in the Bretton 
Woods monetary system, the United States were in a position to maintain deficits 
on their balance of payments without immediate effects. De Gaulle linked this cir-
cumstance to the capacity of American companies to invest in Europe and rea-
soned that therefore they had more access to capital than European companies. De 
Gaulle felt this was a form of unfair competition. The ELEC immediately instructed 
its monetary commission to investigate the relation between movements of capital 
and American investments in Europe. The commission was headed by Hermann J. 
Abs, chairman of the board (Vorstandsprecher) of the investment bank Deutsche 
Bank and one of the most influential bankers in Europe at the time. Boël stipulated 
that Abs should focus the work of his commission on European problems and a 
monetary union of the six.400 
 However, approximately four months later in June 1965, Boël intervened. He 
demanded from Abs to transfer the topic that he was studying in the monetary 
commission to the more industry-focussed economic commission of ELEC. Boël no 
longer believed that the investments from the United States required a monetary 
approach, and felt that the resulting study had to be compatible with two other 
explorations that were being conducted within the ELEC; the previously described 
study on the concentration of enterprises and one on European company law, 
which Boël did not rule out yet. The Frenchman Jean Dupin of the aluminium and 
chemicals firm Péchiney, Boël’s colleague in the chemical sector, would then in 
effect inherit the study.401 
 The reason for Boël’s intervention becomes clearer if we look to his activities 
within the Club de l'Industrie Chimique. As explained, the competition by American 
firms was high on its agenda. In July 1963 and 1964 leaders of the European chem-
ical industry complained that American competition was disturbing European 
cartels and created scarcity in the labour force. Moreover, they deplored the fact 
that European governments were offering incentives to attract American competi-
tors. As a result, Boël and others started contemplating the option of somehow 
limiting or channelling the investments from the United States, but out of fear of an 
American protectionist response to their own investments in that country, the 
matter was not pursued.402 
 In July 1965 however, the chemicals producers discussed the effects of a poli-
cy of the American government that had been introduced in 1963: the interest 
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equalization tax on portfolio investments. Dollars flowing out of the United States 
were taxed if they were intended for taking participations in companies abroad. In 
this way the American government had hoped to limit the growing shortages on 
the US balance of payments. The availability of dollars for investments in Western 
Europe dropped sharply. However, the law did not stop American multinationals 
from continuing to invest in Europe. Instead, they were increasingly taking re-
course to European capital which triggered a price increase, so the European 
chemical industry noted. By July 1966 the shortage of European capital was caus-
ing frustration inside the Club. Boël explained that all the members of the club 
should start active lobbies via the European industrial federations in order to 
“draw attention to the importance of American investments in Europe and to de-
mand that the European capital markets would be more protected against the 
Americans.”403 
 These preoccupations of the European chemical industry places Boël's inter-
vention in Abs' monetary commission in a different light. As one of the leaders of 
the chemical sector he wanted the ELEC to consider the industrial viewpoint on 
European monetary relations and capital markets, instead of the banker's perspec-
tive. Abs refused. He would only accept a transfer of the mission of his commission 
to an ad hoc panel with another banker in charge, the Belgian Louis Camu of 
Banque de Bruxelles.404 
 As a result the Ad Hoc Commission on American investments was created. 
However only few industrialists were included and it was still dominated by indus-
trial investors and bankers. The subject that underpinned its assignment was the 
question whether and how intervention in the European capital market should be 
organized to limit the American investments. Within ELEC the decision-making on 
the subject remained firmly in the hands of the banking sector.405 
 The Ad Hoc Commission met in October 1965. Surprisingly, despite concerns 
about American competition all participants agreed that the European economies 
required American investments. However, several of them felt mistreated by their 
own governments. Particularly men from the chemical industry, Bakker from the 
Dutch artificial fibres producer AKU, and Noan, of the French Péchiney, but also 
Meimberg of Deutsche Bank and Pulinckx of the Federation of Belgian industry, 
indicated their frustration with government-subsidies to attract American firms. 
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According to them European governments should at least guarantee equal treat-
ment of all firms. That conclusion was shared by James van Luppen, an administra-
tor for the American Ford cooperation in Belgium. He agreed that American in-
vestments should not be stimulated by governments, but he also warned against 
any government interference against investments. According to him these invest-
ments were improving the European living-standard and the productivity of Euro-
pean enterprises. As a result, the removal of all governmental incentives, or in 
other words, the creation of a level-playing field, was one of the main conclusions 
of the meeting.406 
 However, the key issue discussed during the meeting was the effect of Ameri-
can investments on the European capital markets. The Frenchman Geniteau from 
the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce de l'Industrie (BNCI) explained that multi-
nationals from the United States had more access to capital from their home mar-
ket, while simultaneously they were also creating shortages on European national 
capital markets, for example in France, where savings were insufficient to fulfil 
increasing demands in industrial finance. He asked for improvements on the Euro-
pean capital market so that European firms would have less disadvantages vis-à-
vis the Americans. Camu however explained that this was not such a simple en-
deavour, as most appeared to think. According to him numerous adaptations and 
cooperation in national economic policies would be required to create a working 
capital market in the first place. To his frustration, the European Community 
member states refused such measures. Finally, backed by Meimberg of Deutsche 
Bank, Camu firmly denounced to solve the industrialists’ problems by rushing into 
the creation of an imperfect European capital market. He moreover felt that the 
American move to restrict the export of dollars should be seen as an attempt to 
contribute to a solution of a complex problem of global dimensions: the increasing 
shortage on the American balance of payments. He brushed aside the implicit and 
explicit suggestions of protectionist elements in a future European capital market, 
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as if they were an inappropriate response to measures of such a global magni-
tude.407 
 Camu's response can moreover be seen as an expression of the conditions 
under which the European banking sector was operating. Since the 1950s Ameri-
can banks had established subsidiaries in Western Europe with which the Europe-
an banks were in competition. In such a context it was difficult to envisage how 
preferential access to capital for European industry would work. Moreover, Euro-
pean banks were also in a position to provide capital to American corporations. 
Preferential access to capital for European firms would put the American custom-
ers at a disadvantage.408 
 What then were the conclusions of this exchange of views? In effect, Camu had 
personally shielded ELEC's monetary commission from future involvement by 
European industrialists and by French financiers of industry who wished to ex-
plore protectionist options through the organization of a European capital market. 
Instead he, and his colleague at Banque de Bruxelles, Michel Grosfils, concluded that 
the problem that could actually be addressed was the size of American firms. They 
proposed two approaches to remedy the resulting competition problems in Europe. 
The first was to request from American multinationals to follow certain game rules 
or develop cooperation, about which Louis Camu felt that it would have to be ad-
dressed on a transatlantic level, perhaps even through NATO diplomacy. The sec-
ond suggestion effectively transferred back the entire matter of American invest-
ments to the study on industrial concentration in the economic commission: to 
resolve fiscal, legal and administrative disparities within and outside the EEC in 
order to facilitate a European concentration process.409 
 The ELEC did not adopt a protectionist attitude even though there were pres-
sures from France and the chemical industry which found itself in open competi-
tion with American multinationals. When options or views that vaguely referred to 
a protectionist attitude were on the table, they were quickly renounced out of fear 
to stir up counter-protectionist sentiments across the Atlantic. The achievements 
of the liberalization drive of the 1950s were ultimately not undermined.  
American Investments in Europe and the Bilderberg meetings 
In the Bilderberg meetings the key questions were similar to those in the European 
League for Economic Cooperation: to accept the American challenge as articulated 
by Servan-Schreiber, and to protect European corporations against the giant US-
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companies. As discussed in chapter 4, some doubts had emerged during the Bild-
erberg meetings of the early 1960s when the issue was raised whether the transat-
lantic post-war consensus about liberalizing markets was still intact. The meetings 
of 1965, 1967 and 1968 discussed the American investments. At these occasions, 
tensions emerged between the European and the United States' members as a 
result of entirely different perceptions of how multinational companies ought to 
behave when operating abroad.410 
Capital markets  
The first time that tensions on the topic of American investments emerged in the 
Bilderberg meetings, was in April 1965. The conference discussed only two sub-
jects: the security related “State of the Atlantic Alliance”, and “Monetary Co-
operation in the Western World”, which was of course linked to the subject of 
American investments in Western Europe. Also in the Bilderberg meetings the 
growing deficit of the US balance of payments motivated the choice of that topic. 
The Dutchman Emile van Lennep, chairman of the OECD working party on interna-
tional balance of payments-problems, explained in an introduction that the deficit 
was mainly caused by the American expenditures for the Vietnam war and by de-
velopmental aid. The deficit posed a threat to the long-term stability of the mone-
tary system and the meeting was geared towards identifying possible solutions.411 
 Nonetheless, the subject was repeatedly hijacked by French participants. They 
disagreed with van Lennep's interpretation of the main reasons for the United 
States' deficit-problems. They attempted to frame the deficit as an expression of 
out of control private US investments in Europe. The French were not against in-
vestments: they agreed with the rest of the speakers that they were “wholesome”, 
thereby particularly welcoming the export of American “know-how.” Nevertheless 
one of the French speakers asked the conference to consider restricting those 
investments, or limit them selectively. According to him, the dollars should be 
directed “to fields where new techniques and means of production were necessary, 
while avoiding those where fresh investments in markets already saturated were 
likely to disrupt the economy unduly.” These remarks most probably must have 
come from Jacques Baumel, an important Gaullist, who fully confirmed the inter-
ventionist and protectionist style of de Gaulle's actions against American invest-
ments since 1963.412 
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Other Europeans were more keen on improving circumstances in the European 
economy in order to equip firms better for competition, instead of blocking Ameri-
can competitors. Participants from Belgium and Norway for example proposed to 
realize an actual European capital market to utilize surplus savings more effective-
ly, and decrease Western European dependence on dollars. A Dutchman and an 
Italian confirmed this attitude of independence: “While many European industrial-
ists might see cause for anxiety in certain American investments, the answer to the 
challenge should be found by Europe in her own energy and potentialities.” They 
felt that mergers and European cooperation in scientific and technical research 
were the solution for withstanding American competition. In other words, a com-
mitment to free competition was affirmed. Reservations about the liberal economic 
order between the European and American markets remained limited to the 
French Gaullists.413  
Strength through unity 
Different than in 1965, the Bilderberg meeting of April 1967 addressed the trans-
atlantic tensions through a planned and dedicated session. European worries 
about American investments had not subsided but had shifted to the question 
whether Europe itself was still capable of doing original and path-breaking re-
search when American corporations were buying their assets? The American sec-
tion of the Bilderberg meetings saw this as an opportunity to set the record 
straight. In October 1966, George Ball pushed the steering committee to select this 
topic for the next meeting, as he aimed at forestalling European worries. Strikingly, 
roughly a third of European and American participants of the conference were 
leaders of multinational industry and finance.414 
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The subject was introduced by an Americanized Dutchman, Antonie Knoppers, of 
the company Merck Sharp and Dohme that was active in the research intensive 
pharmaceutical sector. Having little sympathy for European vulnerabilities vis-à-
vis US investment power, his message was clear: Europe should remain open to US 
investments. While he understood the “anxiety of foreign (U.S.) dominance” as a 
result of a “ 'take over' of national industries by [...] U.S. world companies”, he be-
lieved that the deterrence of US investments would hamper the transfer of techno-
logical knowledge. He was convinced that Western Europe required American 
investments to learn how to manage research and how to exploit research through 
product development. Moreover, according to Knoppers, Europeans should emu-
late the American system of education: instead of catering to the elites, it should 
offer opportunities to a larger group. Furthermore, he considered it essential to 
increase the dimensions of European companies through mergers. Similar to his 
sector-colleagues Baron Boël and Jean Dupin in the ELEC, he felt that mergers 
should be facilitated by a uniform European company law, including harmoniza-
tion of taxes, monetary conditions and other regulations. According to Knoppers 
American investors were unduly asked to soften their aggressive approach. In-
stead Western Europe should adapt its market to help European industry face 
these developments.415 
 The Europeans were agitated. They felt that Knoppers had left out from his 
analysis a crucial source of American scientific and technological progress. Accord-
ing to them corporations from the United States were taking advantage of the in-
novations that were fuelled by government expenditures for the purpose of de-
fence and the space program. Otto Wolff von Amerongen observed that the leaders 
of American business disliked being reminded about the fact that 60 per cent of 
total American expenditures on research and development came from government 
programmes.416 
 Despite this disagreement on the cause of the differences between Western 
Europe and the United States, a shared outlook developed about how the transat-
lantic industrial disparities should be equalized. Several approaches were dis-
cussed like countering the European brain-drain to the United States, Knoppers' 
suggestion to change the European approach to education, or to actively pursue 
European “spin-off” effects from large-scale government-sponsored research. 
However, the approach on which all participants settled was “European unity”: to 
continue on the path of integration! Nobody doubted that Europe required a large 
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market area and far-reaching common policies which in combination would create 
the appropriate pressures for a concentration process. Moreover, in light of en-
couraging European transnational mergers, the need for improved European capi-
tal markets, and indeed, a European common market as had been intended in the 
Rome Treaties, was generally acknowledged. But these could only become a reality 
if the Western European states, not just the member states of the European Com-
munities, would find unity in their political affairs. The American participants 
made one thing absolutely clear though: according to them "political union" should 
not include any interventionist action that would involve forcing the different 
national industries into pan-European industries. Instead, they wanted enterprises 
to act on their own. So, the Western European and American multinationals agreed 
on increasing competition and flexibility on the European market in order to facili-
tate European corporations to grow and increase their ability to do research.417 
A code for multinationals 
During the meeting in April 1968 the problem of American investments was again 
on the agenda, but this time it was informed by a debate on the effects that Ameri-
can multinationals were having on the sovereignty of states. The discussion re-
volved around the possibility of establishing a code of conduct for multinationals. 
This time, nearly half of all the participants from Europe and the United States 
were leaders of large companies.418 
 George Ball again played a role in the conference and delivered the introduc-
tory paper. Recently his career as advisor to the Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson had ended, and he now had taken a position at the investment 
bank Lehmann Brothers Kuhn Loeb. From his frank, direct and nearly euphoric 
presentation of free trade conceptions it seems that his positions in the highest 
circles of government had muzzled him at earlier occasions. For those familiar with 
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public criticisms directed at multinationals, Ball's contributions come across as a 
hagiography of the virtuous characteristics that multinationals had to offer the 
world. He used the term “world companies” and praised their ability to shape “pol-
icies not in terms of national economies but in terms of the overall world economy.” 
Nevertheless, he understood the need for reconciliation between international 
firms and national interests and asked the question: “where was there a legitimate 
base for the power of corporate management to make decisions that could pro-
foundly affect the economic life of nations”?419 
 However, instead of acknowledging the state's prerogative to force companies 
to follow certain rules, he proposed to create the missing legitimate base: lifting 
the multinationals and their subsidiaries out of national legal frameworks and to 
subject them to an “international companies law” instead. This law would be estab-
lished by treaty and enforced by an international body of national representatives 
from countries that had signed the treaty. In combination with widely dispersed 
shareholder ownership the legal framework would start a process of “internation-
alizing or denationalizing the parent”, to reduce suspicion about the loyalty of any 
firm to any state. Ball believed in the force of such “new world instrumentalities” 
[...] “to stimulate mankind to close the gap between the archaic political structure 
of the world and the visions of commerce that vault beyond confining national 
boundaries.” In fact, he wanted to free the multinationals from national differences 
and particularities, to create the ultimate level playing field, for all multinationals 
at the same time. George Ball's code was to replace all potential codes with one, 
thereby significantly simplifying the international landscape. Needless to say this 
vista would strengthen the already favourable position of the giant American cor-
porations. On the other hand, in Ball's proposal the fact that they were American 
multinationals would de jure seize to have any relevance at all.420 
 In light of this utopian dream of the ultimate freedom of entrepreneurship, 
Ball pleaded for more European integration on social, fiscal and legal regulations, 
to facilitate international mergers so that “European companies will achieve the 
scope and resources needed to serve our modern world economy with full efficien-
cy.” Additionally, he stressed the need for a European “counter invasion” by invest-
ing in the United States which would relieve the disequilibrium of the US balance of 
payments. A Dutch participant however criticized Ball's remarks, and stressed that 
the United States itself still had significant regulations in place that were discour-
aging European investments.421 
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Ball's code also received a reply by Jacques de Fouchier, banker and vice-chairman 
of the state controlled investment bank La Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. Alt-
hough admitting his satisfaction with the internationalization of business, Fouchier 
disagreed with Ball about the basic intentions that should underlie an international 
agreement on multinational corporations. While Ball regarded an international 
code for multinationals as an instrument to free the world corporations from ex-
cessive governmental interventionism, Fouchier wished to use it “to emphasize 
their duties as citizens of the individual countries in which they were operating.” 
He explained the problems that American companies were causing, such as large 
investments in industries of strong national interest, thereby endangering the 
existence of national firms in those sectors, reserving higher management jobs for 
American employees, concentrating research in the companies' home country, the 
repatriation of multinationals' profits to the home country, leaving behind the host 
countries with a vulnerable balance of payments, and unstable capital markets.422 
 Indeed, he pleaded for an international agreement on multinationals that did 
not merely improve the position of the company, but also the position of the coun-
tries where they invested. According to Fouchier, foreign companies should em-
brace competition instead of engaging in its elimination and they should grant 
their national competitors access to their scientific and technological advances. He 
also demanded more relevant jobs for employees of foreign affiliates, such as man-
agement positions and research. Additionally, and of key importance, companies 
should change their financial structures in such a way that their capital would 
become distributed globally instead of mainly in the companies' home country. He 
complained that American companies with subsidiaries in France were transfer-
ring funds back to the United States instead of investing it in France. In other 
words, what Fouchier proposed was to curtail the intense competitive behaviour 
of American firms on European soil. By forcing American firms to act in the local 
interest, a level playing field would be created between European and American 
firms in European markets. According to Fouchier the European firms were forced 
to consider their local environment and now Americans ought to learn their place 
within the national context.423 
 The proposal by Fouchier only was supported by the Belgian delegation. This 
consisted entirely of Belgian businessmen, including Jean Charles Snoy d'Oppuers 
of Groupe Lambert, Jacques E. Solvay of Solvay & Cie. and Louis Camu of Banque de 
Bruxelles, in sum a representation of the major industrial holdings of the country. 
Fouchier's code resembled the conclusions that had been reached by the ELEC 
working group headed by Louis Camu, about the need for an international code for 
multinationals. They stressed that a code was necessary but first “a European code 
for European companies” should be established, thus a code for companies operat-
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ing in Europe. In the past years particularly the Belgian government had offered 
incentives on American investments. As a result Belgium had experienced a high 
influx of American companies, which explains the position of the Belgian holdings. 
The rest of the participants to the meeting thought that the enforcement of such a 
code would be highly problematic. Ultimately the majority declined the option of 
any code, even George Ball's suggestion of a global level-playing field for multina-
tionals.424 
 Despite the diverging views between the European and American members on 
how to deal with the imbalances between American firms and European firms, a 
consensus was closer than would appear from the introductory papers: wide-
spread agreement was expressed about the phenomenon of the multinational 
company in general. Americans on their part stressed the multinationals' potential 
to advance economic welfare. More importantly, several unnamed European heads 
of companies made clear that the phenomenon of the multinational was no “object 
of controversy.” After all they were leaders of multinationals themselves. The 
commitment to liberal relations between the Western markets remained firm.425 
Conclusion 
During the 1960s the European League for Economic Cooperation and the Bilder-
berg meetings explored comparable themes that involved sensitivities among Eu-
ropean corporations. But the approach of both networks to the idea of the Europe-
an market was based on diverging outlooks. In the Bilderberg meetings the Euro-
pean market was no longer discussed as part of the economic pillar of the Western 
Cold War strategy. Instead the organization of the European market became a 
contested issue for diverging European and American interests. The Transatlantic 
membership disagreed on the insurance of export credits to Eastern Europe and 
the European membership repeatedly felt the need to question the activities of 
American multinationals on the European market. The ELEC instead discussed 
how the organization of the European market could be changed to help European 
corporations to adapt to external competition. 
 How did the European multinationals' views on the European market change 
during the 1960s? The focus on liberalization of European and particularly Trans-
atlantic markets was replaced by a new priority: the equalization of conditions of 
competition on international playing fields. Four different expressions of this pri-
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ority can be distinguished. The first was a lobby on reducing the repayment terms 
for government insured export credits that governments and banks offered to 
European capital goods producers. Particularly the chemical sector and the ELEC 
as a whole, including industrial goods producers and banks, lobbied against a pref-
erential treatment of the export interests of the capital goods producers, because 
that was fuelling the industrialization of the East-bloc at the expense of Western 
industrial interests. They demanded a limitation of export credit insurance. Be-
cause the German government did not offer similar insurance for export loans the 
German capital goods exporters agreed with the suggestion to limit these facilities 
in the entire West.  
 A second expression of this attempt to equalize playing field also concerned 
trade with the East-bloc and involved the coordination between the economic 
systems of the East-bloc and Western European markets to enable joint ventures 
or other forms of collaboration. The goal of these agreements was to involve East-
ern European companies and states into good relations with Western European 
corporations so that they would have less reasons to dump their products on the 
European market.  
 Further expressions were related to the dominance of American corporations 
on the European market. European firms agreed that Western European govern-
ments should abolish investment incentives for US companies. Another example 
lies in the general suggestion within the ELEC to investigate the possibility of code 
of conduct for American multinationals with activities on the European market. 
Such a code was thought to reduce the aggressive competitive behaviour of Ameri-
can companies. However, when the subject reached the Transatlantic Bilderberg 
meetings only the representatives of the major Belgian holdings of industry were 
committed enough to pursue such a code. 
 Moreover, it is interesting to note that there wás a broad agreement on level-
ling playing fields, instead of outright protectionist responses. Whenever a protec-
tionist attitude reared its head, it was quickly brushed aside. The case on the im-
provement of access to capital for European firms is telling in this regard. Some 
representatives of European industry felt that European companies should have 
more access to European capital than American firms. However, European banks 
refused such discriminatory measures.  
 In addition to the reduction of inequalities in international competition, Euro-
pean firms also saw a need for transnational concentration of European industry. 
In order to improve conditions for transnational mergers European multinationals 
attempted to convince the European Community to adopt new measures in order 
to facilitate such mergers. Most European corporations agreed that national tax 
schemes for company mergers in the Community should be reformed and aim at 
preventing double taxation. However, particularly the European chemical sector 
preferred the creation of a European company law which would enable to create 
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actual European companies in legal terms. Most corporations strongly declined the 
option of a European company law however. 
 These changing views vis-à-vis the European market can firstly be explained 
through changed circumstances in international political economic developments. 
The French government, which in the 1950s still had been a major driving force 
behind European integration, obstructed further liberalisation between the Euro-
pean Community and the rest of Western Europe. This forced members of the 
ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings to rethink their expectations of the European 
Community and the European market. At the same time the prospect of a large EEC 
market with a collective external tariff wall led to increased investments from 
large American multinationals. Their aggressive competition and size forced Euro-
pean multinationals to rethink their priorities. Additionally, competition emerged 
from the East-bloc by means of state trading companies.  
 In addition to these changing political and economic circumstances the chang-
es in views can also be explained by an emerging awareness about significant im-
perfections of the common market. The resulting competition by large American 
firms required European companies to increase their scale, for instance by trans-
national mergers. The structure of European firms was originally based on their 
relatively small national markets. American competition now forced European 
companies to restructure and adapt to the new reality of a large market. However, 
the European Community had not provided the necessary transnational legal 
framework for such solutions. Mergers between companies from different member 
states were problematic as a result of differing national legal contexts and taxation 
practices. European firms were thus obstructed in the adaptation process to the 
new circumstances. As a result, the European chemical industry demanded a uni-
form company law. Other firms demanded a reduction in taxation. Member states 
of the European Community however refused to go along with such measures. Path 
dependencies of European companies ánd a lack of consensus in European Com-
munity decision-making therefore prevented that those companies could make a 
head start: while they were originally ideally attuned to the typically European 
national idiosyncrasies they now struggled to achieve the same dimensions as 
their American competitors.  
 European companies seldom achieved a general consensus on how new de-
velopments should be approached. How can such differences be explained? In 
comparison to the 1950s, the national contexts of firms ceased to really dominate 
the debates, but they were still relevant for the explanation of some differences. 
The position of the Dutch multinationals on a European company law can be ex-
plained by considering the freedom of entrepreneurship that they depended on. 
Out of fear that the German policy of co-determination of company decisions by 
company personnel might be introduced via such a European company law, the 
Dutch firms held off any involvement with the issue. The views of the German 
capital goods producers represented by Otto Wolff von Amerongen were also de-
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termined by the national context. The German government refused to offer insur-
ance for export loans to the East-bloc going beyond a repayment term of five years. 
Other European governments however did insure export loans for longer periods 
than five years. As a result German capital goods exporters, as already stated above, 
had a unique perspective on the subject and demanded that other governments 
adhered to the internationally agreed standard of five years. The support of Bel-
gian holdings for a behavioural code for American multinationals can be explained 
by the relatively large share of American investments that Belgium experienced. 
 Several differences in views of multinationals can certainly be explained by 
the type of industries in which they were operating. Representatives from the 
chemical sector pushed for a European company law, in order to achieve central-
ized organisations. Moreover, they were prepared to think along lines of protec-
tionist measures against American investments if this could slow down the ad-
vance of their American competitors. At the same time, the banking sector coun-
terbalanced such desires, pointing out the unfeasibility of such plans on a Europe-
an level. Additionally, tensions developed on export loans for capital goods exports 
to the East-bloc between producers of industrial products, exporters of capital 
goods, and the financial sector. 
 These sector-based differences can be explained through sectoral competitive 
pressures and specific sectoral features. The chemical industry was already a high-
ly internationalized sector, and since long competed on the basis of innovation 
capability. The emergence of large American competitors on their European home 
market forced them to achieve similarly large organisations within the European 
Community. Only in this way, they thought, the high expenditures on research and 
development could be financed.  
 The European banks' unwillingness to contemplate preferential access to 
capital for European firms can be explained by the competition they experienced 
from American banks on the European market. On their turn, producers of indus-
trial goods wished to see export guarantees abolished since the financially risk-
free capital goods exports were literally building the production facilities of their 
competition. Such opposed perspectives of sectors make clear that views of busi-
ness on the organization of the European market often obscure in fact very differ-
ent interests.  
 Finally the question arises how these findings relate to the historiography on 
the place of European business in European integration theory and history? During 
the 1960s the dominant voice in integration theory was that of Stanley Hoffmann, 
who argued that European integration solely progressed through intergovernmen-
talist decision-making processes. According to him, member states, especially the 
large ones, were in full control of the direction that the European Community 
would take. This chapter indeed shows that national governments were in a posi-
tion to resist the requests that European corporations formulated. Even when the 
multinationals fully agreed, as on the subject of double taxation, they were unable 
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to steer the Community in their preferred direction. However, this does not mean 
that European multinationals were totally absent. As we have seen, they were very 
capable of connecting to and engaging with the European Commission. A symbiotic 
relation grew between the ELEC and the Commission, in which the ELEC found a 
receptive attitude towards their views on European company laws and double 
taxation. These views inter alia found their way to the earlier mentioned Colonna 
memorandum on the need for an industrial policy for the European Community in 
1970. An important part of this memorandum was the appeal for a transnationali-
zation of European industry via mergers and other forms of collaboration, which 
required harmonization on company laws and fiscal rules. In fact these were the 
complaints of European industry that would only be addressed by the European 
Community during the 1980s in the Single European Act and the resulting Single 
Market Program.426 In the 1960s there was not enough support within the Council 
to adopt such measures.  
 At the same time, the interaction with the multinationals was also beneficial 
for the European Commission. The latter was able to rely on the ELEC for shaping 
informal relations of economic diplomacy with East-bloc countries. This permitted 
to circumvent the formal limits that Community member-states had imposed on 
the European Commission with regard to matters of external trade policy. In this 
role the European Commission was also able to shape the attitudes of European 
multinationals towards a cooperative strategy amongst themselves and with East-
bloc competitors.  
 Despite this mutually beneficial interaction, the European Commission was 
however not able to assist European multinationals in their pursuit of internation-
al level-playing fields. Mere EEC agreements were not sufficient because Europe-
wide and even Transatlantic agreements were required. Moreover, such agree-
ments would be ineffective because non-EEC countries could take advantage of the 
constraints that the EEC member-states would place on themselves. European 
multinationals were therefore forced to turn to the OECD and NATO to cover all 
the politically sensitive issues and create an as large level-playing field as possible.  
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Chapter 6 
 
European multinationals during the 
oil crises, 1970-1980 
Introduction 
In the 1950s European multinationals supported the liberalization of Western 
markets and European economic integration. During the 1960s, in the face of com-
petition on the Common Market, they tried to adapt their own organizations and 
relevant European regulations, to those new circumstances. The 1970s however 
posed entirely different challenges. During the economic boom of the 1960s, eco-
nomic and monetary disequilibria developed that resulted in a monetary crisis, an 
oil crisis and an economic crisis. Especially the emerging energy shortages and 
price rises led to upheaval and intense debates between Europe, the United States 
and Japan. A lack of international consensus on the solutions for international 
problems raised the spectre of uncertain economic conditions for years to come. 
The Trilateral Commission was founded in response to the inability of the major 
industrialized regions to cooperate. 
 The outcomes of those international debates were of paramount importance 
for European multinationals as they affected the stability of the international sys-
tem in which their businesses had developed. Unstable international relations 
posed significant problems for the oil, petrochemicals and automotive industries 
especially. These industries were well represented in the ELEC, the Bilderberg 
meetings and the Trilateral Commission, during discussions on how international 
energy policies and economic relations could be improved. That circumstance 
provides an ideal case for gaining a better understanding on how the views of 
business developed in relation to the European market, in an international context. 
 The present chapter investigates how industries responded to those uncertain 
and problematic circumstances. Did their requests to the European Community 
change? How should the European Community, according to business leaders, act 
in international economic affairs? Moreover, did the atmosphere of crisis increase 
the importance of national contexts with respect to the views that European multi-
nationals held? And to what extent did the context of crisis affect the views of 
business on the freedom of entrepreneurship, which they guarded so closely dur-
ing the 1950s? This chapter argues that under the pressure of the globalization of 
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their sectors and the worsening international circumstances the views of multina-
tionals on the European Community and its institutions changed considerably. 
Economic circumstances during the early 1970s 
As was discussed in previous chapters, during the 1950s and 1960s the Western 
economies flourished under a relatively stable political, economic and military 
order that was enforced by the United States. The foundations of that order were 
laid during and in the wake of WWII. They included the implementation and 
maintenance of the Bretton Woods monetary order, the gradual materialization of 
an Atlantic military alliance that included Western Europe, and the economic and 
military power of the United States. As will be explained below, this order was 
fundamentally challenged during the 1970s, with profound consequences for the 
international outlook of the European multinationals.  
The monetary crisis 
The post-war economic order was severely shaken by the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system in 1971. The monetary system was based on fixed ex-
change rates in relation to the dollar and on the exclusive dollar-exchangeability 
with gold. However, a combination of expansive policies of the US government 
during the 1960s, the financing of the Vietnam war, and foreign investment by US 
multinationals, undermined the value of the dollar and thereby the viability of the 
system. Because the exchange rate of the dollar was fixed against gold, holders of 
dollars began to increasingly exchange dollars for gold. To solve that problem the 
United States asked for a controlled revaluation of the Japanese and Western Eu-
ropean currencies against the dollar. Those governments refused though, feeling 
that this would endorse the disruptive expansive monetary policies that the US had 
practiced over the past decade. A further deterioration of the US gold-position 
ultimately led President Nixon to unilaterally force a revaluation by cancelling 
dollar-gold convertibility on the 15th of August 1971. The move severely damaged 
transatlantic relations and affected the United States' international standing. At-
tempts to mend the system were fruitless and by March 1973 most governments 
had decided to allow their currencies to float.427 
The oil crises of the 1970s 
The transformed monetary order that unfolded from August 1971 onwards, re-
sulted in the first oil crisis. As intended, Nixon's decision devalued the dollar. The 
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terms of trade for oil exporting countries were immediately affected. A lower dol-
lar decreased their returns on oil exports. Moreover, a global boom had simultane-
ously driven up prices of food and industrial products, which further decreased the 
import power of oil producing countries. As most of these countries were strongly 
dependent on imports, the monetary upheaval crippled their economies. In order 
to guard their common interests, the oil exporting countries had already in the 
1960s organized themselves in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). But until 1971 OPEC had failed to force the major Western oil companies 
to raise the price of oil. However, from August 1971 onwards OPEC started to de-
mand higher returns on oil exports in order to finance their sizeable imports. Up to 
October 1973, several rounds of price increases were dictated to the oil companies 
and company assets were nationalized by OPEC countries. The oil-majors were 
defenceless as their home governments refused to accept a confrontational ap-
proach in order to prevent the risk of a shutdown in oil supplies.428 
 Additionally, the OPEC resorted to the use of an oil-embargo to force Western 
countries to change their policies as regards Israel during the Arab-Israeli Yom 
Kippur war. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on the 6th of October, after which 
OPEC immediately increased oil-prices by 70 per cent. That month, Arabian OPEC 
countries imposed embargoes on the United States, and subsequently also on the 
Netherlands, because these countries refused to cancel their support for Israel. 
OPEC imposed another price increase by 125 per cent in January 1974. From Feb-
ruary 1974 onwards most cuts were reversed and the shortages abided. During the 
following six months the embargoes for the US and the Netherlands were lifted. 
Prices however were not reduced which caused payments imbalances and severe 
inflation throughout the world.429 
 The oil crisis of 1979 was not the result of a monetary crisis but of a sudden 
reduction in the availability of oil. From August 1978 onwards the Islamic Revolu-
tion of Iran and its associated strikes caused a sharp drop in Iranian oil production. 
It caused chaotic competition for oil supplies in the West and rising prices, result-
ing in similar economic effects as the first oil crisis.430  
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Economic crisis and protectionism 
Particularly in Western Europe the combination of a collapsing monetary order 
and the oil crisis of 1973 converged with another development. The strong growth 
of Western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s was not merely a result of liberali-
zation but also followed from growing productivity. Production increased notably 
as a result of internal European labour transfers from agricultural labour into 
industrial production. By the late 1960s however, the supply of labour-migrants 
was depleted and the growth of production began to level off. Despite dropping 
profits, wages continued to rise as had been the practice during the long boom, 
thus draining the capacity of businesses to invest. Moreover, in the early 1970s the 
long period of growth had resulted in temporary overcapacity. Investments de-
clined and unemployment began to rise. When this stagnation was confronted with 
surging inflation due to rising oil prices, “stagflation” was the result, and an eco-
nomic crisis set in from which recovery was only achieved during the 1980s.431 
 At the same time, Western Europe, but also the United States, found them-
selves confronted with increasing economic competition by Japan. Between 1950 
and 1973 that country had caught up with the West through a state-managed and 
export-led model of growth. The state facilitated industry in areas such as indus-
trial strategy, foreign exchange policy, protectionism, and technology licencing. In 
that period Japan achieved the unprecedented average growth of more than 10 per 
cent per year, increasing its GNP from $ 11 billion to $ 320 billion, turning it into 
the third-largest world economy in 1973.432 
 When the economic, monetary and energy crises successively took hold be-
tween 1970 and 1974, protectionist tendencies that had been reduced since 1945 
now resurfaced. The United States, the European Community and Japan put in 
place non-tariff barriers and arranged subsidies to assure the survival of domestic 
industries. As a result the model of liberal international trade that had served the 
United States and Western Europe so well since WWII came under severe pressure 
during the 1970s.433 
Responses to the oil crisis of October 1973 
The energy crisis of 1973 caused significant damage to international relations and 
highly determined international debate on how to approach the issue of oil scarcity. 
From 1969 onwards however, relations within the European Community were 
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turning a corner following de Gaulle's resignation in 1969. That year the freshly 
elected President of France George Pompidou lifted two of Charles de Gaulle's 
veto's that had stifled European integration on key subjects: negotiations on an 
independent budget for the Community, and the accession of the United Kingdom 
to the Community. The United Kingdom joined in January 1973, together with 
Ireland and Denmark. The move not only significantly expanded the Community, it 
also affected the comprehensiveness of a new mechanism in the making: European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). In exchange for progress in matters of Community 
expansion, the French government had been granted an opening to introduce its 
longstanding wish of an intergovernmental form of European foreign policy coor-
dination. From October 1970 onwards, bi-annual meetings of EC foreign ministers 
and regular meetings of foreign policy officials were introduced. When the oil crisis 
emerged in October 1973, major deficiencies in European integration, coordination 
and cooperation appeared to have been remedied.434 
 At the same time, relations between Western Europe and the United States 
were burdened with frustration just before the oil crisis escalated. The American 
government's role in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 had 
shocked the European and Japanese governments. The US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger tried to mend relations with the European Community by announcing 
the need for a “New Atlantic Charter” during the US “Year of Europe” in 1973, but 
the invitation was declined.435 
 With the advent of the oil-crisis, European progress in integration had little 
effect on crisis management. The Americans, but also the Dutch, were blamed by 
their European partners for rigidly holding on to their support to Israel during the 
OPEC oil embargo. European solidarity was a hollow phrase: the French and Brit-
ish governments even complied with the Arab embargo and agreed to halt the re-
export of oil to the United States or the Netherlands. At the same time the Europe-
an oil multinationals Shell and British Petroleum were experiencing pressure from 
the British government to uphold normal supplies. Based on their commercial 
motives, the companies preferred to distribute the available oil equally among its 
customers instead. Nonetheless, British Petroleum secretly gave in to the govern-
ment's demands. Still, the potential shortages of oil were alleviated by the oil-
sharing strategy of the oil companies.436 
 European relations with the United States further deteriorated when the 
French government began demonstrating its weight in the newly established EPC 
mechanism. From November 1973 onwards, Henry Kissinger tried to unite West-
ern Europe, the United States and Japan into an oil-consumer collective against 
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OPEC interests. The French government preferred a different approach, because of 
its strong dependence on oil from the Middle East. Moreover, France convinced its 
European counterparts to aim for a dialogue with the oil exporting countries in-
stead of supporting a consumer-nations collective. The country also pressed for a 
joint European declaration that condemned American support for Israel. The Unit-
ed States actively attempted to limit the success of the French government, result-
ing in an isolation of French diplomats during the Washington Energy Conference of 
February 1974. Unlike its European counterparts France subsequently declined 
membership of the International Energy Agency, established in November 1974, 
which studied means for collective action of the oil consuming countries. At the 
same time however, European governments did start a dialogue with the oil ex-
porting countries, particularly the Arab countries. The dialogue involved the ques-
tion of how to help oil exporting countries to reduce their dependence on imports, 
which was one of the causes of their need for a high oil price.437 
 The response of the United States, Western Europe and Japan to the oil crisis 
involved far reaching choices regarding their energy policies. To adequately inter-
pret the position of European multinationals in these international energy debates 
a short overview is appropriate. 
Western European energy policy response 
The Western European energy policy context was characterized by two main fea-
tures: the dependence on the Middle East to the extent of 60 percent of the energy 
requirements, and, secondly, diverging national energy strategies.438 
 Examples of French, British and German policy responses show how different 
European countries responded to the oil crisis. In 1974 the French government 
initialized a national nuclear energy project that involved the construction of suffi-
cient nuclear plants over the next decades to achieve national energy independ-
ence. It united national industries around unprecedented goals of nuclear energy 
capacity. The policy was moreover supplemented by severe energy saving 
measures. Alternatively, the United Kingdom decided to depend on recently dis-
covered reserves: natural gas and oil deposits were discovered in the North Sea 
between 1960 and 1973. At the same time the United Kingdom had maintained a 
significant coal mining industry, which made the country less dependent on im-
ports in the short term in comparison to other European countries. Germany in its 
turn, had a declining coal industry similar in size to that of the United Kingdom. 
New closure of mines was stopped immediately. Moreover, plans for nuclear ener-
gy were initialized. Germany had still to replace imported oil by natural gas though, 
due to the time that was required for the construction of nuclear energy plants. 
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Only during the early 1980s, nuclear energy began replacing oil up to slightly over 
10 per cent of Germany's needs. 439 
 As a whole the European Community was unable to arrive at a collective ener-
gy policy during the 1970s. Attempts had been undertaken since 1960, but the 
contradictory interests of the involved institutions, the High Authority, the Euro-
pean Commission and Euratom, undermined those initiatives. Only after the mer-
ger of these three institutions into one Community, in January 1967, the European 
Community was able to start a comprehensive approach. Since 1967 the driving 
force behind that approach became the fear for oil blockades, because OPEC had 
tried that policy instrument that year for the first time. To reduce the effects of a 
possible second blockade, the European Commission proposed a regulated energy 
market with incentives for internal oil exploration. This should alleviate the Euro-
pean import dependency. No Council agreement on the plans could be reached 
though, except in 1972, on a minor directive for storing emergency oil to supply 
the European economies for 90 days if necessary. In May 1973 similar proposals 
on an energy market failed again, notably due to opposition by the Dutch and Brit-
ish governments that felt that Shell and British Petroleum ought to remain exempt 
from Common Market regulations. Only an agreement on non-binding resolutions 
could be achieved, in December 1974, which merely formalized existing energy 
policies of the Community member states on energy mix diversification and on 
reduction of energy consumption.440 
The United States energy policy response 
Unlike Western Europe, the United States had significant domestic oil reserves and 
coal deposits at its disposal. As a result, interruptions of supply did not affect the 
United States much in 1973. However, prices of domestically drilled oil rose along 
with the OPEC-dictated prices. To encourage domestic oil exploration, the Ameri-
can government allowed oil from new wells to be sold at the higher OPEC prices. 
That policy had an unintended effect. Oil companies began to replace oil from ex-
isting wells by oil from new wells to reap higher profits. As a result, American 
domestic oil production decreased. At the same time, the US Congress consistently 
blocked energy saving policies and allowed the increase of oil consumption. Com-
bined with the aforementioned decreasing domestic production the American 
dependency on imported oil from the Middle East increased by 28 per cent be-
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tween 1973-1978. Such results were in conflict with the energy reduction policies 
that the US government had agreed upon with Western Europe and Japan. During 
the same period Europe and Japan reduced their dependency on imports by 2,2 
per cent. The Community and Japan criticized the US for exposing them to new oil 
shocks. That criticism only grew louder when in May 1979 the United States sud-
denly decided to subsidize oil imports by 5 dollar per barrel, thereby further stim-
ulating dependence on Middle East oil.441  
Japanese energy policy response 
Japan, had few local energy resources available and had become almost entirely 
dependent on imported oil during its prolonged economic boom of the 1960s. In 
1973 Japan imported 93 per cent of its energy requirements. At the same time oil 
represented 75 per cent of the national energy mix, and came largely from the 
Middle East. When the embargo and price increases began, Japan gave in to Arab 
demands and adapted its policy towards Israel. Moreover, a dialogue was started 
with particularly the Middle East countries in order to arrive at higher prices and 
supplies. This went against the preferences of the United States of forming a con-
sumers bloc. Energy saving policies were implemented while at the same time 
Japan opted for an increasing role of imported natural gas and of nuclear energy in 
its electricity production. In that process Japan initialized a comprehensive state-
facilitated nuclear industry capable of building the numerous plants that the elec-
tricity producers required. Similar to France, Japan was aiming at a strong nuclear 
energy based economy.442 
Energy security and the European League for Economic Co-
operation 
As discussed, several developments converged during the 1970s. The breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system and the resulting devaluation of the dollar led to 
demands from OPEC countries for higher returns on oil. During 1971-1973 oil 
prices rose and private oil companies lost their privileged position as industry 
leaders. The European Community lacked an energy policy, despite repeated pro-
posals by the European Commission since 1967. From October 1973 oil prices 
soared and supply was reduced, suddenly undeniably bringing home Western 
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Europe's dependency on Arabian oil. Meanwhile an economic crisis emerged that 
was deepened by the high inflation resulting from risen oil prices.  
 As will be discussed below, even before the oil crisis escalated Western Euro-
pean multinationals made several attempts to convince the European Community 
of vigorous concerted action in the sphere of energy. Also after October 1973 they 
continued to approach European policy makers and took position in the interna-
tional debate on either forming a Western bloc against the Arab world or starting 
consultations with the Middle East on the reduction of their import dependency via 
industrialization. These actions were also caused by growing industrial overcapac-
ity and by the economic crisis that hit Western Europe during the 1970s. Finally, 
European multinationals were confronted with a renewed American commitment 
to nuclear non-proliferation policy as a result of French, British, German and Japa-
nese commercial nuclear energy strategies. 
 As a result, certain sectors of European industry began to appeal to the Euro-
pean Community to help them in protecting European industrial competitiveness 
and to support them by safeguarding minimal conditions of stability and predicta-
bility of international markets. 
 During 1972-1973 the European League for Economic Cooperation developed 
a policy paper on the establishment of a European energy policy. The time was ripe 
for action. Already since February 1971 Western oil companies were forced to 
accept higher oil prices as agreed in the so-called Tehran agreement, formally the 
result of negotiations between them and OPEC. In fact they had no choice but to go 
along with OPEC's wishes. The companies were not prepared to accept OPEC's 
terms but the American and Western European governments had urged them to 
arrive at an agreement instead of risking a shutdown of oil supplies. In January 
1972 prices were again raised by 20 per cent under the similarly imposed Geneva 
agreement. Moreover, from late 1971 onwards oil companies were confronted 
with the nationalization of their oil fields and production facilities. In December 
1971, the Libyan government nationalized assets of BP, and in 1972 the Iraqi gov-
ernment nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company, a joint-venture of Western oil 
companies. Many other nationalizations followed. The loss of such key assets 
transformed oil producers into mere distributors of oil. Meanwhile the European 
Community, showed no willingness to undertake action on matters of European 
energy security.443 
European energy policy, 1972-1974 
It thus should not be a surprise that the first request within ELEC to develop a 
proposal on a European energy policy came from the oil industry. In July 1972, 
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Bernardo Lopez Majano, the general director of the Spanish nationalized oil com-
pany Campsa, contacted key-persons within ELEC.444 
 Normally ELEC's Economic Commission would first discuss an initial draft and 
hold sessions between representatives of national sections to arrive at a common 
position. However, the newly appointed president of ELEC's Economic Commission, 
Guido Colonna di Paliano, felt that a different approach was required. Colonna had 
been European Commissioner for Industrial Affairs from 1967 until 1970, and was 
responsible for the so-called Colonna-memorandum of 1970 on the need of a com-
prehensive industrial policy for the European Community. As a former central 
figure in Community affairs Colonna was an ideal person to direct the drafting 
process of a resolution on energy affairs. Moreover his involvement in European 
industrial affairs had resulted in positions as director of the Belgian chemicals 
producer Solvay & Cie and the Italian FIAT concern.445 
 The reason why Colonna preferred a different approach also lies in his experi-
ence with the affairs of the European Community. As former Commissioner, Colon-
na di Paliano knew the issues that ELEC's Economic Commission was going to 
handle. Its membership was based on the national sections, who sent representa-
tives based on the dominant theme under discussion. Colonna feared that the com-
bination of the inherent political aspects of a European energy policy and the rep-
resentation from the national sections would result in a lack of focus. Instead he 
proposed “a very restricted group of experts” [...] with the assignment to “delimit 
the field of the investigation and to define the guidelines.” His decision led to the 
establishment of an “Energy Panel” in which Colonna himself played no further 
role.446 
 The panel was formed early 1973 and Colonna's preference for “experts” 
resulted in a nearly exclusive representation from the Western European energy 
industry. The national sections had made the selection and they had done so in 
accordance with major national energy interests. The Dutch section opted for oil 
company Shell, the British section selected British Petroleum, as well as the Nation-
al Coal Board, the supervisory body of the nationalised coal industry. The Belgian 
representation also was a mix of longstanding Belgian energy interests: Banque de 
Bruxelles, via its financial relations with Brufina committed to the Belgian coalmin-
ing industry; the Belgian petrol federation and the Belgian federation of electricity 
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producers and distributors. The German section, by mistake only present at the 
second meeting, had chosen the Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke, an RWE subsidiary. 
The Austrian section sent the Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung, the national oil 
company. The rather large French delegation was formed by the coalmines of Lor-
raine and a group of semi-governmental atomic energy interests: the Atomic Ener-
gy Commission (CEA) and the state-owned utilities company Electricité de France 
(EdF). Lastly, the in 1971 largest private industrial conglomerate of France, 
Péchiney-Ugine-Kuhlman (PUK) took part: a major aluminium producer (a very 
energy intensive industrial process) and a producer of metals, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals. PUK was also active throughout the entire nuclear fuel cycle, 
making it part of the public-private partnership of the French government in nu-
clear energy. Strikingly, the French delegation was the only group to include two 
senators and a former French delegate to European energy affairs. This circum-
stance was in line with the French practice of fusing political governance and in-
dustrial strategy when that served their needs. Also a minority of energy consum-
ing industries participated, such as FIAT and Solvay & Cie., via René Boël, now Hon-
orary President of the firm. The energy consuming industries only played an ob-
serving role.447 
 The panel met in February and May 1973. Although the producers of energy 
and energy-resources clearly represented important national interests, the meet-
ing's minutes and the accompanying correspondence make clear that they thought 
and cooperated along lines of the energy resource-sectors: coal, oil and nuclear 
energy. Starting with the oil companies, the fact that the initial proposal came from 
a president of a Spanish oil firm is an odd occurrence since Spain was not a mem-
ber of the European Community. Why would a Spanish oil firm involve itself with a 
Community policy?448 
 The draft proposal of the Campsa director for the energy panel provides an 
answer. Departing from Europe's dependence on imported oil, he proposed to 
stimulate EC-internal oil exploration by lifting Community restrictions on oil ex-
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ploration by companies from third countries, such as Spain. The international oil 
companies Shell and British Petroleum agreed, stressing that no energy source 
would be able to significantly replace oil during the next decade. Additionally, the 
oil companies also had a unique outlook that had not been heard before in the 
Europe-focussed ELEC. C. A. Ruys, of Shell was of the opinion that any endeavour 
regarding oil supply security should not be dealt with on a European level but on a 
global level, because of the “international nature of the oil industry.” Moreover, he 
proposed coordination with the USA and Japan to “avoid a scramble” for available 
oil. Ruys thus wanted the European Community member states to collectively 
coordinate their external political-economic relations, so that they could be of 
service to his internationalized sector as a bloc of governments. It is important to 
stress that they did not want the European Commission to play a role in their af-
fairs. Dutton from British Petroleum illustrated the extent to which Shell and BP 
had transcended mere Europe-focussed perspectives. According to him the pro-
posals should not include references to a “supranational regime” for energy policy. 
He rejected the proposal of “direct negotiations between the EEC and producer 
governments” [oil exporting countries, RG]. Instead of involvement with suprana-
tional arrangements within the Common Market, Shell and BP preferred harmo-
nized national policies, alongside a strengthened European hand in international 
negotiations, but always in coordination with the USA and Japan.449 
 The European coal-producers on the other hand tried to save what was left of 
their industry. The sector had been in decline since oil and cheap American coal 
had begun flooding European markets since the 1950s. For them the current cir-
cumstance of rising oil prices was a welcome change in the energy landscape. 
French and British coal exploiters explained that under further oil price increases, 
coal might even regain a competitive position. Moreover, they made clear that 
unlike oil, coal was locally and immediately available providing an element of “se-
curity” that under present conditions would justify an elevated coal price. Their 
main goal however was to keep open their mines.450 
 Lastly the electricity and uranium producers had a different view of what an 
energy policy should contain. They felt that Community support for nuclear energy 
should be stressed especially. The French representatives from EdF and the CEA, 
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and Roger Paquet of the Belgian federation of electricity producers and distributors, 
insisted on a European strategy with regard to uranium supply and enrichment to 
enable higher production levels of nuclear energy. For the Belgian electricity pro-
ducers the motive was particularly sector based, because of the importance of 
nuclear energy for electricity production. The French however were pushing a 
nuclear strategy also for national reasons. The development of nuclear energy had 
been a national project since WWII, which was carefully fostered by the French 
government. Since 1960, the CEA and French industry had focussed on the devel-
opment of a single uranium enrichment method: gaseous diffusion. In 1970 how-
ever a competing enrichment method was introduced. Germany, the United King-
dom and the Netherlands established URENCO in order to develop and exploit 
enrichment by means of ultra-centrifuges. The CEA subsequently developed a 
strategy to bind the founders of URENCO to the successfully operating French nu-
clear fuel cycle. In February 1973, the same month when the CEA proposed a Eu-
ropean enrichment strategy in the ELEC, the CEA assembled a group of European 
countries for a collective enrichment study, with the aim to include the sharehold-
ers of URENCO into a new company based on gaseous diffusion enrichment: Euro-
dif. The URENCO members declined. The French proposal in ELEC to arrive at a 
collective strategy on uranium supply and fuel enrichment should thus be inter-
preted as an expression of a national goal to make the European nuclear sector 
dependent on the advanced fuel cycle developed by the French.451 
 ELEC's energy panel thus represented diverse and competing interests with 
regard to how a European energy policy should be shaped. The result of the panel's 
meetings was a hybrid request from the Community governments for stimulating 
the further development of all three energy sectors simultaneously, in the form of 
subsidies for coal mines, encouragement of oil-exploration, access to nuclear 
plants for electricity producers, and the swift completion of a European nuclear 
fuel cycle. However, what is much more important than the different sector-based 
preferences is the collective expression of a necessity for intervention and an em-
bryonic sign for the need for a European industrial policy. One difference stands 
out between the coal and nuclear industries operating mainly in Europe, and the 
international oil firms: as BP and Shell had requested, the document asked for an 
international agreement with the US and Japan that would ensure the correct dis-
tribution of oil in times of crisis. Unlike the Europe-based coal industry and the still 
infant nuclear industry that preferred a European approach and supranational 
policies, the internationalized oil companies required the Community member 
states to take a global approach to oil policy and preferred harmonized policies 
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across the member states. The oil companies' international, global structure and 
the severe problems that the sector was dealing with required international action. 
Although the European Political Cooperation framework was gradually taking 
shape, the European Community for now still was ill equipped to negotiate as a 
collective on a global level. This can explain the oil companies' attitude in this re-
gard.452 
 The proposal for a European energy policy was sent to the Council of Minis-
ters, which was scheduled to meet on the 22nd of May 1973. However, no Commu-
nity energy policy was agreed upon, nor on any later occasion during the 1970s.453 
Economic crisis 
When Western Europe was confronted in October 1973 with the oil embargo and 
price rises, it was already struggling with an economic downturn for several years. 
Since 1970 the European economies had been showing signs of slacking growth, 
which was unrelated to the developments in the oil industry. Western European 
productivity growth was stagnating. At the same time, putting trust in the two past 
decades of growth, wages were allowed to rise and investments continued. The 
resulting overcapacity required a consolidation, a process that set in when energy 
prices began to rise. In January 1974, only three months after the beginning of the 
oil embargo, ELEC started working on a publication on the very vulnerable situa-
tion that was now arising for two particularly oil-dependent industries: the petro-
chemical and automotive industries. As a whole the study, named Conjunctural and 
structural problems of the European industry, tried to drive home the message of 
the vulnerability of those sectors in a context of international competition and 
political-economic upheaval and proposed a facilitation of industrial restructur-
ing.454 
 The study was conducted under chairmanship of the earlier mentioned Italian 
representative Guido Colonna di Paliano. When he joined ELEC in 1971, he had 
agreed to reorganize the Italian section. As a result he was able to involve the Ital-
ian section in active ELEC-work for the first time since 1952. Representatives of 
two prominent Italian businesses executed the study: car-maker Fiat and the pet-
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rochemicals and utilities firm Montedison. They chaired panels consisting of major 
European corporations in those sectors and authored the final results.455 
 The analyses of the panels sketched the consequences of both the oil crisis and 
the overcapacity crisis. According to them the present circumstances could only 
result in an “adaptation of the European industrial apparatus”, and in a geograph-
ical redistribution of production. The reasons for this were a combination of inter-
national competition, rising oil prices and the uncertain provision of oil. The Euro-
pean automotive industry was competing with lower American production costs 
due to energy price controls. The petrochemical industry was partly driven to 
invest in oil-producing countries where process and energy feedstocks were 
cheaper. At the same time the panels complained about inflexible industrial rela-
tions: according to them social demands and the norm of full employment were 
making a European adaptation to new international competitive pressures impos-
sible.456  
 To remedy these obstacles, both panels proposed an industrial policy on 
Community level that would enable a dialogue between industry and the trade 
unions. Moreover, the necessary geographical redistribution also required the 
elimination of fiscal and regulatory obstacles to create a homogenous area for 
investment decisions. It is important to note, with hindsight, that within ELEC this 
was the first concrete proposal that came close to the intentions of the Single Euro-
pean Act Community treaty of 1986, namely to finalize the single market. Further-
more the panels asked the Community to cultivate, encourage, and “foster” re-
search in the direction of anti-pollution technology, new materials, propulsion and 
foodstuffs and provide coordination on a European level to achieve greater effi-
ciency. In this way the industries could retain their technological edge.457 
 The chairmanship of Guido Colonna di Paliano automatically places the out-
come of this study in light of the memorandum Industrial policy in the Community 
which appeared in 1970 under his responsibility as the European Commissioner of 
Industrial Affairs. As discussed in chapter 5 this memorandum already included 
remarks on industrial restructuring, transnational mergers, and on the minimiza-
tion of fiscal and regulatory obstacles that were advocated by the ELEC since 1965. 
Together, ELEC's earlier work, Colonna's memorandum, and the new ELEC study 
indicate a continuity of ideas and solutions advocated by parties from the Europe-
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an industry from the mid-1960s to the mid 1970s. That continuity will be further 
discussed below.458 
 Coming back to the energy crisis, the high oil prices also posed a long-term 
strategic challenge for the chemical and automotive industries. Leaders from those 
industries wondered where the OPEC oil revenues would be invested? The ELEC 
publication summarized the two available options: the Arabs could invest directly 
in Western European and Japanese assets, such as real estate or industry, thus 
allowing funds to flow back. The second option involved the so-called petrodollar 
recycling: the OPEC countries could transfer their surpluses back to Western Eu-
rope and Japan in return for the development of the industrial base in the OPEC 
countries, in order to limit their import needs. This implied the transfer of indus-
trial and technological know-how and plants, in return for oil.459 
 Particularly the chemical industry had learned its lesson with regard to these 
matters. During the 1960s exports of industrial know-how and plants to Eastern 
Europe by the capital goods industry had raised the spectre of a boomerang effect 
of the dumping of chemical products on European markets. Now similar worries 
existed. In Conjunctural and structural problems of the European industry Aldo 
Romoli of Montedison stated on behalf of the European chemical sector that West-
ern Europe should cooperate with the OPEC countries in order to secure oil sup-
plies and “to re-establish monetary, economic and political stability, all features to 
which the chemical industry is particularly sensitive.” The chemical sector also 
acknowledged the need for either direct investments in Western Europe or petro-
dollar recycling to normalize the balances of payments. Nonetheless, the European 
chemical industry preferred direct investments in Western Europe. The report 
made clear that petrodollar recycling, or technology transfers, should only be un-
dertaken against the highest possible return of oil and that when recycling would 
nonetheless be the result of a European-OPEC dialogue, particularly overcapacity 
in the Middle East should be prevented. Otherwise Community policies would once 
more create dumping effects for the Communities' own chemical industry. Accord-
ing to Romoli, each move in this regard should take into account the consequences 
for Western European industry.460 
 From October 1974 onwards René Boël, the President of ELEC, repeatedly 
attempted to organize a technology transfer dialogue with OPEC countries, particu-
larly with those in the Middle East. The Director-General of Energy in the European 
Commission, Fernand Spaak, urged him to take the lead in organizing a corporate 
                                                                  
458 AEI, Commission of the European Communities (1970). Industrial policy in the Community. Memoran-
dum from the Commission to the Council. Brussel: Commission of the European Communities, Retrieved, 
September 6, 2013, from http://aei.pitt.edu/38638/1/A3443.pdf, pp. 19, 23-24, 26-27.; Winter, H. 
(1994). Interdependenzen zwischen Industriepolitik und Handelspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 64-65. 
459 ELEC (1975). Conjunctural, pp. 14-15, 38-39. On petrodollar recycling and import substitution also 
see: Clark (1990). The political economy, pp. 291-296. 
460 Italics are mine. See chapter 5. ELEC (1975). Conjunctural, pp. 14-15, 38-39. 
225 
version of the Europe-Arab dialogue, alongside what was being undertaken on the 
Community member state level. Boël approached the national sections of ELEC at 
several occasions but only the British section was enthusiastic enough to take up 
the initiative. In 1976 that section organized a conference with Arab government-
representatives and British industrialists and bankers without the other ELEC 
sections being present.461 
 As a result of global economic pressures, both the chemical and automotive 
sectors were in effect asking for an industrial policy. They wanted the Community 
to think about industrial policy in terms of global competition. Just as Shell and BP 
they demanded new policies because they were so internationalized. However, 
unlike Shell and BP they were mainly based within Europe and required the Com-
munity to take action on a supranational basis because the problems they were 
experiencing had transcended national policymaking. Additionally, they wanted 
the Community to defend the positions of European multinationals in international 
markets.  
European energy policy, 1978-1981 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the European League for Economic Coopera-
tion continued to work on two new proposals for a European energy policy. These 
proposals followed two major incidents that shook the world and the European 
energy industries. The first was the recurrence of oil shortages as a result of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, triggering a veritable oil crisis and accompanying price 
rises from August 1978 onwards. The second event was the Three Mile Island nu-
clear power reactor accident in the United States in March 1979. The accident 
caused strong uncertainties with regard to the future of nuclear energy and result-
ed in widespread public debate about nuclear technology and in strong resistance 
by anti-nuclear activists.462 
 The first of these proposals was published in December 1979. The month 
before the ELEC had founded a small committee to prepare a new resolution de-
manding a Community energy policy. The most notable members of that commit-
tee were Baron Pierre Snoy of the Belgian branch of oil giant Shell and the German 
Paul Dax of Siemens. Among many things, Siemens was a builder of power plants 
and together with its partner AEG the company was deeply involved in nuclear 
energy via their joint venture Kraftwerk Union. Other members included M. Pouly, 
a representative of the Swiss nuclear power-plant constructor Motor Columbus, 
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and Michel Gras, director of the French Commission for Atomic Energy (CEA), the 
institution overseeing the French government's public-private nuclear energy 
ambitions. René Boël himself chaired the meetings.463 
 The statement that resulted from these meetings largely resembled the energy 
policy requests from 1973. The Iranian oil crisis had again brought home the mes-
sage of the dependence of the European Community on Middle East oil. The energy 
industries collectively requested the European Commission to stimulate the fur-
ther development of all non-oil energy sources. Particularly the coal and nuclear 
industries saw an opportunity for Community level support. The ELEC committee 
advised that coal should be imported as well as extracted domestically, and that 
the construction of nuclear plants should be continued with speed. Further the 
document stated that the Community should investigate all possible innovative 
energy resources. The resolution also asked for a pricing of natural gas that would 
be more in line with the prices of other energy sources. In the Netherlands domes-
tic natural gas was sold for very low prices to industry. According to Snoy, all ener-
gy resources should be priced in correspondence with international prices and 
therefore nearer to the price-level of oil. In other words, Snoy advocated a level-
playing field for oil. He argued that this would lead to a downward pressure on oil 
prices. He also included a request for a foreign policy of the Community related to 
energy, based on consultation with the oil-producers, the developing countries and 
the United States. According to oil major Shell the new problems in Iran again ne-
cessitated a European foreign policy response. It is significant that only the Euro-
pean oil majors and as became clear in the former section of this chapter, the Eu-
ropean chemical industry, demanded such a policy. The dependency of both indus-
tries on oil and oil derivatives in a time of oil-scarcity explains this attitude. At the 
same time, both industries had in common that they were very internationalized, 
owning multiple production facilities outside Western Europe. As a result they 
required stable international arrangements and hands-on international coordina-
tion where necessary, factors in which a Community policy could make a differ-
ence.464 
 The committee members connected to nuclear plant constructors, namely Dax 
(Siemens), Pouly (Motor Columbus) and Gras (CEA), stressed that the speed of nu-
clear investments ought to be increased. A stunning proposal was Gras' request 
that the European Community should start a campaign towards the European 
public on the merits of nuclear energy. The events at Three Mile Island had caused 
a decisive blow to the nuclear industry's public image: new orders for nuclear 
power stations had been rare since then. The idea was immediately embraced by 
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all the members of the committee, convinced that the public needed to be educated 
on one of the key solutions to Europe's energy shortages.465 
 Again, it is striking that the dominant view on the organization of the Europe-
an market of the 1960s, the creation of level playing fields, was replaced by a pref-
erence for intervention by the Community. A preference for Community directed 
industrial policy with regard to the energy industry was a key element of these 
proposals. The participation of such a variety of energy branches can be explained 
by the scarcity of energy resources on the European market: all were in position to 
take advantage of the situation, with the exception of the oil companies perhaps. 
The fact that an oil multinational such as Shell supported an educational campaign 
on the desirability of nuclear energy is not as surprising as it may sound. In 1969, 
Shell became a shareholder of the public-private holding Ultracentrifuge Nederland 
N.V. which on its turn took a share in the British-Dutch-German Uranium Enrich-
ment Corporation (URENCO), founded in 1971. Moreover, in 1973 Shell bought half 
of the shares of General Atomics, co-owned by the American oil major Gulf Oil, with 
the goal of developing Very High Temperature Nuclear Reactors. In other words, 
Shell had broadened its strategic scope from oil to energy. Educating the public on 
nuclear energy was therefore no strange move for Shell.466 
 Based on the outcomes of the small ad hoc energy committee ELEC's Central 
Council decided in December 1979 to found a permanent Energy Committee to 
further elaborate ELEC's position. Table 6.1 offers an overview of its membership, 
which also includes the membership of the ad hoc small committee that preceded 
it. From the oil industry only Belgian Shell participated. Expertise on the gas-
industry came from the Nederlandse Gasunie, and the coal-industry was represent-
ed by the German Saarbergwerke and the British National Coal Board. The nuclear 
industry was overrepresented. Several utilities and nuclear engineering firms took 
part. The Belgian section included the holding Sofina and Société Générale de 
Banque, which under an umbrella of cross-ownerships represented the dominant 
Belgian energy industries: the oil company Petrofina, the utilities holding Elec-
trobel and the industrial engineering firm Tractionel that was involved in building 
nuclear facilities. Together they were involved in a strategy to redirect their coal 
and oil-based electricity operations towards nuclear-based energy production. The 
French representatives again included the Atomic Energy Committee (CEA) and 
Electricité de France, while the German section was once more represented by Paul 
Dax from Siemens. The Swiss Motor Columbus and the Italian Montedison, both 
involved in the construction of nuclear reactors, were also included. An advisor to 
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the Director General of DG Energy of the European Commission, Robert de Bauw, 
took part in the sessions.467  
 From April 1980 until September 1981 the group worked on a final report. In 
October 1980 the ELEC organized a colloquium on a European energy policy. The 
outcome foreshadowed the outcome of the Energy Committee, in which the nucle-
ar industry was so strongly represented. The colloquium included representatives 
from all energy sectors and dealt with all energy sources and aspects, but nuclear 
energy dominated the discussion. The participants of the colloquium were frus-
trated about the popular attacks on nuclear energy, and about the attack on coal-
based energy as well. According to them a campaign of misinformation was being 
fuelled by “a small nucleus of people”, [...] at whom “operations of control and re-
sistance” should be aimed.468 
 When the committee finally produced a report in September 1981, which was 
sent to the Community member states and the European Commission, it became 
clear that the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident had strongly influenced the 
outcome. All important sources of energy received their share however and the 
requests for industrial policy-like interventions persisted. Coal was considered an 
important resource in securing Western Europe's energy independence, warrant-
ing further subsidies, as the document stated. The oil interests were included sole-
ly through an appeal for a focus of Community actions in order to create conditions 
to develop oil or gas sources outside OPEC or the Eastern World. The request origi-
nated from Pierre Snoy representing Shell. This also included European action on 
enforcing respect for contract-relations and preventing nationalizations such as 
had taken place in the Middle East. In other words, the international oil industry 
did not ask for internal European policies, but external representation to support 
their international expansion.469 
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Table 6.1:  Participants in the small ad-hoc ELEC Energy Committee (November 1979) and the per-
manent ELEC Energy Committee thereafter (April 1980, December 1980, April 1981).470 
Country Last Name, First Name Company Sector Nov79 Apr80 Dec80 Apr81
Belgium Bauw, Robert de Commission of the EC Public Admin. x x x 
Belgium Berghe, Adrien van den Shell Oil   x 
Belgium Boël, René Solvay Chemicals x  x  
Belgium Cayron, Robert Belgo-Nucléaire Nuclear Energy x x x 
Belgium Hatry, Paul Fédération Pétrolière Belge Business Ass. x x x  
Belgium Henrard, Jacques Com. de Contrôle de l'Electri-
cité et du Gaz 
Public Admin. x x x 
Belgium Snoy, Pierre  Shell Oil x x x x 
Belgium Ugeux, Georges Societé Générale de Banque Banking x x x 
Denmark Breitenstein, Finn Fed. of Danish Industries Business Ass. x x x 
France Couture, Jean Societé Générale Multiple x x x 
France Jacquier, Armand Electricité de France Utilities   x 
France Royere, Olivier de Rhône-Poulenc Chemicals x   
France Thierry Djaparizde, A. Electricité de France Utilities x x x 
France  Gras, Michel Comm. de l'Energie Atom. Public Adm. x x   
Germany Dax, Paul Siemens Electrical Eng. x x x x 
Germany Jorzyk, Sigurd Saarbergwerke AG Coal x   
Germany Schmidt, Hans Peter Siemens Electrical Eng.  x  
Italy Romoli, Aldo Montedison Multiple x   
Netherlands Plouvier, L.J.M. Nederlandse Gasunie Gas x x x 
Spain Lopez Majano, B. Asfaltos Espagnoles Asfalt x  x  
Switzerland Baumberger, H. Motor Columbus Automotive  x x 
Switzerland Pouly, M. J. Motor Columbus Automotive x x x  
Switzerland Zwahlen, Jean   x  x 
U. K.  Jenssen, W.G. National Coal Board Coal  x  
U. K.  Mabon, J. Dickson Former Minister of Energy Politician x   
U. K. Rhys-Williams, B. European Parliament Politician x    
 
However, the key part of the report was devoted to nuclear energy. In addition to 
the chemical industry and the oil industry in earlier reports and resolutions, the 
nuclear industry also appealed to the European Community for more support in 
foreign relations, outside the EC. In this case this involved in particular an issue of 
United States-European Community relations, namely non-proliferation. During 
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the 1970s, the development of commercial nuclear reprocessing plants and the 
emerging technology of the fast breeder reactors also gave rise to non-
proliferation risks. The reprocessors were designed to extract residual plutonium 
from spent uranium. The fast breeder reactors were designed to produce plutoni-
um from uranium, for the purpose of immediately used fuel. While both were de-
signed with energy production and environmental goals in mind, the installations 
offered the possibility of acquiring weapons-grade fissile material for anyone who 
was able to order such plants commercially. At the same time companies from 
several European countries were willing to build them. In 1976, the United States 
Carter administration therefore demanded a renewed non-proliferation treaty, 
which was concluded in 1978. American pressure had forced Western European 
countries to accept controls on proliferation. In return for American and Canadian 
controlled access to uranium, a prohibition for sales of reprocessing plants and 
breeder reactors was agreed upon. In other words, the European countries were 
forced to accept a further energy dependence besides the already high degree of 
dependence on Middle East oil. As a result the ELEC asked for a common action to 
“remove the political constraints on uranium supply.” Additionally, in order to 
reduce the dependence on uranium from the United States and Canada the report 
asked to cooperatively realize the demonstration projects for the efficient fast 
breeder reactor.471 
 ELEC's proposal did not affect decision-making on energy policy though. The 
energy shortage disappeared due to a decreased demand for oil in industrial coun-
tries following the widespread economic slowdown of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Moreover, the oil industry was confronted with an abundance of oil from 1982 
onwards. Meanwhile, orders for new nuclear reactors stagnated, and did not pick 
up later. The energy crisis was over and, as a result, this drastically reduced the 
need for Community member states to develop a common energy policy.472 
 The views of the oil industry, nuclear industry, automotive industry and 
chemical industry illustrate a growing desire for intervention by the European 
Community in the areas of industrial policy and foreign policy. The automotive and 
chemical industries demanded support in scientific research and assistance in 
improving the relations with unions on a European level. At the same time the 
chemical, oil and nuclear industries stressed the need for Community representa-
tion on a global level to protect their interests overseas in terms of stable condi-
tions, controlling the direction of investments (chemical industry) respect for con-
tract relations, and support for the expansion of the oil industry. Additionally the 
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nuclear industry demanded a diplomatic effort in EC-US relations aimed at lifting 
blockades on the global commercialization of nuclear technology. 
 In a period of international upheaval and increasing international pressures 
on European multinationals, the views that were expressed by the ELEC changed 
into an interventionist direction in terms of industrial policies. Moreover, an in-
creasing desire for external representation can be noted. In the Bilderberg meet-
ings particularly this last aspect would dominate. 
Bilderberg meetings 
Over the course of the 1970s the Bilderberg meetings discussed several themes 
related to the energy crisis. However, only in 1973, the annual Bilderberg meeting 
focussed on the issue of a European energy policy and energy security. In the fol-
lowings years the energy crisis was mainly discussed in terms of financial conse-
quences, particularly inflation.  
 The decision to discuss the topic of a European energy policy in May 1973 was 
based on requests by representatives of European industries that depended on 
stable oil prices for their activities: the petrochemical and automotive industries. 
Already in September and October 1972, three appeals were made to discuss the 
deteriorating situation with regard to oil. As explained, since 1971 OPEC had 
forced Western oil companies to accept higher oil prices and during 1972, individ-
ual OPEC member in Northern Africa and the Middle East had begun nationalizing 
Western oil assets such as oil field concessions. The first request came from the 
Belgian Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers, Minister of Finance from 1968 until 1971. Snoy 
et d'Oppuers was also active in the ELEC, but was not related to the Belgian Baron 
Pierre Snoy of Shell who was also a member of the ELEC. Before Snoy et D'Oppuers 
was the Minister of Finance he had several directorships in the Belgian energy 
sector (BP Belgium, Electrogaz, Intercom) and recently had again taken on direc-
torships for BP Belgium and Fiat Auto Belgio. But also Daniel Janssen, director of 
Union Chimique Belge and Giovanni Agnelli, President of Fiat had expressed their 
preference for a discussion on the Middle East, both in relation to the security of 
energy supplies for Western Europe. During two Steering Committee meetings in 
October 1972 the decision was reached to put following topic on the agenda: The 
possibilities of the development of a European energy policy, and the consequences 
for European-North American relations.473  
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The conference of May 1973 included a strong participation of the oil and petro-
chemical industries. Of the 80 participants only seventeen were from the USA, of 
which four were active in business: two longstanding Bilderberg members, Henry J. 
Heinz II of the multinational Heinz and the former Under-Secretary of State George 
W. Ball, now an investment banker with Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, and two oil 
company executives: Emilio Collado of Exxon and Robert O. Anderson of Arco.474 
 The Europeans had invited 54 participants of which fifteen were from indus-
try (Table 6.2) They mainly came from the oil and petrochemical industries. The 
Belgian representations included the Union Chimique Belgique (UCB), BP Belgium 
and Fiat Auto Belgio. The French group was built around energy intensive industry 
and energy producers: Rhône Poulenc which was one of the largest chemicals pro-
ducing groups in Europe, the public utilities company Electricité de France and the 
commercial oil company Compagnie Française des Pétroles. The Dutch and British 
representatives included the chairmen of Shell and British Petroleum. The Norwe-
gian representatives were the recently installed chairmen of the state oil compa-
nies Statoil and Saga Petroleum established in 1972, after major oil discoveries The 
Swiss group included the chemical firm Ciba-Geigy, and the Swedish delegation 
included utilities company Sydkraft. Non oil dependent, but most certainly oil & 
energy - interested firms were electronics multinational Philips, part of the Dutch 
group, and FIAT, part of the Italian group.475 
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Table 6.2: Overview European participants from business, Bilderberg Saltsjöbaden Conference, May 
1973.476 
Country Name Company Energy/Oil relation 
Belgium Janssen, Daniel E. Union Chimique Belge Petrochem. 
Belgium Snoy et d'Oppuers, J.-Ch. BP Belgium & Fiat Auto Belgio Oil prod.-Automotive
France Baumgartner, Wilfrid S. Rhône Poulenc Petrochem. 
France Boiteux, Marcel Electricité de France Utilities 
France Lilliac, Granier de Comp. Française des Pétroles Oil prod. 
Netherlands Wagner, Gerrit A. Royal Dutch Shell Oil prod. 
U.K. Drake, Eric British Petroleum Oil prod. 
Norway Lied, Finn Statoil Oil prod. 
Norway Tidemand, Otto Grieg Saga Petroleum Oil prod.  
Switzerland Umbricht, Victor M. Ciba-Geigy Petrochem. 
Sweden Björgerd, Anders Sydkraft Utilities 
Netherlands Philips, Frits J.  Philips Electronics 
Italy Agnelli, Giovanni FIAT Automotive 
Germany Wolff von Amerongen, Otto Otto Wolff Steel  
 
To block or absorb the Arabs? 
The Bilderberg debate on a European energy policy was very different from that 
inside ELEC in 1973. Instead of a focus on how the European energy industry could 
decrease Europe's dependency on Arabian oil, it revolved around a controversy 
between oil multinationals and Fernand Spaak, the Director-General of Energy in 
the European Commission on how to organize a European response to OPEC's 
actions. 
 Fernand Spaak opened the conference with an explanation of the point of view 
of the European Commission. His remarks breathed the caution that any repre-
sentative of the European Commission had to observe: many aspects of energy 
policy overlapped with foreign policy, a domain that had almost entirely remained 
outside the Commission's mandate. Since 1970 an intergovernmental foreign poli-
cy framework, European Political Cooperation, was being developed, initially also 
shutting out involvement by the European Commission. Indeed, during his intro-
duction Spaak limited himself to the relation between energy security and the 
European market, which was a central responsibility of the European Commission. 
He offered an elaborate explanation of how to stimulate, harmonize and coordinate 
all sorts of aspects of the Communities' energy market. Nevertheless, he felt that 
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“one of the principal factors at issue” were Community-relations with energy im-
porting countries and the Middle East.477 
 According to Spaak it was of central importance that Europe, the United States 
and Japan would develop a basis for cooperation on energy issues. He feared that if 
oil supplies would suddenly drop, harmful outbidding on the oil market would be 
the result. Cooperation should prevent such a situation according to him. At the 
same time however, he sketched the European Community's vulnerability within 
such a cooperative constellation. Western Europe's dependency on the United 
States was not to be underestimated, as Spaak indicated: American oil companies, 
holding a third of the European market, could be prompted by American incentives 
to redirect activities to the US market. He also pointed out European worries about 
the dominant position of the United States in nuclear technology and its role as 
price-setter and setter of terms for the sale of enriched uranium.478  
 The truly important issue to Spaak however were relations with the Middle 
East. He explained that if any consultation were to take place between Europe, the 
United States and Japan, these countries “should not look as if they were creating a 
bloc of energy importing countries as against the bloc of energy exporting coun-
tries”, [...] or, “as if they were a defensive reaction.” According to Spaak the Europe-
an Community should aim at “stability and controlled development” in its ap-
proach of the Middle-East. As a result, Spaak explained that the oil companies, 
which had been conducting all the negotiations with OPEC countries in the past, 
could not any longer keep the Western oil-dependent nations in the dark about 
their intentions “before and during any negotiations.” In Spaak's view the oil com-
panies should retain the role of negotiating party, but facilitated by consultations 
between the United States, Japan and the European Community. In other words, he 
preferred a commercial approach of oil supplies to Western Europe, thereby avoid-
ing direct involvement of European governments in negotiations.479  
 Spaak encountered strong opposition from participants close to, or part of, the 
oil industry. The American Walter J. Levy, an authoritative oil industry consultant, 
was invited to respond to Spaak's views. He was defensive of the oil companies, 
and stressed their inability to represent the interests of the West by themselves 
any longer. The Arab countries had taken control of pricing and had nationalized 
oil concessions formerly owned by Western oil companies. Thereby, he explained, 
the Arab countries had reduced them to “junior partners” and [...] “service compa-
nies”, who were no longer capable of acting as an “independent-intermediary 
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commercial force” as Spaak still had implied. According to Levy, the West had to 
utilize its political and military strength to remedy the “imbalance of negotiating 
power” and enforce “respect for the dignity of agreements.”480  
 Leaders of the oil industry attending the meeting agreed with that analysis, 
and demanded support given their new position. Eric Drake, chairman of British 
Petroleum, posed a particularly forceful request.481 He felt that no such thing as an 
oil crisis existed; according to him the current situation of OPEC-imposed prices 
was a political crisis. As he explained, agreements on oil supply could not be en-
forced and thus had ceased to be a commercial matter, with the consequence that 
“it was now essential that consuming governments become involved in what was 
essentially a political confrontation.”482  
 Drake had no time for extensive rounds of consultations as Spaak had pro-
posed. He felt that the situation required immediate action. European, American 
and Japanese agreements could take years, while “oil companies were 'in the firing 
line,'“ in their relations with the Arab countries. He therefore proposed a far-
reaching and unprecedented oil-industry-empowering collaboration with the big-
gest three industrial blocs (USA, Europe and Japan). Drake pleaded for the quick 
establishment of an “action committee”, consisting of nine delegates of interna-
tional oil companies and nine delegates of the three importing blocs who were 
fully authorized (“plenipotentiary”) to represent their governments, which would 
be “able when necessary to provide decisions in a week's time or less.”483 
 Moreover, one of the representatives of American oil companies that was 
taking part expressed a deep concern about the political pressure that would be 
mounted against oil companies in the case of suddenly dropping oil-supplies. The 
allocation of scarce supplies in an emergency situation would result in a political 
confrontation between importing countries, and the oil companies did not wish to 
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be caught in the middle. They felt that governments ought to devise oil-sharing 
arrangements to deal with such emergencies.484 
 Emile van Lennep, secretary-general of the OECD, explained that his organiza-
tion would be well suited to “associate the efforts of governments and the petrole-
um companies.” As an intergovernmental consultative and coordinative body on 
economic matters for the US, Europe and, since 1964, Japan, the OECD indeed 
seemed ideal for serving the interests of the importing countries. Spaak's pro-
posals for a non-confrontational attitude towards OPEC countries were largely 
ignored. None of the delegations that included petrochemical industry opposed the 
proposal put forward by Drake. There appeared to be widespread agreement that 
the Western private oil companies had to be supported by their governments in 
attempts to counter the OPEC assertiveness.485  
 This debate is a further confirmation of what could be observed with respect 
to the European League for Economic Cooperation. The internationalized oil com-
panies wanted governments to engage in multilateral consultation and collabora-
tion. Specifically for the European market this meant that the oil industry was in 
favour of international representation by the Community, capable of acknowledg-
ing on the one hand the shared interests of the Community and at the same time 
the worldwide interests of European ánd American oil-multinationals. In other 
words, the oil companies demanded political actions from the Community for 
which it was not prepared yet, namely the combination of a foreign economic poli-
cy, a strategic energy policy, and a collective external representation to take a 
stand against what the oil companies clearly saw as a form of economic insubordi-
nation by the OPEC.  
 As can be told from the discussions, the May 1973 meeting signalled an at-
mosphere of crisis several months before the oil crisis would actually escalate in 
October 1973. Given OPEC's recent assertiveness, that was not showing signs of 
coming to an end soon, the Bilderberg meeting also considered long-term implica-
tions, such as the consequences for balances of payments in the case that such a 
vastly traded resource would become even more expensive. Moreover, the partici-
pants considered the possible results of an enormous accumulation of oil-dollars in 
Arab countries, whose economies were incapable of absorbing the surplus dollars 
through internal investments. Already at this point ideas were developed to let the 
importing countries actively aid the Arabian countries in developing their own 
economies by, for example, building petro-chemical complexes. These complexes 
would be constructed by Western contractors, and as a result the Arabian oil dol-
lars could flow back to the oil importing countries. 486 
 During the following years the Bilderberg meetings would pay little attention 
to energy problems. The oil crisis that escalated in October 1973, only worsened 
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already damaged Trans-Atlantic political relations. In the context of the Bilderberg 
network, which was originally founded to address such Western tensions, these 
relations took precedence over issues of crisis-management. In April 1974 the 
Bilderberg meeting featured only one subject: “Prospects for the Atlantic world.” 
The oil crisis was only discussed as a symptom of deteriorated Western relations. 
Furthermore, a key oil-crisis topic such as the founding of the International Energy 
Agency was not addressed.487 
 In fact, during the following years the economic subjects on the Bilderberg 
agenda transformed into more general concerns about the future structure of the 
Western economies. Hyperinflation preoccupied the Bilderberg meeting of 1975, 
and the meeting of 1976 was cancelled due to the involvement of -the founder and 
chairman of Bilderberg meetings, Prince Bernhard, in the Lockheed-affair. When 
the second oil crisis developed in early 1979, the Bilderberg meeting considered 
the recurrent frustrating effects of instability in the Middle East and Africa.488 
 At two instances however, debates about energy security resurfaced. The 
meeting of April 1977 resulted in a short disagreement between Americans and 
Europeans on nuclear proliferation. The issue centred around criticism from the 
German delegation against actions of the Carter administration with regard to a 
commercial nuclear reprocessor that the Siemens-AEG combine Kraftwerk Union 
wished to sell to Brazil. On the 7th of April 1977, shortly before the Bilderberg 
meeting took place, President Carter had announced a new policy on nuclear pro-
liferation. The policy involved placing controls on the commercial sale of nuclear 
energy plants and fuel-cycle processes, designed in such a way that weapons grade 
plutonium would be excluded as a fuel for energy-generation. Since the Carter 
administration had taken office in 1976, the American government had already 
insisted on negotiations on the commercial sale of nuclear enrichment plants, 
capable of producing weapons grade plutonium. Similarly, the reprocessor could 
be operated to extract weapons grade plutonium from spent uranium. In other 
words, on grounds of fear for proliferation of access to plutonium, the United 
States blocked European and Japanese sales of the nuclear technology that was 
considered proliferant. At the Bilderberg meeting the Germans asked for close 
collaboration between France, Germany and Japan, all three builders of nuclear 
installations, to reach a solution.489 
 Three years later, the meeting of April 1980 featured a similar outburst of 
criticism by Europeans towards the American government, this time from indus-
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trialists. The meeting as a whole considered a variety of current affairs from politi-
cal, security and economic angles, while shortly touching on the energy situation 
that had developed since the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Belgian and German dele-
gations seized the opportunity to express their misgivings. They were agitated 
about the lack of success of the American government to truly affect oil price regu-
lation policies. In 1971 the American government had introduced domestic price 
regulations for oil, designed to compensate for the OPEC determined price rises. 
The Belgian representatives of business included Daniel Janssen, president of pet-
rochemicals and pharmaceuticals firm Union Chimique Belge, and Léon Lambert, 
chairman of Groupe Bruxelles Lambert, owner of significant shares in the Belgian 
energy industry. The group of nineteen German participants largely consisted of 
politicians, including Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, but also some of the 
most prominent industrialists of the country: Otto Wolff von Amerongen, president 
of the Deutsche Industrie und Handelstag, and still chairman of the steel goods 
trading Otto Wolff company, Karlheinz Kaske, president of electric engineering firm 
Siemens, Gerhard Prinz of carmaker Daimler Benz, Herbert Grünewald, chairman of 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals firm Bayer, Thyssen's chairman Dieter Spethmann 
and banker Alfred Herrhausen of Deutsche Bank, all involved in energy intensive 
industry the energy industry or widespread . They complained that the US was 
artificially keeping prices low for American industry while European industry had 
to work under free market price conditions. In other words, according to them 
European industry was finding itself in a position of unfair competition with the 
United States since the early 1970s. European industry had irreversibly entered a 
mode of global competition in which since the advent of the oil crisis differences 
between energy prices posed a challenge to their competitive position in the global 
market.490 
 Similar as in the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings debates illustrated how chang-
ing global circumstances forced major private oil companies and other industries, 
to view the European market as strongly influenced by economic policies from 
other countries and markets. To counter this situation the oil companies required 
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the Community to engage in multilateral, strategic action together with the other 
industrialized regions of the world. Adaptation was not an acceptable approach, 
the position of the oil industry had to be protected via diplomatic channels. How-
ever, for the oil companies the European market was not an area in itself. The 
companies were too interconnected with the energy markets of the United States 
and Japan to limit themselves to mere European diplomacy. The debates in the 
Bilderberg meetings therefore also aid this investigation in the interpretation of 
the same oil companies' views in the ELEC that were discussed earlier. The further 
discussed energy debates in the Bilderberg meetings were less instructive about 
what European corporations expected from European Political Cooperation or 
Community institutions. It is nevertheless clear that they used the Bilderberg 
meetings to bring across their views to American circles of influence. 
Trilateral Commission 
While the ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings were already addressing problems in 
relation to rising oil prices, expropriations of Western oil company assets by OPEC 
members and a potential supply crisis during 1972 and early 1973, the Trilateral 
Commission was still in the process of being founded. The reasons for founding the 
Trilateral Commission initially did not lie in a concern with energy but in the dete-
rioration of monetary relations since the Nixon shock of decoupling the dollar from 
gold in 1971. The first Trilateral studies initialized in the Spring of 1973 offered 
solutions for the international monetary disorder and addressed the lacking inter-
national will to solve problems on a multilateral basis. As explained however, the 
escalation of the oil crisis in October 1973 functioned as an accelerator of tensions 
between governments of Western Europe, the United States and Japan and exacer-
bated already existing animosity on monetary affairs. The Trilateral Commission 
tried to remedy the deteriorating international collaboration and coordination. For 
this reason the conflicts that followed the first oil crisis triggered a prolonged in-
terest in the energy theme. Oil and energy supply became a topic of interest from 
late 1973 onwards, right after the crisis had taken on full blown proportions. Be-
tween 1973 and 1980 the Trilateral Commission recurrently debated the political 
economic structure of energy relations. As a result, studies and debates on trilat-
eral energy policies and related topics began appearing from 1974 onwards. Be-
fore turning to these studies and debates however, an overview of Trilateral Com-
mission members which were involved in energy related subjects is required to 
gauge the balance of interests involved in these discussions.491 
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Trilateral Commission's energy actors 
As discussed in chapter 2, the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission 
consisted of a diverse group of businessmen, policy experts, politicians, ex-
ministers, lawyers and public administrators. This composition does not provide 
any clues for the interpretation of the Trilateral Commission's work in general.  
 However, when interpreting the Executive Committee's membership within 
the context of the gradually developing oil crisis and energy security more broadly, 
a pattern emerges. Table 6.3 presents the membership of the Trilateral Commis-
sion Executive Committee in 1975. It shows that the Canadian, European, and the 
Japanese delegations had several members from strong energy-related interests. 
Strikingly, these were absent in the American section. The concentration of energy 
related interests is most obvious in the European membership: key industry lead-
ers with high stakes in the oil industry, energy industry or in oil dependent devel-
opments such as fuel prices, were part of the European leadership. These include 
the French Paul Delouvrier, chairman of the public corporation Electricité de 
France, the Dutch chairman of the supervisory board of the Dutch-British Royal 
Dutch Shell, John Loudon and the Italian Giovanni Agnelli, president of Fiat.  
 Canadian energy related members included the chairman of utilities company 
BC Hydro and a director of the nuclear-energy technology heavyweight Westing-
house. The Japanese Trilateral Commission's leadership included the largest indus-
trial conglomerate of Japan, Mitsubishi, which was active in oil production and 
development of nuclear energy but also energy intensive metals production and 
petrochemicals.  
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Table 6.3: Overview of the members of the Trilateral Commission Executive Committee in 1975.492 
Country Last Name, First Name Societal Sphere Sector Company/Institution 
Belgium Eyskens, Marc Academic University Catholic Univ. Louvain 
Canada Bonner, Robert W. Business Utilities Brit. Col. Hydro Company 
Canada Pepin, Jean-Luc Business Electronics Westinghouse Canada 
France Berthoin, Georges Other Other Other
France Delouvrier, Paul Business Utilities Electricité de France 
Germany Birrenbach, Kurt Business Ferrous Metals August Thyssen-Hütte 
Germany Ehrenberg, Herbert Politics Parliament SPD (social-democratic) 
Ireland Robinson, Mary T.W. Politics Senate Independent
Italy Agnelli, Giovanni Business Automotive Fiat
Italy Compagna, Francesco Politics Parliament Partito Repubblicano Italiano 
Japan Fujino, Chujiro Business Multiple Mitsubishi
Japan Haraguchi, Yukitaka Labour Labour Fed. of Metal Mine Labor Unions 
Japan Hirasawa, Kazushige Media Media Japan Broadcasting 
Japan Kashiwagi, Yusuke Business Banking Bank of Tokyo
Japan Mushakohji, Kinhide Academic Pol. Res. Inst. Instit.of Intern. Relations 
Japan Okita, Saburo Academic Pol. Res. Inst. Japan Econ. Rese.Center 
Japan Takeuchi, Ryuji Publ. Adm. Foreign Affairs Ministry Foreign Affairs 
Japan Ushiba, Nobuhiko Publ. Adm. Foreign Affairs
Japan Watanabe, Takeshi Business Banking Bank of Tokyo
Netherlands Kohnstamm, Max Semi Publ. Adm. University European Univ. Institute 
Netherlands Loudon, John Business Oil Royal Dutch Shell 
Norway Tidemand, Otto G. Business Oil Saga Oil
U.K. Younger, Kenneth Business Law
U.K. Zulueta, Philip de Business Banking Hill, Samuel & Co. 
U.S.A. Abel, I. W.  Labour Labour United Steelworkers of America 
U.S.A. Brown, Harold Semi Publ. Adm. University California Institute of Technology 
U.S.A. Brzezinski, Zbigniew Academic University Columbia Res. Inst. on Intern. 
Change 
U.S.A. Haggarty, Patrick E. Business Electronics Texas Instruments 
U.S.A. Reischauer, Edwin O. Academic University Japan Institute Harvard University 
U.S.A. Rockefeller, David Business Banking Chase Manhattan Bank 
U.S.A. Roth, William M. Business Roth Properties 
U.S.A. Scranton, William W. Publ. Adm. Security GAC Arms Control and Disarma-
ment 
U.S.A. Smith, Gerard C.  Business Law Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering 
U.S.A. Warnke, Paul C. Business Law Clifford & Warnke 
                                                                  
492 This table is based on the table A1.14, included in Appendix 1. The main source for the information in 
this table is Sklar, H., & Everdell, R. (1980). Who's who on the Trilateral Commission. In H. Sklar (Ed.), 
Trilateralism: the Trilateral Commission and elite planning for world management (pp. 90-130). Montré-
al: Black Rose Books. 
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A similar picture emerges in table 6.4. The table presents an overview of the mem-
bers of the entire Trilateral Commission between 1973 and 1980 that were in-
volved in the production of energy feedstocks, energy producers, energy-intensive 
industries, oil-related industries or energy policy specialists. Energy intensive 
industry typically comprises the production of basic-chemicals and metals. The  
American membership only included six members in this category with little con-
tinuity in membership. In comparison with the European (22), Japanese (18) and 
even Canadian (8) energy related memberships, American energy interests were 
poorly represented. Particularly striking is the multiple appearance (4) of Shell 
representatives. 
 In other words, the European and Japanese energy intensive or oil dependent 
industry made sure to be involved in the international study and lobby platforms 
of the industrialized world, whereas their American counterparts appeared to be 
less interested. One exception to this situation was oil giant Exxon Corporation, 
which was involved in the American membership since 1974. This did not mean 
that American industry was not interested in the Trilateral Commission. Particu-
larly companies from the emerging information-technology firms were represent-
ed: General Electric, Texas Instruments, Hewlett Packard, Honeywell and IBM.493 
 A lack of interest of American industry in the oil subject can be explained 
through the specific domestic context. Prices of domestically drilled oil were 
placed under government control since 1972, guaranteeing continued access to 
cheap energy. Moreover, the Americans never developed a high realization of de-
pendence on OPEC oil as in contrast to Western Europe or Japan, the United States 
had large amounts of energy resources at their disposal on their own territory.494 
  
                                                                  
493 The representatives from the American information-technology firms were John F. Burlingame 
(General Electric Co., member from 1980 onwards), Patrick E. Haggerty (Texas Instruments, member 
between 1973-1975), David Packard (Hewlett Packard, member from 1973), Mark Shepherd Jr. 
(Chairman, Texas Instruments, member from 1977), Edson W. Spencer (President, Honeywell Inc., 
member from 1977). Moreover, several European directors of IBM were members. See Sklar & Everdell 
(1980). Who's who. 
494 Ghosh (1983). OPEC, pp. 149-187 
243 
Table 6.4: Overview of Energy/Oil Related Members of the Trilateral Commission 1973-1980. 495 
Country Name 1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Company Energy/Oil relation 
Belgium Janssen, Daniel E. x x x x x x x x Union Chimique Belge Petrochem. 
Belgium Lambert, Leon J.G. x x x x x x x x Group Bruxelles Lambert Multiple, Utilities 
Belgium Rey, Jean x x x x x x x x Sofina Utilities 
Canada Bonner, Robert W. x x x x x x x x British Columbia Hydro Company Utilities 
Canada Pepin, Jean-Luc x x x  Westinghouse Can., Power Corp. 
Can. 
Utilities, Nucl. Energy 
Canada Murray, J. R. x    Hudson's Bay Oil & Gas. Co. Oil, Gas prod. 
Canada Nielsen, Arne R.  x   Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. Oil prod. 
Canada Strong, Maurice F.    x x Petro-Canada Oil prod. 
Canada Harvie, Donald S.     x x x Petro-Canada Oil prod. 
Canada Macdonald, Donald 
S. 
    x x x Shell Can. Ltd., Dupont Can. Ltd. Oil prod., Petrochem. 
Canada Mckeough, Darcy     x Union Gas Ltd. Gas prod. 
France Delouvrier, Paul x x x x x x x x Electricité de France Utilities, Nucl. energy 
France Marjolin, Robert x x x x x x x x Royal Dutch Shell France Oil prod., Petrochem. 
France Martin, Roger  x x x x x x x Saint-Gobain Petrochem.-Glass-Nucl. 
France Bonety, Rene  x x x x Electricité de France Utilities, Nucl. energy 
France Jouven, Pierre  x x  Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann Co. Petrochem. 
France Boiteux, Marcel     x x Electricité de France Utilities, Nucl. Energy 
Germany Birrenbach, Kurt x x x x x x x x August Thyssen Hütte Metal prod. 
Germany Sohl, Hans-Günther x x x x x x x x August Thyssen Hütte Metal prod. 
Italy Agnelli, Giovanni x x x x x x x x Fiat Automotive 
Italy Colombo, Umberto x x x x x x x x Montedison, Nat. Comm. for Nucl. 
En. 
Petrochem., Utilities 
Italy Colonna di Paliano, 
G. 
x x x x x x x x Fiat, Solvay, CGE, Exxon Multiple 
Japan Ashihara, Yoshishi-
ge 
x x x x x x x x Kansai Electric Power Co. Utilities 
Japan Fujino, Chujiro x x x x x x x x Mitsubishi Corp. Multiple 
Japan Hasegawa, Norishi-
ge 
x x x x x x x x Nippon Alum., Sumitomo Chem. 
Co. 
Metal prod., Petrochem. 
Japan Inayama, Yoshihiro x x x x x x x x Nippon Steel Corp. Metal prod. 
Japan Kawamata, Katsuji x x x x x x x x Nissan Motor Co. Automotive 
Japan Kobayashi, Koji x x x x x x x x Nippon Electric Co. Utilities 
                                                                  
495 The column “Energy/Oil relations” contains the category “multiple”, typically including conglomerate 
corporations. This indicates that the company was involved in most or even all of the other mentioned 
industrial categories. The term “multiple” also covers corporate advisors or directors that were affiliat-
ed with multiple energy or energy-intensive industries. Sklar, H., & Everdell, R. (1980). Who's who on 
the Trilateral Commission. In H. Sklar (Ed.), Trilateralism: the Trilateral Commission and elite planning 
for world management (pp. 90-130). Montréal: Black Rose Books. 
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Country Name 1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Company Energy/Oil relation 
Japan Kono, Fumihiko x x x x x x x x Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Multiple 
Japan Ohjima, Yoshihisa x x x x x x x x Arabian Oil Co. Ltd. Oil prod. 
Japan Toyoda, Eiji x x x x x x x x Toyota Motor Company Automotive 
Japan Hotta, Shozo x x x x x x Sumitomo Bank Multiple 
Japan Komai, Kenichiro x x x x x x Hitachi Ltd. Multiple 
Japan Kikawada, Kazutaka x x x x Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. Utilities, Nucl. energy 
Japan Kondo, Shinichi x x x x Mitsubishi Corp. Multiple 
Japan Miyazawa, Kiichi x x   x x x Nippon Steel Corp. Metal prod. 
Japan Hyuga, Hosai     x x x x Sumitomo Metal Ind. Ltd. Metal prod. 
Japan Shibusawa, Masa-
hide 
    x x x Sumitomo Corp. Multiple 
Japan Oshima, Keichi     x x Tokyo University, Nucl. Engineer-
ing 
Nuclear energy 
Japan Yoshiyama, Hi-
rokichi 
    x x Hitachi Ltd. Multiple 
Neth. Loudon, John x x x  Royal Dutch Shell Oil prod., Petrochem. 
Neth. Fibbe, Karel     x x x Overzeese Gas en Electriciteits-
bedrijf 
Utilities 
U.K. McFadzean, Frank  x x x Shell Transport and Trading Co. Oil prod., Petrochem. 
U.K. Grierson, Ronald     x x x x General Electric Co. Nuclear energy 
U.K. Littman, Mark     x x x x British Steel Corp. Metal prod. 
U.K. Shackleton, (Lord)     x x x x Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Metal prod., Uranium 
U.K. Smith, J. H.      x x x British Gas Corp. Gas prod. 
U.K. Turner, Mark     x x Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Metal prod., Uranium 
U.S.A. Anderson, John B. x x x x x x x x Joint Committee Atomic Energy Nuclear energy 
U.S.A. Wilson, Carroll L. x x x x x x x x Alfred Sloan School: Alt.Energy 
Strat. 
Policy Research 
U.S.A. Jamieson, J. K.  x x x Exxon Corp. Oil prod., Petrochem. 
U.S.A. Sawhill, John C.     x x x Aspen Inst. Comm. On Energy Policy Research 
U.S.A. Caldwell, Philip     x x Ford Motor Company Automotive 
U.S.A. Schaetzel, J. Robert     x x Cummins Engine Inc. Automotive 
U.S.A. Burlingame, John F.          x General Electric Nuclear energy 
 
This imbalance between regional energy interests in the Trilateral Commission 
provides a frame for interpreting the different positions that were taken in the 
debates that will be presented below. 
The energy debates 
The Trilateral Commission's debates on the oil crisis and its effects took place in 
two main phases, from 1973 to 1975 and from 1977 to 1979. In both phases a 
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different assessment was made of the oil and energy crisis. During the first period 
the Commission's discussions were characterized by three different yet entangled 
subjects that came together in one main argument on how to approach the OPEC 
members. Initially the Trilateral Commission worked on formulating a collective 
American, European and Japanese approach towards a reduction of dependence on 
OPEC oil. Secondly, these questions quickly became inseparable from the Trilateral 
Commission's concern with regard to the projected long-term financial effects of 
the accumulation of surplus foreign capital in OPEC countries. Thirdly, proposed 
strategies to deal with the financial effects of the oil crisis were entangled with the 
question on how to integrate the oil-exporting countries in international institu-
tions. Fourthly, all these questions were ultimately connected to a controversy 
about the attitude that should be taken towards the oil exporting countries. Be-
tween 1977-1979 little innovation was introduced in the consideration of these 
problems. Instead the debate was supplemented with an entirely different dimen-
sion of the international energy supply balance, namely the combination of the 
United States’ nuclear proliferation policy and oil policy that were damaging the 
European and Japanese energy positions.  
 On all these subjects, as will become clear, the Trilateral Commission tried to 
achieve a consensus among the different sections of how the several dimensions of 
energy supply should be approached. Participating multinationals were implicitly 
involved in the attempt to build consensus. In the following the extent and nature 
of this involvement will be explained.  
 In the beginning of the Trilateral Commission's work in 1973 however it ini-
tially appeared to be very difficult to start any discussions on the energy subject at 
all. Even within the Trilateral Commission in which like-minded members had 
committed themselves to improving the conditions for cooperation among their 
governments, the international distrust of late 1973 had a paralysing effect. When 
in October and November 1973 tensions escalated between Western Europe, Japan 
and the United States, the American membership felt that the Trilateral Commis-
sion had to act. However, during the first Executive Committee meeting in October 
1973 the European and Japanese sections denounced the idea of an internationally 
conceived lobby towards their governments. Instead they wanted the Trilateral 
Commission to operate as a study organization in the service of mutual under-
standing and long-term education on international cooperation.496 
  In December 1973 the American members grew restless about these attitudes. 
In the course of November, the oil crisis had shown its potential risk for undermin-
ing all prospects for cooperation within the industrialized world, the primary pur-
pose of the Trilateral Commission. At that time, the OPEC oil embargo to the United 
States and the Netherlands was activated and prices had surged. The North Ameri-
                                                                  
496 See Chapter 2. Rockefeller Archive Center, The Trilateral Commission (North America) Records 
(hereafter RAC, Trilateral Commission), box 2, folder 23, 8-12-1973, Planning Committee meeting 
[American section RG].  
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can Chairman Gerard Smith proposed to the European and Japanese sections to 
issue a joint statement that urged their governments to start consulting each other 
on “common arrangements on energy to prevent the economic collapse of any of 
the countries in our regions.” To the frustration of the American members, the 
European and Japanese Executive Committee members declined the proposal. In a 
meeting of the Trilateral Commission's chairmen, Gerard Smith (North America), 
Max Kohnstamm (the European Community), and the banker Takeshi Watanabe 
(Japan) in December 1973, it became clear that not even a statement that urged 
governments to refrain from taking unilateral action was an option. Watanabe 
explained that in Japan such a statement would be considered “an attempt to im-
pose American policy on them.” Kohnstamm repeated the approach of long-term 
education on international cooperation instead of statements. A further proposal 
by Brzezinsky to devote a special conference to the energy problem was also re-
jected. In other words, the Japanese and European Trilateral Commission members 
wanted to stay out of their government's ways. As a result, the Trilateral Commis-
sion had nothing to contribute.497 
 However, parallel to these fruitless efforts, the chairmen did initialize two 
studies that laid a basis for discussion on the energy situation between the sections. 
The first report, Energy: The Imperative for a Trilateral Approach focussed on the 
immediate necessary action, and the second report, Energy: a strategy for interna-
tional action focussed on long-term strategy. They primarily functioned as an ad-
vice to the Executive Committee. They were designed as an overview of the evolu-
tion of the oil crisis and proposed courses of action for the industrialized world. 
The two resulting reports were written by a group of experts: the American John C. 
Campbell, a research fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, the French Guy 
de Carmoy, a professor at the European Institute of Business Administration (IN-
SEAD), and Shinichi Kondo a former ambassador to Canada and advisor to the 
Japanese conglomerate Mitsubishi.498 
 Despite the different setup of the studies the recommendations were very 
similar. Fundamentally both argued for a American-European-Japanese approach 
with shared policies in order to take away any further upward pressures on the oil 
price: collective energy-use-reduction, collective increases in energy-efficiency, 
coordinated policies to maximize their bargaining power with OPEC countries, a 
                                                                  
497 RAC, Trilateral Commission, box 2, folder 23, 8-12-1973, Planning Committee meeting [American 
section RG], Annex; box 3, folder 32, 16/20 December 1973, The Trilateral Commission meeting of 
Chairmen. 
498 Campbell, J. C., Carmoy, G. de, & Kondo, S. (1974). Energy: the imperative for a trilateral approach: a 
report of the trilateral task force on the political and international implications of the energy crisis to the 
executive committee of the Trilateral Commission, Brussels, June 23-25, 1974 (Vol. 5). New York: The 
Trilateral Commission; Campbell, J. C., Carmoy, G. de, & Kondo, S. (1974). Energy: a strategy for interna-
tional action: a report of the trilateral task force on the political and international implications of the 
energy crisis to the executive committee of The Trilateral Commission, Washington, D.C., December 8-10, 
1974 (Vol. 6). New York: The Trilateral Commission. 
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comprehensive oil-sharing plan for new supply crises and the sharing of technolo-
gy and research & development aimed at unlocking new energy resources. The 
root of the problem, the dependence of Western Europe and Japan on Middle East-
ern oil, was also acknowledged. These measures were hardly controversial and 
could be easily backed by the different sections of the Trilateral Commission, 
which they did. After the Executive Committee meeting in June 1974, the Trilateral 
Commission finally was able to issue a collective statement on a trilateral approach 
to the global energy problem. One sensitive subject which had featured prominent-
ly in the reports however was left out: economic cooperation with the OPEC coun-
tries and the required cooperative attitude towards them in solving the long term 
issues of oil trade.499 The next section will discuss this sensitive issue in more de-
tail. 
Economic cooperation with OPEC, 1974 
The advisory reports to the Executive Committee of 1974 were very outspoken on 
what the oil consuming countries ought to do in response to the actions of OPEC. 
Instead of advising assertive action as major oil companies had indicated during 
the Bilderberg meeting in the Spring of 1973, the Trilateral Commission reports 
asked for a cooperative attitude and investments in OPEC countries. The logic 
underlying this response was a financial one. The quadrupling of oil prices in the 
last months of 1973 had started a flow of billions of extra dollars into OPEC hands. 
This resulted in large deficits in the balances of payments of Western Europe and 
Japan. The outflow of oil dollars could not be kept up indefinitely, nor could the 
OPEC countries endlessly accumulate dollars. To balance financial flows, or in 
other words, to pay the oil bill, the reports stressed the requirement of exports to 
the OPEC countries. Moreover, because the overall small sized OPEC economies 
had limited import requirements, the reports also stressed the responsibility of the 
industrialized world to aid in diversifying the OPEC economies, particularly by 
assisting in establishing basic industries within their borders. The reports particu-
larly stressed the inevitability of the building of refineries and petrochemical 
plants in OPEC countries, close to the basic resource of petroleum. This way the 
OPEC countries' import capacity would grow, enabling a more balanced structure 
of international financial relations. Even though such exports in the form of capital 
goods and industrial knowledge would create competition for particularly Western 
European and Japanese oil-based industries, the authors of the reports deemed it 
                                                                  
499 Campbell, Carmoy, Kondo (1974). Energy: the imperative, pp. 8-9, Campbell, Carmoy, & Kondo 
(1974). Energy: a strategy, pp. 34, 40-42. Trilateral Commission (1974). Trialogue. 5th Issue. New York: 
Trilateral Commission, pp. 6-8. 
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necessary in the service of the functioning of the international financial struc-
ture.500 
 As mentioned these reports principally played an advisory role. Nevertheless 
these views were also held by financial and industrial members of the Executive 
Committee. When the first report was discussed during the Executive Committee 
meeting in June 1974, David Rockefeller expressed a strong preference for cooper-
ation with the OPEC countries. He viewed the energy crisis as an opportunity to 
realize a new international cooperative structure that had crumbled during the 
past four years. To him the “cement” for post-war unity had been the collective 
stance against Soviet expansion, but now that relations with Soviet Russia were 
normalizing, the “energy crisis [...] could provide this kind of unifying force.” In 
Rockefeller's view the crisis played the role of obstacle that could only be over-
come by acting in unison. The Japanese members, government advisors in this 
particular case, took a more cautious view and merely expressed their interest in 
creating the conditions under which cooperation could develop. They were taking 
care not to force anything upon the OPEC countries that might make them less 
willing to be lenient in on-going negotiations. On the European side, the Dutch 
chairman of the Shell supervisory board, John Loudon, explained that cooperation 
with the Arab countries was inevitable: “OPEC countries will demand refining, 
petrochemical industry and other manufacturing and [...] they will get it”, he stated, 
adding that it was important to help in these “natural aspirations.” Now that Shell 
had lost its oil field assets in OPEC countries, the corporation could alternatively 
expand its sizeable petrochemical branch near the sources of oil. Kurt Birrenbach, 
a German member of parliament and a director of steel producer Thyssen, referred 
to a different aspect of cooperation with the OPEC countries. According to him 
their economies could impossibly absorb the enormous funds that they were ac-
cumulating. Only by means of foreign direct investments or by importing capital 
goods to build an industrial base and infrastructure could the funds be put to use, 
he explained. In other words, cooperation with the OPEC countries was a result of 
financial, nearly technical necessity.501 
 In October 1974 the chairmen of the Trilateral Commission actively pursued a 
practical method to provide a solution for these imbalances. They requested Leh-
man Brothers Kuhn Loeb investment banker and former Under Secretary of State 
George Ball to take part in their plan. Ball had recently presented a scheme for a 
Bank for Fund Recycling which he, despite his membership of the Trilateral Com-
mission, had developed independently. The proposed bank was intended to acti-
vate OPEC capital. Under equally shared control of oil-consuming and producing 
countries the bank would borrow capital from OPEC countries and lend it to oil 
                                                                  
500 Campbell, Carmoy, & Kondo (1974). Energy: the imperative, pp. 25-26; Campbell, Carmoy, & Kondo 
(1974). Energy: a strategy, pp. 31-34.  
501 RAC, Trilateral Commission, box 4, folder 44, 23/24-06-1974, Executive Committee Meeting, Brus-
sels, Discussion on Energy, pp. 3-6 
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consumer countries that were facing problems in their payments balances. The 
OPEC countries would receive income over these possibly “perpetual” loans in the 
form of interest. Ball felt that this way the oil consuming countries would maximize 
the OPEC countries' willingness to invest their funds in the trilateral regions in-
stead of elsewhere. The chairmen asked him present his proposal at the next Exec-
utive Committee meeting, flanked by carefully prepared co-sponsor statements 
elsewhere in the world and important invitees to lend an aura of significance to the 
plan. The plan was further prepared through consultation with the Japanese and 
European Executive Committee members in view of publishing a joint resolution. 
Important French and Japanese members, Paul Delouvrier, chairman of Electricité 
de France and Takeshi Watanabe from the Bank of Tokyo indicated the need for an 
extremely careful approach in proposing such a bank. According to both the reso-
lution should in no way suggest already thought-out goals or mechanisms so that 
OPEC governments could be given the chance to formulate their own preferences. 
The Western European and Japanese members were afraid to trigger anything that 
might cause further price increases or damage an atmosphere of cooperation. Thus 
adapted, the resolution was agreed upon and published.502 
 The most remarkable aspect of these and other Trilateral Commission reports 
was their consistent, implicit criticism of United States foreign policy. From Octo-
ber 1973 onwards, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had tried to build a coalition 
of oil consuming countries in a collective stand against rising oil prices. This con-
frontationist approach had been resisted strongly by the Japanese and French 
governments respectively, who, based on their dependency on oil from the Middle 
East stressed cooperative strategies and dialogue. The Trilateral Commission col-
lectively and openly adopted this critical approach and under David Rockefeller's 
guidance actively approached the American Secretary of State with their different 
assessment. Rockefeller personally organized a dinner-meeting between the Exec-
utive Committee and Henry Kissinger on the 9th of December 1974 for a discus-
sion. To make absolutely clear to the outside world what message they wanted to 
convey to the Secretary of State, the Trilateral Commission organized speeches on 
the preceding day: the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Nubohiko Ushiba, 
Electricité de France chairman Paul Delouvrier, and investment banker George Ball, 
openly opposed the United States strategy of forcing OPEC to lower prices. After 
the meeting, Rockefeller explained in his thank-you-note to Kissinger, that the 
meeting had “clearly eased some of the worries they had had on the question of 
                                                                  
502 RAC, Trilateral Commission, box 6, folder 68, 8-12-1974, The Hon. George Ball, former Under Secre-
tary of State of the United States. Energy and Middle East Crises. Trilateral Commission meeting held in 
Washington, pp. 1-24; 19-11-1974, Memorandum, George Franklin to Dr. Brzezinsky; 11,-8-1974, 
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cooperation versus confrontation with the OPEC countries”, particularly for the 
European and Japanese members.503  
 These views on cooperation with the OPEC countries were supplemented with 
the conviction that they should be integrated in international institutions and sub-
sequently take responsibility for their new-found role in the international econo-
my. These ideas were advised to the Executive Committee in two reports by the 
American Richard Gardner, professor of Law at Columbia University, Saburo Okita, 
the chairman of the Japan Economic Research Center, and the Dutch Berend Udink, 
former Minister of Development Aid and Transport and at that time managing 
director of the construction and energy holding OGEM. The writing process of 
these reports was, unlike the energy reports, however hardly rooted in advice from 
business circles. Instead circles involved in aid and development were consult-
ed.504 
 The reports were titled A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations, 
published in 1974, and OPEC, the Trilateral World and the Developing Countries: 
New Arrangements for Cooperation, 1976-1980, published in 1975. Both more spe-
cifically featured the question on how to involve OPEC countries in a shared re-
sponsibility for the plight of the developing countries which due to higher oil pric-
es and subsequent inflation in the West had been hit the hardest by the combina-
tion of a monetary and oil crisis. The Executive Committee accepted the proposals 
of the reports: they advised a restructuring of the international institutions by 
increasing OPEC members' voting rights in the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. Moreover, a plan was presented to invite OPEC countries to share 
in the cost of a development fund for developing countries.505  
 The logic that underlay the Trilateral Commission's views with regard to the 
energy crisis was the necessity of stability and the realization that economic con-
flict with global repercussions was unacceptable. Its leaders were convinced of the 
need for absorbing the new political-economic reality instead of opposing it and 
incorporating the financial imbalances that had occurred in the global capital flows, 
by including the OPEC countries in the international financial framework instead of 
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keeping them at arms length. Keeping in mind ELEC's reservations against aiding 
the development of the OPEC economies out of fear for creating competition for 
the European market, or the American Foreign Policy reservations against cooper-
ation with OPEC countries, it becomes clear that in the Trilateral Commission there 
was no room for regional preferences. The Trilateral Commission employed a 
perspective that presupposed cooperation, burden sharing, the possibility of a 
global economic architecture in which the greater good ignored local specificities.  
Criticizing American energy policy 
In the next years the Trilateral Commission's treatment of the energy theme be-
came characterized by strong European and Japanese criticism of American policy 
on the two subjects of price controls on oil and nuclear proliferation policy. The 
debates were less informed by a world view that characterized the Trilateral 
Commission as a whole. Instead the debates mainly became an expression of criti-
cisms on the inability of the United States, Western Europe and Japan to coordinate 
and facilitate each other’s strategies.  
 The debates on energy and oil were temporarily replaced by other subjects 
after 1975, but the theme re-emerged in 1977 under entirely different circum-
stances. The reason for this was a sudden policy shift from the United States with 
regard to international nuclear non-proliferation. The shift was caused by an 
American reassessment of the advances in nuclear enrichment technology. In 
Western Europe and Japan, the oil crisis of 1973 had resulted in an increasing 
commitment to nuclear energy. Especially France, Germany and Japan had engaged 
in comprehensive national public-private nuclear projects. Moreover, in Europe 
commercial parties were developing stakes in enrichment technologies. British, 
Dutch and German companies participated in the ultra-centrifuge enrichment 
company Urenco, and French, Belgian, Italian and Swedish firms participated in 
Eurodif. By 1975 both companies had begun selling entire nuclear fuel cycles in the 
form of process machinery. These sales were made within the rules of existing 
non-proliferation treaties. However, the international policy-landscape on prolif-
eration shifted. To the surprise of the United States government India tested a 
nuclear bomb in 1974, pointing out the failure of non-proliferation policies. Shortly 
afterwards the American government began to openly question the commercial 
exports of nuclear enrichment technologies and nuclear reprocessing technology. 
This change in policy was motivated by the fact that these exports potentially gave 
access to limited amounts of weapons grade plutonium.506 
 In 1975 American pressure forced non-proliferation treaty members to accept 
stricter rules on the export of enrichment technology. Two years later, in April 
1977, President Carter decided that the reprocessing of spent uranium for residual 
plutonium was no longer acceptable. This particularly angered the American allies. 
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The national nuclear projects in France, Germany and Japan now lost the prospect 
of further commercialization of their efforts in research & development. Moreover, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan were all aiming at increasing the 
efficiency of their respective national fuel cycles by using reprocessing technology 
to acquire residual plutonium from spent uranium as recycled fuel. However, in the 
eyes of the United States' non-proliferation efforts, a commercialization of such 
reactors and facilities was unacceptable.507 
 The new stance of the Carter administration on reprocessing technology 
caused intense discussion at the Trilateral Commission plenary meeting of October 
1977, in Bonn, and of June 1978, in Washington. One of the speakers at the meeting 
in Bonn was Gerard Smith, former chairman of the Trilateral Commission Ameri-
can section, but now US Ambassador at-Large for Non-Proliferation Matters. He 
was recruited by Jimmy Carter himself who until his election as President had been 
a member of the Trilateral Commission. Another speaker at the meeting was Zbig-
niew Brzezinsky, the former Trilateral Commission director and now National 
Security Advisor to President Carter. According to Smith, non-proliferation now 
took precedence over energy matters. Brzezinsky, whose ideas on international 
economic interdependence formed an important basic concept that lay at the basis 
of the Trilateral Commission, now stressed how nuclear proliferation was an ex-
pression of political interdependence which required a joint approach. What had 
moved the secretaries and chairmen of the Trilateral Commission to arrange these 
speeches and subsequent discussions was to “get our grip on the issues involved, 
and find constructive and cooperative ways to proceed.”508 
 Nonetheless, the remarks made by Smith and Brzezinsky were difficult to 
accept for Kinya Niizeki, Commissioner of Japan's Atomic Energy Commission. Ac-
cording to him Japan required reprocessing technologies to make their nuclear fuel 
cycle more efficient. Since they depended on other nations for their uranium, this 
was of capital importance. Another speaker, André Giraud the leader of the French 
atomic program and director of the French Atomic Energy Commission thought it 
unacceptable that negotiations were taking place under pressure from the United 
States. According to him vital European interests were at stake in relation to the 
European energy supply and energy dependence. Both Niizeki and Giraud were 
central figures in their national public-private endeavours into nuclear energy and 
both represented the interests of their respective states, the nuclear industry and 
energy dependent industries. The intense debate that followed was dominated by 
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critical European and Japanese members who demanded a predictable playing 
field in which they could develop their own ambitions.509 
 This criticism directed at the United States continued during the plenary 
meeting in June 1978 in Washington. A new report, Energy: Managing the Transi-
tion, centred around an evaluation of the achievements of American, European and 
Japanese energy policies since the oil crisis. What again emerged from the discus-
sion was a frustration about the lack of cooperation that the industrialized nations 
had been able to achieve. The criticism was particularly directed at the new status 
of the United States as the largest global importer of oil, thereby causing extra 
pressure on international oil prices. Up until 1973 the United States were only 
minimally dependent on imported oil. The reason for this turnaround lay in the 
price-control measures that were initiated in 1972 for all oil produced from do-
mestic oil wells. The immediate result was a decline in oil production from those 
wells. In order to maintain the level of their profits, oil companies became more 
keen on delivering oil to the United States from wells outside the country. The 
report asked the US to cancel the local price controls, which was expected to lead 
to more domestic supply, thus decreasing the pressures on international oil prices. 
The debate on the report made clear that many participants criticized United 
States policy, asking for a long-term policy orientation instead of the out-dated 
short-term energy crisis based orientation.510 
 What do these debates on energy security in the Trilateral Commission teach 
us about the views of European multinationals on the European market? As be-
came clear, participation in the Trilateral Commission represented the acknowl-
edgement of a need for global and international stability. Members believed that 
disparities in decision-making between the major industrialized areas of the world 
would result in undesirable upheaval and instability, negatively affecting their 
operations. Seen from this angle, the European market was viewed as deeply inte-
grated with and affected by global economic relations. Moreover, they embraced 
the idea that the political-economic governance of the European market should be 
geared towards a maximum degree of international stability. However, this basic 
attitude did not mean that the different industrial regions and their business rep-
resentatives by default agreed on how to organize the global economy, or on which 
interests took precedence over others. On the contrary: similar to the Bilderberg 
meetings the ingrained model of discussion, debate and disagreement points in the 
direction of an organization in which learning about each others different stand-
points was the main function.  
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Conclusion 
During the 1970s the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission 
all had their own way of dealing with the global challenges that were posed to their 
members from business. The ELEC went from an agenda for a European economic 
union in the 1950s, finally to a more interventionist agenda for Community policies 
for industry and for international representation by the Community to safeguard 
European corporate interests on foreign territory. The Bilderberg meetings, by 
contrast, forced by the deteriorating Transatlantic relations of the 1970s, returned 
to the original purpose for which they had been founded: namely of enabling mu-
tual understanding between the different US and European memberships. The 
Trilateral Commission introduced a new agenda altogether. Concerned as its 
founders were about the deteriorating consensus that had characterised the post-
war liberal economic order, the Trilateral Commission tried to propose new angles 
for a new consensus. Its basic assumption was that a global economic architecture 
belonged to the realm of possibilities and was fundamentally important for the 
prevention of economic conflict with global repercussions. 
 The views of European multinationals on the European market changed dur-
ing the 1970s. The tendency of the 1960s to resolve international economic dispar-
ities between regions via the equalization of playing fields was replaced by a policy 
of paying attention to the possible roles of the European Commission and the 
Community member states to support their sectors. In the ELEC the energy indus-
tries requested stimulation of coal mining, oil-exploration and aid in the comple-
tion of a European nuclear fuel cycle in order to reduce the Communities' depend-
ency on oil. Also in the ELEC the automotive and chemicals sectors asked support 
for research and development in industries that were experiencing strong interna-
tional competition. Moreover, to improve the competitiveness of European indus-
try as a whole, business leaders requested from the European Community to or-
ganise workable relations between employers and unions to enable a restructuring 
process of European industry. Whereas European corporations had tried to avoid 
interventionist Community institutions during the 1950s, by the 1970s they obvi-
ously had changed their minds. 
 Moreover, a significant group of multinationals asked for international repre-
sentation by the Community. Oil firms wanted the Community to take a position in 
upholding commercial law also outside the Community. They found themselves 
confronted with hostile nationalizations of their assets. The European chemical 
sector demanded active involvement by the Community in developmental ques-
tions regarding the Middle East. The prospect of industrializing OPEC countries to 
balance their import capacity with their export capacity worried them because it 
could result in strong competition. Engineering firms involved in nuclear reactor 
and nuclear enrichment technology demanded that the Community would take a 
role in the negotiation of treaties that negatively affected European firms.  
255 
A final occurrence of changing views could also be identified both in the Bilderberg 
meetings and the Trilateral Commission. In the Bilderberg meetings, oil firms re-
quested consultation between the largest industrialized areas of the world. In fact, 
this was the basic rationale behind the Trilateral Commission. In that view the 
European market was perceived as a part of a global interdependent economy in 
which the European Community should play a role in developing international 
policies together with the other major industrialized regions. 
 An explanation for these changed views firstly lies in changed circumstances. 
The monetary crisis that escalated in 1971 marked the end of a historic economic 
boom that began in the 1950s. The economic decline of the 1970s was aggravated 
by rising oil prices which particularly affected energy intensive industries. Moreo-
ver the on-going competition by American corporations on the European market 
was joined by increasing exports from Japan.  
 The changed views can moreover be explained by the on-going cumbersome 
adaptation process of European industry to international competition already 
discussed in chapter 5. The crisis intensified the need for more flexibility of Euro-
pean industry to allow companies to restructure their operations by making use of 
the opportunities offered by the size of the European market. By transnational 
mergers and relocation of production greater efficiency and competitiveness could 
be achieved. In addition to the differences between national tax laws and company 
laws, according to European industry a further threshold to such a restructuring 
process was the resistance of trade unions. 
 The present chapter again confirms that European corporations did not self-
evidently agree on how the European market should be organized. Looking more 
closely at how these differences in views were structured, it becomes clear that the 
national perspective that dominated ideas on the European market in the 1950s, 
disappeared almost during the 1970s. Sectoral motives began to inform European 
industrial views instead. Within the energy sector, oil companies, coal miners and 
nuclear energy producers took position depending on their key business and in 
relation to their specific challenges of their sector within the Community. The oil 
companies stood out in this regard. The international nature of their sector result-
ed in two striking preferences that differed from other sectors. Firstly they pre-
ferred a strengthened role for the European Community in consultation with the 
governments of the main industrial regions of the world, the United States and 
Japan. At the same time they rejected supranationally organized policies or a su-
pranationally organized market for energy. They instead preferred a European 
coordination of policies by means of harmonization of national policies. This para-
dox of an internationalized sector preferring harmonization of national policies 
instead of supranational arrangements may be explained by the oil companies' 
main interests in foreign relations of the European Community since they were 
being confronted, as we have seen, with the hostile appropriation of their assets by 
OPEC countries. 
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The European chemical and automotive sectors similarly departed from their spe-
cific sectoral contexts. In contrast with the oil corporations, these sectors however 
did favour a supranational approach with regard to industrial policy. The reason 
for demanding Community action however was the same as with the major oil 
firms. International competition within their sectors required adaptation on a 
sectoral level. 
 One exception to the dominance of the sectoral context can be noted in the 
case of French nuclear energy interests. Electricité de France (EdF), the state 
owned French utility corporation gave more weight to the context of the national 
nuclear industry. This can be explained by the fact that EdF was a state owned 
corporation that represented the main investments in French nuclear power plants 
as part of the French government's nuclear ambitions. The French nuclear project 
was a national endeavour in which national motives informed a strategy to Euro-
peanize the French nuclear fuel cycle.  
 How do the insights provided in this chapter relate to the historiography dis-
cussed in chapter 1? During the 1970s political scientists with a focus on European 
integration such as Feld, Häckel and Axt were interested in the role of multination-
als in the dynamics of the integration process. They all defended the view that 
European economic integration could only succeed if multinationals would realize 
a transnationalization of European capital and economies. They considered trans-
national mergers and less intensive forms of transnational collaboration between 
European firms as the key route to turning national economies into a European 
market. They also concluded that this was not taking place. Multinationals were 
investing outside the Community and national governments were obstructing 
mergers and collaboration. European companies were willing to organize mergers 
and collaboration, but European national governments were not prepared to think 
of the European market in European terms, these political scientists argued. The 
results from this chapter and the previous chapter largely confirm the basic insight 
of barriers to European corporate transnational collaboration. However, the au-
thors were mainly interested in how transnational collaboration could contribute 
to political integration. In contrast, chapter 5 and 6 show the extent to which Eu-
ropean multinationals wanted political assistance in maintaining a viable Europe-
an industrial apparatus. According to firms, corporate transnational collaboration 
was a practical necessity instead of a prerequisite for European integration.511 
 This chapter also provides important insights into the historical background 
that induced the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERTI) to support the Sin-
gle European Act in 1986, the European treaty that provided the basis for complet-
                                                                  
511 Feld, W. J. (1970). Transnational business collaboration among common market countries. Its implica-
tion for political integration. New York: Praeger; Häckel, E. (1975). Multinationale Konzerne und Euro-
päische integration. Bonn: Europa-Union Verlag; Axt, H.-J. (1978). Staat, multinationale Konzerne und 
politische Union in Westeuropa: ein Beitrag zur Staatstheorie und Analyse regionaler Integration. Köln: 
Pahl-Rugenstein. 
257 
ing the single market by 1992. Both Sandholtz & Zysman and Cowles argued how 
international competition since the late 1970s forced European developers of 
telecommunications and chips technologies to demand a European single market. 
As these scholars explained, the large European market in fact still was a collection 
of smaller markets as a result of non-tariff discrimination. The corporations re-
quired larger sales and a rationalized company structure. The Single market would 
remove national protectionism and strip national governments of their vetoes on 
market-related directives. Chapters 5 and 6 enrich these insights. A continuity 
between the experiences of industrial corporations represented in the European 
League for Economic Cooperation and the ERTI emerges. Already since the mid-
1960s European businesses were aiming at transnational mergers and joint ven-
tures in response to American competition. To facilitate such cross-border under-
takings they demanded a response from national governments on harmonization 
of European company laws and on ending the phenomenon of double taxation. 
During the 1970s no progress was made while the circumstances continued to 
worsen as a result Japanese competition, rising oil prices and an economic crisis. In 
addition to the still existing legal and tax barriers to transnational mergers, multi-
nationals in chemicals and automotive industries identified Community-wide frus-
trated relations between industry and the unions. Attempts at adapting the Euro-
pean industrial structure to the new challenges were being blocked. It is argued 
here that the root cause for the ERTI's support regarding the Single European Act 
in 1986 stemmed from the longstanding need for industrial restructuring on a 
European level. Their support for the Single European Act was the result of a defi-
ciency of the Common Market that had caused problems for European industries 
since its inception in 1957: the barriers to a transnational rationalization and 
amalgamation of European company structures.512 
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Chapter 7 
 
Changing views on a changing 
European market 
The first research question addressed in this volume is how views of European 
multinationals in the European market have changed between 1950 and 1980. It is 
answered by describing the dominant views that leaders of European companies 
put forward in the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. 
 During the 1950s most European multinationals were strong proponents of 
liberalization of the Western European market. In their view tariff walls, import 
quotas and other trade restrictions should be abolished in order to achieve an as 
large market as possible, preferably including the United Kingdom. Moreover a 
broad consensus took shape on the organization of the market. Multinationals 
opposed regulation by interventionist supranational institutions and rejected the 
idea of a multiplication of sectoral institutions. The companies felt that suprana-
tional institutions instead should guarantee the freedom of entrepreneurship and 
enforce conditions of competition. According to them freedom of entrepreneurship 
and competition were the main organizing principles of the European market. 
European multinationals were also persistent about the predictability of the im-
plementation of liberalization processes. Instead of ad-hoc determination of suc-
cessive steps, they wanted a predetermined and a well-defined time-schedule and 
roadmap for the removal of trade barriers. 
 In the 1960s most European multinationals continued to support and advo-
cate liberal European and Trans-Atlantic trade relations. New however was that 
European multinationals felt that the European Community should play a role in 
levelling international playing fields. They turned against what they saw as compe-
tition distorting measures within and outside the European Community that af-
fected their ability to compete internationally. For example, investment incentives 
for American companies by Community member states were mostly rejected, and 
attempts were undertaken to curb Eastern European dumping practices by start-
ing coordination efforts between the Western European and the East-bloc econom-
ic systems.  
 During the 1970s the views of the investigated multinationals changed with 
regard to the role of the European Community in the markets. The demand of in-
ternational level playing fields was replaced by requests for intervention. This was 
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expressed in two ways. Multinationals asked the Community to actively secure and 
defend the international interests of European industry outside the European 
market. Major oil firms for example wanted the Community to consult with other 
major industrialized areas in the world on concerted, international interventions 
in order to create stability in global trade relations. Engineering firms in nuclear 
technology also turned to the Community, asking to reopen negotiations on inter-
national treaties on non-proliferation where these harmed their interests. A fur-
ther expression of the new take on Community intervention was that European 
business requested an active industrial policy. Energy corporations for example 
were looking for a policy that would aid them in developing more energy sources. 
Chemical companies and carmakers asked for support in financing and coordinat-
ing industrial research. By supporting technological development, the internation-
al competitiveness of European multinationals could be maintained, the multina-
tionals argued (Table 7.1). 
 
Table 7.1: Schematic overview of changes in views on the European market among European multi-
nationals. 
Period Views of European multinationals on the European market
1950-1960 Enlargement of the European market, opposition to intervention.
1960-1970 Demand for international level playing fields, facilitation of transnational mergers. 
1970-1980 Intervention via international interest-representation on a European Community level and by means of a European industrial policy.  
 
How can these changes be explained? On the one hand the explanation lies in 
changes in international political and economic circumstances. On the other hand 
the answer can be found in the difficulties experienced by European multinationals 
in adapting to changes in the European market. 
Changing circumstances 
During the 1950s West European corporations adopted a new economic direction 
that was coherent with an American view on the development of international 
trade. In the first few years after WWII the United States government firmly 
shaped its future role as one of the two superpowers on the world stage. At the 
same time Western Europe entered a phase of economic reconstruction which in 
1947 reached a bottleneck. The main problem was a shortage of dollars which 
were badly needed for imports from the United States. The Marshall Plan provided 
the necessary import power, but in return the United States government used its 
leverage to manoeuvre Western Europe into a restructuring of its internal rela-
tions. The Americans applied pressure on European governments, demanding 
cooperation, integration of their national economies, and increased European 
productivity within the fragmented Western European markets. According to the 
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American government a large, liberalized European market would develop more 
balanced import and export relations with the American market. This was seen as 
the main underpinning of the in 1944 established multilateral Bretton Woods 
monetary system. The project of liberalization and European integration held the 
promise of large markets. European multinationals in the ELEC consistently sup-
ported these views. For the already large and widely distributed corporations 
larger markets provided circumstances in which they could centralize their organ-
izations in one headquarter. For smaller corporations larger markets were an 
opportunity for growing their scale which was becoming a necessity for withstand-
ing competition from large American firms. Moreover, in the Bilderberg meetings, 
American and European multinationals mutually affirmed their preference for 
increased access to each other's markets, further bringing about balanced ex-
changes in the new Western economic order. 
 The project of liberalization of the European market was undermined during 
the early 1960s though. The French government blocked further initiatives for 
liberalizing trade between the Common Market and the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation, established in 1960, and it blocked the accession of the United Kingdom to 
the Community. At the same time the conditions on the European market began to 
change. European multinationals were increasingly facing competition from out-
side Western Europe. The prospect of a European market without internal tariff 
barriers, but with a common external tariff wall, attracted large investments by 
major American companies. This resulted in strong competition for European 
corporations. In addition several European industries encountered competition 
from the East-bloc. Eastern European state trading companies started offering 
basic industrial products against dumping prices. These new circumstances fo-
cussed the attention of European multinationals on distorted competition and on 
strategies designed for neutralizing such international unbalances. In response to 
American investments for example, companies in the ELEC and the Bilderberg 
meetings proposed a code of conduct for American corporations to limit their 
aggressive competitive behaviour on the European market. In response to compe-
tition from the East-bloc, European corporations tried to develop a framework of 
agreements to enable joint ventures between Western European and Eastern Eu-
ropean companies. 
 Three related crises dominated the developments in the West during the 
1970s. In 1971 the post-war monetary system collapsed, which resulted in signifi-
cant instability in currency markets. The consequential changing terms of trade for 
OPEC countries caused them to increase oil prices, triggering a second crisis, which 
resulted in high inflation. The simultaneous stagnation of European productivity 
growth and the occurrence of overcapacity marked the end of the global economic 
boom that had taken place since the 1950s. It introduced the novelty of stagflation, 
which rigorously affected European economies. Moreover, the unilateral response 
to these events by the governments of the United States, France and the United 
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Kingdom resulted in a crisis in international, Western relations. The option of 
solving international problems on a multilateral basis was severely undermined. In 
the midst of this cocktail of instability and uncertainty European multinationals 
demanded from their governments to pursue international stability and to organ-
ize collective European representation of business interests in external markets. 
Moreover, as a result of diverging energy prices in the world, particularly the Eu-
ropean chemical industry warned for an international restructuring process 
whereby companies would move production capacity to regions with the cheapest 
sources of energy, such as the United States that artificially held down prices, or 
the Middle East, with an abundance of oil. However these developments were 
intimately connected with another process that began to take hold since the early 
1960s. 
Adaptation problems 
The views of multinationals on the European market were also shaped by adjust-
ment problems related to the changes of this very market. As explained, during the 
1950s several large European corporations were strong supporters of the removal 
of internal barriers to trade in order to create an as large as possible market for 
their goods. But for the earliest European multinationals, that had already devel-
oped before WWII, this perspective also created problems. During the protection-
ist interbellum Dutch and Belgian multinationals such as Philips, Unilever and Sol-
vay had expanded their firms outside their small home markets. They established 
subsidiaries in the Western European national markets, decentralizing production, 
marketing and research and development. To them the establishment of the Com-
mon Market represented an enlarged market in which companies could realize 
mass production at more centrally located and cost-efficient sites. The Common 
Market was an opportunity to recentralize.513 
 In the 1960s it became clear that the prospect of the Common Market attract-
ed investments of very large American industrial corporations. American corpora-
tions had achieved their position within a large American market and had grown to 
corresponding dimensions. European companies instead had developed in smaller, 
national home-markets. As a result their production units often were much smaller 
than those of the American companies that began investing in Europe. Moreover, 
unlike the European multinationals that had expanded internationally during the 
Interbellum, the American firms were not tied to already existing investments that 
first required restructuring and centralization before the scale advantages of the 
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Common Market could be reaped. To summarize, quite some European companies 
had remained relatively small and they were challenged by American firms in 
terms of sheer size. A small group of early European multinationals was held back 
by the path-dependency of their since long existing investments and they were 
challenged by American firms in terms of company structure. In order to at least 
approach the size of American companies European multinationals proposed har-
monization of national taxation systems to encourage transnational mergers.514 
  The need for adaptation only grew larger during the crises of the early 1970s. 
The combination of industrial overcapacity and growing wage demands was un-
tenable and further increased the need for restructuring the European companies. 
At the same time, international competition only increased, as a result of Japanese 
exports, for example. But the rigid conditions on the European labour market made 
restructuring an impossible task. Moreover, the requests for improved circum-
stances for transnational mergers still had not been met. Whereas the European 
multinationals had resisted interventionist governments and supranational insti-
tutions in the 1950s, they were now prepared to accept intervention to enable the 
necessary restructuring. European automotive and chemical multinationals for 
example demanded an active involvement of the European Community in arrang-
ing European industrial relations in order to achieve flexibility in relocating their 
production sites. In their view, unions were obstructing a restructuring process of 
European industry. An industrial policy was badly needed. 
 The European Commission was a powerless partner for European multina-
tionals though. It indeed presented proposals in line with the wishes of European 
multinationals, including a memorandum for a Community industrial policy by 
Commissioner Guido Colonna di Paliano. However, member states were unwilling 
to accept them. The de facto veto structure of Community decision-making that had 
emerged since the Luxembourg compromise in 1966, obstructed far reaching deci-
sions. Moreover, European multinationals appeared to gain little from cooperation 
with the European Commission in matters of international trade diplomacy with 
the United States and European countries outside the Community. The Commis-
sion merely represented a small group of countries in a large international playing 
field. The European Community was not in a position to commit to level playing 
fields in an early stage, because non-Member States could easily benefit from the 
possible self-restraint of the Community. In such cases, the European companies 
turned to the OECD, or even NATO, to devise arrangements with a wider represen-
tation of Western governments.515 
 In that process European multinationals found themselves trapped between 
international competition, a supranational system of governance that was unable 
to cater to their needs for restructuring, and an accumulation of crises during the 
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1970s. This unfortunate combination of affairs reached a peak in the early 1980s 
and will be discussed in more detail in the section on historiography. 
Explaining diverging views: national and sectoral contexts 
The dominant views among the investigated European multinationals described 
above conceal subtle differences. The second research question of this study is 
which differences existed among the views of multinationals and how they can be 
explained? Chapter 3 introduced an interpretative framework that proposed an 
explanation of those differences by considering the diverse national and sectoral 
contexts in which companies operated.516 
National views 
As was described above the 1950s were characterized by a broad consensus 
among the investigated multinationals on the necessity of liberalizing the Europe-
an market. At the same time, there were differences of opinion on how liberaliza-
tion should be realized and they mainly differed along national lines. French cor-
porations for example preferred a special brand of liberalization. They were of the 
opinion that the largest share of differences in cost-prices between countries 
should be harmonized through compensation rates. The French companies 
launched the plan to hold negotiations within European sectors in order to arrive 
at proposals for economic integration that included specific measures to overcome 
resistance from unfavourably positioned companies. Multinationals from the other 
countries saw little use for such de facto protectionist temporary measures. Ger-
man companies preferred a free trade area (without a common external tariff) 
rather than a Common Market (with a common external tariff wall). The Dutch and 
Belgian companies were pushing for any form of liberalization that had a realistic 
chance of success. The British representation in the ELEC and the Bilderberg meet-
ings hardly represented multinationals that were established in the United King-
dom. Therefore it is not possible to sketch a clear picture of the views of British 
multinationals. Shell and Unilever however were established both in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands and were part of the Dutch section, which at least 
gives some insight into views held by British firms. 
 These differences can be explained by the national contexts of economic struc-
ture, competitive position and path-dependencies, and the consequences of these 
factors for opportunities in the European market. The French context was strongly 
determined by the large role of the state in national economic planning. With re-
gard to the liberalization drive of the 1950s, the wishes of French corporations on 
cost-price harmonization can moreover be understood by considering the relative-
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ly high French wages and the costs that companies incurred from the French social 
system. When as a result from the Common Market import-tariffs would be 
dropped, the competitive strength of French firms would be eroded. The attitude 
of German companies regarding the preference for a free trade area without a 
common external tariff wall can be explained by the broad orientation of German 
trade outside the Benelux, France and Italy. Germany already had a relatively low 
tariff wall. The projected higher external tariff wall of the Common Market would 
make their exports more expensive. Finally the views of the Dutch and Belgian 
multinationals were based on a path dependency that resulted from the small size 
of their markets. Already before WWII companies from these countries had ex-
panded outside their small domestic markets. As a result to them the liberalization 
of European markets meant opportunities for economies of scale. Moreover, as a 
result of prolonged liberal policies by both governments the multinationals from 
the Benelux were since long exposed to external markets and had developed a 
strong competitive position. In a liberalized market they would benefit from that 
position. With regard to the decision how to shape a Common Market during the 
1950s it is also important to stress that the views of the investigated European 
companies in the European League for Economic Co-operation can be largely ex-
plained by considering the negotiating positions of their national governments. 
They remained very close to positions held by their governments in negotiations. 
 In the 1960s the diverging views that were based on a national context cannot 
be so clearly explained by nationally differing economic structures, competitive 
position and path-dependencies. The explanations seem to be more idiosyncratic 
than structural. As became clear in the Bilderberg meetings, the temporary de-
mand of German capital goods exporters for a virtually OECD-wide limitation of 
terms for export loans to the East-bloc originated from the unwillingness of the 
German government to follow the practices of guaranteeing export loans in the 
rest of Western Europe. Western European governments took on a competitive 
attitude versus Germany over a share in these exports and were prepared to go 
beyond the maximum period of guarantees that the German government was pre-
pared to offer. Therefore a level-playing field on such terms would be beneficial to 
German companies. Similarly nationally informed was the rejection by the Dutch 
multinational companies in the ELEC of a uniform company law for the European 
Community. Their refusal to cooperate in this regard stemmed from the fear of 
inadvertently introducing German participation rules in the Dutch economy. 
 In the 1970s in the ELEC a pronounced national attitude could be noted 
among French companies who were active in the sector of nuclear energy. Their 
attempts to elevate the nuclear fuel cycle that they had developed, as the dominant 
European standard would further strengthen their leading role in nuclear technol-
ogy in Europe. More importantly, the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique, a semi-
public administrative institution and the state company Électricité de France 
played a leading role in the pursuit of this strategy. The explanation of this attitude 
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here also lies in the role of the state in France's economic management. The gov-
ernment's consistent role in planning and stimulating the nation's scientific and 
industrial control over nuclear energy since the 1950s illustrates that the national 
attitude of French firms in this case was an example of path dependency. 
Sectoral views 
Views that differed along lines of sectoral interests resulted mostly from sector 
specific challenges. In the 1960s, for example, representatives of the European 
chemical industry favoured the creation of a European company law instead of 
harmonization of national taxation schemes. Additionally, in the 1960s clear dif-
ferences of opinion emerged on the organization of the European market with 
regard to aiding exports of capital goods to the Eastern European bloc. The remain-
ing European industry, especially the chemical industry, opposed indirect govern-
ment-support to exporters of capital goods because it facilitated emerging compe-
tition by the East-bloc. European banks also fulfilled a separate role in this dispute. 
They provided the export loans to the East-bloc countries but were only willing to 
do so if governments provided guarantees. Each sector had different ideas about 
how to organize these aspects of external trade. Some banks such as Banque Brux-
elles and Deutsche Bank were also confronted with increasing demands from Euro-
pean industry to reform the nationally still very separated European capital mar-
kets in such a way that European industry would gain more access to affordable 
capital.  
 Also in the 1970s industries developed different ideas about the organization 
of the European market. Among the energy industries an interesting difference 
emerged. The commercial oil industry requested international representation by 
the European Community in strategic and commercial affairs. The coal and nuclear 
industry instead preferred Community support for the further development of 
their industries. However, around 1980 the European nuclear industry changed its 
position and joined the oil industry in a demand for external representation by the 
European Community.  
 Those sectoral differences can be explained by a combination of the interna-
tionalization of markets and specific sectoral responses to changing circumstances. 
Increasing competition by American companies played a decisive role. The activi-
ties of large American chemical companies on the European market forced the 
European chemical industry to increase their scale and efficiency in research and 
development. According to the European chemical industry mergers and centrali-
zation of European companies could only be stimulated by the adoption of a uni-
form legal structure for European companies. The research intensity of their oper-
ations was the main rationale behind that preference for mergers and enlargement 
of scale. Other sectors were satisfied with the abolishment of double taxation that 
occurred in transnational mergers. 
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During the 1960s the increased industrial competition on the Western European 
market also led to competition with respect to capital. When in 1963 the export of 
dollars to Europe was limited by an American tax, American multinationals turned 
to the European capital market, which resulted in rising prices of capital. European 
industry and European banks disagreed on how this scarcity of capital should be 
approached. Industry wanted a European capital market that would be predis-
posed to European industry. The bankers however were opposed to any sugges-
tion of a preferential treatment for European industry and saw no quick solution in 
terms of a European capital market, as they were convinced that European gov-
ernments were not prepared to follow through on all the required adaptations for 
such an undertaking. A further explanation was that European banks were in com-
petition with American banks which made discrimination between European and 
American clients undesirable. 
 In the 1970s the degree of internationalization of companies explains differ-
ences in attitude towards to the organization of the European market. Globalised 
oil companies in the Bilderberg meetings attempted to organize European, Ameri-
can and Japanese governments around an assertive policy to counter OPEC's in-
creasing control of oil price-formation and on-going nationalization of industry-
assets. They wanted a predictable environment instead of the chaos that the oil-
exporting countries were causing and perceived any effort by the European Com-
munity in this area as a step in the right direction. Instead the Europe-based coal 
and nuclear industries were not concerned with these problems since their activi-
ties were focussed on the domestic market. 
 The views of European multinationals on the organization of the European 
market were thus not only determined by national circumstances and path-
dependencies. They were also determined by competition within their own sectors 
and the specific characteristics of each sector. Studying European business on a 
transnational level therefore requires both a national and a sectoral perspective. In 
addition, it became clear that the liberalization and internationalization of the 
European market led to adjustment problems, forcing sectors to demand much 
more intervention from the European institutions than they preferred to accept in 
the first place when the European institutions were being founded. 
Transnational networks 
A key element of this investigation is its comparative perspective on the ELEC, the 
Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. Studying these organizations 
has resulted in new insights into how they operated, their different roles and the 
different setting that each provided for multinational companies.  
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European League for Economic Co-operation 
The ELEC was already thoroughly investigated by Michel Dumoulin and Anne-
Miriam Dutrieue. Still, even though similar sources were used in the present inves-
tigation new insights could be gained. The investigation of Dumoulin and Dutrieue 
mainly focussed on individuals. Although the authors acknowledged a dominant 
role of European business in the ELEC, they disregarded corporate interests in 
explaining the formation of ideas in the organization. The present study has shown 
though that the ELEC is eminently suited to be studied from a business history 
perspective. The large European companies played an all-decisive role in the ELEC: 
they financed it, set the agenda and contributed to the content of publications. In 
addition, the milieu of large European companies and multinationals formed the 
primary environment in which the ELEC tested how it should shape its role. Finally, 
it became clear how ELEC reformulated its mission when initiatives for liberaliza-
tion of the European market stalled. The original priority of liberalizing the Euro-
pean market was moved into the background in favour of the new priority of de-
vising a response to external competition. The ELEC asked for attention for a broad 
range of ideas emerging from European business. 517 
Bilderberg meetings 
Research on the Bilderberg meetings by Valérie Aubourg and Thomas Gijswijt 
remained limited to the period 1952-1966. Both concluded that the Bilderberg 
meetings enabled an exchange of ideas between Americans and Europeans and 
agreed that the organization was not geared to generating any influence as a group. 
According to Gijswijt the encounters functioned as a sort of pressure valve for the 
transatlantic alliance in which differences of opinion could be freely expressed 
without self-censorship. With regard to the topic of European integration, accord-
ing to Aubourg the Bilderberg meetings were particularly distinctive compared to 
other networks or groups because the members showed great willingness to in-
clude the United Kingdom into the Common Market.518 
 For the period 1952-1966 our investigation has shown the extent to which the 
economic dimension of the Bilderberg meetings was characterized by views cher-
ished by the American government on the European market. According to the 
Americans, Western Europe had to develop economic cooperation, liberalize their 
markets, integrate, and increase productivity in order to arrive at a stable equilib-
                                                                  
517 Dumoulin, M., & Dutrieue, A.-M. (1993). La Ligue Européenne de Coopération Économique (1946-
1981): un groupe d'étude et de pression dans la construction européenne. Berne: Lang.  
518 Aubourg, V. (2009). Transatlantische Geschäftsbeziehungen. Die Bilderberg-Gruppe. In Gehler, M., 
Kaiser, W. & Leucht, B. (Eds.), Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegen-
wart = Networks in European multi-level governance. From 1945 to the present (pp. 69-86); Wien: Böh-
lau; Gijswijt, T. W. (2007). Uniting the West: the Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European integra-
tion, 1952-1966. Unpublished dissertation, Heidelberg, Heidelberg, pp. 294-298. 
269 
rium in exchanges within the in 1944 established multilateral Bretton Woods 
monetary system. The discussions during the Bilderberg meetings on the need for 
European economic integration match this context. The repetitive mutual reaffir-
mation between Europeans and Americans about the importance of avoiding pro-
tectionism moreover fits this grand scheme. Particularly during the 1950s the 
Bilderberg meetings were an instrument for both Americans and Europeans to 
continuously evaluate whether they still agreed on the economic foundation of the 
military alliance.519 
 The positive attitude in the Bilderberg meetings with regard to the accession 
of the UK to the Common Market and other forms of integration between the UK 
and the EEC should also be seen in light of the liberalization and productivity 
agenda. The Bilderberg meetings were however not unique in this regard. Du-
moulin and Dutrieue had already identified a similar attitude in the ELEC, which is 
confirmed by our investigation.520 
 Both Aubourg and Gijswijt also argued that the Bilderberg meetings should be 
seen as a continuous effort to strengthen Transatlantic ties, and that the partici-
pants used the encounters to influence each other. In the previous chapters several 
examples of those efforts have been discussed. However, an additional function of 
the Bilderberg meetings was identified for the leaders of multinational companies. 
Through their participation in these meetings they were able to satisfy their needs 
regarding up to date knowledge about international developments. As members 
they were better informed about changes that the international system was under-
going, or might undergo. The meetings provided an opportunity for gathering new 
perspectives and for monitoring the international debate by leading experts on the 
liberal order.521 
 Particularly interesting were the results for the period after 1966. The leaders 
of the Bilderberg meetings developed a concern about the too homogeneous com-
position of the membership. After the turbulent period of student protests around 
May 1968, they began to actively invite younger participants, especially from cir-
cles of the New Left. These doubts were accompanied by a more fundamental 
sense of a lacking legitimacy for continuing the exchange of ideas on a strictly 
Transatlantic level. A disagreement on the possible participation of Japanese 
members undermined the group's original goals. That dispute was finally settled in 
the wake of President Nixon's decision to suspend dollar-gold convertibility in 
1971: the monetary and political upheaval that followed, suddenly convinced the 
leaders of the Bilderberg meetings that future transatlantic relations would con-
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tinue to require an informal exchange of ideas without participation of other re-
gions.522 
Trilateral Commission 
Previous research on the Trilateral Commission by Stephen Gill was informed by a 
neo-Marxist reading of globalization. Gill considers the Trilateral Commission as an 
expression of a transnational class struggle in which multinationals attempt to 
realise their superiority on a global scale. That view is similar to the approach by 
Holly Sklar, who also published a critical analysis in which the supposedly undem-
ocratic nature of the Trilateral “elite” is emphasized. Both consider the fact that so 
many representatives of multinational companies were members of the Trilateral 
Commission as evidence of a broad similarity in interests. But we have shown that 
this was not the case. 
 Particularly during the first years after the Trilateral Commission was found-
ed in 1973, and throughout the 1970s, substantial differences emerged between 
the American, Japanese and European members. The three regional sections made 
diverging assessments about the tense circumstances of the 1970s. Trilateralism, 
the idea that the three major industrialized regions of the world together would 
take on global leadership, was a wishful interpretation of world affairs on the part 
of the American initiators and was approached very critically by the European and 
Japanese sections until at least the early 1980s. Although the Trilateral Commis-
sion aimed at real trilateral cooperation, in reality the Trilateral Commission had 
no choice but to settle for a modus operandi similar to that of the Bilderberg meet-
ings.523 
Comparisons 
The comparative perspective on these three networks was very useful for under-
standing the views of multinationals on the European market. The simultaneous 
investigation of the selected themes via the ELEC, the Bilderberg and Trilateral 
Commission meetings, results in the insight that in each group each subject mani-
fested itself in a different way. The composition of the membership of the networks, 
and their diverging missions, played a role in how a topic was treated. Compare for 
example the ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings: European national differences 
were more pronounced in the ELEC due to the presence of Europeans only. How-
ever, in the Bilderberg meetings European national positions remained more in the 
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background due to the confrontation of Europeans with Americans. In order to 
accomplish a sensible discussion the Europeans were forced to think in more or 
less European terms instead of continuously stressing national idiosyncrasies. 
 Additionally, the different contexts of the networks mattered for how a topic 
was treated. For example, in the ELEC in the 1950s the subject of liberalization of 
the European market was repeatedly discussed in terms of lower tariffs. In the 
Bilderberg meetings the subject of liberalizing the European market instead took 
on the contours of an element of the American strategy for the West against the 
Soviet Union.524 
 In the 1960s the ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings fulfilled different roles for 
European business, even when on the same subjects. In the ELEC the topics of East-
West trade and American investments were solely treated from a European per-
spective and revolved around safeguarding the position of West European compa-
nies. In the Bilderberg meetings however, East-West trade was approached from a 
Transatlantic perspective which was still strongly determined by Cold War sensi-
tivities. The American members preferred to limit Western export credits for the 
export of turn-key factories and production machinery to the East-bloc in order to 
prevent that Soviet Russia would benefit from Western know-how. The theme of 
American investments was mainly turned into an opportunity to once more mutu-
ally reaffirm the importance of a liberal attitude towards American investments. 
The Bilderberg members decided that the only answer to American investments 
would be increased European unity. 525 
 Also in the 1970s similar subjects manifested differently across the organiza-
tions. In the ELEC the activities were mainly directed at improving Community 
policies to the benefit of European industry. In the Bilderberg meetings and the 
Trilateral Commission the members focused on shaping opportunities for interna-
tional cooperation and tried to actively address global problems and to promote 
international stability.526  
 The combination of the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral 
Group has played a complementary role in this investigation. The ELEC offered a 
broad perspective on the developments that took place within the European mar-
ket. At the same time the debates taking place in the Bilderberg meetings and the 
Trilateral Commission illustrated how these developments were linked with the 
internationalization of the world economy. The juxtaposition and comparison of 
these three organizations yielded a fuller picture of the motives behind the views 
of European multinationals. 
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Influence 
The selection of these particular transnational networks and the focus on corpora-
tions, begs the question about whether these organizations had any influence or 
not? Although this investigation was never designed to answer this question, some 
insights can be offered.  
 The activities of the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission make 
it difficult to characterize them as lobbying groups. And even though ELEC clearly 
lobbied via its publications and resolutions it is still not possible to identify con-
crete examples of policy influence emerging from these networks. The relation 
between the networks' activities and policy outcomes was not investigated. It is 
important however to make a distinction between the largely absent lobby-
activities of the networks and lobby-activities that firms undertook outside the 
networks.  
 One could consider possible similarities between the networks' preferences 
and immediate policy outcomes as instances of influence. In that case ELEC's views 
throughout the 1950s come very close to the decision to found the Common Mar-
ket in 1957. But to ascribe influence to the ELEC based on such a similarity would 
be a gross misrepresentation of the complexity of the actors and parties involved 
in the decisionmaking process towards the signing of the Rome Treaties. The ELEC 
however was able to change attitudes in Eastern Europe, by proposing practical 
collaboration schemes. ELEC's other activities did not result in the preferred out-
comes. 
 Although outcomes remained largely unaffected, aspects of influence existed 
in other ways. Clearly the ELEC was seen as an important interlocutor for the Eu-
ropean Commission on topics in which they shared a common goal. The Bilderberg 
meetings' members were in the position to arrange a meeting between govern-
mental representatives from France and the United Kingdom on the vetoed British 
accession to the Common Market. At times the networks acquired a role of discus-
sion partner. 
Relation to historiography 
The questions addressed in this book are related to the historiography on Europe-
an business in the three disciplines that were discussed in chapter one: European 
integration theory, history of European integration, and business history. To what 
extent do the insights from this study enrich the historiography of these disci-
plines? 
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Business and European integration theory 
Since the 1950s European integration theorists have tried to understand and pre-
dict how European integration would proceed. The Americans Ernst Haas and 
Leon Lindberg, two neofunctionalist integration theorists, defined integration as a 
shift in political activity of elites towards newly created supranational institutions. 
The logic inherent in this perception of integration is that society redirects itself to 
a new institutional reality. It precludes that elites can be initial actors in starting 
the integration process before the existence of supranational institutions. The 
activities of multinationals in the ELEC and the Bilderberg meetings show however 
that companies were already lobbying national governments to take steps towards 
integration, even before supranational institutions existed. Moreover, companies 
took part in debates on how supranational institutions should organize the Euro-
pean market before the institutions were founded. Still, as stated by neofunctional-
ist theorists, particularly the ELEC developed loyalties, expectations and political 
activity towards the supranational institutions. ELEC's position papers and publi-
cations were aimed both at member states and the European Commission. The 
European Commission on the one hand became a source of proposals for ELEC's 
agenda, for example with regard to seeking cooperation with East-bloc states, or 
on starting a dialogue with OPEC countries. On the other hand, the European 
Commission tried to mobilize the ELEC in areas where it could not act itself. The 
European Commission also showed sensitivity to ideas that emerged from the 
ELEC, for example on tax harmonization and industrial restructuring.527 
 Implicitly ingrained in integration theory is the question of how actors influ-
ence the European integration process. In neofunctionalist theory, elites and su-
pranational institutions play a central role. In intergovernmentalist theory, mem-
ber states are considered the main decision makers. Although the present investi-
gation was not designed for studying decision-making dynamics, still, by consider-
ing the preferences of European multinationals and the degree of success they had 
in seeing their views realized, the following general conclusions can be drawn. 
 In the 1970s political scientists such as Werner Feld and Erwin Häckel as-
cribed an important role to multinationals in breaking down the national struc-
tures of the European economy. To do so these multinationals had to engage in 
transnational mergers and joint ventures. The neo-marxist Heinz-Jürgen Axt was 
also convinced that in order to achieve deeper market integration, national capital 
had to become increasingly transnationalized. All three authors concluded that the 
Community member states were blocking such developments. That conclusion 
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agreed with intergovernmentalist integration theory, based on the work of Stanley 
Hoffmann that claims that European integration proceeds when national govern-
ments allow it to proceed: governments remained in full control of the preserva-
tion of sovereignty. The results in this book confirm that conclusion. It appeared 
that already since the mid-1960s European multinationals had a different view on 
the organization of the European market than Community member states. As an 
answer to American competition companies required a larger scale of operation. 
However, transnational mergers were unattractive due to major differences be-
tween national legal systems, particularly with regard to taxation. Even though the 
European Commission adopted the ideas of mitigating these obstacles, member 
states were not willing to accept reform proposals during the 1960s and 1970s.528 
 Further advances in integration theory acknowledged a role for business in 
explaining European integration, albeit on the national level. Andrew Moravcsik's 
liberal intergovernmentalism went beyond Hoffmann's state-centric explanation of 
integration in that he explicitly recognized that states develop their position to-
wards integration in domestic preference formation processes. However, although 
business interests played a role in national debates, according to Moravcsik the 
state remained the only aggregator of interests in relation to state bargaining pro-
cesses. What liberal intergovernmentalist theory does not acknowledge however is 
the potentially transnational nature of business interests. Chapter 4 showed a 
mixed message in this regard. During the 1950s the ELEC published papers that 
received transnational approval, but these were the result of nationally diverging 
business views. However, chapter 5 on the 1960s and chapter 6 on the 1970s 
showed the emergence of sector-based preferences on a European, transnational 
scale: chemical industries, major oil firms, carmakers across Europe attained a 
consensus on the main issues for their sectors. National representatives of these 
industries conveyed those views to their national governments. In this way trans-
national views were introduced in national preference formation processes. In 
other words, Moravcsik's implicit argument that domestic preference formation 
processes are closed off to transnational ideas is too simplistic.529 
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History of European integration 
The literature on the history of European integration lacks a broad perspective on 
business. This book is a first attempt to add that perspective to the research agen-
da.  
 Nonetheless, to a certain degree European industry has been given a role in 
the history of European integration, mainly by economic historians. In the 1990s 
Alan Milward and John Gillingham included the interests of business in their semi-
nal works on European integration. More recently scholars such as Marine 
Moguen-Toursel and Neil Rollings, who are interested in the crossover between 
business history and European integration, focussed on how national industrial 
sectors, nationally organized industrial federations, or employers' associations, 
perceived economic integration. By focussing on national settings, naturally their 
results were nationally formulated business views on the European market. The 
investigation of transnational business organizations to date remained limited to 
the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF), which mainly functioned as 
an instrument to forward the goals of national associations on a European level. 
Moreover, the organization knew no direct business representation.530 
 The investigation of transnational networks offered the opportunity to deviate 
from a strictly national perspective and allowed room for discovering cross-
industry and industrial transnational perspectives. What were the results of this 
approach? 
 It appeared that in the 1950s multinationals approached European integra-
tion from a national perspective, similar to what the aforementioned authors have 
found. Remarkably so, particularly in the ELEC the firms investigated closely ad-
hered to the views defended by their national governments. In all cases it was 
difficult to distinguish between positions of the companies and those of the nation-
al governments. It is argued here that the prospect of trade liberalization in West-
ern Europe represented an opportunity for all parties to push for a specific version 
of trade liberalization. Each national group fended for an organization of the Euro-
pean market that remained the closest to the market organization from which they 
had expanded their firms.531 
 Whereas in the 1950s the national contexts offer the best explanation for 
business views on the Common Market, during the 1960s the growth of external 
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competition by the United States and the East-bloc countries resulted in transna-
tional industry-specific challenges. Business views on the European market were 
increasingly formulated in terms of interests of entire European industries or 
groups of industries. During the 1970s transnational sectoral preferences became 
much more pronounced as a result of deteriorating international competitiveness. 
The emergence of transnational industry-based views suggests that the European 
market at least was transnationalizing in terms of a European industrial business 
identity. Histories of European integration should start taking into account such 
transnational industry-specific concerns and their specific agenda's regarding 
European integration. Moreover, investigations of business views on European 
integration should focus on how post-war transnational industrial identities were 
shaped in the first place.  
 Since the mid-2000s various authors have developed a transnational ap-
proach to European integration history. In 2006, Thom Misa and Johan Schot pro-
posed to write a transnational history of the technological integration of Europe. In 
2009 Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, Michael Gehler and Morten Rasmussen 
proposed the investigation of transnational political networks and the suprana-
tional European polity that they shaped. Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Kiran Patel 
additionally proposed in 2010 to write a transnational history of Europe by inves-
tigating processes of Europeanization. A transnational history of European busi-
ness in relation to European integration history is a natural component of these 
endeavours and this book has made a first contribution in this direction. A particu-
larly interesting dimension of Misa and Schot's and Hirschhausen and Patel's pro-
posals is the acknowledgement that ideas and meanings that shaped the transna-
tional history of Europe were also shaped by global influences. As this book has 
shown, the history of the changing views of business on the European market can-
not be understood from a strictly European perspective. By focussing on the Euro-
pean Community from a perspective of European multinationals it became clear 
that the need for harmonization of trade rules, codes of conduct, and international 
economic policies was part of processes that went beyond the integration of Euro-
pean markets. Because of the fact that European companies were more and more 
confronted with competition from the United States, the East-bloc, Japan and po-
tentially the Middle East, the need arose to pursue international level playing fields 
and to convince Western governments of the need to undertake strategic action. 
Such international agreements however could only be arranged via connections 
with NATO and the OECD, which in these cases functioned as platforms for consul-
tation. A transnational history of European business inevitably also shows how 
such global challenges affected its identity.532 
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Business history 
Business historiography in relation to European integration has taken two forms. 
The first consists of individual company histories that partly zoom in on the specif-
ic challenges of restructuring a multinational firm with multiple subsidiaries in the 
European market since 1950. The second approach of business historians consists 
of studying business associations in the context of European integration. 
 Researchers of individual businesses like Geoffrey Jones and Peter Miskell 
who investigated Unilever, and Ivo Blanken, who investigated Philips, made clear 
that these companies initially saw great potential for economies of scale in an inte-
grated European market, due to the prospect of amalgamating the hundreds of 
factories that they controlled across Europe. Plans for such reorganizations failed 
however during the 1960s and 1970s. National governments resisted relocation of 
production and local management preferred national sales and marketing strate-
gies. Moreover, Steven Tolliday showed that also an originally American multina-
tional with several production sites in European markets, the car manufacturer 
Ford for example, had to overcome major challenges to integrate these. Local mar-
keting needs and different production practices complicated technical inter-
changeability of parts between the different factories. The rationalization of wide-
spread production structures of multinational companies on the European market 
was a difficult and lengthy process.533 
 The present investigation adds to these insights. The competition from Ameri-
can companies on the European market especially caused a need for mergers for 
European companies. European business tried to convince European governments 
to simplify tax rules or to consent to a Community-wide company law. In the cases 
of multinationals such as Unilever and Philips the need for mergers was less of an 
issue since they had already achieved a large size by expanding across Europe. The 
suggestion then is that companies with different structures used different strate-
gies to cope with increasing competition in the European market. Extensive and 
widespread European multinationals ended up in a complicated reorganization 
process aimed at centralization and harmonization. European companies that in 
comparison to American companies were relatively small and had not expanded 
beyond national borders were forced to enter into national or transnational mer-
gers to obtain the appropriate scale. How the integration of the European market 
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exactly forced companies from various industries and company structures to re-
spond remains an exciting direction for future research. In any case it became clear 
that adjustment problems of European business to the new size of the European 
market was a widely shared experience.534 
 Business historians who have recently studied European business associa-
tions put forward a different take on the relation between business and European 
integration. Neil Rollings, Matthias Kipping and Marine Moguen-Toursel resist the 
dominant approach in political science to study business associations in terms of 
their influence on the policy-making aspects of European integration. According to 
them, the existence of business associations at a European level should be inter-
preted as stemming from the uncertainty that was caused by the stream of integra-
tion plans during the 1950s. Moreover, they argue that business associations 
should be investigated as examples of the formation of ideas about European inte-
gration. As shown, this dissertation demonstrates the value of investigating associ-
ations in which business played a large role as places where ideas on European 
integration took shape. However, the suggestion by the abovementioned authors 
that investigating business associations as examples of formation of ideas is differ-
ent from investigating influence can be qualified on the basis of this dissertation's 
findings on the ELEC. Certainly the ELEC contributed to the formation of ideas on 
European integration. On the other hand the ELEC pro-actively chose position and 
its primary goal was to gain influence on policy making. If the ELEC had influence, 
it was via the ideas that it forwarded, not through concrete pressure. Its proposals 
for economic integration stemmed from 1949 and in 1955 the group was actually 
ahead of consensus with their agenda for a Common Market between the ECSC 
states. Moreover, ELEC's early ideas on the need for harmonized taxation measures 
and a European company law both in the service of adaptation of European indus-
try to external competition ended up in Commission memoranda on industrial 
policy. Ultimately, as explained below, these suggestions were realized via the 
European Commission's White Paper following the Single European Act in 1985. 
The investigation of influence of business associations cannot be so easily separat-
ed from investigating them as examples of the formation of ideas.535 
 In conclusion, it is important to explain how this investigation offers more 
clarity about the activities of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERTI) 
towards the realization of the Single European Act in 1986. In other investigations 
on European integration this subject would probably be dealt with in a section on 
European integration theory. However, the contribution of this study to a better 
understanding of the ERTI lies in the area of the history of business associations 
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and the themes they placed on the political agenda. The Single European Act (SEA) 
amended the Treaties of Rome of 1957. The intention behind the SEA was to elimi-
nate protectionism within the Community and to initialize the formation of a truly 
uniform single market. The Common Market had abolished all internal import 
tariffs by 1969, but non-tariff trade barriers had proliferated since. Each member 
state had devised specific exceptions that determined which products could be 
imported and which could not. The SEA also abolished these trade barriers. More-
over, the SEA replaced the veto-based voting system with a qualified majority 
voting system for market related policies in order to simplify and accelerate deci-
sion-making. Wayne Sandholtz, John Zysman and Maria Green Cowles ascribed a 
crucial role to European industry in bringing about this treaty. According to them 
the European Round Table of Industrialists, founded in 1983, had set up a successful 
lobby on national and supranational levels in order to convince governments and 
to assist the European Commission where needed. According to these authors the 
involvement of European industry was a result from international competition 
since the 1970s, particularly from companies that were active in advanced infor-
mation technology.536 
 This investigation shows why the creation of the ERTI and its lobby were the 
result of longer standing problems originating from a broadly shared business 
experience since the early 1960s. Particularly the ELEC clearly has functioned as a 
precursor to the ERTI. The ELEC dedicated itself to the realization of the Common 
Market during the 1950s. During the 1960s it surfaced that European companies 
were facing strong foreign competition. Efforts to promote the concentration of 
European industry by means of transnational mergers encountered the lacking 
political will of Community member states. At the advent of the crisis years of the 
1970s, competition intensified as a result of quickly growing Japanese exports. 
Suddenly an urgent need for rationalization of particularly the automotive sector 
presented itself. European business even requested a European industrial policy in 
order to speed up the required restructuring of European companies so that full 
advantage could be taken of the scale economies that the Common Market had to 
offer. The main topic of the ERTI, the single market, was a consistent and coherent 
result from these developments. 
 The European integration theorist Andrew Moravcsik argues in his book The 
choice for Europe, that the industrialists of the ERTI presented their ideas only 
after Community member states had expressed their willingness to change Com-
mon Market policies and therefore were too late to influence the decision-making 
process with regard to the Single European Act. This argument should be turned 
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upside down: European business had forwarded multiple suggestions to address 
the issue for the past twenty years but governments had not acted. The govern-
ments were only now taking up a problem that had been spelled out by the Euro-
pean Commission since the late 1960s. In fact the establishment of the ERTI should 
be seen as an expression of continuity, continuing the work of the European League 
for Economic Cooperation on a different scale: it represented a resumption of earli-
er efforts by leading European corporations to convince Community member 
states to follow through on their initial decision in 1957 to create the Common 
Market.537 
Geo-political insights 
This investigation was not designed for answering questions about geo-political 
dynamics between powerblocs. However, as explained in chapter 1, the combined 
historiographical overviews did indicate that geopolitical tensions played a role in 
the experience of European multinationals. The following geo-political insights 
with regard to the West-European and American powerblocs can be deduced from 
the results of this dissertation.  
 Clearly a competitive dynamic existed between American and West-European 
corporations. This dynamic can be explained by structural differences between the 
American and European market circumstances. The structure of European corpo-
rations was attuned to the smaller national markets. During the 1950s, European 
multinationals were favourably positioned towards realizing a large, European 
market, because scale advantages would likely improve their ability to compete 
abroad. However, European corporations were not counting on the competition of 
large American corporations on their still poorly integrated market. The American 
multinationals had a significant structural advantage: unlike the European corpo-
rations, the American companies originated from a large, integrated home-market. 
As a result, when they began to increase their European investments in the early 
1960s, they were much larger than most of their European counterparts who were 
still mainly geared towards their much smaller home-markets. Moreover, this 
circumstance enabled American companies to spread their costs across a large 
market, something European companies were unable to do. The same advantage 
can be noted for corporations from Japan. The adverse starting position of Europe-
an corporations determined this development and also explains why they favoured 
a continuing integration but also enlargement of the Common Market. 
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Reflection on methodology 
While the design of the study and the choices that were made yielded significant 
results, they also pose limitations that have to be taken into account when as-
sessing the results. The main pillars of the design are the choice for a longitudinal 
investigation from 1950 until 1980, the themes for the sub-periods' cases, and the 
selection of the three transnational networks. 
 The investigation of the period from 1950 to 1980 made it possible to exam-
ine the views of European multinationals in relation to changing circumstances. 
Additionally it offered the opportunity to identify gradual changes in views. More-
over, the long timeline made visible that the Common Market was no undivided 
blessing to European multinationals. Companies were confronted with adaptation 
problems as a result of changing conditions of competition, which were only re-
solved in policy changes during the 1980s. That picture would not have emerged if 
we would have limited ourselves to the 1950s or the 1960s. Finally, the examina-
tion of the period 1950-1980 resulted in insights on how the relationship between 
European multinationals and the institutions of the European Community changed 
and how other organizations such as the OECD and NATO played a complementary 
role when the European Community was unable to act.  
 As explained in chapter 1, the choice for a longitudinal approach was comple-
mented by a selection of major themes. It is important to realize that that selection 
inevitably underexposed other topics that were of relevance to European industry 
and finance. Additional investigations of those topics will undoubtedly enrich the 
findings of this study. The challenge in such endeavours is to determine which 
sectors and actors were affected most by the chosen topics. In the present investi-
gation the choice for a representative and typical theme for the 1970s, energy 
security, did not turn out to be as representative of the priorities of European in-
dustry and finance as initially expected. While the subject of economic integration 
for the 1950s, and East-West trade and U.S. investment for the 1960s resulted in 
involvement of several sectors, energy security in the 1970s was mostly just dis-
cussed by parties connected to the energy sector. 
 The value of the selection of the transnational networks has already been 
addressed in relation to the selected comparative approach. There are also draw-
backs to investigating such networks. Indeed, representatives of multinationals 
played an important role in the networks. However, the available archival material 
not always allowed the identification of particular views that could be associated 
with single firms. The identification of national groupings and industries was pos-
sible however, offering a more general approach to the experiences of European 
multinationals. As a result, this research design has also demonstrated that the 
investigation of business views is very well possible through transnational net-
works such as the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. 
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That insight provides opportunities for further research on other transnational 
networks of business. 
Opportunities for further research 
As a result of the dynamics caused by the implementation of the Common Market, 
European multinationals were confronted with difficulties in adapting their organ-
izations to the new circumstances. Academic attention for this restructuring pro-
cess has to date primarily focussed on the decision-making processes on the level 
of the European Community during the 1980s. Still, the roots of this problem for 
European business seem to lie in the 1960s when the European Community was 
unable to introduce new policies. It appeared that the need for the restructuring of 
European industry became tied up with other difficulties. The European technolog-
ical gap with the United States during the 1960s and energy scarcity in the 1970s 
were also translated into restructuring problems. The single market program fol-
lowing the Single European Act in the 1980s merely was the provisional endpoint 
in these developments. The theme of the adaptation and restructuring process of 
European business in relation to European economic integration is connected to 
many aspects of the wider European business experience. The restructuring pro-
cess can function as a focal point for a research agenda on the business experience 
of the European Community. Such an approach will moreover contribute to re-
search agendas that endeavour towards a transnational history of Europe.  
 Various sub-areas can be identified for the investigation of European industri-
al restructuring. It is important to stress the potential for business historians to 
contribute to such a perspective. Relatively few business histories position compa-
nies in the wider European political economic landscape. As became clear in chap-
ter 1 and 3, histories of single multinational companies can have an impact on our 
understanding of how European business experienced the profound changes in the 
European market organization since WWII. But also views of management on Eu-
ropean integration and strategies in lobbying in the European Community are 
valuable for understanding how business has co-shaped the present system. The 
investigation of the transnational organization of European industries since the 
founding of the Common Market should result in particularly interesting contribu-
tions. 
 Such a research agenda would moreover include the relations between insti-
tutions and European business. This includes the investigation of the contacts 
between the European Commission and European business, as well as the contacts 
with business from other regions, from a European Commission perspective. In 
what way did the European Commission try to manage the European restructuring 
process, what policy angles did it employ in this regard, and how did it deal with 
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the implicit tension between European business and American and Japanese busi-
ness? 
 Moreover, as became clear European multinationals at times turned to the 
OECD and incidentally even mobilized relations within the NATO for consultations 
on establishing international level playing fields. The suggestion is that particularly 
the OECD has repeatedly played a role in organizing global markets for European 
as well as American and Japanese business. Whether European business attempted 
to manage aspects of the restructuring challenge on a global scale via the OECD 
and whether this resulted in tangible agreements, can be a productive angle for 
future investigations. 
 
These agendas should particularly acknowledge the importance of changing cir-
cumstances, the national and industry-based contexts of multinationals, the differ-
ences in structure and resulting path dependencies and the increasingly global 
nature of competition that demanded a response from all actors involved. 
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Appendix - The leadership of the ELEC, 
Bilderberg meetings and the 
Trilateral Commission, 1950-1980: a 
database 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a database of the individual professional affiliations of the 
leadership of the ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. The 
database is included in this appendix in tables A.2 to A.15. Its structure is designed 
to answer questions about:  
 
• The networks' main members and their professional affiliations.  
• The size of the networks' business membership. 
• The industrial composition of the networks' business components  
• The overlap between the networks' leaders 
 
The data is analysed in tables and figures included in chapter 2 and 3. Also see the 
section “Tables and figures” below. 
 The database has one important additional asset. It offers an overview of the 
distribution of nationalities and indicates the distribution of other societal spheres 
than business. This feature offers unprecedented transparency about the composi-
tion of these networks and the changes in composition through time. As a result 
the database has become a resource for future investigations on the ELEC, Bilder-
berg meetings and the Trilateral Commission. Moreover, it supplements the neces-
sarily limited selection of individuals that occur in the main text.  
Content and creation of the database 
For the period 1950-1980, measuring points at 5-year intervals were selected. This 
resulted in the years, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980. For these 
years the database offers details on each individual member of the ELEC's Central 
Council, the Bilderberg meetings’ Steering Committee and the Trilateral Commis-
sion's Executive Committee, with regard to: 
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• Nationality 
• Name 
• Societal Sphere 
• Industry 
• Company/Institution for which they worked. 
 
The process of data-compilation consisted of two phases with each phase involving 
the compilation of a different set of data. The first phase and set of data was 
“membership”, the second phase and set of data was “affiliation.” Both sets of data 
required different types of sources. 
Membership 
Firstly three sub-datasets were compiled for each group. The datasets included the 
details on membership, name, nationality and timing of membership of the ELEC's 
Central Council, the Bilderberg meetings’ Steering Committee and the Trilateral 
Commission's Executive Committee. 
 
 1. Members of ELEC's Central Council:  
 
The data on ELEC's Central Council's membership is based on ELEC's frequent 
publications which included updated member-lists. For the year 1980 it was not 
possible to use information from a publication of that exact year. Instead a list of 
members from 1979 was used. Because the ELEC Central Council had a limited 
turnover of members over the years, the short time-gap was considered acceptable. 
The “affiliation” data for the 1979 group was still based on the year 1980. 
 
 2. Members of the Bilderberg meetings' Steering Committee 
 
The data on the Bilderberg meetings' Steering Committee’s membership is based 
on a hardcopy list from the Max Kohnstamm archive that compiles the Bilderberg 
meetings' conference visitors and Steering Committee members for the period 
1954 to 2001. The list includes information on conference participation and Steer-
ing Committee membership. It is safe to assume that list originated from the Bild-
erberg meetings secretariat itself, as Max Kohnstamm has been a member of the 
Steering Committee himself.  
 The hardcopy list was photographed and turned into an excel spreadsheet via 
Optical Character Recognition software. The spreadsheet was subsequently proof-
read and supplemented with further data about Steering Committee membership 
in minutes of the Steering Committee meetings, from 1954 until 1977. Individuals 
who participated in the Steering Committee meetings only once between 1954-
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1980 were not included in the database because they typically stood-in for official 
members.538 
 
 3. Members of the Trilateral Commission Executive Committee 
 
The data on the Trilateral Commission's Executive Committee’s membership is 
based on the work of Holly Sklar: she compiled an elaborate “who's who” on the 
Trilateral Commission for the period 1972-1980, which was gratefully used for the 
purpose of this database. Note that Sklar's interpretations were not reproduced 
here. The membership-information and the biographical information included in 
her book was used to make a new assessment.539 
The resulting sub-datasets were then combined, constituting the basis for the next 
step. 
Affiliation 
The database was subsequently complemented with information about the main 
professional affiliation of each individual member. Data like this is typically availa-
ble in biographical sources such as biographical dictionaries, encyclopaedias, 
online databases etcetera. In the case of the Trilateral Commission the required 
biographical information was already compiled by Holly Sklar.540 
 The selection of the main appointment or professional affiliation of each indi-
vidual requires interpretation. Often the individuals in this database held several 
positions at the same time. The rule that informed the decisions was to choose the 
most likely main professional activity. The company or institution that appears in 
the “Company/Institution” column is the person's main affiliation for that year. On 
the more specific problems of interpretation and classification in this database, see 
the sections on the “Company/Institution” column and the “Remarks” column 
below, in the discussion of the database's structure and taxonomy of the database. 
 The affiliation of each individual was further categorized in terms of “societal 
sphere” and “sectors.” The taxonomy involved in making these choices is also ex-
plained below.  
                                                                  
538 IISGA, AMK, inv. nr. 110, Bilderberg Meetings Alphabetical List of Participants 1954-2001. For details 
on the sources on the Steering Commitee see the section “Sources database - Membership sources per 
group” of this appendix. 
539 See the section “Sources database - Membership sources per group” of this appendix. 
540 See the sections “Sources database - Membership sources per group” and Sources Database - “Profes-
sional Affiliations” sources per country of this appendix. 
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Structure and taxonomy 
The following explains the decisions and interpretations that were involved in 
compiling and structuring this database. The eight columns of the database will be 
discussed separately. Additionally, the use of the category “Other” is explained. The 
eight columns of the database are: 
 
Group Country Name Societal Sphere Sector Company/Institution Remark 
Group 
The column indicates whether the respective individual in the “Name” column was 
a member of the ELEC Central Council, the Bilderberg meetings Steering Commit-
tee or the Trilateral Commission Executive Committee.  
Country 
This column indicates the nationality of the individual in the “Name” column.  
Name 
The names of the database entries are stripped of titles such as “Lord”, “Baron”, 
“Viscount” and “Sir.” The exception to this rule are royal titles that belong to the 
direct line of succession in relation to the head of state, such as Crown Prince, 
Prince, Queen, King. Last names are followed by a comma, which is followed by 
first names as they appeared in the original sources. 
 Some names appear twice in a single measuring year. As the “group” column 
will indicate, these persons are members of two different networks at the same 
time. Some names are stricken through: their biographies could not be located and 
membership sources did not provide additional information. Per interval the fol-
lowing amount of individuals have remained uncategorized: 
 
Table A.1: Percentage of uncategorized members in database in relation total member in database. 
Year Number of individuals 
without biographies: 
Of total members: Percentage of  
uncategorized members 
1950 0 20 0
1955 0 39 0
1960 4 60 6,70% 
1965 3 60 5% 
1970 3 66 4,50% 
1975 7 115 6,10% 
1980 6 133 4,50% 
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Societal Sphere 
The column “Societal Sphere” is a general categorization of the entry in the “Com-
pany/Institution” column. The categories that are distinguished within the “Socie-
tal Sphere” column pertains to the following broad ideal types:  
• Business: the individual in the name column works in a private or state-
owned corporation active in any possible sector (but see “Media”). 
• Media: media corporations are part of the business sphere. However, con-
sidering the organizations under scrutiny it makes sense to reserve a cate-
gory for media alone. Popular publications about the Bilderberg meetings 
or the Trilateral Commission often imply a close relationship between 
them and media. In such publications “the media” are accused of failing to 
pay due attention to the networks. 
• Labour: this societal sphere solely pertains to persons active in national 
unions or international federations of national unions. 
• Politics: the individual in the name column performs a function which is 
primarily related to party politics such as a membership of parliament and 
government, either in a national or international context. Ministers are 
considered to primarily fulfil a political function that informs their role as 
public administrators. With regard to the “Company/Institution” column, 
the political parties that the ministers represent are included.  
• (Semi-)Public Administration: any person who performs a function in pub-
lic administration or semi-public administration, either in a national or in-
ternational context. The difference between public administration and 
semi-public administration lies in a larger degree of autonomy for the lat-
ter, despite its dependence on public funds: examples are hospitals or uni-
versities. 
• Academic: this category is not perfect. It tries to capture several profes-
sional activities that go beyond (but include) work in academia in a nar-
row sense. The persons in this category are all involved in study-
organizations, policy research institutes or universities. 
Sector 
The column sector specifies in which industries the corporations from the business 
sphere were active. For the other societal spheres the column offers further specifi-
cation on organizations or institutions to which the individual members were 
affiliated. 
• Societal Sphere Business: for the business sphere, the column “Sector” lists 
the area in which the firms were active. The industries “Arms”, “Automo-
tive”, “Banking”, “Consultancy”, “Electrical Engineering”, “Electronics”, 
“Law”, “Foods”, “Glass”, “Oil”, “Telecommunications”, “Transport”, “Utili-
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ties”, could be attributed to companies without strong potential for over-
lap or other difficulties of interpretation. However, the following attribu-
tions of industries require some explanation541: 
o “Business Associations”: business associations obviously do not 
form an industry. Within the sphere of business however, the 
business association is a type of business-involvement in the net-
works under scrutiny. In the database the business associations 
typically appear in the form of national federations of industry.  
o “Chemicals” versus “Pharmaceuticals”: a single terminology for 
the chemical industry and the pharmaceutical industry is prob-
lematic. Chemical firms often diversified into the production of 
pharmaceuticals for example. To tackle this problem of overlap, 
the sector “Pharmaceuticals” was only attributed to firms that 
unmistakeably focussed on the production of pharmaceuticals.  
o “Ferrous Metals” versus “Non-Ferrous Metals”: ferrous metals 
(mostly steel, in this database exclusively steel) differ from non-
ferrous metals (aluminium, copper, tin, zinc, etc.) in that they con-
tain iron. In this database the distinction is made to single out the 
steel industry, particularly because the sector was directly in-
volved in a specific phase of integration of European markets in 
the early 1950s: the Schuman Plan and the resulting European 
Coal and Steel Community.  
o “Multiple”: the term “Multiple” stands for activities in multiple 
sectors. Examples include financial holdings of industry that 
branched into almost all imaginable sectors (Mitsubishi for exam-
ple), but also Unilever that combines sizeable foods and chemicals 
branches. The category also includes individuals that combine 
multiple advisory directorships in several sectors at the same 
time. 
o “Private Foundations”: again, not an industry, but nonetheless a 
relevant category to single out within the business sphere be-
cause of their pursuit of ideological goals. The Ford Foundation is 
a familiar example: it is a private fund used for private means on a 
number of issues: education, research, and among others, funding 
the Bilderberg meetings or the Trilateral Commission in their 
start-up phases.  
• Societal Sphere Media: in terms of the goals of this database, companies 
within the “Media” sphere require no further specification or division. The 
term “Media” is repeated in the “sector” column. 
                                                                  
541 For the categorization of business sectors the following encyclopedic source was consulted: Interna-
tional directory of company histories (1988-...). Chicago: St. James Press.  
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• Societal Sphere Labour: the societal sphere “Labour” only pertains to rep-
resentatives of unions. The sphere “Labour” is further specified as “Unions” 
in the “sector” column. 
• Societal Sphere Politics: the “sector” column further specifies a role in 
government, house of representatives or the senate. 
• Societal Sphere (Semi-)Public Administration: The “sector” column further 
specifies the area of expertise of the person or company/institution, in this 
database limited to “Economic Affairs”, “Foreign Affairs” and “Security.” 
• Societal Sphere Academic: the organization or institution is further speci-
fied in terms of “University” and “Policy Research Institute” in the “sector” 
column: only Universities are actually called “Universities” in the “sector” 
column. One exception to this rule was allowed for the French Centre Na-
tionale Recherche Scientifique, which is not a University as such but an or-
ganization created to strengthen University research. It nonetheless re-
ceived the category “University.” All the others are categorized as “Policy 
Research Institutes.” 
Company/Institution 
This column states the main affiliation of the individuals in the database by listing 
the corporation or institution for which they worked or participated in. Compo-
nents of corporate names that express details about the legal structure of the firm, 
such as N.V., A.G., Incorporated or Corporation, were not included. In the case of 
European political parties a rough characterization was added between brackets to 
provide added usability for future users of the database.  
 In some cases the selection of “main affiliation” was problematic. At times, 
more then one option was available. In these instances the criterion of most likely 
main professional activity was not helpful. Specific problem-cases and the choices 
that were involved in solving them are explained in the footnote.542 
                                                                  
542 Beugel, Ernst van der (70, 75, 80): the choice was made to include his multiple advisory board func-
tions in corporations instead of his extraordinary professorship at Leiden University on Post-war 
Western Cooperation. Van der Beugel himself claimed that half of his time went to advisory board work, 
the rest to all his other (multiple) duties. Therefore he is classified as part of the societal sphere of 
business. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 357 E.H. van der Beugel, 1946-1990, nummer toegang 
2.21.183.08, inv. nr. 64, p. 478. 
Edwards, Robert (all intervals): the choice was made to include his role as union leader, instead of his 
membership of Parliament. He took on his role as union leader earlier and remained union leader 
throughout his membership of Parliament. As a result he was qualified as part of the societal sphere of 
Labour. 
Birrenbach, Kurt (75, 80): the choice was made to stress his role in the steel-producing firm Thyssen, 
instead of his position in the German Reichstag as a Foreign Affairs expert. It appeared impossible to 
determine which role consumed the most time. His affiliation with Thyssen combined with his advisory 
role towards businesses, was the longest standing one. Therefore he is qualified as part of the societal 
sphere of business. 
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Remark 
The remark column provides extra information, including the following types of 
entries: 
• Relevant previous appointments, typically leading roles in national govern-
ments. 
• Relevant previous or current internal positions in ELEC, the Bilderberg meet-
ings or the Trilateral Commission (such as Chairman, or European Secretary 
etc.).  
• Extra information regarding the entry in the Company/Institution column 
where it was considered helpful. 
• Deviating source rules. Three forms of deviating source rules exist: 
o A single *-sign indicates that the person in question already retired from 
the affiliation listed in the Company/Institution column. Nevertheless the 
affiliations are listed because of the continuing importance for a correct in-
terpretation of the person in the current measuring year. Typically this 
method is used for indicating individuals with a particularly long involve-
ment in big multinational firms on a top executive level, who after retiring 
remained active in ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Com-
mission.  
o A double **-sign followed by a number, representing a year: **62, 
for example. This means that the entry in the Compa-
ny/Institution column is based on information for the year men-
tioned. In these cases there was no biographical source available 
to give information about a measuring year. In the case of bio-
graphical encyclopaedia one can then normally use a later edition 
(if available) and use the updated biography entry. One exception 
that occurs at times is that the individual's biography does not re-
cur in later editions. In these cases individuals may have deceased 
in the interval between editions, or have withdrawn from profes-
sional activities. 
o ***-signs means that no entry could be included in the Compa-
ny/Institution column, but that information with regard to “Socie-
tal Sphere” was available from the source material that was used 
to establish the membership of ELEC, Bilderberg meetings and the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Tidemand, Otto Grieg (75, 80): Tidemand had since long been an owner of ships, and between 1965 and 
1971 he was the Norwegian Minister for Defence, Trade and Shipping. When he left public office in 
1971 he became chairman of the in 1972 created Saga Oil, a state-oil-company. Because this was a full 
time function, it was Tidemand's most important activity. Therefore he was included in the societal 
sphere of business. 
Zellerbach, J. D. (60): the choice was made to include his diplomatic career as a US ambassador to Italy 
instead of his leading position in the Crown-Zellerbach Corporation. In the late 1950s this became his 
main career activity. Therefore he's categorized as part of the societal sphere of public administration. 
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Trilateral Commission: if an affiliation was missing in such docu-
ments, in some cases at least mention was made of the individual 
being an “Industrialist”, or “Banker.” This particularly occurred in 
the ELEC publications. 
Other 
The entry “Other” appears in some special cases of persons whose work or affilia-
tion is difficult to categorize. This entry was used with members of royal families. 
The entry was further used in two cases: Joseph Retinger and Georges Berthoin. 
Both did not perform clearly distinguishable professional roles but were very ac-
tive in the networks under scrutiny. 
Tables and figures 
This section explains the content and composition of the tables and figures in this 
book that are based on this database. 
Societal Spheres 
The tables 2.2, 2.6, 2.7 and 3.1 and figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 compile the infor-
mation in the societal spheres-column of the database from 1950-1980. The tables 
offer insight into the absolute distribution of spheres in the different networks. 
The figures graphically display the relative distribution of the categorized members 
across the societal spheres. As mentioned, not all members included in the data-
base could be categorized due to a lack of sources. This small group (see table A.1) 
was left out of the graphs. 
Sectors 
Tables and figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 compile the information in the sector-
column of the database, but only for the business sphere. The tables offer insight 
into the absolute distribution of the industries in all networks. The figures graph-
ically display the relative distribution of the categorized sectors of the business 
sphere. In rare cases the company at which an individual worked could not be 
determined, which made it impossible to add an industry in the sector column. 
These were left out of the graphs. 
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Results 
Results can be distilled from the database on three levels. The first level of results 
is obtained through the unprecedented overview that the database offers on the 
structure of the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings and the Trilateral Commission 
leadership in terms of membership, nationality, societal spheres and sectors. The 
second level of results is obtained by comparing the ELEC, the Bilderberg meetings 
and the Trilateral Commission on these aspects. Those are discussed in chapter 2 
and 3. Results regarding the distribution of nationality are mentioned here. 
Country database table 
The database offers a good overview of the countries that were involved in the 
leadership of the networks. Several aspects are worthwhile noting here. The in-
volvement of Italian members was very limited until 1970. More importantly, the 
weight of the Dutch members in the Bilderberg group and Belgian members in the 
ELEC, is striking. Both countries were more strongly represented in the networks 
than should be expected based on the size and importance of their countries in 
international affairs. Moreover, both achieved this position through similar means. 
The initiative to found the ELEC originated with the Belgian Paul van Zeeland. 
Subsequently, the Belgians secured central positions within the ELEC (Presi-
dent/Secretary general) and managed to hold on to them for a long time. Similarly, 
the Dutch carried the initiative for the Bilderberg meetings and also secured cen-
tral positions within the network (Chairman, European secretary, Treasurer). The 
Dutch for example consistently selected the Bilderberg treasurers from the leader-
ship of Dutch multinationals. The group of Belgian and Dutch leaders clearly were 
the driving forces behind both organizations. The Dutch nonetheless lost the 
chairmanship in the Bilderberg meetings in 1976 when Prince Bernhard was 
forced to resign.543 
 Additionally, it is worth noting that the American position in the Bilderberg 
meetings is small compared to that of the Europeans, even taking into account that 
the Europeans require extra representation to cater to national sentiment. This 
strengthens the idea that the Bilderberg meetings ultimately was and remained a 
European initiative. It was initiated and continued by Europeans, with European 
chairmen. In this perspective, Americans formed the main invitees.  
 
 
  
                                                                  
543 See chapter 2. 
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Sources database 
The database “Professional Affiliations of Leadership ELEC-Bilderberg meetings-
Trilateral Commission 1950-1980”, is created from two source-types: membership 
sources, and biographical sources, mainly biographical dictionaries.  
Membership-sources per group 
ELEC 
LECE (1950). Résolution relative au Plan Schumann. Bruxelles: LECE. 
ELEC (1955). A European solidarity plan to aid the depressed areas of southern Europe. Brussels: ELEC. 
ELEC (1960). Topical tasks of monetary policy in Europe. Brussels: ELEC, p. 0. 
ELEC (1965). East-west commercial relations: study conference, opening speech, introductory report, 
resolutions, list of participants, Brussels, May 14th and 15th, 1965. Brussels: ELEC, p. 71. 
LECE (1970). Rapport du Sécretaire Général sur l'activité de la L.E.C.E. en 1969. Bruxelles: LECE. 
ELEC (1975). Report of the Secretary General on the activities of ELEC in 1974. Brussels: ELEC, pp. 26-27. 
ELEC (1979). Report of the Secretary General on the activities of ELEC in 1978. Brussels: ELEC. 
Bilderberg meetings 
IISGA, AMK, inv. nr. 110, Bilderberg Meetings Alphabetical List of Participants 1954-2001. 
NL-HaNA, Bilderberg Conferenties, 2.19.045, inv. nrs. 30-31-35-41-46. Steering Committee Minutes 
from 1954 until 1958. 
RWWK, NOWA, inv. nrs. 72-377-3, 72-378-3, 72-378-4, 72-379-2, 72-374-2, 72-374-3, 72-374-4, 72-
372-5, 72-968-3, 72-969-1, 72-969-2, 72-969-2, 72-969-3, 72-970-1, Advisory and Steering 
Committee Minutes From 1959 until 1977 (except for 1966 and 1968, which could not be locat-
ed). 
Trilateral Commission 
Sklar, H., & Everdell, R. (1980). Who's who on the Trilateral Commission. In H. Sklar (Ed.), Trilateralism: 
the Trilateral Commission and elite planning for world management (pp. 90-130). Montréal: Black 
Rose Books. 
“Professional affiliations” sources per group 
Trilateral Commission 
Sklar, H., & Everdell, R. (1980). Who's who on the Trilateral Commission. In H. Sklar (Ed.), Trilateralism: 
the Trilateral Commission and elite planning for world management (pp. 90-130). Montréal: Black 
Rose Books. 
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“Professional affiliations” sources per country 
AUSTRIA 
Bohman, R. & Taylor, S. S. (Eds). (1964/1967). Who's who in Austria. Montreal: Intercontintenal Book 
and Pub. Co. 
Strute, K. & Doelken, T. (Eds.) (1969/1977). Who's who in Austria. Wörthsee: Who's who, the Interna-
tional Red Series Verlag.  
Taylor, S. S. (Ed.) (1955). Who's who in Austria: a biographical dictionary. Montreal: Intercontinental 
Book and Publishing. 
BELGIUM 
Decan, R. G. A. (1981). Qui est qui en Belgique francophone 1981-1985. Encyclopédie biographique de la 
Belgique francophone 1981-1985. Bruxelles: Éditions BRD. 
ELEC (1970). A programme for monetary integration within the E.E.C : feasibility study and proposals as 
to the measures to be taken (Vol. 46). Brussels: ELEC, p. 5. 
ODIS (2007). Databank Intermediaire structuren in Vlaanderen 19e-20e eeuw. Retrieved October 9, 
2012, from www.odis.be. 
Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, G. & Puissant, J. (Eds.) (1996). Dictionnaire des patrons en Belgique: les hommes, 
les entreprises, les réseaux. Bruxelles: De Boeck Université. 
Michielsen, F. & Taylor, S. S. (Eds.) (1962). Who's who in Belgium and Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Les 
Editions Biographiques: Brussels.  
CANADA 
Lumley, E. (Ed.) (1997). Canadian Who's Who. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Simpson, K. (Ed.) (1986). Canadian Who's Who. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
DENMARK 
(1974). Kraks Blaa Bog: ... nulevende Danske mænds og kvinders levnedsløb. Retrieved, October 9, 2012. 
From www.rosekamp.dk/kbb_74_ALL/N.htm 
Cedergreen Bech, Svend et al. (Eds.)(1979-1984). Dansk Biografisk Leksikon. Kopenhagen: Gyldenhal, 
published as online database on Den Store Danske (2011). Retrieved October 9, 2012, from 
www.denstoredanske.dk/Dansk_Biografisk_Leksikon. 
ELEC (1978). A new economic impetus for Europe. The Fundamental role of the European Parliament. 
ELEC Conference on December 14th 1978. Brussels: ELEC. 
FRANCE 
ELEC (1970). A programme for monetary integration within the E.E.C : feasibility study and proposals as 
to the measures to be taken (Vol. 46). Brussels: ELEC, p. 5. 
Who's who in France = Qui est qui en France (1955/1967/1980). Paris: Lafitte. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Kliemann, H. G. et al. (Eds.) (1964/1972/1980). Who's who in Germany. Wörthsee near Munich: Who's 
who, the international red series Verlag GmbH. 
Pöllath, R. & Heukamp, M. (2009). 200 Jahre Wirtschaftsanwälte in Deutschland. Baden-Baden Nomos 
2009. 
ICELAND 
Strute, K. & Doelken, T. (1981). Who's who in Scandinavia. Zürich: Who's who. 
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ITALY 
Aftalion, F. (1991). A history of the international chemical industry. Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, pp. 223, 225. 
GEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 370.6, 2-10-1967, Reconstitution d'un comité Italien de la Ligue Européenne 
de Coopération Economique.  
GEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 273, 10-10-1980, Colloque “Pour Une Politique Energétique Commune”, Liste 
des Participants (see Appendix 2 for details on archival sources). 
Giordani, I. & Taylor, S. S. (Eds.) (1958). Who's who in Italy. Zürich: Sutter's International Red Series. 
Groeg, O. J. (Ed.) (1980). Who's who in Italy. Zürich: Sutter's International Red Series. 
NORWAY 
Steenstrup, B. (1973). Hvem er Hvem? Oslo: Aschehoug. 
Steenstrup, B. (1984). Hvem er Hvem? Oslo: Kunnskapsforlag 
Strute, K. & Doelken, T. (1981). Who's who in Scandinavia. Zürich: Who's who. 
 
SPAIN 
Dove, J. C. (Ed.)(1987). Who's who in Spain. [s.l.]: [s.n.]. 
Olives Canals, S. & Taylor, S. S. (Eds.) (1963). Who's who in Spain. Barcelona: [s.n.] 
 
SWEDEN 
Lagerström, S. & Sölvén, E. (Eds.) (1969). Vem är det, Svensk biografisk handbok. Stockholm: P A Nor-
stedt & Söners Förlag. Retrieved, October 9, 2012, from runeberg.org 
Strute, K. & Doelken, T. (1981). Who's who in Scandinavia. Zürich: Who's who. 
Vem är det, Svensk biografisk handbok. (1985). Stockholm: P A Norstedt & Söners Förlag. Retrieved, 
October 9, 2012, from runeberg.org 
SWITZERLAND 
Historisches Lexicon der Schweiz Online (no year). Retrieved October 9, 2012 from http://www.hls-
dhs-dss.ch/index.php 
Who's who in Switzerland, including the Principality of Liechtenstein, (1968). Zürich: Orell Füssli. 
Who's who in the World, 1978-1979 (1978). Chicago: Marquis Who's who. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Who Was Who, A & C Black, 1920–2008; online edition. Oxford University Press (2007). Retrieved 
October 9, 2012, from www.ukwhoswho.com 
LUXEMBOURG 
CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 370.1 , 23-09-1955, Extrait du “Memorial” (Recueil Spécial) No. 70. 
CEHECLlN, LECE, inv. nr. 371, 30-03-1967, 20ème anniversaire du plan Marshall. Membres de la LECE, 
qui pourraient y être invités. 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (1977-2005). A.N.P. Biodienst. Den Haag: ANP. 
Egmond, Frans van (Ed.) (1984). Wie is wie in Nederland, 1984/1988. 's-Gravenhage: Pragma Nederland. 
Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis (no year). Biografisch Portaal van Nederland. Retrieved, Octo-
ber 9, 2012, from www.biografischportaal.nl 
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum Universiteit Leiden (no year). Biografisch Archief Online. Re-
trieved October 9, 2012, from www.parlementairdocumentatiecentrum.nl 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(1943). Who was who in America. Chicago: Marquis Who's who. (Volumes 7-17). 
(2012). Who's who in America. Chicago: Marquis Who's who. 
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Samenvatting 
Na 1945 bleef in Europa de lappendeken van nationale markten aanvankelijk ge-
handhaafd. Maar mede onder druk van de Amerikaanse regering bewoog een 
groep van zes West Europese overheden zich vanaf 1947 langzaam naar overeen-
stemming over het wegnemen van de onderlinge handelsbelemmeringen. België, 
de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië, Luxemburg en Nederland besloten 
in 1952 de nationale handelsbelemmeringen op kolen en staal op te heffen met het 
vormen van de Europese Gemeenschap van Kolen en Staal. In 1957 breidden de 
landen deze markt uit met de oprichting van een gemeenschappelijke markt voor 
industriële goederen. De handelsquota en importtarieven verdwenen geleidelijk en 
een gezamenlijk importtarief werd opgezet. Beide besluiten resulteerden tevens in 
aparte supranationale instellingen om de overeengekomen verdragen uit te voeren, 
respectievelijk de Hoge Autoriteit en de Europese Commissie. Vanaf 1959 werd er 
ook een begin gemaakt met het zoeken naar oplossingen voor de grote administra-
tieve en juridische verschillen tussen de lidstaten welke een soepele integratie van 
markten in de weg stonden. 
 De geleidelijke verandering van een nationale ordening van markten naar een 
supranationale ordening van één markt roept vragen op over bedrijven die al ver-
takt waren in een aantal van deze landen. Van multinationale ondernemingen zoals 
Unilever en Philips, twee van de meest internationaal vertakte ondernemingen in 
de jaren vijftig, is bekend dat zij voordelen zagen in een zo groot mogelijke markt 
en probeerden in de decennia daarna ook te profiteren van de geboden mogelijk-
heid tot schaalvergroting. 
 Eerder onderzoek toont ook aan hoe Europese multinationals dachten over de 
Europese Economische Gemeenschap in de jaren tachtig. In 1983 startten grote, 
toonaangevende bedrijven een lobby om de gemeenschappelijke markt eindelijk 
volledig in te voeren. Onder de noemer van de European Round Table of Industria-
lists constateerden ze dat de Europese markt onvoldoende was geharmoniseerd 
sinds haar oprichting vanaf 1957. De blijvende grote verschillen tussen de markten 
verhinderde de ondernemingen nog altijd om gebruik te maken van de schaal-
voordelen van de Europese markt, zo claimden ze. Onder invloed van Amerikaanse 
en Japanse concurrentie was de resterende nationale marktordening gaan knellen.  
 De aanvankelijk positieve houding onder enkele multinationale ondernemin-
gen in de jaren vijftig en de kritische houding van een forse groep in de jaren tach-
tig doet de vraag reizen hoe hun visies op de Europese markt zich hebben ontwik-
keld in de tussenliggende periode? Tegelijkertijd is de term "multinational" een 
noemer voor bedrijven met grote onderlinge verschillen. Zo komen zij voort uit 
diverse nationale contexten met eigen beleidsrichtingen, economische pad-
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afhankelijkheden en bedrijfsculturen. Ook opereren zij in sterk verschillende sec-
toren. Zodoende onderzoekt deze dissertatie ook hoe eventuele verschillen in 
opvattingen onder multinationals kunnen worden verklaard. 
 Tenslotte wil dit onderzoek bijdragen aan een alternatief voor de veelal natio-
nale benaderingen in het onderzoek naar de geschiedenis van Europese integratie. 
De visies van ondernemingen worden onderzocht via hun rol in drie transnationa-
le netwerken waarin bedrijven uit heel West Europa ideeën uitwisselden over de 
plek van de Europese markt in internationale economische verhoudingen. Zo 
draagt dit proefschrift bij aan een transnationale geschiedenis van de plek van 
Europese, multinationaal georganiseerde en georiënteerde bedrijven in de ge-
schiedenis van de Europese integratie. 
 De bedoelde drie transnationale netwerken die zijn onderzocht zijn: de Euro-
pean League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC), de Bilderberg meetings en de Trila-
teral Commission. Om de ontwikkelingen tussen circa 1950 en 1980 te onder-
zoeken zijn voor de jaren vijftig, de jaren zestig en de jaren zeventig dominante 
debatten geselecteerd die enerzijds een vergelijking tussen de netwerken mogelijk 
maakten en anderzijds een belangrijke rol vervulden voor de betrokken bedrijven 
in relatie tot hun positie op de Europese markt.  
 Het boek bestaat uit twee delen. Samen met het inleidende hoofdstuk vormen 
hoofdstukken twee en drie een introductie tot de geselecteerde netwerken en tot 
de diverse contexten waarin Europese multinationals opereerden. Hoofdstukken 
vier, vijf en zes vormen samen het empirische hart van het boek. De hoofdstukken 
bespreken achtereenvolgens de onderzochte debatten per decennium. Hoofdstuk 7 
bespreekt de conclusies. 
 Om de debatten goed te kunnen plaatsen binnen de activiteiten van de ELEC, 
de Bilderberg meetings en de Trilateral Commission onderzoekt hoofdstuk 2 aller-
eerst hoe deze netwerken functioneerden. De ELEC is een in 1947 opgerichte 
West-Europese studie- en lobby-organisatie welke zich richtte op onderwerpen 
van economische integratie. De organisatie bestond uit nationale secties, waarin 
België, de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, Frankrijk, Nederland en het Verenigd Ko-
ninkrijk de belangrijkste waren. De ELEC volgde debatten over de ordening van de 
Europese markt en deed voorstellen tot aanpassing. De Bilderberg meetings is een 
in 1953 opgerichte Trans-Atlantische studiegroep die zich als doel stelde het we-
derzijdse begrip tussen Europeanen en Amerikanen te verdiepen. Eens per jaar 
besprak een, veelal stabiele, groep van voornamelijk vertegenwoordigers van het 
bedrijfsleven met een groot aantal goed ingevoerde genodigden over veiligheids-
vraagstukken en de internationale economie. Deelnemers aan de Bilderberg mee-
tings waren tijdens de bijeenkomsten verwikkeld in lopende internationale debat-
ten. De Trilateral Commission is een in 1973 opgerichte Europees-Amerikaans-
Japanse studie-organisatie van privépersonen die de internationale politieke en 
economische samenwerking weer op de agenda probeerde te krijgen nadat deze 
aan het begin van de zeventiger jaren onder druk was komen te staan. Op basis van 
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een in de appendix opgenomen biografische database biedt hoofdstuk 2 tevens een 
gedetailleerde analyse van de rol van het bedrijfsleven in die drie netwerken. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 staat de vraag centraal hoe eventuele verschillende opvattin-
gen over de ordening van de Europese markt onder bedrijven verklaard kunnen 
worden. Het voorgestelde raamwerk benoemt twee dominante contexten waarin 
multinationals opereerden voor wat betreft de samenvoeging van nationale mark-
ten tot een Europese: de nationale context en de sectorale context van een bedrijf. 
Verschillen in nationale contexten waaruit de diverse Europese multinationals 
oorspronkelijk vandaan kwamen bepalen mede hoe zij aankeken tegen markt-
integratie. Zo kwamen Belgische en Nederlandse multinationals voort uit kleine 
markten en stonden in het protectionistische Europa van de jaren dertig onder 
druk om zich internationaal te vertakken. Tegelijkertijd waren zij onder een eco-
nomisch liberale politiek en beperkt overheidsingrijpen tot bloei gekomen. Bedrij-
ven uit de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland raakten na WOII geënt op het Duitse export-
beleid en vormden zich naar liberale importtarieven en een goedkope Deutsch 
Mark. Bedrijven in Italië en Frankrijk hadden daarentegen te maken met interven-
tionistische en plannende nationale overheden. De Franse economie genoot bo-
vendien forse afscherming van buitenlandse concurrentie. Deze verschillen deden 
er toe bij het bepalen van de kaders waarbinnen de Europese markt zou worden 
opgezet. Zo zouden Nederlandse bedrijven minder profiteren van een Europese 
markt die de Franse voorkeur voor protectionisme volgde, en zouden Franse mul-
tinationals zich moeilijker redden in een sterk geliberaliseerd Europa.  
 Naast andere nationaal gemotiveerde voorkeuren kunnen verschillen in visies 
op de Europese markt ook begrepen worden vanuit een sectorale context. Bedrij-
ven concurreren met hun sectorgenoten waarin sectorspecifieke concurrentie-
voordelen een grote rol spelen. Europese banken opereerden als gevolg van natio-
nale afscherming vooral nationaal gedurende de periode 1950-1980. Concurrentie 
van nieuw opgerichte dochters van Amerikaanse banken noopte echter tot sa-
menwerking onder Europese banken waardoor een geleidelijke internationalise-
ring op gang kwam. De chemische industrie was meer aan internationale concur-
rentie onderhevig. Na WOII vestigden Amerikaanse en Europese chemische multi-
nationals zich in elkaars markten, waarbij forse investeringen in onderzoek en 
ontwikkeling een noodzaak tot steeds grotere organisaties tot gevolg hadden. 
Daarnaast speelden energiekosten een rol voor de chemische industrie. De staalin-
dustrie raakte verwikkeld in intense competitie als gevolg van herhaaldelijke inno-
vaties in het productieproces en internationale veranderingen in de beschikbaar-
heid van grondstoffen. De daaruit volgende druk tot rationalisering van de produc-
tie leidde tot verzoeken om bescherming en tot een golf van fusies. De Europese 
auto-industrie ontwikkelde pas onderlinge concurrentie vanaf de oprichting van 
de Gemeenschappelijke Markt. Vanaf de jaren zeventig groeide de Japanse concur-
rentie op de Europese markt waardoor forse modernisering van productie nood-
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zakelijk werd. De bijzonderheden van elke sector spelen een rol in de verklaring 
van hun visie op de Europese markt. 
 Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 vormen de kern van het proefschrift en behandelen elk 
een debat over een dominant thema in zowel de ELEC, de Bilderberg meetings als 
de Trilateral Commission. Hoofdstuk vier onderzoekt de periode 1950 tot 1960 en 
zoomt in op de vraag hoe Europese multinationals aankeken tegen economische 
integratie in West Europa. Deze visies op integratie gingen veel verder dan libera-
lisering op zichzelf. Binnen de European League for Economic Cooperation werd er 
langs nationale lijnen verschillend gedacht over hoe de Europese markt moest 
worden ingericht. Vooral vertegenwoordigers van de Nederlandse multinationals 
Philips, Unilever, AKU (later AKZO), en het Belgische Solvay & Cie., de Launoit hol-
ding en Société Générale de Belgique, maar ook bedrijven in de Duitse groep wilden 
de Europese markt volledig geliberaliseerd zien. Zij waren aangepast aan een libe-
rale handelspolitiek en gericht op competitieve export. Bovendien betekende libe-
ralisering voor de Belgische en Nederlandse multinationals dat ze hun internatio-
naal vertakte ondernemingen konden centraliseren. Over liberalisering werd an-
ders gedacht door Franse bedrijven: vanwege een duurder nationaal sociaal stelsel 
gaven zij de voorkeur aan tijdelijke protectionistische overbruggingsmaatregelen. 
Opvallend is dat de onderzochte nationale secties veelal op één lijn stonden met de 
nationale regeringen die over de oprichting van een gemeenschappelijke markt 
onderhandelden. In de Bilderberg meetings verkondigden vertegenwoordigers van 
Europese multinationals eveneens hun instemming met de plannen voor liberali-
sering en integratie. Toen na de oprichting van de gemeenschappelijke markt dui-
delijk werd dat het Verenigd Koninkrijk samen met andere landen een eigen han-
delsblok zou opzetten, ontwikkelden de ELEC en de Bilderberg meetings zich uit 
vrees voor handelsverschuivingen als tegenstanders van afzonderlijke handels-
blokken binnen Europa. 
 De Europese multinationals ontwikkelden niet alleen een visie op hoe Europe-
se marktliberalisering moest worden vormgegeven, maar ook op de rol van institu-
ties in die markt. Zowel in de Bilderberg meetings als de ELEC spraken bedrijven 
zich uit tegen de verdere introductie van interventionistische supranationale insti-
tuties, hetgeen sinds de oprichting van de Hoge Autoriteit van de Europese Ge-
meenschap van Kolen en Staal een reële mogelijkheid bleef voor andere sectoren. In 
plaats van een in het bedrijfsleven ingrijpende instelling prefereerden de multina-
tionals vrije competitie en een grote vrijheid van ondernemerschap. In hoofdlijnen 
ontwikkelde de gemeenschappelijke markt zich ook in de door deze bedrijven 
gewenste richting.  
 Gedurende de jaren 1960-1970 werd echter duidelijk dat de nieuwe Europese 
markt ongewenste consequenties met zich meebracht. In hoofdstuk 5 worden twee 
dominante debatten gevolgd rondom toenemende concurrentie voor Europese 
bedrijven op de Europese markt en welke gevolgen dit had voor hun visie op eco-
nomische integratie. Hier gaat het om de reacties van Europese bedrijven op een 
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golf aan investeringen door Amerikaanse bedrijven in Europa en daarnaast om 
hun reacties op de activiteiten van Oost Europese staatsbedrijven op de West-
Europese markt gedurende de jaren zestig. 
 De jaren zestig stonden voor Europese bedrijven in het teken van aanpassin-
gen aan de nu grotere markt en pogingen om het speelveld waarop concurrerende 
krachten actief waren zoveel mogelijk gelijk te trekken. De investeringen van Ame-
rikaanse bedrijven werden door veel Europese bedrijven ervaren als een bedrei-
ging voor de eigen concurrentiepositie omdat ze veel kleiner waren door hun klei-
nere nationale markten. Bovendien waren Amerikaanse bedrijven in een positie 
om met enkele investeringen maximaal te profiteren van de nieuwe Europese 
marktschaal terwijl Europese multinationals en bedrijven vast zaten aan bestaan-
de productiecentra die niet eenvoudig te verplaatsen waren. In de ELEC besloten 
Europese bedrijven dat onderlinge transnationale fusies nodig waren om in elk 
geval de schaalproblemen tegemoet te treden. De verschillende vormen van natio-
nale bedrijfswetgeving binnen de EEG maakte deze fusies echter onaantrekkelijk. 
Over de oplossing van zulke problemen bestonden verschillende opvattingen, 
langs zowel sectorale als nationale lijnen. In de ELEC en de Bilderberg meetings 
stelden bedrijven uit de chemische sector voor dit probleem op te lossen via har-
monisering van Europese bedrijfswetgeving. Nederlandse multinationals verzetten 
zich hiertegen omdat zij vreesden langs deze weg ongewenste medezeggenschaps-
regels uit Duitse wetgeving via de achterdeur binnen te halen. Tenslotte vond men 
elkaar in het voorstel tot afschaffing van onnodige dubbele belastingheffingen over 
transnationale kapitaalstromen tussen moeder en dochterbedrijven. Dan zouden 
Europese bedrijven meer animo tot fusies tonen, zo dachten zij. De lidstaten waren 
echter niet bereid een start te maken met het optuigen van een Europees indu-
striebeleid. Zo werd in de ogen van Europese bedrijven het beperkt inrichten van 
de Gemeenschappelijke Markt een complicerende factor in het Europese industri-
ele aanpassingsproces. 
 Als onderdeel van deze ontwikkelingen werden Europese bedrijven gecon-
fronteerd met de stijgende kosten van kapitaal. Omdat Amerikaanse bedrijven 
sinds 1963 geen dollars meer mochten exporteren ten behoeve van buitenlandse 
investeringen haalden ze het benodigde kapitaal op in Europa, met hogere rentes 
tot gevolg. Europese bedrijven waren het niet meteen eens over de te volgen koers. 
Een groep sprak zich uit voor een Europees geregelde bevoorrechte toegang voor 
Europese bedrijven tot Europese kapitaalmarkten maar vertegenwoordigers van 
banken die zelf Amerikaanse bedrijven bedienden, blokkeerden zulke protectionis-
tische voorstellen. Tenslotte vond men in de ELEC overeenstemming over het 
nastreven van een gedragscode voor Amerikaanse bedrijven op de Europese markt, 
teneinde hun als agressief ervaren concurrentiemethoden af te zwakken en zo het 
speelveld in Europa gelijk te trekken. Ook in de Bilderberg meetings werd dit punt 
in het bijzonder door Belgische bedrijven aangeroerd, omdat zij binnen hun natio-
nale markt relatief veel Amerikaanse investeringen hadden meegemaakt. 
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Tegelijkertijd dwong concurrentie van geavanceerde Amerikaanse producenten 
van fabrieken en machines de Europese kapitaalgoederenproducten mogelijkhe-
den van afzet te onderzoeken in het Oostblok. Dit leidde tot complicaties in de 
verhoudingen tussen de Gemeenschappelijke Markt en de Oost-Europese staten. 
Vanuit West Europa werden fabrieken en machines geëxporteerd met behulp van 
door de West Europese overheden fors ondersteunde exportleningen met een 
lange looptijd. Het Oostblok ontwikkelde zo versneld een surplus aan goederen dat 
vervolgens werd gedumpt op onder andere de Gemeenschappelijke Markt. Dit 
werkte marktverstorend voor Europese goederenproducenten in de chemie en 
staal, waarop zij in de ELEC en de Bilderberg meetings krappere regels voor ex-
portleningen bepleitten. Hierover kon op OESO niveau echter geen overeenstem-
ming worden bereikt. Samen met de Europese Commissie zetten Europese bedrij-
ven zich vervolgens via de ELEC in voor het organiseren van joint ventures tussen 
West Europese private bedrijven en de Oostblok-staatsbedrijven. Zo konden de 
verhoudingen tussen de markten nog enige vorm van ordening worden geboden 
waar staten dit moesten nalaten. Ten tijde van grote aanpassingen in internationa-
le handelsstructuren verwachtten Europese multinationals een reeks aan orde-
ningshandelingen van de Europese Gemeenschap, welke deze niet wilden of kon-
den bieden. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt hoe bedrijven in de ELEC, de Bilderberg meetings en 
de Trilateral Commission zich opstelden ten aanzien van energie-zekerheid gedu-
rende de door crises geplaagde jaren zeventig en hoe deze veranderende omstan-
digheden hun visies op de Europese markt bepaalden. De ineenstorting van het 
monetaire systeem in 1971 en de olie crisis van 1973 leidden tot internationale 
spanningen en ondermijnden internationale samenwerking tussen Amerikaanse, 
Europese en Japanse overheden, nadrukkelijk op het gebied van de internationale 
energievoorziening. Naar aanleiding van deze ontwikkelingen verzochten Europe-
se bedrijven de Europese Gemeenschap stappen te zetten naar een Europees indu-
striebeleid. In de ELEC ontwikkelden Europese energiebedrijven voorstellen voor 
een Europees energie beleid waarin ondersteuning gevraagd werd voor de verdere 
ontwikkeling van de sectoren van olie, gas, kolen en nucleaire energie binnen de 
Gemeenschap. Tussen deze sectoren waren er grote verschillen in de gezochte 
ondersteuning. De gas-, kolen- en nucleaire sectoren streefden naar stimulering 
van hun activiteiten. De oliemultinationals British Petroleum en Shell wilden daar-
entegen vooral de Europese Gemeenschap bewegen tot actieve afstemming met de 
Verenigde Staten en Japan over de verdediging van Westerse energiebelangen. 
Daarnaast waren de olie bedrijven op zoek naar een externe representatie door de 
Europese Gemeenschap in hun contacten met de OPEC landen, problemen die ook 
werden aangekaart in de Bilderberg meetings. In de ELEC zochten ook de interna-
tionaal vertakte chemie- en auto-sectoren naar ondersteuning door de Europese 
Gemeenschap. Als antwoord op de Europese industriële herstructurering die zou 
volgen op de beschikbaarheid van goedkope energie in het Midden-Oosten en 
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Amerika vroegen zij om Europese steun voor onderzoek en ontwikkeling. Die 
steun zou ook een antwoord vormen op de snel groeiende Japanse auto-exporten. 
Daarnaast zagen ze een rol voor de Europese Commissie als intermediair tussen 
industrie en bonden in het vlottrekken van een Europese industriële herstructure-
ring. Ook in de Trilateral Commission bepleitte een reeks aan bedrijven een meer 
intensieve rol voor de Europese Gemeenschap. Deze toenemende roep om inter-
ventie op een Europees niveau laat goed zien hoe sterk de opstelling van Europese 
bedrijven was veranderend sinds de jaren vijftig. De posities van Europese ener-
gieproducenten en energie-intensieve sectoren in de Trilateral Commission maak-
ten tevens duidelijk dat zij de Europese Gemeenschap graag ingebed wilden zien in 
een stabiele internationale orde waarin multilateraal werd onderhandeld over de 
ordening van de wereldwijde handelsverhoudingen.  
 
 Conclusies 
 
De visies van Europese bedrijven op de Europese markt wijzigden zich over de 
periode 1950-1980. Gedurende de jaren vijftig waren de meeste onderzochte mul-
tinationals grote voorstanders van liberalisering in de West Europese markt van-
wege het vooruitzicht van schaalvergroting. Tegelijkertijd verzette men zich tegen 
de invoering van interventionistische supranationale instituties die de markt van 
bovenaf zouden organiseren. De jaren zestig zagen echter de concurrentie door 
grote Amerikaanse bedrijven toenemen. Europese bedrijven zochten nu de mede-
werking van de Europese Gemeenschap in het faciliteren van hun aanpassing aan 
deze nieuwe omstandigheden. De Gemeenschap vond echter geen overeenstem-
ming over het organiseren van gelijke internationale speelvelden en het aantrekke-
lijker maken van de volgens bedrijven gewenste transnationale fusies. De crises 
van de jaren zeventig maakte versnelde aanpassing aan de grotere markt alleen 
maar urgenter. Europese multinationals stelden nu een gemeenschappelijk indu-
strieel beleid voor om onderzoek en ontwikkeling te ondersteunen en de Europese 
herstructurering te begeleiden. Waar in de jaren vijftig het van bovenaf organise-
ren van de markt door supranationale instituties nog werd afgewezen werd er in 
de jaren zeventig weer om gevraagd. Ook vroeg een deel van de bedrijven voor het 
eerst expliciet om wereldwijde belangenbehartiging door de Europese Commissie.  
 De Europese Commissie bleek een machteloze partner voor Europese bedrij-
ven. Hoewel de Europese Commissie enkele genoemde voorstellen van de multina-
tionals overnam, stuitten deze toch op een blokkade van de lidstaten. Zo raakten 
Europese bedrijven ingeklemd tussen internationale concurrentie, een supranati-
onaal politiek ordeningssysteem dat niet aan hun behoeften beantwoordde, en een 
internationale crisis gedurende de jaren zeventig.  
 Deze dominante visies verbergen echter ook (subtiele) onenigheden onder 
bedrijven. Vooral in de jaren vijftig zorgden nationale contexten van Europese 
multinationals voor onderling afwijkende stellingnames; bedrijven in Frankrijk 
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hadden bijvoorbeeld een ander opvatting over Europese vrijhandel dan Neder-
landse multinationals. Maar ook verschillen tussen sectoren hadden invloed op het 
denken over hoe de Europese markt geordend moest worden. Chemiebedrijven 
bijvoorbeeld waren gebrand op Europese bedrijfswetgeving om de herstructure-
ring van hun bedrijven te faciliteren, terwijl andere bedrijven daar niet op zaten te 
wachten. Tenslotte bepaalde de mate van internationalisering ook hoe er tegen de 
Europese marktordening werd aangekeken. Europese oliebedrijven met wereld-
wijde investeringen en leveringscontracten poogden bijvoorbeeld vooral de Euro-
pese Gemeenschap bij multilaterale, internationale ordeningsinitiatieven te be-
trekken. Het Europese bedrijfsleven was dus niet homogeen in hun opvattingen en 
mag in een transnationaal perspectief dus ook niet zo benaderd worden. 
 Europese bedrijven reageerden tevens verschillend op de herstructurerings-
uitdaging waar Amerikaanse bedrijven hen voor stelden. Bedrijven die al voor de 
jaren vijftig een omvangrijke multinationale organisatie hadden opgebouwd kamp-
ten niet met schaalproblemen maar moesten hun bestaande internationale organi-
saties herstructureren; hetgeen complex was in de Europese markt. Kleinere be-
drijven moesten transnationale fusies aangaan maar werden daarin geremd door 
de gebrekkige harmonisering van de Europese regels. Ook dit zijn verschillen waar 
toekomstig onderzoek sterker rekening mee zou moeten houden. 
 Het perspectief van multinationals op de Europese markt maakte ook duide-
lijk dat allerlei Europese ordeningsvraagstukken zoals de harmonisering van han-
delsregels, gedragscodes en internationale economische beleidsvraagstukken 
onderdeel waren van processen die veel verder gingen dan integratie van Europe-
se markten. Internationale concurrentie vroeg om strategische positionering in 
internationale speelvelden, zowel van bedrijven als van overheden die deze zaken 
via de OESO en zelfs de NAVO agendeerden. Deze verbanden tussen Europese 
integratie en wereldwijde afstemming rondom globaliseringskwesties zijn van 
belang in het bepalen van de Europese identiteit.  
 Tenslotte laat dit onderzoek zien dat de lobby van de European Round Table of 
Industrialists voor het vervolmaken van de gemeenschappelijke markt in de jaren 
tachtig voortkwam uit een breed gedeelde ervaring van Europese, multinationaal 
georiënteerde bedrijven sinds de jaren zestig. Door de aanhoudende nationale 
ordening van de Europese markt konden zij hun organisaties onvoldoende aanpas-
sen aan de potentiële omvang van die markt. De gezochte schaalvoordelen bleven 
daardoor uit, terwijl de bedrijven die nodig hadden om de concurrentie uit de 
Verenigde Staten en Japan het hoofd te bieden.  
 Het thema van het herstructureringsproces kan een vruchtbare ingang zijn 
voor een onderzoeksagenda over het bedrijfsperspectief op de Europese Unie. 
Bedrijfsgeschiedenissen van multinationale ondernemingen kunnen hier een grote 
bijdrage aan leveren. Onderzoek naar de relaties tussen bedrijven en Europese 
instituties zou tevens inzicht geven in hoe bijvoorbeeld de Europese Commissie de 
diverse belangen van Europese, Amerikaanse en Japanse bedrijven afwoog terwijl 
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ze dit herstructureringsproces begeleidde. Tegelijkertijd kan onderzoek naar hoe 
Europese bedrijven dit herstructureringsproces vorm gaven in wereldwijde lob-
by’s voor het gelijktrekken van speelvelden, inzicht geven in de globale aspecten 
van Europese integratie.  
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